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SUMMARY
Workers’ compensation originated internationally because of the need to address 
the plight of workers and communities left destitute due to occupationally sustained 
disabilities or death. This study examines how the right to no-fault compensation 
developed in South Africa in comparison to the comparable law in Canada and 
Australia. Specific limitations regarding the right to workers' compensation 
pursuant to the South African compensatory laws were identified. Limitations 
identified include the persons falling within the ambit of the law, circumstances 
creating a right to compensation, the right to claims for increased compensation 
uniquely provided for in South African compensatory law and founded in the 
negligent conduct of employers as well as common law redress for damages. The 
background of the administrative remedy in the form of the right to compensation 
for occupational injuries and diseases ought to be seen in the light of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996.
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CHAPTER 1
MILEU
1. INTRODUCTION
Workers' compensation is a liability neither in tort nor in contract. It is a 
responsibility postivi juris and is annexed by law to a relationship, that of 
master and servant. The parties may choose whether they will enter into 
the relationship; but if they do the employer's liability for, and the 
worker's and his dependants' corresponding right to, compensation are 
legal consequences which are independent of and cannot be controlled 
by their agreement.1
These words of the honourable Justice Dixon2 indicate the uniqueness of workers’ 
compensatory law, a relatively new field of law resembling features of delict, 
contract, human rights and labour law. It forms part of social security law3 and true 
to social security law, aims to provide a safety net in circumstances when the need 
arise. To determine if the current South African workers' compensatory scheme 
provides the necessary safety net, a comparison will be drawn between the 
workers' compensatory legislation of South Africa, Canada and Australia in the light 
of these countries' shared common law origins, the influence of the first British 
Workers' Compensation Law4 and how compensatory legislation was developed in 
the three countries. Canadian workers' compensatory legislation is of particular 
importance to South Africa as the Workmen's Compensation Act 30 of 1941s was
Mynott v Barnard [1939] HCA 13; (1939) 62 CLR 68. Hereinafter: Mynott. Retrieved on
08/11/2012 from http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1939/13.html as per Dixon J.
Ibid.
Molefe v Compensation Commissioner and Another (25579/05) [2007] ZAGPHC 365, Seriti J at
[5] found in this unreported case that “The Compensation for Occupational Injuries and 
Diseases Act supra, is a social legislation and according to section 39(2) of the Constitution, it 
must be interpreted in such a manner that the said interpretation promotes the spirit, purport 
and objects of the social security right as enshrined in section 27 (l)(c ) of the Constitution.” 
Hereinafter: Molefe.
Frank, GS. 1940. The South African law o f  workmen's compensation. Durban: Butterworths. 
Frank at vii refers to the similarities between the Workmen's Compensation Act 25 of 1914, the 
Workmen’s Compensation Act 59 of 1934 and the English Workmen's Compensation Act of 
1925 and its antecedent acts.
Hereinafter: 1941 Act.
2
3
4
5
1
greatly influenced by the then Ontario Workmen's Compensation Act6 and the work 
done by Chief Justice WR Meredith.7 Ison8 reports that South Africa imitated the 
Ontario Workmen's Compensation Act which not only incorporated the same 
principles but in effect meant that Meredith was considered to be the founder of the 
South Africa workers' compensation system.9 The differences in exercising the right 
to compensation between the three countries will be explored to specifically 
determine the position of South African employees who are faced with occupational 
injuries or diseases.
The purpose of this study is to determine if South African employees find 
themselves in a less favourable position and if so, the extent thereof when 
compared to other compensation systems in respect of the right to workers’ 
compensation in the light of:
• the historical and current circumstances giving rise to this right;
• the administrative system that underpins the exercise of the right to 
workers’ compensation;
• the purpose of this type of legislation;
• the requirements of a valid right;
• the scope of protection afforded to employees by workers' compensatory 
laws; and
• the scope of protection afforded to employers by workers' compensatory 
laws.
It is submitted that it is of the utmost importance that all employees who find
Ontario: An Act to provide for Compensation to Workmen for Injuries sustained and industrial 
Diseases contracted in the course of their Employment, S.O, 1914, c. 25. Hereinafter: Ontario 
Workmen's Compensation Act.
Ison, TG. 1996. A historical perspective on contemporary challenges in workers’ compensation. 
Osgoode Hall L. J. 34: 807-833. Hereinafter: Ison 1996. Retrieved on 07/03/2012 from 
http://heinonline.org.
Ibid.
Le Roux, PAK. 1977. An administrative law enquiry into the nature and function o f  the powers o f  
the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner. LLM thesis, University of South Africa. At 31 -33  Le 
Roux noted that the Departmental Committee on Workmen’s Compensation appointed in 1930, 
had to investigate a State-run collective liability fund based "as far possible" on the Ontario 
system and although a proposed Bill was approved by a Select Committee, political reasons 
delayed promulgation until 1941 when the 1941 Act which in essence embodied the 
recommendations of the 1930 Committee, was reintroduced.
6
7
a
9
2
themselves in the unfavourable situation of being harmed by occupational injuries 
or diseases, are duly protected against financial distress and in applicable cases are 
compensated fairly, both in amount and manner in a just and speedy manner.
2. CONSTITUTIONAL IMPERATIVE
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 is the supreme law of the 
Republic and forms the basis of all law in the country. It provides for the needs of its 
people in every aspect of life and all other legislation should give life to the rights 
and provisions of the Constitution.10 The Constitution 1996 includes the Bill of 
Rights11 which sets out and jealously protects the fundamental rights that protect 
life itself as well as human dignity and equality in various life situations. It 
determines how these rights should be promoted,12 interpreted13 and how it may be 
limited14 in "an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and 
freedom."15
Social security aims at social protection and forms an important, although at times a 
silent part of everyday life, as in the words of the International Labour Organisation 
(ILO) "social security or its absence touches nearly everyone on the planet”.16 The 
nature of social security systems are described as financial instruments "fulfilling 
economic and social purposes” created and shaped by law.17 From the viewpoint of 
an individual, social security is rights-based and entails legislated "prescribed 
entitlements, qualifying conditions and procedural guarantees".18 The concept of 
social security includes various forms e.g. social assistance, social welfare and social 
insurance such as workers’ compensation which is normally instituted and ruled by
10 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 ss 1-2. Hereinafter: Constitution 1996.
11 Ibid Chapter 2.
12 Ibid s 7(2).
13 Ibid s 39.
14 Ibid s 36.
15 Ibid s 36(1).
16 International Labour Conference. 100th Session. 2011. General survey concerning social security 
instruments in light o f  the 2008 Declaration on Social Justice fo r  a Fair Globalization. Hereinafter: ILO 
Conference (2011). Retrieved on 25/09/2012 from http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/ 
@ed_norm/@relconf/documents/meetingdocument/wcms_152602.pdf.
17 Frank vii.
18 Molefe [5].
3
legislation.19 Section 2720 of the Constitution 1996 determines the rights pertaining 
to social security. Section 27(1) (c) states that "everyone" has the right of access to 
social security in circumstances of inability to provide for themselves and their 
dependants. The justiciability of this right was challenged in the Certification case.21 
Subsequent interpretation by the Constitutional Court gave direction to the state's 
responsibility on the "progressive realisation"22 of this right.23
Section 9 of the Constitution deals with one of the core human rights values namely 
equality of all people while subsection (3) prohibits both direct as well as indirect 
unfair discrimination on a listed ground. Subsection (4) also prohibits direct and 
indirect unfair discrimination but on an unlisted ground and furthermore instructs 
the state to enact legislation to prevent or prohibit unfair discrimination. 
Discrimination on a listed ground will be unfair unless it can be proven to be fair. 
The listed grounds consist of race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or 
social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, 
culture, language and birth.24 Discrimination against people with disabilities will 
therefore be unfair unless it can be proven to be fair and may only be limited if
19 Harger L [Sa], Workers' Compensation, a brief history. Retrieved on 17/03/2012 from
http://www.myfloridacfo.com/wc/history.html. Harger distinguishes between "insurance" and 
social insurance as part of social security. Insurance relates to a contractual relationship where 
one party undertakes to indemnify the other against risk and workmen’s compensation is the 
oldest form of social security. Social security in this study refers to the social protection 
afforded ito compensatory legislation which is a form of social insurance rather than social 
assistance.
2° "27. Health care, food, water and social security.-
(1) Everyone has the right to have access to -
(a) health care services, including reproductive health care;
(b) sufficient food and water; and
(c) social security, including, if they are unable to support themselves and their 
dependants, appropriate social assistance.
(2) The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available 
resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of each of these rights.”
21 Ex Parte Chairperson o f  the Constitutional Assembly: In Re Certification o f  the Constitution o f  the 
Republic o f  South Africa, [1996] ZACC 26; 1996 (4) SA 744; 1996 (10) BCLR 1253 (CC) see [78], 
Hereinafter: Certification case.
22 ILO Conference (2011). At 66 the ILO Committee of Experts traced the concept of progressive 
realisation of social security rights to the United Nations Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights which expects from States to develop medium and long-term policies and 
programmes to realise the rights progressively. The right to social security is considered to be 
achieved progressively in accordance to the level of economic and social development of the 
particular State and the availability of resources. Progressive realisation entails "moving as 
expeditiously and effectively as possible towards that goal."
23 Government o f  the Republic o f  South Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others (CCT11/00) 
[2000] ZACC 19; 2001 (1) SA 46; 2000 (11) BCLR 1169.
24 Constitution 1996 s 9(3).
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limitations satisfy the conditions laid down in section 36.25 Occupational injuries 
and diseases often result in disabilities of a temporary as well as a permanent 
nature.
Interpretation of the rights included in the Bill of Rights should be in accordance 
with section 39 which places an obligation upon a "court, tribunal or forum" to 
promote the values that underlie an open and democratic society based on human 
dignity, equality and freedom. It also requires from a court, tribunal or forum to 
consider international law and allows it to consider foreign law. When legislation is 
interpreted, every court, tribunal or forum "must promote the spirit, purport and 
objects of the Bill of Rights."26
The Bill of Rights further provides for just administrative action in section 33 which 
specifies that everyone has the right to administrative action that is “lawful, 
reasonable and procedurally fair."27 Everyone also has the right to written reasons 
when administrative actions adversely affect them.28 Workers' compensatory 
legislation functions primarily in an administrative environment and decisions by 
the applicable bodies are generally of an administrative nature.
The Constitution furthermore determines how international law and soft law 
instruments find application in South African law in sections 39,29 2 3 1 30 and 23331.
25 “36. Limitation of rights.- (1) The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law
of general application to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open 
and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account 
all relevant factors, including-
(a) the nature of the right;
(b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation;
(c) the nature and extent of the limitation;
(d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and
(e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose.
(2) Except as provided in subsection (1) or in any other provision of the Constitution, no law 
may limit any right entrenched in the Bill of Rights."
26 Constitution 1996 s 39(2).
27 Ibid s 33(1).
28 Ibid s 33(2 )”Everyone whose rights have been adversely affected by administrative action has 
the right to be given written reasons."
29 "39. Interpretation of Bill of Rights.- When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum-
(a) must promote the values that underlie an open and democratic society based on human 
dignity, equality and freedom;
(b) must consider international law, and
(c) may consider foreign law.”
5
In examining the South African compensation legislation, it will be compared to the 
Canadian and Australian legislations to determine if South Africa's legislation is on 
par with standards and trends in those two countries.
3. SADC INSTRUMENTS
Regional instruments are important as migrant labour32 forms an integral part of 
the workforce in the region. The Southern African Development Community 
(SADC)33 protects social security benefits at a regional level through specifically- 
designed policy documents, e.g.:
• the SADC's founding Treaty which forms the regional framework for 
regulation and development of social security in Southern Africa;34
30 "231(2) An international agreement binds the Republic only after it has been approved by
resolution in both the National Assembly and the National Council of Provinces, unless it is 
an agreement referred to in subsection (3).
(3) An international agreement of a technical, administrative or executive nature, or an 
agreement which does not require either ratification or accession, entered into by the 
national executive, binds the Republic without approval by the National Assembly and the 
National Council of Provinces, but must be tabled in the Assembly and the Council within 
reasonable time.
(4] Any international agreement becomes law in the Republic when it is enacted by law into 
national legislation; but a self-executing provision of an agreement that has been 
approved by Parliament is law in the Republic unless it is inconsistent with the 
Constitution or an Act of Parliament."
31 "233 Application of international law.- When interpreting any legislation, every court must
prefer any reasonable interpretation of the legislation that is consistent with international 
law over any alternative interpretation that is inconsistent with international law."
32 The relevancy of migration labour in the South African labour market will be discussed in 
Chapter 5 under the definition of an "employee".
33 Member states comprises of the People's Republic of Angola, the republics of Botswana, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Zambia, 
Zimbabwe, the Democratic Republic of Congo, the United Republic of Tanzania and the 
kingdoms of Lesotho and Swaziland.
34 The SADC's founding Treaty provides for rights in respect of social security for workers and 
non-workers. Article 6 deals with equality of all people and forbids discrimination based on 
grounds similar to the RSA Constitution e.g. "ARTICLE 6 GENERAL UNDERTAKINGS. 2. SADC 
and Member States shall not discriminate against any person on grounds of gender, religion, 
political views, race, ethnic origin, culture or disability.” Social development is addressed as an 
objective in article 5 as "ARTICLE 5 OBJECTIVES The objectives of SADC shall be to: promote 
sustainable and equitable economic growth and socio-economic development that will ensure 
poverty alleviation with the ultimate objective of its eradication, enhance the standard and 
quality of life of the people of Southern Africa and support the socially disadvantaged through 
regional integration." Article 21 deals with cooperation with regard to policies, strategies, as 
well as programmes and projects. Jordaan, B, Kalula, E & Strydom, E (eds). 2009. Understanding 
social security law. Cape Town: Juta Law. Hereinafter: Jordaan eta l. At 26-57 the authors noted 
that the Treaty is continuously being expanded by additional instruments in the form of 
charters, protocols and codes for example the Charter on Fundamental Social Security Rights 
(also known as the Social Charter) in the SADC.
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• the Charter of Fundamental Social Rights in the SADC which aims to 
provides for regional regulation of labour law protection;35
• the Code on Social Security (2007) acknowledges the right to social 
security and supports social dialogue to promote development of social 
security on national level through co-ordination, harmonization and 
involvement of communities in social security policies;36
• the Protocol on the Facilitation of Movement of Persons (2005) promotes 
free movement of people in the SADC region;37
• The Protocol on Health (1999) deals with sustainable human 
development and productivity dependant upon a healthy population 
through a process of close co-operation in the area of health.38
35 The objectives contained in article 2 of the Social Charter provides for regional regulation of 
labour law protection with specific protection for certain vulnerable groups like children and 
young persons and people with disabilities, enabling environments for health, safety and 
environmental protection as well as ratification of ILO instruments by member states. Social 
security receives specific attention in article 2 (l)(e )  providing for a process of facilitation 
between the social partners to "(e) promote the establishment and harmonisation of social 
security schemes" inclusive of health and safety in the workplace in article 2 (l)(f).
36 Jordaan et al 50-51 . The authors explain that the SADC Code on Social Security of 2007 to be of 
crucial importance in the development of the right to social security at national level and 
further supports social dialogue to promote development of social security on national level 
and the African nature of ubuntu shows from the importance given to co-ordination, 
harmonization and involvement of communities in social security policies. It acknowledges the 
fact that governments are not on its own able to fully provide in the social security needs of the 
region’s people. The position of marginalised groups like women, children and persons with 
disabilities, migrants and foreign workers are recognised. A reading of the Code on Social 
Security shows that it guides on the implementation of Article 5 of the Charter of Fundamental 
Social Rights and of specific importance for purposes of this study are: Article 4: The Right to 
Social Security; Article 5: Social Assistance, Social Services and Social Allowances; Article 6: 
Social Insurance; Article 9: Death and Survivors; Article 12: Occupational Injuries and Diseases 
as well as Article 17: Migrants, Foreign Workers and Refugees.
37 Jordaan et al 53-54. Southern African Development Community. 2005. Protocol on facilitation o f  
the movement o f  persons. This Protocol gives expression to the objectives of the SADC Treaty, 
which requires SADC to develop policies aimed at the progressive elimination of obstacles to the 
free movement of capital and labour, goods and services and of the people of the region generally 
amongst the member States. Retrieved on 26/05/2012 from
http://www.sadc.int/index.php/documents-publications/protocols?sortBy=34&pageSize=4&
doc_q_0=&sort0rder=desc&filterByKey=&filterByVal=&page=2.
38 Southern African Development Community. 1999. Protocol on health. Retrieved on 26/05/2012 
from http://www.sadc.int/documents-publications/themes/health/. This Protocol aims to 
achieve sustainable human development and productivity dependant upon a healthy 
population and SADC identified the need for close co-operation in the area of health to 
effectively control communicable and non-communicable diseases in dealing with common 
concerns in the region. The Protocol came into force in 2004 and coordinates regional 
preparedness on epidemics, prevention procedures, disease control and where feasible the 
eradication of communicable and non-communicable diseases. The Protocol deals with 
education, training, efficient laboratory services and universal strategies in addressing the 
health needs of women, children and vulnerable groups.
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According to a study by Fultz and Pieris,39 the relationship between a social security 
scheme and its milieu is dynamic and is influenced by economic factors of 
resources, distribution,40 productivity, labour mobility and labour costs41 and 
regional policy instruments should be seen in the context of economic limitations, 
high informal employment realities and the realities of limitations on the 
administrative capacity of governments 42
The role of social security in strengthening political and economic transition in the 
SADC region is important43 as it inter alia provides protection to workers "who are 
displaced or lose employer-provided benefits as markets are opened to increased 
competition".44
4. STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY
This study will follow a similar structure in each of the chapters starting with 
general background information, and then discuss the statutory provisions and case 
law of South Africa, Canada and Australia before concluding the chapter.
The right to workers' compensation will be explored from different angles to 
determine the historical need for the right to workers' compensatory legislation, the 
nature and purpose of workers' compensatory laws and trends of interpretations 
flowing from it, circumstances under which the right will arise or will defeat such 
right and person’s entitled to the right as well as limitations the right to delictual 
remedies. In exploring the right, it will be prudent to give some attention to the 
systems of government and adjudicative structures applicable to each of the three 
countries. For purposes of this study, discussions will be limited to one act per 
jurisdiction per aspect unless appropriate to discuss more than one. The right to 
workers’ compensation by employees and the right to protection against delictual
39 Fultz, E & Pieris, B. 1999. Social security schemes in Southern Africa: An overview and proposals 
fo r  future development Harare: ILO. At 7. Hereinafter: Fultz & Pieris,
«  Ibid 35.
41 Ibid ix.
«  Ibid 7.
43 Ibid ix.
44 Ibid ix.
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actions afforded to employers will be discussed under the following headings, 
being:
• Chapter 2: Adjudicative structures and the historical development of 
compensatory law. In discussing these aspects, information will be given on 
the differences in adjudicative structures between the three countries and it 
will be demonstrated how compensatory legislation developed. Due to the 
stare decisis doctrine applicable in all three countries, it is important to have 
insight in the hierarchical court structure applicable to case law and as 
workers' compensation is in essence an administrative remedy, the 
limitation on the right of access to courts will receive attention.
• Chapter 3: The administrative nature, purpose and interpretation of 
compensatory legislation. This is closely related to the historical 
development of compensatory law and it will be shown that the courts often 
examine and consider the historical development in the process of 
interpretation of the purpose of the right to compensation and the barring of 
the right to delictual actions.
• Chapter 4: Causality and the relationship with employment. The right to 
compensation is limited to injuries and diseases arising within the 
boundaries of employment; and establishing whether an injury arose out of 
and in the course of employment may include gray areas clouded by the 
circumstances of the injury and the law that needs to be applied.
• Chapter 5: The scope of application of compensatory legislation. The 
statutory definitions of employee and employer will be explored. The right to 
workers' compensation and the right to protection against delictual action 
are limited rights and will only arise within an employment relationship. 
However, proving the existence of an employment relationship is not always 
an easy task in the absence of a contract of service.
• Chapter 6: The right to delictual remedies. Abrogation of this right forms an 
intimate part of the history and purpose of workers' compensatory 
legislation and is dealt with differently in the three countries.
• Chapter 7: Conclusion.
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CHAPTER 2
ADJUDICATIVE STRUCTURES AND THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF 
COMPENSATORY LAW
1. INTRODUCTION
One of the aims of this study is to determine how and why a statutory right to 
workers' compensation was developed. In addition to exploring the historical 
development of compensatory law, the adjudicative structures of South Africa, 
Canada and Australia warrant attention as to provide an understanding of the 
background applicable to court cases due to the commonly shared stare decisis 
doctrine and as workers' compensation is in essence an administrative remedy. 
Limitations to the right of access to courts will also receive attention in this Chapter.
Legislation on occupational injuries and diseases regulates a tripartite relationship 
of social partners,1 aiming to balance the interests of state, employer and 
employee.2 The intention of this kind of social security legislation is to create a right
Olivier, MP, Smit, N & Kalula, ER (eds). 2003. Social security: A legal analysis. Durban: LexisNexis 
Butterworths. At 38. Hereinafter: Olivier et al (2003). Ison 1996: 8 0 7 -833  argues that the 
Canadian workers compensation system is increasingly complex and open to pressure groups. 
See also Winder, C. 2009. The development of OHS legislation in Australia./ Occup Health Safety 
AustNZ 25(4): 277-287 . Retrieved on 17/03/2012 from
http://0-search.informitcom.au.oasis.unisa.ac.za/browseJournalTitle;res=APAFT;issn=0815-6409. 
In Jooste v Score Supermarket Trading (Pty) Ltd (Minister o f  Labour Intervening) 1999 (2) SA 1 
(CC). (Hereinafter: Jooste). At [9] the CC discussed the importance of this type of legislation and 
the "significant impact on the sensitive and intricate relationship amongst employers, 
employees and society at large." The Court recognised the intervention by the State to create an 
appropriate balance. The balance struck "between the competing interests of employers and 
employees" was also a point of interest in the case of Healy v Compensation Commissioner and 
Another 2010 (2) SA 470 (E) at [11]. (Hereinafter: Healy). In Canada, courts often refer to this 
balance as the "historic trade-off' introduced to compensatory law by Chief Justice Meredith in 
Ontario as in Puddicombe v Workers' Compensation Board (N.S.), 2005 NSCA 62 (CanLII) para 
[29]. Retrieved on 09/04/2011 from http://canlii.ca/t/lk549. (Hereinafter: Puddicombe). In 
Australia the Victorian Accident Compensation Act, Act No. 10191 of 1985 (retrieved on 
12/06/2010 from http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/vic/consol_act/acal985204/) s 2 0 (l)(o ) 
requires from the Compensation Authority to foster the relationship between the parties while 
the Queensland Act, Workers' Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 in s 5(5) 
acknowledges the need for a balance by not placing too heavy a burden upon industry or 
society. Retrieved on 12/06/2010 http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/nt/consol_act/wraca400/.
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to no-fault3 compensation in the form of an administrative remedy4 replacing 
common law litigation. The right to compensation is the main objective of 
compensatory legislation5 but as no right is absolute, the right to workers' 
compensation will only arise under specific circumstances dependent upon the 
fulfilment of specific criteria. It is predominantly exercised through an 
administrative process.
In this chapter the need for legislation to provide for workers who sustained harm 
in the workplace will be viewed from its historical perspective and background 
information on the three countries' judicial structures will also be given because it 
is in court that practical meaning is attached to the words of an act through 
interpretation.6
The MEC fo r  Education, Western Cape Province v Strauss 2008 (2) SA 366 (SCA) explains no­
fault compensation at para [11]-[12] as: "COIDA came into operation on 1 March 1994 
providing for a system of no-fault compensation for employees who are injured in accidents 
that arise out of and in the course of their employment or who contract occupational diseases. A 
compensation fund is established to which employers are required to contribute and from 
which compensation and other benefits are paid to employees. Employees meeting the 
requirements of the Act are entitled to the benefits provided for and prescribed by COIDA. 
COIDA ‘supplants the essentially individualistic common-law position, typically represented by 
civil claims of a plaintiff employee against a negligent defendant employer, by a system which is 
intended to and does enable employees to obtain limited compensation from a fund to which 
the employers are obliged to contribute.’
[12] At common law an employee has to show that his or her employer acted negligently 
thereby risking a finding that he or she was contributory negligent. The employee claiming 
damages from the employer would also bear the risk of the employer’s insolvency or his 
inability to meet a judgment debt. While the employee ran the risk of an adverse cost order if he 
or she was unsuccessful, a common-law action might lead to his or her recovering substantially 
more by way of damages than under the compensation provided by COIDA. Section 35 
abolished an employee's common-law right to claim damages."
Piron, J. 1978. Workmen's compensation law: The test fo r  "arising out o f  and in the course o f  
employment. Pretoria: Institute for Labour Relations UNISA. The author at 1, discussed the 
phrase "out of and in the course o f’ as contained in s 2(i) in the 1941 Act. But the third element 
in the word "resulting" was not included in the discussion.
Ontario. Workmen's Compensation Commission. 1913. Final report relating to the liability o f  
employers. (Meredith, WR Chairperson). Toronto: Legislative Assembly of Ontario. Hereinafter: 
Meredith Report. Meredith states at 4: "... the true aim of a compensation law is to provide for 
the injured workman and his dependants..." Retrieved on 09/05/2010 from 
http://www.awcbc.org/common/assets/english%20pdf/meredith_report.pdf.
South Africa (Republic). Law Reform Commission. 2006. Discussion paper 112: Statutory 
revision: Review o f  the Interpretation Act 33 o f  1957. Retrieved on 24/07/2013 from 
http://www.justice.gov.za/salrc/dpapers/dpll2_interpretation.pdf. At 2 the duty of the courts 
is described as "... to ascertain and give effect to the will of Parliament as expressed in its 
enactments. In the performance of this duty the Judges do not act as computers into which are 
fed the statutes and the rules for the construction of statutes and from which issue forth the 
mathematically correct answer. The interpretation of statutes is a craft as much as a science
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2. INTERNATIONAL HISTORY
In general, legislation serves the society which it regulates.7 The intention of an act 
determines the purpose and objectives8 which is often based on the historical 
context that gave rise to the need for that particular legislative measure.9
Compensation for bodily injuries dates back to antiquity with Nippur Tablet No. 
3191 from Sumeria on the law of Ur-Nammu, king of Ur approximately 2050 B.C. 
Monetary compensation were granted for certain injuries to workers' limbs, 
including fractures.10 In the collection of laws and rules of the king of Babylon (1750 
B.C.), the Code of Hammurabi, similar determinations were made to provide for 
widows, orphans and the permanent impairments of the injured.11 The model was 
followed by ancient Greeks, Arabs, Chinese and Romans by enacting laws providing 
for fixed schedules determining exact compensation for the loss of specified body 
parts.12
10
and the judges, as craftsmen, select and apply the appropriate rules as the tools of their trade. 
They are not legislators, but finishers, refiners and polishers of legislation which comes to them 
in a state requiring varying degrees of further processing."
WorkSafe (British Columbia). Policy and Regulation Development Bureau. [Sa], Royal 
Commission briefing papers. Richmond: WorkSafeBC. Retrieved on 09/08/2012 from 
http://www.worksafebc.com/regulation_and_policy/archived_information/royal_commission_ 
briefing_papers/assets/pdf/rc_introduction.pdf. At 15 the purpose of an enquiry by a Royal 
Commission is stated, to: "examine the statutory framework, mandate, structure, organization, 
and governance and administration of the British Columbia workers’ compensation system in 
order to meet the needs of the people of British Columbia for a high quality public system that 
is equitable, effective and efficient in the context of changing workplaces and consistent with 
the underlying principles of workers’ compensation in British Columbia, namely:
(a) accident prevention
(b) no-fault compensation
(c) collective employer liability
(d) industry funding
(e) universal coverage
(f) administrative adjudication." (Own emphasis).
Hereinafter: Royal Commission briefing papers.
Botha, C. 2005. Wetsuitleg. 4 th edition. Cape Town: Juta Law. At 81.
Burger, AJ. 2009. A guide to legislative drafting in South Africa. Cape Town: Juta law. At 25 
Burger discusses the purposive method of interpretation and quote the very old case of Heydon 
[1584] 3 Co Rep 7a; where four principles were laid down: firstly, what the common law was 
before the enactment; secondly, what was the deficiency that the common law lacked; thirdly, 
what remedy was instituted by Parliament and fourthly, the proper motive for that remedy. 
Guyton, GP. 1999. A Brief History of Workers' Compensation. Iowa Orthop J  19: 111-121. 
Retrieved on 17/03/2012 from http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/issues/144831/.
Winder 277-287.
Guyton 111-121. Ancient Arab law assessed the loss of a joint of the thumb equal to one-half the 
value of a finger while loss of part of a penis was compensated proportionally to the length lost
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Feudalism became the structure of government during the Middle Ages causing 
compensation for workers to be dependent upon the honour, goodwill and 
generosity of feudal lords.13
The development of English common law which influenced the legal system in 
western countries and continued into the Industrial Revolution replaced the 
compensation schedules with common law rules.14
The Industrial Revolution changed the way in which work was done forever by 
introducing sources of inanimate power; the introduction of machines and 
production methods and in the process aggravated the risk to injury and disease 
proportionally.15 If the ability to earn is lost through injuries or diseases, it usually is 
unexpected and it results in a cost transfer to the injured employee, his next of kin 
and society at large.16
In Britain, the incidence of fever amongst child labour in cotton mills led to the 
Health and Morals Apprentices Act of 1802 which marked the creation of legislation 
regulating working conditions, initially primarily pertinent to child labour.17
Social assistance was provided through the guild system of the Middle Ages, 
according to which artisans contributed to a fund administered by the guild and 
from which compensation could be claimed in instances of incapacity due to injuries 
or diseases.18 But not all workers could afford this form of mutual insurance19 which 
was also provided by trade unions.20
13 Ibid.
14 Guyton 111-121. Winder 277-287.
15 Winder 277-287 . Derickson, A. 1988. Workers' health, workers’ democracy: the Western miners' 
struggle, 1891-1925. New York: Cornell University Press. At 37 the death rate of hard rock 
miners in the metal and coal sectors in British Columbia (Canada) is tabled as 4.2 per 1,000 
between 1898-1908  and 3.3 per 1,000 for the period 1909-1920. These sectors were notorious 
for the dangers associated therewith and the risk of being fatally injured due to an occupational 
injury was more than ten times as high as in the manufacturing industry during 1910.
16 Meredith Report at 4 states: "... the true aim of a compensation law is to provide for the injured 
workman and his dependants and to prevent their becoming a charge upon their relatives or 
friends, or upon the community at large."
Winder 277-287.
18 Le Roux 3. Le Roux contended that "workmen's compensation legislation is a typical 
manifestation of the modern welfare state where the state plays an increasing role in many 
facets of society. The result is a corresponding increase in the power of the state to regulate and
13
Workers could sue employers for negligence under common law, known to be an 
expensive, onerous and protracted process and workers were subject to court 
decisions by judges firm on maintaining existing social conditions.21 An employer, 
normally being in a stronger financial and influential position than the worker, 
could manipulate court processes to his own advantage and could afford the best 
legal representation.22 Employees taking legal action against employers usually lost 
their work.23 In cases where workers were fatally injured, the key source of 
evidence for litigation would be the post-mortem done by the coroner's juiy but under 
influence of the employer, the process was open to prejudice often blaming the victim24
Employers defended claims based on three key, relatively solid, common law 
(known as the "unholy trinity of defences")25 defence principles:26
• Volenti non fit  injuria: damage through consent produces no cause of action. 
Employees were considered to be familiar with hazards inherent to a 
particular job and voluntarily assumed that risk in taking up the job. 
Assumption of risk was formalised through both employment contracts 
excluding the right to sue contractually and through the interview process;
organise the life of the citizen through granting discretionary powers to state officials." Le Roux 
at 5 confirmed the assistance through guilds, fraternities and social assistance organisations. 
Derickson examines the role of trade unions in social assistance and Workmen’s Compensation 
Legislation in the western mining districts of the USA as well as in the Canadian province of 
British Columbia. At xi the conclusion is drawn that most unions provided social assistance and 
death assistance programmes to their members following the example set earlier by “railroad 
brotherhoods and other craft organizations..."
19 Winder 277-287 .
20 Derickson at 63 relates the preamble to the Gold Hill constitution of 1866 which declared 
“Experience has taught us... that the dangers to which we are continually exposed are,... fully 
verified by the serious and often fatal accidents that occur in the Mines, and that Benefits in 
many of these cases are positively necessary." It is calculated that the main expense in time and 
money to unions in the western mining regions of the USA and the Canadian province of British 
Columbia was devoted to mutual aid. Loss of income caused a lack of subsistence and thus 
unions provided mutual insurance to provide a continuous flow of income for periods of 
temporary incapacity, Derickson 64. Costs incurred by occupational injuries and diseases were 
predominantly borne by the injured parties themselves, their relatives, unions, mutual benefit 
associations and society, Derickson 174.
21 Winder 277-287 . Guyton 111-121.
22 Derickson 174-176.
23 Ibid 177.
24 Derickson 174-175. According to Derickson the coroner often was employed as the company's 
doctor.
25 Mushai, I & Hutcheson, H. 2013. Injuries, compensations, myths and realities: Is increased 
compensation under the South African workmen's compensation system a myth or reality? 
SHEQ Management Journal March/April 2 0 1 3 :1 0 -1 2 .
26 Winder 277-287 . Guyton 111-121. Derickson 175.
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• Contributory negligence: if the worker was partly negligent, irrespective of 
the extent, the employer could not be held liable;27
• Fellow servant rule: an employer could not be held liable if the injury was 
affected through negligence of a co-worker of the injured employee.28
Compensation in successful cases was often meagre29 but over time, more workers 
approached the courts and with legal assistance, the number of successful claims 
gradually increased.30 The increase in successful court actions and a number of 
other factors forced legislative change e.g. respondent employers in successful civil 
litigation cases faced insolvency, social pressure by both organised labour and the 
socialist movement increased in combination with labour unrest due to a lack of 
compensation for occupational injuries and diseases.31
These pressures led to the first successful comprehensive legislated social 
insurance scheme as developed by Chancellor von Bismarck in 1884.32 Other 
countries soon followed suit33 with presently some form of cover in most countries 
of the world and still based on the Bismarckian model. It was preceded in 1838 by 
legislative protection of railroad workers in the event of an accident and in 1876 by 
a failed Voluntary Insurance Act.34
27 Contributory negligence still defeats a claim for increased compensation pursuant to s 56 of 
COIDA in South Africa currently as will be discussed in Chapter 6.
28 The fellow servant rule is still partly applicable in claims pursuant to COIDA's s 56 because of 
the working of s 35(2) and s 5 6 (l)- (e )  which afforded identical protection to specific categories 
of employees and employers. The protection will be further discussed in Chapter 6.
29 Derickson 177, as is evident from a report by the Montana Department of Labor and Industry 
(1913-14 ) revealing that "only a small percentage of the victims ... are receiving adequate and 
proportionate compensation for the loss sustained."
30 Guyton 111-121. Derickson 176.
31 Guyton 111-121. Le Roux 18. Derickson 177.
32 Olivier et al (2003) 29. According to Le Roux similar legislation followed worldwide i.e.: 
Germany (1884); Austria (1887); Norway (1894); Great Britain (1897); Denmark, Italy & 
France (1898); Spain, New Zealand & South Australia (1900); New South Wales, Netherlands, 
Greece & Sweden (1901); Western Australia, Luxembourg & British Colombia (1902); Russia & 
Belgium (1903); Cape of Good Hope (1905); Hungary & Transvaal (1907); Alberta (1908) & 
Quebec(1909). In America the "Employers' Liability Act of 1880" excluded the defence by 
employers that employees voluntarily accepted the risk (volenti non f it  injuria), Le Roux 11.
33 Derickson 175-179, although some legislative reform was made to the common law defences 
raised by employers, no real difference was affected before the promulgation of no-fault 
legislation resulting in unions advocating it. Initially employers opposed social insurance 
measures but eventually had to accede to demands from trade union movements.
34 Le Roux 25. Derickson 178 remarks that following the enactment of compensatory legislation 
the United Mine Workers (a trade union) of British Columbia assisted its members in obtaining 
the amount of $70,000 in compensation by 1909.
15
The scheme was from its inception controlled by the social partners consisting of 
labour, business and the State.35 Although a great improvement from the common 
law recourse previously available, a measure of tension remained. It is obvious from 
the words of Miller who lamented that employers initially did their best to prevent 
compensatory legislation and when sensed it to be unavoidable "they changed their 
tactics and got into it to make the law and make it as harmless to themselves as they 
could".36 It was perceived that the major western countries enacted laws 
characterised by inadequate benefits, tedious processes and unnecessarily 
restrictive in nature rather protecting employers against economic loss than 
compensating employees for their losses.37
It is submitted that the historical development of compensatory legislation shows 
that its main purpose is the benefit of society at large by removing the economical 
burden society historically had to endure due to occupational injuries and 
diseases.38 In the words of Du Toit: "no society can prosper if large numbers of its 
citizens suffer insecurity or destitution".39 From the beginning, social security was 
characterised by a sense of solidarity between social groupings as is evident from 
the mutual insurance schemes organised by the guilds and unions since the Middle 
Ages discussed supra.40
The purpose of an act ought to be seen in the light of its historical development.41 
Compensatory legislation had its origins in the need for social security and the 
protection of employees and their dependents against losses due to occupational
35 Olivier et al (2003) 38. Ison 1996: 807-833 . Winder 277-287.
36 Derickson 179.
37 Derickson 180.
38 Derickson 179. Australia (Commonwealth). Productivity Commission. 2004. National workers' 
compensation and occupational health and safety frameworks, Report no. 27. Canberra: 
Productivity Commission. At 160-161. Hereinafter: Productivity Commission Report (2004). 
The Report identified the problems faced by the growing number of self-employed people in 
Australia who will be dependent upon the Government’s social security system in instances of 
injuries sustained or diseases contracted, be it occupational or otherwise. Retrieved on 
25/03/2012 from http://www.pc.gov.au/_data/assets/pdf_file/0006/18546/workerscomp.pdf.
39 Olivier, MP (ed.), Okpaluba, MC, Smit, N & Thompson, M. 1999. Social security law -  General 
principles. Durban: Butterworths. At vii. Hereinafter: Olivier e ta l  (1999).
40 Olivier et al (2003) 3 8 -39  & Chapter 2 fn 18.
41 Botha at 1 cited Du Plessis LM, stating the purpose of statutory interpretation to be "about
construing enacted law-texts with reference to and reliance on other law-texts, concretising the 
text to be construed so as to cater for the exigencies of an actual or hypothesised concrete 
situation."
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injuries, diseases and fatalities associated with it.42 The Industrial Revolution 
increased the risk of injury and disease proportionally due to the augmented 
occupational exposure.43
3. SOUTH AFRICA
3.1. Introduction
The Republic of South Africa has nine provinces with a central government enacting 
national legislation applicable to the entire country and of which the Compensation 
for Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act 130 of 1993 (hereinafter: COIDA) is an 
example. All legislation needs to conform to the Constitution 1996 and COIDA, as 
part of the social security rights provided for in section 27 of the Constitution, 
should aim to gradually "realise" these rights.44 Interpretation of these rights should 
be in accordance with section 39 of the Constitution which places an obligation 
upon “a court, tribunal or forum" to promote the values that underlie an open and 
democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom 45 According to 
Currie,46 constitutional interpretation entails a two step enquiry: firstly 
determination of the meaning of a right and secondly it should be established 
whether the challenged provision conflicts with the Bill of Rights. Every court, 
tribunal or forum is obliged to "promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of 
Rights"47 when these rights, inclusive of social security rights, are interpreted. 
Currie contends that a purposive interpretation aims at carefully examining the 
essential values underpinning the "listed fundamental rights in an open and
42 According to Le Roux 22, the first no-fault compensatory act in a common law country was the
British "Workmen's Compensation Act, 1897". Two clear characteristics distinguished it: i) the 
employee was entitled to compensation irrespective whether the injury was caused through 
the fault of any person, thus the very important no-fault principle, according to which an
employee had a valid claim even if he was injured through a fault of his own, and ii)
compensation was paid by the employer based on pre-determined amounts.
43 Le Roux 6.
44 Botha 67. In determining the purpose and intention of a statute it should in principle be 
interpreted in the light of the Bill of Rights (Chapter 2) in the Constitution of the RSA.
45 These values are important to the injured or diseased.
46 Currie, I & De Waal, J. 2005. The Bill o f  Rights handbook. 5th edition. Cape Town: Juta Law. At 145.
47 Constitution 1996 s 39(2).
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democratic society based on human dignity equality and freedom and then to prefer 
the interpretation of a provision that best supports and protects those values".48
Social insurance as a form of social security is normally instituted and ruled by 
legislation.49 It is financed through the payment of insurance premiums known in 
COIDA as assessments and paid by employers.50 In a quid pro quo process, the 
employee loses his right to claim pursuant to common law against his employer51 
but is entitled to compensation benefits when the employee sustains an 
occupational injury or contracts an occupational disease.52 Social security is 
protected in the Constitution's Bill of Rights53 and may only be limited under the 
strict and specific conditions prescribed by section 3654 but because section 27 is 
already demarcated by the term "reasonable", section 36 would hardly ever be 
applied.55
Effective social security in developing countries (like South Africa) is hampered 
because it is limited to people working in formal employment while in Africa less 
than ten percent of the active population is employed as such.56 The scope of cover57
48 Currie 148.
49 Harger L [Sa]. Workers' compensation, a brief history. Retrieved on 17/03/2012 from 
http://www.myfloridacfo.com/wc/history.html.
50 COIDA s 83. Assessments are calculated based on the needs of the Compensation Fund, the risk 
category of the industry and the annual earnings of employees and is paid by the employer.
51 COIDA s 35.
52 COIDA s 22.
53 South Africa (Republic). Department of Social Development. (Taylor, V. Chairperson). 2002. 
Transforming the present -  Protecting the future, Report of the Committee o f  Inquiry into a 
comprehensive system o f  social security fo r  South Africa. Pretoria: Department of Social 
Development. At 113-116. Hereinafter: Taylor Report. The Taylor Report at 36 indicates that 
social security rights enjoy equal status to political and civil rights in the Constitution 1996. 
Retrieved on 05/11/2008 from
http://www.sarpn.org/CountryPovertyPapers/SouthAfrica/taylor/index.php.
54 According to s 36 of the Constitution, a right in the Bill of Rights may only be limited pursuant 
to a law of general application and only to the extent that is "reasonable and justifiable in an 
open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom." Factors that 
further qualify the limitation relates to the nature of the right, importance and purpose of the 
limitation, relation between the limitation and its purpose and any less restrictive means to 
realise that purpose.
55 Currie 186 -188  & 594-595.
56 The Taylor Report at 37, found that the high unemployment rate (±50% ) in developing 
countries leaves a huge number of people without social security protection as it is often 
limited to people in formal employment. Unemployment in South Africa by the end of 2011 was 
23.9% and between 2000 and 2008 it averaged at 26.38% with an all-time high of 31.20%  in 
2003 according to http://www.tradingeconomics.com/south-africa/unemployment-rate.
57 The definitions of employer and employee will be discussed in Chapter 5 of this study.
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is limited to those within the definition of an employee excluding a vast number of 
atypical employed or unemployed people.58 To make matters worse, the Taylor 
Committee opined that in developing countries large proportions of formally 
employed people are caught in poverty known as the "working poor".59 A 
comprehensive system with an integrated system covering the total population is 
recommended.60
3.2. South African court structure and compensatory legislation
It is prudent to have regard to each of the three countries’ court structure as case 
law is influenced by the doctrine of precedence, a characteristic of the common law 
legal system.61 South Africa has a mixed system of common law and civil law.62 The 
common law countries derive the system from the English legal system63 and the 
civil law system was derived from the Roman-Dutch law.64
The South African Constitution Seventeenth Amendment Act of 2012 provides in 
section 166 for the judicial structure. In hierarchical order, from the most superior 
to the lowest the courts provided for are:
(a) the Constitutional Court;
(b) the Supreme Court of Appeal;
(c) the High Court of South Africa, and any high court of appeal that may be 
established by an Act of Parliament to hear appeals from any court of a 
status similar to the High Court of South Africa; and
(d) the Magistrates’ Courts; and
(e) any other court established or recognised in terms of an Act of 
Parliament, including any court of a status similar to either the High 
Court or the Magistrates’ Courts.
sa Olivier et al (2003) 131 -134  & 162.
59 Taylor Report 38.
60 Olivier et al (1999) 17. Taylor Report 41.
61 Bassam, S & Gardiner, D (eds). 2012. The Law Handbook, your practical guide to the law in New
South Wales. 12th edition. Sydney: Thomson Reuters. At 2. Retrieved on 09/02/2013 from 
http://www.legalanswers.sl.nsw.gov.au/guides/law_handbook/legal_system.html.
52 Tetley, W. 1999-2000. Mixed Jurisdictions: Common Law vs. Civil Law (Codified and
Uncodified). La. L. Rev. 60: 677-738. Retrieved on 12/07/2013 from http://0-heinonline.org. 
oasis.unisa.ac.za/H0L/Print?collection=journals&handle=hein.journals/louilr60&id=691.
63 Ibid.
64 Ibid.
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The judicial structure of the South African court system has been depicted 
schematically as follows:65
I Superior Courts
In terms of section 167(3) of the Constitution, the Constitutional Court is the highest 
court in all matters66, is may adjudicate on constitutional and any other matters 
which raise an arguable point of law of general public importance67 and has the final 
word on whether a matter is within its jurisdiction.68
The Supreme Court of Appeal69 may judge all matters on appeal from the High Court 
other than labour or competition matters. The Constitution70 provides that the SCA 
may hear appeals in respect of constitutional matters, and a further appeal, on 
constitutional issues only, may lie to the Constitutional Court. Although it has
65 Courts of South Africa schematic. Retrieved on 24/07/2013 from 
https://en.rn.wikipedia.0rg/wiki/File:C0urts_0f_S0uth_Africa_schematic.svg#file.
66 Constitution 1996 s 167(3)(a).
«  ibid s 167(3)(b)(i) & (ii).
68 Ibids  167(3) (c).
69 Hereinafter: SCA.
70 Constitution Seventeenth Amendment Act, s 168.
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jurisdiction in the whole country, it has no original jurisdiction and all matters come 
to it out of necessity from the High Court on appeal or review.71
The High Court derives its jurisdiction from section 169 of the Constitution and 
pursuant to the Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013; the country has 7 divisions of the 
High Court with main seats situated in the bigger cities of the country as well as 6 
local seats. The High Court has inherent jurisdiction and acts as a court of first 
instance, or it may act as a court of appeal for the Magistrate's Court within its area 
of jurisdiction. Furthermore, all the divisions of the High Court operate as courts of 
appeal regarding decisions made by a single judge of the High Court. Appeals 
against a decision made by a single High Court judge will either go to a full bench of 
the same decision consisting of three members or to the SCA.72
All other courts are instituted under section 170 of the Constitution including 
Magistrates' Courts which do not have jurisdiction to decide on any constitutional 
matters. Magistrates' Courts are "creatures of statute" by nature and are created 
and operated within the ambit of the Magistrates' Courts Act 32 of 1944. 
Magistrates’ Courts have no jurisdiction over compensatory legislation73 and are 
therefore irrelevant for the purposes of this study.
Section 91 of the COIDA74 provides for an appeal process to be heard by a tribunal
71 Law Society of the Northern Provinces. 2011. Jurisdiction o f  South African courts and tribunals, 
a guide fo r  the legal practitioner. Pretoria. At 9. Retrieved on 24/07/2013 from 
http://www.northernlaw.co.za/important_information_for_members/constitutional_courtjud 
gment/Jurisdiction.LSSA.pdf.
72 Ibid 12.
73 Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act 130 of 1993 section 91.
74 "91(5)(a)Any person affected by a decision referred to in subsection (3)(a), may appeal to any 
provincial or local division of the Supreme Court having jurisdiction against a decision 
regarding-
(i) the interpretation of this Act or any other law;
(ii) the question whether an accident or occupational disease causing the disablement or 
death of an employee was attributable to his or her serious and wilful misconduct;
(iii) the question whether the amount of any compensation awarded is so excessive or so 
inadequate that the award thereof could not reasonably have been made;
(iv) the right to increased compensation in terms of section 56.
(b) Subject to the provisions of this subsection, such an appeal shall be noted and prosecuted 
as if it were an appeal against a judgment of a magistrate's court in a civil case, and all 
rules applicable to such an appeal shall mutatis mutandis apply to an appeal in terms of 
this subsection."
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and for a limited right of appeal75 from a decision by a tribunal to the High Court.76 
Tribunals are formed pursuant to an enabling statute that governs that particular 
tribunal77 and its functions.78 The Superior Courts Act provides in section 3(b) for 
the establishment of any tribunal as contemplated in section 34 of the Constitution 
after consultation with the Minister responsible for the administration of justice. No 
administrative review council is in place in spite of an increasing number of 
tribunals, as Armstrong points out: "... the tribunal landscape of South Africa 
continues to be made up of haphazard, unstructured and unsystematic appeal 
procedures which hinder rather than assist the advancement of access to 
administrative justice".79 COIDA provides in section 2 for the appointment by the 
Minister, of the Director-General, the Compensation Commissioner and "such other 
officers and employees"80 as will be needed in the performance of the Director-
75 Odayar v Compensation Commissioner 2006 (6) SA 202 (N) at [7]—[11] the Court examined 
s 91(5)(a)(i) of COIDA as cited in Chapter 2 fn 74 supra. (Hereinafter: Odayar). The Court cited 
earlier case law [Grobbelaar v Workmen's Compensation Commissioner 1978 (3) SA 62 (T) and 
Nicosia v Workmen's Compensation Commissioner 1953 (4) SA 165 (T)] in which it was held that no 
appeal shall lie against a finding of fact but only on interpretation of the Act. The Court previously 
held that "...in certain cases, inferences drawn from proved facts may be questions of law".
76 COIDA s 91(5).
77 "91.0bjections and appeal against decisions of Director-General
(1) Any person affected by a decision of the Director-General or a trade union or employers' 
organization of which that person was a member at the relevant time may, within 180 
days after such decision, lodge an objection against that decision with the commissioner in 
the prescribed manner.
(2)(a) An objection lodged in terms of this section shall be considered and decided by the 
presiding officer assisted by two assessors designated by him, of whom one shall be an 
assessor representing employees and one an assessor representing employers.
(b) If the presiding officer considers it expedient, he may, notwithstanding paragraph (a), 
call in the assistance of a medical assessor.
(c) The provisions of sections 6, 7 , 45  and 46 shall apply mutatis mutandis in respect of the 
consideration of an objection.
(3)(a) After considering an objection the presiding officer shall, provided that at least one of 
the assessors, excluding any medical assessor, agrees with him, confirm the decision in 
respect of which the objection was lodged or give such other decision as he may deem 
equitable.
(b) If neither of the assessors agrees with the view of the presiding officer, the presiding 
officer shall submit the dispute in terms of section 92 to the Supreme Court for 
decision.
(4) The presiding officer may in connection with proceedings in terms of this section make
such order as to costs and the payment thereof as he may deem equitable.”
78 Venter v Compensation Commissioner 2001 (4) SA 753 (T) at 757A-D.
79 Armstrong, GC. 2011. Administrative justice and tribunals in South Africa: A Commonwealth 
comparison. LLM thesis, University of Stellenbosch. At 129. Retrieved on 02/08/2013 from 
http://www.google.co.za/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=tribunals%20in%20south%20africa&source=web&cd 
=3&cad=rja&ved=0CDoQFjAC&url=http%3A%2F%2Fscholar.sun.ac.za%2Fbitstream%2Fhandle% 
2F10019.1%2F17997%2Farmstrong_administrative_2011.pdf%3Fsequence%3Dl&ei=Ej39UYmgF 
qLe7AbPuYH4CA&usg=AFQjCNFPxCDEs386rEV-BXF9ujUMGwdxGg&bvm=bv.50165853,d.ZWU.
80 COIDA s 2 ( l) (b ) .
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General's functions and a "presiding officer" who is an officer appointed and 
designated in terms of section 2(l)(a ) or (b). Assessors are appointed in equal 
numbers to represent the interests of employers and employees after consultation 
with the Compensation Board to assist the presiding officer with hearings held in 
terms of section 91.81 Section 91(3)(a) empowers the presiding officer after 
consideration of an objection to confirm a decision or substitute it for any other 
equitable decision on condition that at least one of the assessors besides the 
medical assessor, agrees with him. However, if "neither of the assessors agrees with 
the view of the presiding officer, the presiding officer shall submit the dispute in 
terms of section 92 to the Supreme Court for decision". The non-agreement with the 
presiding officer by the assessors, led to the still unreported High Court case of 
Director-General Department o f  Labour & Another v Nazeem Mallie & Another82 in 
which the Director-General stated a case for the High Court to consider inter alia a 
question of locus standi in referring a case to the High Court in terms of section 92 of 
COIDA. The question arose because in "practice presiding officers enjoy 
appointments of limited tenure and cannot be expected to use their own resources 
to fund such proceedings".83 The Court considered the Director-General to be better 
resourced than an individual presiding officer in referring a matter to the High 
Court84 although the law clearly empowers the presiding officer to have standing to 
refer cases to the High Court.85 The honourable Court refused to interpret the 
defined meaning of "presiding officer" as inclusive of "Director-General" as it is 
incapable of an interpretation beyond the ordinary meaning of the words.86 Section 
91(3)(b) does not empower the Director-General to refer a matter to the High Court87 
but section 4(1) (p) confers the power upon the First Applicant to "institute such 
inquiries and perform such other functions as may be prescribed, or as he may deem 
necessary for the administration of this Act" which functions may include a referral to 
the High Court provided it is necessary for the administration of the Act.88
si COIDA s 8.
82 Director-General Department o f  Labour & Another v Nazeem Mallie & Another [22684/09) 
[2013] ZAWCHC 124.
83 Ibid [9].
84 Ibid [9].
ss Ibid [10].
“  Ibid [10].
87 Ibid [11].
88 Ibid [12].
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This case clearly shows the peculiarity applicable to the administrative tribunal 
adjudicative system in South Africa and applicable to COIDA.
3.3. A synopsis of the history of compensatory legislation in South Africa
The historical development of compensatory legislation in South Africa cannot be 
separated from the history of mining in South Africa or the consequences thereof. 
South Africans were not subjected to the dreadful consequences of the Industrial 
Revolution because farming was the general occupation. However, the discovery of 
minerals like gold, diamonds and coal and the mining operations89 which 
consequently followed90 exposed employees to newly-identified risks,91 causing 
them to organise themselves into trade unions and enforce collective interests92 
Workers compensatory legislation developed along two very distinguishable lines 
in the form of compensation for injuries and diseases other than lung diseases93 
contracted by mine workers and compensation for the latter.94
Compensation for occupational injuries commenced for mine workers when three 
gold mining companies founded the Rand Mutual Assurance Company Limited in 
189495 and it rapidly expanded to include forty-two mines by 19 0 0 .96 This
89 International Labour Office. Silicosis records o f  the International Conference held at 
Johannesburg 13-27August 1930. London: PS King & Son. Retrieved on 01/08/2013 from 
http://www.ugr.es/~amenende/investigacion/ILO-Silicosis-Conference-1930.pdf. Hereinafter: 
ILO Silicosis Conference Report. At 5 89 -590  & 4 9 4-495  the paper states that mine managers 
and officials were of American origin and miners came from England particularly from 
Cornwell and Northern England. Only a few South Africans were employed in mining. Due to 
their previous exposure to tuberculosis, the migrant workers from Europe and the USA had a 
measure of immunity to tuberculosis contrary to South Africans.
90 Dekker, AH. 2005. Informal social security: A legal analysis. LLD thesis. University of South 
Africa. At 29.
91 ILO Silicosis Conference Report 494-495 .
92 Dekker 31.
93 Compensated under COIDA.
94 Compensated under ODIMWA.
95 RMA History and nature o f  the business. [Sa]. Retrieved on 18/03/2012 from
http: //www.randmutual.co.za/AboutUs/HistoryandNatureoftheBusiness/tabid/15 2/Defaultaspx, 
Garzarelli, G, Keeton-Stolk, L & Schoer, V. 2008. Report on workers' compensation in the Republic 
o f  South Africa. Two licensed mutual associations function pursuant to COIDA i.e. the Rand
Mutual Assurance in the mining industry and The Federated Mutual Employers Assurance in
the building and construction industry at 3. Retrieved on 23/07/2013 from 
http://ssreform.treasury.gov.za/Publications/Workers'%20Compensation%20in%20the%20 
Republic%20of%20South%20Africa%20(USAID,%202008].pdf.
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voluntary scheme preceded legislation in the Transvaal and the Cape Colony as well 
as Britain.97
Legislation commenced with the Employer’s Liability Act 35 of 1886 in the Cape 
Colony and Natal followed in 188 6.98 The first real compensation act was the 
Workmen's Compensation Act 40 of 1905 (Cape of Good Hope) that replaced the 
Employer's Liability Act 35 of 1886. The Transvaal followed in 190799 with the 
Workmen's Compensation Act 36 of 1907 (hereinafter: 1907 Act). This Act applied 
only to white employees and it compensated loss of income at a rate of 50% of 
earnings during periods of disablement and compensated fatal injuries or 
permanent disablement in the form of lump sums. Calculations were based on the 
employee's earnings and were restricted to maximum amounts. The unification of 
South Africa in 1910, lead to the applicability of the Transvaal's 1907 Act to the 
whole country. It was repealed by the Workmen's Compensation Act 25 of 1914.100
A voluntary compensation scheme for black workers was introduced in 1905 and 
followed up in 1911 with the Native Labour Regulation Act 15 of 1911.101 Racial 
discrimination was thus embedded in legislation and people covered by the 
definition of a worker by virtue of this Act were precluded from claiming under Act 
25 of 1914.102 Over time, the Rand Mutual Assurance provided benefits to all races 
at higher rates considered more appropriate than the statutory prescribed rates.103 
Racial discriminative provisions pertaining to benefits were only removed by the 
Workmen's Compensation (Amendment) Act 28 of 1977.104
96 Lang, J. 1986. Bullion Johannesburg: Men, mines and the challenge o f  conflict. Johannesburg: 
Jonathan Ball. At 197. Garzarelli 3.
97 Lang 51. The British Workmen’s Compensation Act took effect in 1908.
98 Strydom, EML (ed). 2006. Essential social security law. 2nd edition. Cape Town: Juta Law. At 
3.2.1. Le Roux 28.
99 Le Roux 29. Lang 197. The Act came into operation in April 1908. Garzarelli 2, the authors 
noted that the Anglo-Boer War interrupted passing of an intended Employers’ Liability Act in 
the Transvaal.
100 Lang 197.
101 Ibid.
102 Strydom e ta l  3.2.1. Le Roux 30. Lang 197.
103 Lang 197. The Rand Mutual Assurance Company under the auspices of the Chamber of Mines 
established two mine hospitals to provide specialist treatment to injured employees, the first of 
which was the Cottesloe Hospital in 1936 and the second known as the Rand Mutual Hospital in 
1979, Lang 358 & 459-460 .
Ibid 459.
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One of the demands by organised labour contained in the Worker's Charter 
published near the end of the 1913 strike by mine workers on the Witwatersrand 
was the amendment of the 1907 Act.105 The Workmen's Compensation Act of 1914 
(hereinafter: 1914 Act), consolidated, revised and broadened benefits to employees 
paid by employers under specific conditions.106 Certain industrial diseases were 
included by amendment in 1917 in the Workmen's Compensation (Industrial 
Diseases) Act 13 of 1917.107
The Statutes of 1914 and 1917 were repealed108 by the Workmen's Compensation Act 
59 of 1934109 (hereinafter: 1934 Act), pursuant to which fault on the part of the 
employer as sine qua non for compensation was removed.110 The office of the 
Compensation Commissioner was set up to mediate111 on compensation settlements 
between employees and employers who were obliged to obtain insurance.112
The Workmen's Compensation Act 30 of 1941 (hereinafter: 1941 Act), introduced a 
whole new compensation dispensation by establishing a central fund from which 
employees were compensated subject to the fulfilment of certain conditions.113 This 
Act did not cover all employees or incidents and categorised employees by race,114 
sex115 and income.116
105 Ibid 223.
106 Le Roux 29. Mankayi vAnglogoldAshanti LTD 2010 (5) SA 137 (SCA). [15]. Hereinafter: Mankayi (SCA).
107 Le Roux 29. Mankayi (SCA) [15].
108 Schedule 3 of the 1934 Act.
109 Frank v; the then Minister of Labour wrote in the Foreword: "One of the first legislative 
attempts of the Union of South Africa in the industrial sphere was the Workmen’s 
Compensation Act, No. 24 of 1914. It was a measure which played a useful part in its time, but 
by 1934, when the new Act, No. 59 of 1934, was passed, it was quite inadequate to meet the 
needs which had arisen in our post-war industrial world."
110 Mankayi (SCA) [16].
111 S 17. S 18 sets out the functions of the Commissioner i.e.
"(a) To investigate or cause investigation to be made into any claim or other matter referred 
to him in terms of this Act and to assist the parties in bringing about a settlement of the 
dispute by agreement;
(b) To examine the settlements transmitted to him in terms of section seventy-seven by any 
insurer and if he be not satisfied that the terms of any such settlements are equitable, to 
bring the claim into review before a magistrate..."
112 S 74. Frank at v.
113 Mankayi (SCA) [17].
114 The 1941 Act defined "Black" in s 2 as: "'Black'......[Definition of 'Black' amended by s. 1 (g) of Act
51 of 1956, substituted by s. 1 (c) of Act 29 of 1984- and deleted by s. 1 (2) of Act 114 of 1991.]”
115 Gender differentiation is evident from the title of the Act referring to men e.g. "Workmen's 
Compensation Act."
116 The role of remuneration will be discussed in Chapter 5 as part of the definition of an "employee."
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The 1941 Act was repealed by COIDA which came into operation on 1 March 1994 
and broadened the definition of "an employee" by removing the restriction on 
income. Benefits that employees may be entitled to, in essence remained the same 
with strict limitations on the time period (maximum of 24 months) afforded for 
payment of income replacement benefits during periods of recovery; limitations on 
the duration allowed for payment of medical costs (maximum of 24 months) and 
the scheduled determination of the degree of permanent disability stayed 
unchanged from 1941117 and calculation of the monetary value remained tied to the 
average accident earnings.118 The time limits can be criticised for they do not take 
note of the type or seriousness of the injury and no provision being made for 
individual cases. No rights have been enacted pertaining to rehabilitation and 
return-to-work programmes119 and no clear prohibition against dismissal120 is 
entertained within the ambit of compensatory legislation in South Africa while 
travelling expenses have only been allowed for emergency transport associated 
with the accident.121 No provision has been made for loss of retirement income or 
for expenses needed in respect of adjustments to homes, vehicles etc. to 
accommodate consequential disabilities.
Mine workers suffering from occupational diseases contracted through work on
mines could be compensated on an ex-gratia basis within the discretion of the
Board pursuant to the Miners' Phthisis Act 34 of 1911122 (hereinafter: 1911 Act) in 
anticipation of the Miner's Phthisis Act 19 of 1912123 (hereinafter: 1912 Act). The 
1911 Act defined a "miner" as a person from European descent who worked 
underground on a “scheduled mine"124 and a "native labourer" was considered to be 
of aboriginal or African tribal origin who worked underground on a scheduled
117 1941 Act Schedule 1 and COIDA Schedule 2.
us i 94i  Act ss 38 & 39 and COIDA Schedule 4.
119 Oliphant, M. 2013. Budget vote address. The honourable Minister of Labour announced intended 
amendments to COIDA to include rehabilitation and early return-to-work provisions.
Retrieved on 25/07/2013 from http://www.labour.gov.za/media-desk/speeches/2013/ 
budget-vote-address-by-the-hon-minister-of-labour-ms-mildred-n-oliphant-mp-national-assembly.
120 Dismissals fall within the ambit of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995. Hereinafter: LRA.
121 COIDA s 72.
122 ILO Silicosis Conference Report 650.
123 Mankayi v Anglogold Ashanti Ltd 2011 32 ILJ 545 (CC) at 26-27. Hereinafter: Mankayi (CC).
124 ILO Silicosis Conference Report at 592 indicated that the Transvaal mines were classified as 
"phthisis-producing of non-phthisis mines" with all of the gold producers schedules as phthisis- 
producing mines.
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mine.125 The 1912 Act introduced a system of compensation to be paid according to 
the degree of disease, first and advanced stages, which remained the basis until 
presently as section 44 of the Occupational Diseases in Mines and Works Act 78 of 
1973 (hereinafter: ODIMWA) classifies as first and second degree.126
It is important to note that contrary to one of the principles of compensatory 
legislation i.e. funding of compensation by employers in exchange for protection 
against civil liability,127 persons fulfilling the definition of a "miner” were expected 
to contribute 2xh  percent of their earnings towards the compensation fund which 
constituted half of the levy with their employer the balance. The formula was 
changed on 1 August 1914- to a total levy of IVz of the earnings of which the 
employer had to contribute 5 percent.128 "Native labourers" were not expected to 
contribute in the same way but the monetary value of compensation was markedly 
less than the value of compensation paid to "miners"129 under the 1912 Act and its 
amendments in 1914, 1916, 1917 and 1918 as well the Miners' Phthisis Act 40 of 
1919 (a new Principal Act) as amended in 1924130 and the Miners' Phthisis Act, 
Consolidation Act, No. 35 of 1925.131 Payment of compensation was considered a 
burden that could ruin a marginally profitable mine.132
Ironically South Africa was considered to be a world leader in the field of 
occupational lung diseases.133 South Africa inter alia enacted the first statutory
125 ibid 650-651.
126 ibid 651-673.
127 The protection of employers against common law liability will be discussed in the following 
chapters.
128 ILO Silicosis Conference Report 653 & 672-673.
129 Ibid 653.
130 By the Miners' Phthisis Act Amendment Act 35 of 1924.
131 ILO Silicosis Conference Report 652-674.
132 ibid 595.
133 South Africa (Republic). Department of Health. 2009. The hidden epidemic amongst form er 
miners: silicosis, tuberculosis and the Occupational Diseases in Mines and Works Act in the Eastern 
Cape, South Africa. (Research report by Roberts, J). Durban: Health Systems Trust. Retrieved on 
26/06/2012 from http://www.hst.org.za/uploads/files/ODMWA.pdf. At 17 the author cited 
the finding of Katz, E (1994), The White Death. Silicosis on the Witwatersrand Gold Mines 1886 -  
1910 at 5 that between the years 1902 and 1925, "silicosis was the subject of no fewer than 
nine legislative acts, six commissions, ten parliamentary select committees and four major 
state industry reports".
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compensation scheme134 compensating silicosis and tuberculosis,135 did extensive 
research within specialised research facilities136 and accommodated the very first 
International Conference on Silicosis (19 3 0)137 under the auspices of the ILO.138
A very important feature of the South African compensatory legislation is the 
entrenched distinction and long-standing disparity139 between compensation for 
lung diseases contracted on "controlled" mines and "controlled" works140 and 
occupational injuries sustained on mines and works as well as occupational injuries 
and diseases flowing from work in other industries as is evident from the judgment 
by Khampepe J in the Constitutional Court ruling of Mankayi v Anglo Gold Ashanti141 
(hereinafter: Mankayi (CC)). The disparity lead to three court actions culminating in 
a landmark Constitutional Court ruling confirming the right of an employee to sue 
his employer for negligence in forsaking his "duty of care" to an employee pursuant 
to ODIMWA. The Constitutional Court was faced with the question whether section 
35 of COIDA precludes the right to sue an employer pursuant to ODIMWA.142
134 Mcculloch, J. 2009. Counting the cost: gold mining and occupational disease in contemporary 
South Africa. African Affairs Journal 108(431): 221-240. Retrieved on 26/06/2012 from 
http: //www.cwbpi.com/AIDS/reports/SouthAfri caGoldMining.pdf.
135 Meiklejohn, A. 1954. The development of compensation for occupational diseases of the lungs 
in Great Britain. Brit J. Industr. Med. 1 1 :1 9 8 -2 1 2 . Retrieved on 25/07/2013 from 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1037557/pdf/brjindmed00231-0034.pdf.
136 ILO Silicosis Conference Report 98.
Ibid 2.
138 Butler, HB. 1928. Labour problems in Southern Africa. International Labour Review 17(4): 465­
485. Butler, the then Deputy Director of the International Labour Office, reported at 469, after a 
visit to South Africa in 1927 that a conference to be held in Johannesburg and convened by the 
ILO has been proposed on the prevention of silicosis. Retrieved on 02/03/2013 from 
http: //heinonline.org.
139 Olivier et al (2003) 459. "There is also the Occupational Diseases in Mines and Works Act 
(ODMWA), which provides for mandatory reporting and the payment of certain benefits to 
mine workers who develop certain occupational lung diseases, as well as the payment of 
certain benefits for dependants of workers who die from such diseases."
140 ODIMWA s 10 states: "Declaration as controlled mine or controlled works
(1) Whenever it comes to the notice of the Minister that any persons are performing risk work 
at a mine or works which is not a controlled mine or a controlled works in terms of section 
9 or a notice under this subsection, he or she shall, subject to the provisions of subsection
(3) of this section, by notice in the Gazette declare the mine or works in question to be a 
controlled mine or a controlled works as from a date to be specified in the notice, not being 
a date earlier than thirty days after the day on which the notice is published in the Gazette." 
2011 32 ILJ 545 (CC). At 29-34.
142 Ibid the whole ruling but particularly paras 13-14.
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3.4. South African compensatory legislative framework
The COIDA forms the central focus of this dissertation and repealed the Workmen's 
Compensation Act of 1941 which was preceded by the 1934 Act and its 
predecessors.143
COIDA will be examined as well as its counterpart in the mining industry, ODIMWA 
and compared to similar provisions and juridical developments in the Canadian and 
Australian compensatory legislation. Problems and deficiencies identified in the 
South African system will be compared to possible solution/s in the Canadian and 
Australian compensatory schemes. In the process of analysis it will be necessary to 
refer to the provisions of the following South African statutes: Occupational Health 
and Safety Act 85 of 1993, the Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998, the Labour 
Relations Act 66 of 1995 and the Mine Health and Safety Act 29 of 1996.
It is submitted that certain determinations in COIDA and ODIMWA are problematic 
and archaic and its application in the South African labour milieu deserves the 
attention of the legal fraternity. This study will examine some of the aspects that 
influence the right to compensation of an employee i.e. the limitations in the 
definition of what constitutes an “injury", the lack of inclusivity in the definition of 
an "employee" and the reasonableness of the protection afforded to employers in 
shielding employers against civil liability. In the process of analysis, attention will 
be given to the South African determination in comparison to the same 
determination in Canadian law as well as in Australian law.144
3.5. Problematic issues
Legislation pertaining to occupational injuries and diseases in South Africa is 
characterised by a fragmented system regulated by at least four different statutes
143 Chapter 2 fn 113-121  supra.
144 Chapter 6 in particular will discuss this aspect.
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and spread over at least three different government departments,145 causing 
dissimilar compensation and enforcement.146 Two laws deal with prevention by 
promoting safe and healthy work places i.e. the Occupational Health and Safety 
Act147 and the Mine Health and Safety Act.148 The first named Act regulates all 
industries and sectors other than mining which is being regulated by the latter. The 
two Acts brought into existence two different inspectorates with individualised 
responsibilities and jurisdictions under the auspices of two different state 
departments i.e. the Department of Labour and the Department of Mineral 
Resources.149
The fragmentation is further enforced by two different compensatory acts being: 
the COIDA and the ODIMWA. Neither COIDA nor ODIMWA regulate preventative 
measures of occupational health and safety and consequently it does not form part 
of the purpose of either. However, the Director-General as part of his functions 
under COIDA,150 may assist a scheme/s in preventing accidents and diseases and 
promoting the health and safety of employees. COIDA is administered by the 
Department of Labour while ODIMWA is being administered by the Department of 
Health. The fragmented system caused disparity in the nature, amount and type of 
compensation to which an employee may be entitled and as determined by the 
industry as well as prevention of unsafe conditions in the workplace. Although
145 Hatting, S & Acutt, J (eds). 2.008. Occupational health management and practice. 3rd edition. Cape 
Town: Juta. At 9 the authors refer to the Erasmus Commission of Enquiry (1975] who identified 
this as problematic as early as 1975 as it caused confusion in the area of health and safety 
because of the replication of health and safety in various laws which in turn lead to duplication 
over different state departments. Retrieved on 24/07/2013 from http://books.google.co.za/ 
books?id=uptThLmdhxYC&pg=PA10&lpg=PA10&dq=histoiy+of+south+african+workmen's+comp 
ensation+act+1941&source=bl&ots=bdD-rQmszm&sig=PSMYlxa5phVA51jyv05rYulT9ac&hl=en&sa 
=X&ei=hNTwUYecFYaZhQfLvoHQDw&ved=0CFEQ6AEwBTgK#v=onepage&q=history%20of%20so 
uth%20african%20workmen's%20compensation%20act%201941&f=false.
146 South Africa (Republic). Department of Labour. 1997. Report o f  the Committee o f  Inquiry into a 
National Health and Safety Council in South Africa. (Committee members: Benjamin, P & Greef, 
J). [SI]. Electronic copy: Stanton, DW. 2003. At 1. Hereinafter: Benjamin Report. Retrieved on 
12/03/2012 from http://www.commerciallaw.uct.ac.za/staff/academic/pbenjamin/.
Taylor Report at 113-114. The Committee identified fragmentation as a problem that ought to 
be addressed through a process of equalising the different acts and to integrate it in a 
comprehensive occupational health and safety system within the social security framework.
147 Occupational Health and Safety Act 85 of 1993.
148 Mine Health and Safety Act 29 of 1996.
149 South Africa (Republic). Department of Labour. Occupational Health and Safety Act and 
Amendments: Application. Retrieved on 18/07/2013 from http://www.labour.gov.za/legislation/ 
acts/occupational-health-and-safety/occupational-health-and-safety-act-and-amendments.
150 S 4(2).
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integration is widely recommended, it remains problematic with little or no 
progress.151
The Mankayi rulings did not address the question of the constitutionality of the 
disparity in compensation152 between COIDA and OIDMWA.153 The question 
remains open as to unfair discrimination and if so, if it can be saved by the 
"reasonableness" thereof or section 36 of the Constitution.154 Dignity and equality is 
of particular importance for purposes of occupational injuries and diseases.
In 1996, the then Minister of Labour remarked:155
The provision of an efficient occupational health and safety service in South 
Africa, including compensation for injured and diseased workers, is severely 
hampered by the lack of an overall national policy and implementation 
strategy in this field. It is further hampered by the fragmentation of 
responsibility across various governmental departments.
Prevention includes three aspects i.e. pro-active accident prevention, risk 
assessment payments and sanctions against offenders. The lack of a coherent policy 
framework with strategically incorporated prevention measures is identified by 
both Taylor156 and Benjamin157 with a deficiency in rehabilitation and reintegration
151 Taylor Report 113-116.
152  AngloGold Ashanti. 2006. Annual Report 2006. Retrieved on 14/05/2010 from 
http://www.anglogold.co.za/subwebs/InformationForInvestors/ReportToSociety06/worker- 
compensation.htm. The report announced "Worker compensation in South Africa under 
review" but unfortunately no formal process has been established by either the South African 
Department of Labour or the Department of Health yet.
153 Mankayi (SCA) [61].
is4 Harksen v Lane NO 1998 SA 300 CC is the classic ruling on unfair discrimination in South Africa. 
The impact of the discrimination upon the plaintiff and others in the same position determines 
the fairness. If the discriminatory act is found to be unfair, it should be considered if it can be 
saved under s 36 of the Constitution. Only if it cannot be saved by s 36 will it be unfair 
discrimination.
155 Rees, D & Davies, T. 1997. Occupational health, in South African health review, edited by J Reddy, 
Durban: Health Systems Trust: 171-222. Retrieved on 25/07/2013 from 
ftp://apollo.hst.org.za/pubs/sahr/1997/chl9_25.pdf.
156 Taylor Report 36 -37  & 114.
157 Benjamin Report at 1, 43-4-5, 57, 59-60 , 64, 74- (the example of the Canadian province of British 
Columbia is given), 96-97(the example of the Australian scheme), 130 , 178 , 180  & 201.
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programmes for injured or diseased employees into the workplace158 as part of 
COIDA.159
3.6. Summary
South African workers' compensatory legislation developed as a result of the 
hazards associated with mining160 in a fragmented way that distinguishes between 
occupational injuries and diseases and lung diseases associated with mining.161 
Disparate compensation for different races was embedded from the inception of the 
first legislation and was only removed at a later stage.162 The fragmentation is still 
very much alive in the form of two distinctive Acts with disparate compensation 
schemes.163 Appeals against decisions pursuant to COIDA lie in the first instance to a 
tribunal and thereafter in limited circumstances to the High Court, the Supreme 
Court of Appeal and in the last instance to the Constitutional Court on constitutional 
issues.164
4. CANADA
4.1. Introduction
Canada is a federal dominion established by virtue of the British North America Act 
1867 which was amended by the supreme law of Canada,165 the Constitution Act 
1982.166 The Federation comprises of ten provinces (Alberta, British Columbia, 
Manitoba, New Brunswick, Newfoundland and Labrador, Nova Scotia, Ontario, 
Prince Edward Island, Quebec, and Saskatchewan) and three territories (Yukon and 
Northwest Territories from which Nunavut167 was separated in 1999) each
158 Oliphant, the honourable Minister of Labour announced intended amendments to COIDA to 
include rehabilitation and early return-to-work provisions.
159 Taylor Report Chapter 12. Benjamin Report Part 4.
160 Chapter 2 para 3.3 supra.
161 Chapter 2 para 3.5 supra.
162 Chapter 2 para 3.3 supra.
163 Chapter 2 para 3.5 supra.
164 Chapter 2 para 3.2 supra.
165 Canada Constitution Acts, 1867 to 1982 and specifically the Constitution Act 1982 s 52(1).
166 Canadian Constitution Foundation. Retrieved on 27/07/2013 from 
http://www.canadianconstitutionfoundation.ca/constitution.php.
167 Campbell Cohen Law Firm. [Sa]. About Nunavut. Retrieved on 25/07/2013 from 
http://www.canadavisa.com/about-nunavut.html.
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governing independently with legislative authority to enact legislation binding upon 
that particular jurisdiction.168 All legislation needs to conform to the Constitution 
Act 1982169 which includes the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.170 Each of 
the provinces enacted compensatory legislation171 (some more than one act) 
constituting a vast number of statutes with generally similar determinations to the 
province of Ontario which based its legislation on research done and principles laid 
down by Chief Justice Meredith in 1913.172
168 Pearson Education. [Sa]. Retrieved on 28/07/2013 from 
http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0107386.html.
169 Constitution Act 1982 s 52(1) which provides as follows: "The Constitution of Canada is the 
supreme law of Canada, and any law that is inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution 
is, to the extent of the inconsistency, of no force or effect.”
170 Canada (Federation). Department of Justice. 2013. Rights and Freedoms in Canada: The role o f  
the Canadian Charter o f  Rights and Freedoms. Retrieved on 25/07/2013 from 
http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/csj-sjc/just/06.html. It is explained that "The Charter takes 
precedence over other legislation because it is "entrenched" in the Constitution, the supreme 
law of Canada". See also The Canadian Encyclopedia. [Sa]. Constitutional Law. Retrieved on 
25/07/2013 from http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.com/articles/constitutional-law.
171 Alberta: Workers' Compensation Act, RSA 2000, c W-15. Retrieved on 27/10/2010 from 
http://canlii.ca/t/522s2.
British Columbia: Workers Compensation Act, RSBC 1996, c 492. Retrieved on 30/10/2010 
from http://canlii.ca/t/5203j.
Manitoba: The Workers Compensation Act, CCSM c W200. Retrieved on 10/10/2010 from 
http://canlii.ca/t/lb79.
New Brunswick: Workers' Compensation Act, RSNB 1973, c W-13. Retrieved on 30/10/2010 
from http://canlii.ca/t/51zl7.
Newfoundland and Labrador: Workplace Health, Safety and Compensation Act, RSNL 1990, c 
W -ll. Retrieved on 30/10/2010 from http://canlii.ca/t/51zk4.
Northwest Territories & Nunavut: Workers' Compensation Act, SNWT 2007, c 21. Retrieved on 
06/09/2010 from http://canlii.ca/t/1406.
Nova Scotia: Workers' Compensation Act, SNS 1994-95, c 10. Retrieved on 10/10/2010 from 
http://canlii,ca/t/523hv.
Ontario: Workplace Safety and Insurance Act, 1997, S.O. 1997, c. 16, Sch. A. Retrieved on 
10/10/2010 from http://canlii.ca/t/51xr9.
Prince Edward Island: Workers Compensation Act, RSPEI 1988, c W-7.1. Retrieved on 
09/06/2010 from http://canlii.ca/t/51vw4.
Quebec: An Act Respecting Industrial Accidents and Occupational Diseases, RSQ, c A-3.001. 
Retrieved on 03/01/2011 from http://canlii.ca/t/lgb3.
Saskatchewan: The Workers' Compensation Act, 1979, SS 1979, c W-17.1. Retrieved on 
25/09/2010 from http://canlii.ca/t/52377.
Yukon: Workers' Compensation Act, SY 2008, c 12. Retrieved on 06/09/2010 from 
http: //canlii.ca/t/kkkf.
Canada Federal Government: Government Employees Compensation Act, RSC 1985, c G-5. 
Retrieved on 01/05/2010 from http://canlii.ca/t/hzmq.
172 Ison, TG. 1989. Workers' compensation in Canada. 2nd edition. Toronto: Butterworths. At Preface 
v. Hereinafter: Ison 1989. See also the Meredith Report. The report researched existing Canadian 
and international legislation and acknowledged the concerns of employees and employers who 
agreed "(1) That the law of Ontario is entirely inadequate in the conditions under which 
industries are now carried on to provide just compensation for those employed in them who meet 
with injuries, or suffer from industrial diseases contracted in the course of their employment; and
(2) that under a just law the risks arising from these causes should be regarded as risks of the 
industries and that compensation for them should be paid by the industries."
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4.2. Canadian court structure and compensatory legislation
The federal system of governance in Canada empowers individual provinces to 
regulate their compensation systems on an individual basis.173 Canada (except for 
the province of Quebec) follows the legal system of common law like South Africa.174
Four levels of court are operational in Canada with the Supreme Court of Canada as 
the highest court, followed by the Federal Court of Appeal and the provincial and 
territorial courts of appeal. The next level in lower ranking order is the provincial 
and territorial Superior Courts. These courts handle more serious crimes and 
appeals from provincial and territorial courts. On the same level, but responsible for 
different issues, is the Federal Court. The lowest level is the provincial and 
territorial courts which are responsible for the majority of cases.175
Schematically the court structure can be depicted as follows:176
Superior Courts
The Supreme Court of Canada is the final court of appeal as it is the highest court in 
Canada and has jurisdiction in all areas of law, including constitutional matters.177
173 Canada (Federation), Department of Justice. 2005. Canada's court system. Ottawa: Department 
of Justice Canada. Retrieved on 12/07/2013 from http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/csj-sjc/ccs- 
ajc/pdf/courten.pdf. At 1. Hereinafter: Canada's Court System.
174 Pearson Education. [Sa]. Common law. Retrieved on 12/07/2013 from 
http: //www.infoplease.com/encyclopedia/society/common-law.html.
175 Canada’s Court System 3.
176 Canadian Superior Courts Judges Association. [Sa]. Structure o f  the Courts. Retrieved on 
12/07/2013 from http://www.cscja-acjcs.ca/structure_of_courts-en.asp?l=4.
177 Canada’s Court System 7.
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Appeals in all other courts must have been exhausted before the Supreme Court 
may be approached with an application for leave to appeal.178 Leave to appeal to the 
Supreme Court is permitted only if the case involves a question of public 
importance (which may include workers' compensatory matters); an important 
issue of law or mixed law and fact; or if the matter is considered to be important 
enough.179 The Court also assists the Federal Government on matters of law or fact 
particularly regarding interpretation of the Canadian Constitution and other federal 
or provincial or territorial legislation.180
The Federal Court and Federal Court of Appeal are essentially superior courts with 
civil jurisdiction but limited to the corners of federal statutes only.181 The Federal 
Court is a court of first instance and appeals from its decisions are heard by the 
Federal Court of Appeal.182 It hears federal matters on interprovincial disputes, 
intellectual property proceedings, citizenship appeals and issues involving the 
Crown, corporations and government departments.183 It is the only Court that has 
jurisdiction to hear applications for review of administrative decisions and orders 
by federal boards, commissions and tribunals (inclusive of jurisdiction over 
workers' compensation matters) and may be approached at any time during a 
proceeding on a question of law, jurisdiction or practice.184 Provincial and territorial 
Superior Courts on the other hand, have jurisdiction in all matters except those 
specifically excluded by a statute.185
Each province/territory has a Court of Appeal or an appellate division hearing 
appeals from decisions by the Superior Courts and provincial and territorial 
courts.186 Although the number of judges sitting as a Court of Appeal differs
178 Ibid 7.
m  Ibid 7.
180 Ibid 3.
“ I Ibid 4-5 .
182 Ibid 4-5 .
183 Ibid 4-5 .
184 Ibid 4-5 .
is5 Ibid 4.
is® Ibid 4.
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between jurisdictions, the panel usually consists of three judges. These courts have 
jurisdiction to hear constitutional matters raised on appeal.187
Provincial and Territorial Superior Courts are known by different names in the 
individual provinces i.e. Superior Court of Justice, Supreme Court (different from the 
Supreme Court of Canada), and Court of Queen’s Bench.188 The court system is 
similar in all provinces except for Nunavut as the Nunavut Court of Justice deals 
with both territorial and superior court matters.189
The Superior Courts have inherent jurisdiction and may hear any matter except 
where specifically limited to another level of court.190 The most serious criminal and 
civil matters are heard by the Superior Courts with some of the courts having 
specialised divisions dealing with family law.191 The Superior Courts also operate as 
a court of first appeal for the lower ranking courts.192
Each province and territory, except Nunavut, has a provincial or territorial court, 
which hears cases involving either federal or provincial or territorial laws 
concerning criminal offences, family law matters (excluding divorce), young 
persons offenders, traffic violations, provincial and territorial regulatory offences, 
and claims involving moneyless than a predetermined threshold.193
Ancillary to the formal court system functions Administrative Tribunals and Boards 
under different enabling statutes similarly to South Africa.194 Courts supervise the 
Administrative Tribunals and the Tribunals may refer questions to the courts.195 
The Courts recognised Administrative Tribunals as courts of first instance within
is7 ibid 4.
188 Ibid 3-4.
189 Ibid 3-4.
190 Ibid 4.
191 Ibid 4.
192 Ibid 4.
Ibid 2-3.
194 Ibid 9.
Ibid 9.
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the specialised field of workers' compensation196 and their expertise is protected in 
privative clauses included in the enabling act.197 The Canadian system of 
Administrative Tribunals is known for its proliferation198 and although its objective 
is easy access to flexible, informal and inexpensive hearings, it is more and more 
judicialised and influenced by procedural requirements and the involvement of 
lawyers.199 Administrative tribunals aim at the implementation of government 
policy and "implementation of that policy may require from them to make quasi­
judicial decisions".200 The Supreme Court of British Columbia set out the review 
process in Albert v British Columbia (Workers' Compensation Appeal Tribunal)201 of 
which the standard of review to be applied to the decision under review is applied 
as the first and foremost step.202 The Court cited the four applicable contextual 
aspects to be applied in the "pragmatic and functional approach" as stated in 
Speckling v British Columbia (Workers' Compensation Board),203 to be:204
(1 ) the presence or absence of a privative clause or statutory right of appeal;
(2) the expertise of the tribunal relative to that of the reviewing court on the 
issue in question;
(3) the purposes of the legislation and the provision in particular; and
(4) the nature of the question -  law, fact, or mixed law and fact.
196 See for instance Pasiechnyk v Saskatchewan (Workers' Compensation Board), [1997] 2 S.C.R. 890 
paras 29 -31  & 69 of which para 69 states: ..’’the embracive wording of s. 180 indicates that the 
legislators intended to endow the Board with exclusive power to decide whether employee 
actions arising from workplace mishaps proceed, notwithstanding their legal characterization.” 
Pasiechnyk v Saskatchewan (Workers' Compensation Board), [1997] 2 S.C.R. 890. Hereinafter: 
Pasiechnyk. Retrieved on 09/04/2011 from
http://www.canlii.org/en/ca/scc/doc/1997/1997canlii316/1997canlii316.html.
197 Alberta s 13.1; British Columbia s 255;  Manitoba s 60.8; Newfoundland s 26; Northwest 
Territories s 126; Nova Scotia s 10F; Ontario s 31; Prince Edward Island s 56.2; Quebec s 579 & 
Yukon s 59.
198 MacNaughton, HM. 2009. Future directions for Administrative Tribunals: Canadian 
administrative justice -  where do we go from here? In Tribunals in the Common Law World, 
edited by R Creyke. Annandale: Federation Press: 203-226 . Retrieved on 26/07/2013 from 
http://books.google.co.za/books?id=0pvnlCiM7zwC&pg=PR8&lpg=PR8&dq=tribunals+in+the 
+common+law+world+chapter+where+do+we+go+from+here&source=bl&ots=4FqHs2MGgB& 
sig=V3HC9aqiPCjufo00Welqb91LVfA&hl=en&sa=X&ei=yQBdUuWNNYXG0QW3mIGQCQ&ved= 
0CCkQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=tribunals%20in%20the%20common%201aw%20world%20ch 
apter%20where%20do%20we%20go%20from%20here&f=false.
i "  Ibid 206.
200 Ocean Port Hotel Ltd. v British Columbia (General Manager, Liquor Control and Licensing 
Branch), [2001] 2 S.C.R. 781, 2001 SCC 52 at 24. Retrieved on 03/08/2013 from 
http://www.canlii.org/en/ca/scc/doc/2001/2001scc52/2001scc52.pdf.
201 Albert v British Columbia (Workers' Compensation Appeal Tribunal), 2006 BCSC 838. 
Hereinafter: Albert. Retrieved on 03/04/2011 from
http://www.canlii.org/en/bc/bcsc/doc/2006/2006bcsc838/2006bcsc838.html.
202 Ibid [3],
2°3 [2005] B.C.J. No. 270.
204 Albert [4].
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The “patently reasonable standard of review" is determined by applying the 
following principles to the decision under review:205
'Patently unreasonable’ means openly, clearly, evidently unreasonable;
The review test must be applied to the result not to the reasons leading to
the result;
The privative clause set out in s. 96(1) of the Act requires the highest level of
curial deference;
A decision may only be set aside where the board commits jurisdiction error;
A decision based on no evidence is patently unreasonable, but a decision
based on insufficient evidence is not.
In British Columbia the rules applicable to administrative review has been codified 
in the Administrative Tribunals Act S.B.C 2004, c. 45 which in section 58 protects 
privative clauses in the enabling act by stipulating:
(2) In a judicial review proceeding relating to expert tribunals under 
subsection (1 )
(a) a finding of fact or law or an exercise of discretion by the tribunal in 
respect of a matter over which it has exclusive jurisdiction under a 
privative clause must not be interfered with unless it is patently 
unreasonable,
(b) questions about the application of common law rules of natural justice 
and procedural fairness must be decided having regard to whether, in 
all of the circumstances, the tribunal acted fairly, and
(c) for all matters other than those identified in paragraphs (a) and (b), 
the standard of review to be applied to the tribunal's decision is 
correctness.
“Discretionary decision" is defined in subsection (3) in an open-ended definition206 
as patently unreasonable for the purposes of subsection (2) (a) if the discretion:207
(a) is exercised arbitrarily or in bad faith,
(b) is exercised for an improper purpose,
(c) is based entirely or predominantly on irrelevant factors, or
(d) fails to take statutory requirements into account.
205 ibid [9].
206 In addition to the statutory definition, it is necessary to visit the common law definition of 
patently unreasonable because of the open-endedness of the first named as was found in Albert 
at [44]-[45].
207 Ibid [43],
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The codification shows the two different standards of review applied in Canadian 
administrative law comprising of the correctness standard [section 58(2)(c)] and 
the patently unreasonableness standard [section 58(2)(3)]. A finding of mixed "law 
and fact" will attract the standard of "patently unreasonableness" to direct the 
review process.208
4.3. A synopsis of the history of compensatory legislation in Canada
As discussed supra, the origin of workers' compensation lies in Germany which 
spread to Britain and the rest of the world.209 Ison indicated that the body of 
Canadian legislation was drawn from England and France but distinctly Canadian 
jurisprudence started with the work by Meredith on compensatory law.210 The 
crucial language was derived from the British Law but preference was given to 
features from German and American legislation which resulted in legislation sui 
generis to Canada.211 The work of Meredith culminated in the promulgation of the 
Workmen's Compensation Act named: An Act to provide for Compensation to 
Workmen for Injuries sustained and industrial Diseases contracted in the course of 
their Employment, S .0 .1914, c. 25.212
Although some Canadian provinces promulgated compensatory laws as early as 
1902,213 the Canadian province of Ontario was the first to embark on 
comprehensive research on the subject before enactment of legislation with the 
appointment of Chief Justice Meredith to head a Royal Commission of Enquiry.214 
The Ontario, Workmen's Compensation Commission, Final Report on Laws Relating to 
the Liability o f  Employers (1913) (hereinafter: Meredith Report) sets out principles 
that would influence not only Ontario but Canada as a whole and international law 
on compensatory law.215 The South African Workmen's Compensation Act of 1941
208 Ibid [36].
209 Association of Workers' Compensation Boards of Canada. [Sa]. History o f  workers' compensation. 
Retrieved on 17/03/2012 from http://www.awcbc.org/en/historyofworkerscompensation.asp.
2“  Ison 1996: 807-833.
211 Ison 1989 :1 .
2«  Ison 1996: 807-833.
213 Le Roux 11.
214 See Chapter 2 fn 209 supra. See also Chapter 2 fn 216-218 , 238 & 240 infra.
215 Ison 1996: 807-833.
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was based upon the principles laid down in the Meredith Report and as COIDA in 
essence is an amendment of the 1941 Act, it is the same principles still governing 
the current South African statute.216
Meredith217 laid down the following principles218 in his Report based on his 
international research into the compensatory laws of countries like Germany, 
France, Belgium, England and the USA:
• No-fault principle: the right to compensation to injured workers without 
regard to negligence and in return employers are shielded against law suits 
and claims for damages.
• Collective liability: all employers share collectively in the costs of benefits to 
injured employees inclusive of universal mandatory coverage. A system that 
creates security of payment by an independent organ of state with exclusive 
jurisdiction to determine compensation claims, collect and administer 
employer contributions, inquire into, hear and decide on relevant matters, 
where the employer's ability to pay is of no consequence any longer and 
payment to the worker is guaranteed from an accident fund.
• Security of payment: payment of compensation will not be defeated by the 
insolvency of the company or protracted appeals in court.
• Administration by an independent organization.219
216 Ison 1996: 807-833 . Although the Commissioner at the time referred to the "first Workmen’s 
Compensation Act" it can safely be assumed reference was made to the 1941 Act as the 1934 
Act was mostly copied from the British Workmen's Compensation Act, 1925 as is clear from the 
Foreword, Preface and contents of Frank who quoted the relevant sections from the British Act 
and case law through his work in assistance for the purpose of interpretation.
217 Ison 1996: 807-833 . Over the following years, other Canadian provinces followed with 
commissions similar to the Meredith Commission e.g. the British Columbia Workmen’s 
Compensation Board Inquiry, Report of the Commissioner, the Hon. Gordon McG. Sloan of 1952 
and the Commission to Inquire into and Investigate Every Aspect of the Workmen’s 
Compensation Act, Report of the Commissioner, W.F.A. Turgeon, the Workmen’s Compensation 
Act, Manitoba of 1958.
218 Douglas, DG, Mastoras, J & Liversidge, LA. 1995. A guide to workers' compensation in Ontario. 
Toronto: Canada Law Book. At 1 the authors remarked that "Despite the many changes that 
have been effected to the Act since 1914, the basic premise of the Act and its objectives remain 
largely unaltered." See also Knight, J, Kontra, C & Channel, B. 2010. Ontario Workplace Safety 
and Insurance A ct Quick reference. Toronto: Carswell. At 1.
219 Ontario Workplace Tribunals Library. 2009. Workers’ compensation law: A documentary history in 
Ontario. At 1-2. Retrieved on 10/08/2012 from http://www.owtlibrary.on.ca/english/print/wcl.pdf.
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These principles known as the “historic trade-off’220 influenced the development 
and interpretation of compensatory legislation until today and are still applied by 
the courts and taken into account in the consideration of legislative changes.221
Developments were introduced with time as the need arose generally based on 
reports e.g. Middleton Report: The Report o f  the Commissioner in the matter o f  The 
Workmen's Compensation Act 1932;222 the Roach Report (1950)223 enquired and 
reported inter alia on compensation scales, payment of claims, occupational 
diseases, assessments, appeals, rehabilitation224 and the composition of the 
Board;225 the McGillivray Report (19 67)226 concentrated on the operation and 
structure of the Board; the Task Force (1973) again examined the administration of 
workers’ compensation.227 Weiler228 (1980),229 was appointed under pressure from 
the Union of Injured Workers to do a comprehensive inquiry into all aspects 
pertaining to workers' compensation230 and it led to fundamental changes in the 
benefit scheme by introducing a dual system aiming to replace actual wage loss
220 See furthermore Chapter 3 paras 4.2.4 & 5.2; Chapter 4 para 3.2.2 (Puddicombe); also Chapter 5 
& Chapter 6.
221 IAVGO Community Legal Clinic. 2011. WSIB Funding Review: Submissions oflAVGO Community 
Legal Clinic. At 5-8. Retrieved on 24/07/2013 from 
http://www.wsibfundingreview.ca/pdf/IAVG0%20submission.pdf.
222 Ontario Workplace Tribunals Library 2.
223 Ontario (Lieutenant Governor). 1950. Report on the Workmen’s Compensation Act. Toronto: 
Baptist Johnston. The Honourable Mr. Justice Roach, Commissioner was appointed to inquire 
into and report upon, and to make recommendations regarding The Workmen’s Compensation 
Act upon subjects other than detail administration. Retrieved on 11/08/2013 from 
http://www.ontla.on.ca/library/repository/mon/25007/15417.pdf.
224 Ibid 106 distinguished between medical rehabilitation and vocational rehabilitation which 
includes return-to-work. No formal programmes to the latter were in place at the time but 
employers were expected to provide suitable work placements for injured workers similar to 
the current regime under COIDA.
225 Ontario Workplace Tribunals Library 3.
226 Ibid 3.
227 Ibid 3.
228 Ontario (Provincial Government). Ministry of Labour. 1980. Reshaping workers' compensation 
fo r  Ontario. Toronto: Ministry of Labour. Hereinafter: Weiler Report. Weiler reasons that 
workers’ compensation is placed between tort liability and social welfare as a mechanism of 
compensation for loss of income at 13. Retrieved on 11/08/2013 from 
http://archive.org/details/reshapingworkersOOweil.
229 Ontario Workplace Tribunals Library 6-7 , The first Weiler report explored the philosophical 
foundations of workers’ compensation and proposed changes to the benefits scheme and the 
second report dealt with occupational diseases and the third report (1981) revisited the 
proposed benefit scheme and introduced a dual system replacing the "actual wage loss" system 
with a system of "projected wage loss".
230 Ontario Workplace Tribunals Library 4-6 .
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basis with a projected wage loss system231 taking into account factors such as the 
employee's vocational characteristics, prospects for rehabilitation232 and the 
availability of suitable employment with regard to the employee's reduced capacity 
as well as compensation for pain and suffering.233 It also introduced the creation of 
the Workers' Compensation Appeals Tribunal, a tripartite structure with 
representatives from employers and employees under the chairmanship of a 
neutral party; as well as, consultative and advisory services for employers and 
employees in the form of the Office of the Worker Advisor and Office of the 
Employer Advisor.234
4.4. Canadian compensatory legislative framework
Canada has various compensatory laws and not all of them will be discussed in this 
study. Each jurisdiction, including the Federal Government of Canada, has enacted 
at least one compensatory law but certain provinces enacted more than one statute, 
some of which provide for specific groups (e.g. Alberta has the Blind Workers 
Compensation Act RSA 2000 cB 4 as well as the Workers' Compensation Act, RSA 
2000, c W-15).
The general trend in Canada is that all jurisdictions follow a similar structure and 
policy though not identical, with regard to compensatory legislation 235 The 
Northwest Territories and Nunavut are regulated by the same compensation
231 Ibid 6-7.
232 Weiler Report at 22, distinguished three forms of rehabilitation i.e. medical and physical, 
vocational and economic, and thirdly social and psychological. The rippling effect of the injured 
worker's trauma ought to be reduced by medical care, retraining and relocation to increase 
economic productive employment and create income security to combat the social problems 
associated with occupationally-injured people in the form of "frustrations, alcoholism, sexual 
difficulties, and family breakdowns".
233 Derstine, D & Nathu, S. 1990. Workers' compensation in Ontario: A decade of reform. University 
o f  Toronto Faculty o f  Law Review 48, Winter: 22-47. Retrieved on 11/08/2013 from http://utflr.
law.utoronto.ca/utfl_fIle/count/media/UTLFR/utflr48/06_48UTorontoFacLRev22(1990).pdf.
234 Ontario Workplace Safety and Insurance Appeals Tribunal. 2010. History o f  the Tribunal. 
Retrieved on 11/08/2013 from http://www.wsiat.on.ca/english/about/history.htm.
235 Canada (Federal Government]. Auditor General of Canada. 2006. Report on the Workers' 
Compensation Board o f  the Northwest Territories and Nunavut. Auditor General of Canada: 
Ottawa: Ontario. At 3. Hereinafter: Auditor General’s Report 2006. Retrieved on 25/07/2013 
from http://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/internet/docs/200606wcbce.pdf.
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authority and share the same legislation.236 The Territory of Nunavut was 
established in 1999 when it became independent from the Northwest Territories.237 
The two governments agreed to maintain the existing Workers' Compensation 
Board.238 Where provinces share legislative measures, compensation authorities 
and industry characteristics, they will be grouped together for purposes of this 
study. For ease of reference the name of the province rather than the name of the 
specific act will be used in this study e.g. Ontario or Ontario Act rather than Ontario: 
Workplace Safety and Insurance Act, 1997, S .0 .1997, c. 16, Sch. A.
4.5. Problematic issues
Ison argues that workers' compensation systems ought to be unambiguous while 
the Canadian system is increasingly complicated with the inclusion of pressure 
groups in the appointment of commissions of enquiry in contrast to single person 
commissions who ought to be independent but experienced as Meredith.239 He 
contended that recent changes were made without thorough investigative 
processes, under pressure by interest groups, resulting in complicated social 
insurance systems since the practice of single person commissions fell in disuse.240 
Meredith's research showed workers insisted:241
(1 ) That the law  of Ontario is entirely  inadequate in the conditions under 
w hich industries are now carried  on to provide ju st com pensation for 
those employed in them  who m eet with injuries, or suffer from 
industrial diseases contracted in the course of their em ploym ent; and
(2 ) that under a ju st law the risks arising from these causes should be 
regarded as risks of the industries and that com pensation for them  
should be paid by the industries.
Employers agreed to Meredith's proposals except for the inclusion of "industrial 
diseases". Although the Meredith Commission consisted of only one person, he 
consulted with all relevant stakeholders over the period from 1910 until 1913.
236 Ibid 3-4.
237 Campbell Cohen Law Firm. [Sa], About Nunavut. Retrieved on 25/07/2013 from 
http://www.canadavisa.com/about-nunavut.html.
238 Auditor General’s Report 2006: 3-4.
239 Ison 1996: 807-833.
240 Ibid.
241 Meredith Report.
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As with the Jooste and Mankayi court cases in South Africa, the principle underlying 
the historic trade-off242 was also challenged in the Canadian courts, e.g. the Alberta 
Court of Queens' Bench reviewed it in Wilson v City o f  Medicine Hat243 and in Budge v 
Alberta (W.C.B.)244 with the Supreme Court of Newfoundland dealing with Reference 
Re Sections 32 and 34 o f  the Workers' Compensation Act (Nfld)24 5 and the High Court 
of Justice in Medwid v Ontario.246
Mckenna247 examined the relevancy of the historic trade-off in current 
circumstances which differs remarkably from circumstances at the time of the 
negotiated compromise in an article entitled: “Workers’ Compensation: The Historic 
Compromise Compromised?" The application of the historic trade-off principle in 
modern compensatory legislation is criticised taking into account current 
workplace and economic conditions as well as health conditions like burnout and 
mental stress associated with the modern work environment. He suggests the 
"...historic compromise must be renegotiated. A key element of such renegotiation 
should be clear, fair, and functional criteria and processes for determining causation 
of workplace stress and burnout."248
For the purposes of this study, only one Canadian act (the particular act will be 
determined based on the topic under discussion), the principal workers' 
compensatory act as per province, will be compared to COIDA with regard to each 
particular subject matter.
242 Knight et al 1. The authors reason that despite attacks on the historic trade-off in courts, 
together with collective liability, it remains fundamental to compensatory legislation.
243 Wilson v Medicine Hat (City of), 2000 ABCA 247 (CanLII). An appeal to this decision was upheld 
by the Court of Appeal of Alberta. Hereinafter: City o f  Medicine Hat or City o f  Medicine Hat 
ruling. Retrieved on 23/03/2013 from http://canlii.ca/t/5rq8.
244 Budge v Alberta (Workers' Compensation Board), 1987 CanLII 3184 (AB Q.B.). Hereinafter: 
Budge. Retrieved on 23/03/2013 from http://canlii.ca/t/27w0z.
245 Reference re: Validity o f  Sections 32 and 34 o f  the Workers’ Compensation Act, 1983 44 DLR. 
Hereinafter: Reference re. Retrieved on 25/03/2013 from http://canlii.ca/t/lnplb.
246 Medwid v Ontario, 1988 CanLII 193 (ON SC). Hereinafter: Medwid. Retrieved on 25/01/2011 
from http://canlii.ca/t/lp77z.
247 McKenna, I. 2000. Workers’ compensation: The historic compromise compromised? Alta. L. Rev. 
38(2): 578-589 . Retrieved on 24/05/2012 from http://0-heinonline.org.oasis.unisa.ac.za/ 
HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/alblr38&id=590&collection=journals&index=journals/alblr.
248 Ibid.
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4.6. Summary
Canadian workers' compensatory legislation is based on principles laid down by 
Chief Justice Meredith and which led to the law in Ontario and influenced legislation 
in all Canadian jurisdictions as well as internationally including South Africa. It aims 
at creating a balance between the interests of employers and employees and 
encompasses the principle known as the "historic trade-off' according to which 
employees abrogated the right to sue at common law in exchange for no-fault 
compensation through an administrative means.249
5. AUSTRALIA
5.1. Introduction
The Australian Federation came into existence by virtue of the Commonwealth of 
Australia Constitution Act 190 0250 and currently comprises of six autonomous 
States (New South Wales, Queensland, South Australia, Tasmania, Victoria and 
Western Australia) and ten territories of which only three have limited self 
governing authority (Australian Capital Territory, The Northern Territory and 
Norfolk Island).251 The Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 does not 
include a Bill of Rights similar to South Africa or Canada but that does not mean that 
Human Rights do not form an integral part of Australian law.252 The Australian 
Human Rights Commission stated that it can be found in the Australian 
Constitution,253 in common law254 and other legislation reflecting human rights
249 Chapter 2 fn 213-220  supra.
250 Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900. Retrieved on 26/07/2013 from http://www. 
aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Senate/Powers_practice_n_procedures/Constitution/preamble.
251 Australian Government. [Sa], Australia's federation. Retrieved on 30/07/2011 from 
http://australia.gov.au/about-australia/our-government/australias-federation.
252 Australia (Commonwealth). [Sa]. Australian Human Rights Commission. How are human rights 
protected in Australian law? Retrieved on 27/07/2013 from
https://www.humanrights.gov.au/how-are-human-rights-protected-australian-law.
253 Ibid. The Australian Constitution provides for the right to vote (s 41); protection of property 
rights (s 51); the right to a trial by jury (s 80); freedom of religion (s 116) & prohibition of 
discrimination on the basis of State of residency (s 117).
254 Ibid. The Australian common law is inherited from the United Kingdom specifically the Magna 
Carta (1215) which can be considered to be the first human rights treaty.
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values.255 The absence of a Bill of Rights creates a situation of the non-existence of 
constitutional remedies in Australia but the Human Rights Commission may make 
recommendations to the Parliament as was done on legislation discriminating 
against same sex couples.256 The sources of human rights reflect a lack of socio­
security rights. Although Victoria and the Australian Capital Territory enacted 
human rights laws, they do not have constitutional status; they remain ordinary 
laws of Parliament.257 The Australian Federal Government does not have explicit 
constitutional jurisdiction on occupational health and safety or compensatory 
matters.258
All Australian jurisdictions enacted workers’ compensatory legislation, and some 
jurisdictions enacted multiple laws to provide for different fields of work e.g. New 
South Wales enacted inter alia the following workers' compensatory laws: The 
Workers' Compensation (Dust Diseases) Act 14 of 1942; The Associated General 
Contractors Insurance Company Limited Act 38 of 1980; The Workers 
Compensation (Bush Fire, Emergency and Rescue Services) Act 83 of 1987; The 
Workers Compensation Act 70 of 1987; The Coal Industry Act 107 of 2001; The 
Workplace Injury Management and Workers Compensation Act 86 of 1998. For 
purposes of this study, discussions will be limited to one act, the principal act on 
workers' compensation, per aspect per State, unless it is prudent to discuss more 
than one.
5.2. Australian court structure and compensatory legislation
Australia and Canada259 have similar federal systems of government which includes 
self governing states and territories with different degrees of legislative power in 
both260 but in contrast to South Africa's261 one national legislative government.
255 Ibid.
256 Ibid.
257 Saunders, C. 2010. The Australian Constitution and our rights, in Future Justice. At 117. 
Retrieved on 27/07/2013 from
http://www.futureleaders.com.au/book_chapters/pdf/Future_Justice/Cheryl_Saunders.pdf.
258 Productivity Commission Report (2004): 112.
259 See Chapter 2 paras 4.1 & 4.2 supra.
260 Bassam 6.
261 Chapter 2 para 3.1 supra.
Australian compensatory legislation shares certain characteristics to the South 
African labour milieu e.g. the mining industry. Similar to Canada and South Africa, 
Australia shares characteristics of the English mercantile law as it falls within the 
common law tradition.262 Both Canada as well as Australia have specific provisions 
for Federal Government employees separate from the provincial legislative 
provisions pertaining to workers' compensatory legislation.263
The Australian Court system can be depicted schematically as follows:264
The Commonwealth Constitution established the High Court of Australia as the 
highest court265 and final court of appeal266 (dependent upon approval of leave to 
appeal following an application to the High Court) and it has jurisdiction over 
Federal, State and Territorial matters.267 Its jurisdiction includes interpretation of
262 Bassam 2.
263 Government Employees Compensation Act, R.S.C. 1985 (Canada); Safety, Rehabilitation and 
Compensation Act 75 of 1988 (Australia).
264 Harvey A. 2009. Hierarchy o f  the Australian courts. Retrieved on 12/07/2013 from 
http://andrewharvey4.wordpress.com/2009/09/19/genl2021-introduction-to-the-australian- 
legal-system-my-lecture-notes/.
265 Australia Constitution s 71.
266 Australia Constitution s 73.
267 Australia Constitution s 73. Also: New South Wales Bar Association. 2013. Court structure, 
judges' titles and order o f  seniority. At 6-7. Retrieved on 12/07/2013 from
http: //www.nswbar .asn.au / docs/resources / structure_2 013 .pdf.
48
the Commonwealth Constitution and legal disputes between Federal and State or 
Territory courts.268 Appeals may be heard from matters heard in the High Court 
itself, Federal Courts or State Supreme Courts.269
The Federal Court considers civil matters derived from federal law and 
Constitutional issues, industrial cases, corporations, trade practices as well as 
judicial reviews and federal tax cases.270 Appeals are heard from rulings by a single 
judge and rulings by the Federal Magistrates Court (non-family law matters) and 
decisions by the States' Supreme Courts on federal matters.271 Some of the Federal 
Court's judges are the Presidents or Deputy Presidents of the Administrative 
Appeals Tribunal272 that also hears appeals and reviews regarding workers 
compensation cases.273
The Federal Magistrates Court was established to provide uncomplicated and 
accessible judicial service and to decrease the workload of the Family Court of 
Australia and the Federal Court of Australia using conciliation, counselling and 
mediation where appropriate.274 Although family law comprises of about 80% of 
the Federal Magistrates Court's work, jurisdiction includes also admiralty, 
insolvency, patent rights, migration, unlawful discrimination and workplace 
relations law.275 Appeals on general federal matters from the Federal Magistrates 
Court lie to the Federal Court of Australia and on family matters to the Family Court 
of Australia.276
The different States and Territories have individualised judicial structures but in 
general it consists of a Supreme Court at the top of the hierarchy with jurisdiction 
over civil and criminal matters and appellate as well as original jurisdiction.277
268 Australia Constitution s 76. New South Wales Bar Association 4 & 6.
269 New South Wales Bar Association 6.
270 Ibid 8.
271 Ibid 8.
272 Ibid 9.
273 Ibid 21.
274 Ibid 9 -10.
275 Ibid 11.
276 Ibid 12.
277 Australian Post Graduate Network. [Sa], Retrieved on 16/07/2013 from 
http: //www.alpn. edu.au/court-hierarchy.
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District and County Courts, presided over by a judge, are lower in hierarchical order 
to the Supreme Court followed by Magistrate and Local Courts as the lowest in 
ranking order of these four courts.278 Each State also has specialised courts and 
tribunals which is important to workers' compensatory matters e.g. the 
Administrative Decisions Tribunal in New South Wales.279
Different from both South Africa and Canada, the Australian judicial system was 
supplemented by a comprehensive integrated administrative tribunal system280 in 
1976 (appreciated by South African and Canadian lawyers)281 dealing with specific 
areas of law aimed at speedy resolutions282 e.g. the Administrative Appeals Tribunal 
providing a means of review which is considered to be "fair, just economical, 
informal and quick"283 as tribunals are viewed to be the first and most accessible 
mechanism of review of executive decisions.284 The Administrative Appeals 
Tribunal285 reviews administrative decisions on merit, made by Commonwealth 
Government officials, authorities, other Tribunals and bodies on the federal sphere of 
government286 as a general jurisdictional tribunal regarding decisions pursuant to 
more than 400 enactments.287 Decisions may be confirmed, varied or set aside in 
matters that are specifically regulated by statutes and legislative instruments 
conferring jurisdiction on the Appeals Tribunal. Subject matters range from taxation 
and social security to workers' compensation and immigration288 The Administrative 
Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 59 of 1977, codified the grounds for judicial review 
and compelled decision-makers to provide written reasons for decisions.289
278 Ibid.
279 Ibid.
280 Armstrong 76.
281 Creyke 65.
282 New South Wales Bar Association 4.
283 Ibid 20.
284 Groves, M & Lee, HP (eds). 2007. Australian administrative law: Fundamentals, principles and 
doctrines. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) at vii.
285 Robinson, MA. 2007. The explosion in administrative law at the State level. Paper delivered at 
Seminar of the Australian Institute of Administrative Law, NSW Chapter. At 1. The 
Administrative Appeals Tribunal is described as a super-tribunal. Retrieved on 04/05/2012 from 
http://www.robinson.com.au/monoartpapers/articles/MAR%20Explosion%20in%20Adminis 
trative%20Law%20at%20the%20State%20Level%2021%20June%202007.pdf.
286 New South Wales Bar Association 21.
287 Groves 80.
288 New South Wales Bar Association 21.
289 Armstrong 78.
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Besides the Northern Territory and Queensland, all other States introduced similar 
Administrative Appeals Tribunals to the Commonwealth scheme but in South 
Australia and Tasmania, review forms part of the functions of a dedicated division 
of the District or Magistrates Court.290 A tribunal's jurisdiction is limited to the 
corners of the enabling act291 and can also be found in the nature of the decisions it 
may review.292
The South Australian Supreme Court considered the limitation set by the South 
Australian Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1986 in the case of South 
Australian Fire and Emergency Services Commission v Workers Compensation 
Tribunal & Anor293 by limiting jurisdiction in appeals to questions of law294 in 
section 86.295 The right to appeal as well as the jurisdiction to consider an appeal by 
the Workers Compensation Tribunal is limited to the statutory provision which may 
only involve a question of law296 irrespective of how the ground for appeal is 
framed.297 The Full Bench of the Tribunal is not authorised to determine its own 
jurisdiction298 because inter alia, the enabling Act does not constitute the Workers 
Compensation Tribunal as a court although its decision when made within its 
jurisdiction is "final and conclusive".299 The Court held that it is the expressed intent 
of the Act to restrict litigation over determinations by the Tribunal and the Act in its 
totality provides for speedy conclusions and informal hearings of workers' 
compensation claims in the most efficient and cost effective manner possible.300 It 
would contradict the legislative policy to allow "erroneous decisions of the Full 
Bench which expand its jurisdiction to include controversies over factual 
questions”.301 The Supreme Court found that a decision of the Tribunal will be final
290 Groves 83.
291 Ibid 86.
292 Ibid 87.
293 [2009] SASC 213. Hereinafter: South Australian Fire and Emergency Services Commission. 
Retrieved on 08/12/2011 from http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/sa/SASC/2009/213.html.
294 COIDA similarly limits appeals to questions of interpretation in s 9(5).
295 South Australian Fire and Emergency Services Commission [3] & [40],
296 Ibid [43].
297 Ibid [44].
29!! Ibid [45].
299 Ibid [46] & [49].
300 Ibid [48].
301 Ibid [48].
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if it limits itself to the boundaries of its jurisdiction and the task of the Supreme 
Court is to be the guardian as to such limitations.302
5.3. A synopsis of the history of compensatory legislation in Australia
The first attempt at compensatory legislation in Australia was in New South Wales 
(1882) after which South Australia (1884), Victoria and Queensland (1886), 
Western Australia (1894) and Tasmania (1895) followed.303 These laws followed in 
the footsteps of the British Employers' Liability Act 1880 which had only restricted 
application to manual workers and injuries sustained in limited situations with 
meagre compensation.304
No-fault workers' compensatory legislation was only introduced into Australia by 
Western Australia in 1902, followed by the other States with Victoria to be the last 
in 1914. The first Commonwealth Seamen’s Compensation Act 29 of 1909, was 
found to be invalid by the High Court of Australia. The Northern Territory and the 
Australian Capital Territory only enacted compensatory legislation in 1931.305
The history of compensatory legislation in Australia is characterised by periods of 
few legislative changes followed by periods of rapid and often broad legislative 
changes. Changes in increased rights to compensation were often enacted by Labour 
Governments while Conservative Governments were inclined to restrain the rights 
under pressure of the cost burden to businesses which suggests the socio-political 
undertones in workers' compensation that characterised it from inception in 
Germany.306
In 1926 the Labour Government in New South Wales widened the eligibility test by 
changing the conjunctive noun "and” to the disjunctive "or" in the test phrase "out of
302 Ibid [49].
303 Winder 277-287.
304 Ibid.
305 Ballard, J & Sirca, H. 1991. Annotated Commonwealth Employee’s Rehabilitation and 
Compensation Act 1988. Annandale: Federation Press. At: Introduction ix.
306 Purse, K. 2005. The evolution of workers' compensation policy in Australia. Health Sociology 
Review 14(1): 8 -20. Hereinafter: Purse 2005. Retrieved on 07/05/2012 from 
http://0-search.informit.com.au.oasis.unisa.ac.za/fullText;dn=200509528;res=APAFT.
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and in the course of employment".307 This amendment was repealed in 1929 by the 
then Conservative Government. It was reintroduced later and by the end of World 
War II all the Australian States had changed the wording of their workers’ 
compensatory laws to the disjunctive form of the test.308 The pattern repeated itself 
with the right to compensation for commuting injuries to and from work.309 
Queensland replaced the word "accident" by defining an "injury” to allow 
compensation to an employee who is not injured in an accident but suffering from a 
condition as a consequence of work. It also introduced full wages in respect of 
income replacement for the first 26 weeks of disability in 1972 while rehabilitation 
was particularly provided for the next year.310 All the jurisdictions except 
Queensland (which embarked on a publicly-underwritten compensation system in 
1916) had expensive systems of manifold private insurers,311 meagre compensation 
and financial instability by 1970.312 During the 1970's changes involved an increase 
in the level of earnings replacement compensation while the 1980's were marked 
by the introduction of rehabilitation and return-to-work programmes313 aimed at 
reducing costs314 as the financial liabilities reached a crisis level of being under­
reserved by 31%.315 An extension of the duration of income replacement payments 
was also enacted.316
The common law right to claim damages from employers was restricted to claims 
for non-economic loss.317 (Although limited over time, the right to sue employers for
307 This test phrase and its application will be discussed in Chapter 4.
308 Purse 2005: 12.
3<k> Ibid 13.
310 Queensland Parliament. Finance and Administration Committee. 2013. Report No. 28, Inquiry 
into the operation o f  Queensland's Workers' Compensation Scheme. Brisbane: Government 
Printer. At 5. Hereinafter: Queensland Workers’ Compensation Inquiry 2013.
Retrieved on 12/08/2013 from
http://www.parliament.qld.gov.au/Documents/TableOffice/TabledPapers/2013/5413T2695.pdf.
311 Monash University. Institute for Safety, Compensation and Recovery Research. 2011. To strike
a balance'A history o f  Victoria's Workers' Compensation Scheme, 1985-2010 (Monash University
Research report #: Rl-011-018). Clayton: Monash University Publishing. At 25 it is reported that 
Victoria alone had 69 private insurers which was replaced in 1985 with one primary insurer 
and 9 others appointed after a tender process. Hereinafter: ISCRR. Retrieved on 14/08/2013 
from http://www.iscrr.com.au/reports-pubs/research-reports/worksafehistory.pdf.
312 ISCRR 6.
si3 Ibid 20.
3i4 Purse 2005 :15 .
3is ISCRR 10.
Purse 2005: 14-15.
3i7 Ibid 15-16.
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negligence remained part of the Australian compensatory legislation from the initial 
introduction of compensatory legislation318 while in South Africa and in Canada319 it 
was removed with the enactment of compensatory legislation as part of the historic 
trade-off).320
Amendments between 1990 and 1996 in Queensland included inter alia the 
inclusion of "significant contributing factor" into the requirements pertaining to the 
definition of "an injury"321 as part of the prerequisites to establish causality and the 
irrevocable election whether to pursue322 at common law.323
In Victoria the failed amendments of the 1980’s led to the biggest strike action in 
Victorian history since 1970 in late 1992 which was followed with the promulgation 
of a new Act soon after a new government was elected.324 The new Act introduced 
inter alia the concept of a "serious injury" in section 134AB325 (still presently 
applied) as prerequisite for the right to pursue at common law; and income 
replacement benefits ceased after 104 weeks unless the employee was seriously 
injured or permanently disabled.326 These changes and risk rated premiums 
enhanced health and safety performance which in turn led to the financial 
turnaround of the compensation scheme in Victoria.327 Although the announcement 
of the removal of the right to sue at common law in 1997 was followed by 
consecutive protests,328 the Bill was passed and came into effect on 23 December 
1997. Emotions ran high during debate in the Lower House of Victoria, with 
monopoly money thrown in the public gallery329 and the shouting of "shame, 
shame”.330 The right to institute common law proceedings was reintroduced in
318 Ibid 11.
319 Barring of the right to pursue at common law will be discussed in Chapter 6.
32<> Purse 2005: 11.
321 The definition of an injury will be dealt with in Chapter 4.
322 The right to pursue at common law will be discussed in Chapter 6.
323 Queensland Workers’ Compensation Inquiry 2013 at 5.
324 ISCRR 43-44 .
325 The concept of "serious injury” will be dealt with at Chapter 6 paras 4.1; 4.3.1; 4.3.2; 4.3.3 & 4.3.4.
326 ISCRR 45.
327 ibid 48.
328 Ibid 52.
329 The monopoly money was represented of the money that workers stand to lose with the 
removal of the right to pursue at common law. ISCRR 53.
33° ISCRR 53.
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2000 but access was restricted.331 Financial stability followed332 and Victoria took 
the bold step of voluntarily screening workers for preventable diseases since 
2 0 0 8.333 In the recent past, Australia embarked on a programme of national 
harmonisation of both occupational health and safety and workers' 
compensation.334
5.4. Australian compensatory legislative framework
Various compensatory laws are effective in the Australian Commonwealth because 
each jurisdiction has enacted at least one compensatory law of which eleven335 of 
the workers' compensatory laws are considered to be the "principal" statutes with 
main objectives to provide satisfactory monetary compensation, appropriate 
rehabilitation and reintegration into the workplace, affordability of premiums and 
fully funded by employers.336 The differences can be ascribed to differences in 
demographics and social, economic and cultural factors designing the particular 
scheme.337 The multiplicity of compensatory laws is viewed as one of the reasons 
for burdening the economy, employees and employers with inadequacies and 
encumbers employers to comply with health and safety requirements and 
expenses.338 Multi-state employers are faced with compliance and cost burdens as 
each of the workers' compensatory laws "reflects community norms, evolving 
workplace arrangements and the legal and medical practices of that particular 
jurisdiction".339 In addressing these problems as well as the concerns of a growing 
mobile labour force, the Productivity Commission proposed an alternative national 
scheme operating in addition to the existing schemes to provide national 
coverage.340 Furthermore, a formal review mechanism is proposed to increase the
331 Ibid 56.
332 ibid 62.
33 3  Ibid 63.
3 3 4  Ibid 70.
335 Queensland Workers’ Compensation Inquiry 2013 at 9.
336 Productivity Commission Report (2004) at XXII indicates ten principal workers' compensatory 
laws in Australia.
337 Purcal, S & Wong, A. 2007. Australian workers' compensation: A review. At 1. Retrieved on 
14/08/2013 from
http://wwwdocs.fce.unsw.edu.au/actuarial/research/papers/2007/AustWorkComp_Purcal.pdf.
338 Productivity Commission Report (2004): XXII.
339 Ibid XXIII.
3« Ibid XXIII.
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level of consistency and uniformity between jurisdictions with time to benefit all 
employees, employers and the economy.341 However, it was not well received and 
during the inquiry phase the Queensland Law Society referred to it in lucid terms in 
its submission to the Productivity Commission. It warned that the presentations to 
the Commission opened a "debate upon irreconcilable differences in those schemes 
which have been identified by governments as properly within the sovereign 
decision-making powers of the respective States and Territories".342 The Law 
Society was very clear on its stance and submitted that:343
...it is unrealistic to contemplate legislating for "consistent workers’ 
compensation programs across Australia" or for a "consistent benefits 
structure". The existing Australian schemes are simply not amenable to a 
"one size fits all" approach. Matters such as common definitions can, as has 
been mentioned above, be addressed by amendments agreed between all 
jurisdictions and enacted in their respective legislation and no special 
Commonwealth legislation is required to effect that accord.
Similar to Canada, some of the Australian States have more than one compensatory 
law specific to a particular group344 e.g. New South Wales enacted the Workers 
Compensation (Bush Fire, Emergency and Rescue Services) Act 83 of 1987 as well 
as the Workers Compensation Act 70 of 1987. Similar to Canada, not all of the 
Australian laws will be perused for the purposes of this study but only one act per 
aspect under discussion and for ease of reference the name of the State will be 
utilised rather than the name of the specific act, e.g. New South Wales rather than 
New South Wales Workers Compensation Act 70 of 1987,345
3« ibid XX. III.
342 Queensland Law Society. 2003. Accident compensation submission re Workers' Compensation.
(Sullivan, T.: President). At 1. Hereinafter: Queensland Law Society Submission 2003. Retrieved 
on 14/08/2013 from http://www.pc.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0006/19626/sub097.pdf.
343 Ibid 3.
344 Productivity Commission Report (2004): XXII, XXX-XXXII & 5.
345 Commonwealth: Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 75 of 1988. Retrieved on
12/06/2010 from http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/num_act/ceracal988534/. 
Australian Capital Territory: Workers Compensation Act 1951. Retrieved on 12/06/2010 from 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/act/consol_act/wca1951255/.
New South Wales: Workers Compensation Act No 70 of 1987. Retrieved on 12/06/2010 from 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/nsw/consol_act/wcal987255/.
Northern Territory: Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 13 of 2008. Retrieved on 
25/09/2010 from http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/nt/consol_act/wraca400/.
Queensland: Workers’ Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003. Retrieved on 12/06/2010 
from http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/nt/consol_act/wraca400/.
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5.5. Problematic issues
Fragmentation is rife in Australian compensatory legislation due to the 
constitutional government system of the country which empowers each jurisdiction 
to govern independently and promulgate its own statutes as needs.346 This resulted 
in eleven347 different principal workers' compensatory laws with another twenty- 
nine subject specific statutes.348 Fragmentation was increased by disparate
South Australia: Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 124 of 1986. Retrieved on 
12/06/2010 from http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/sa/consol_act/wracal986400/. 
Tasmania: Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 4 of 1988. Retrieved on 06/05/2012 
from http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/tas/consol_act/wracal988400/.
Victoria: Accident Compensation Act No. 10191 of 1985. Retrieved on 12/06/2010 from 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/vic/consol_act/acal985204/.
Western Australia: Workers' Compensation and Injury Management Act 44 of 1981. Retrieved 
on 12/06/2010 from http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/wa/consol_act/wcaimal981445/.
346 Purse, K, Guthrie, R & Meredith, F. 2004. Faulty frameworks: The Productivity Commission and 
workers' compensation. Australian Journal o f  Labour Law, 17(3): 306-316. Hereinafter: Purse 2004. 
Retrieved on 03/05/2012 from
http://ura.unisa.edu.au/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=unisa26596.
347 Queensland Workers’ Compensation Inquiry 2013 at 9.
348 New South Wales: Associated General Contractors Insurance Company Limited Act 38 of 1980. 
Retrieved on 30/06/2011 from
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/nsw/num_act/agciclal980n38564.
New South Wales: Bishopsgate Insurance Australia Limited Act 81 of 1983. Retrieved on 
30/06/2011 from http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/nsw/num_act/bialal983n81411.pdf. 
New South Wales: The Standard Insurance Company Act 18 of 1963. Retrieved on 05/08/2011 
from http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/nsw/num_act/tsiclacoical963nl8712.pdf.
New South Wales: Workers’ Compensation (Brucellosis) Act 1979 (repealed in 2004). Retrieved 
on 30/06/2011 from http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/nsw/repealed_act/wcal979379/s2.html. 
New South Wales: Workers Compensation (Bush Fire, Emergency and Rescue Services) Act 83 
of 1987. Retrieved on 03/07/2011 from
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/nsw/num_act/wcfearsal987n83621.pdf.
New South Wales: Workers' Compensation (Dust Diseases) Act 14 of 1942. Retrieved on 
05/08/2011 from http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/sinodisp/au/legis/nsw/consol_act/wcda 
1942388/longtitle.html?stem=0&synonyms=0&query=Workers%20Compensation%20Dust% 
20Diseases%20Act%201942.
New South Wales: Workmen's Compensation (Lead Poisoning -  Broken Hill) Act 31 of 1922. 
Retrieved on 05/08/2011 from
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/nsw/num_act/wcphal922n31513.pdf.
New South Wales: Coal Industry Act 107 of 2001. Retrieved on 03/07/2011 from 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/nsw/num_act/cia2001nl07197.pdf.
Victoria: Victoria State Emergency Services Act 1987. Retrieved on 05/08/2011 from 
http://www.austlii. edu.au/au/legis/vic/hist_act/vsesa1987330/.
Victoria: Juries Act 53 of 2000. Retrieved on 05/08/2011 from 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/vic/consol_act/ja200097/.
Victoria: Emergency Management Act 75 of 1986. Retrieved on 05/08/2011 from 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/vic/hist_act/emal986190/.
Victoria: Police Assistance Compensation Act 1968. Retrieved on 05/08/2011 from 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/vic/hist_act/pacal968307/.
Victoria: Country Fire Authority Act 1958. Retrieved on 05/08/2011 from 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/vic/hist_act/cfaal958292/.
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augmentation of benefits through legislative amendments in the different 
jurisdictions and resulted in the system being described as "dysfunctional".349
A proposal for a National Framework with a "national Authority" on workers 
compensation in 1994 by the Industry Commission was met by strong resistance in 
1994 and again in 199 7.350 The persistent need to harmonise coverage and 
compensation benefits while remaining sustainable eventually led to the founding 
of the Agreement by the States and Territories on Harmonisation of Workers 
Compensation and Occupational Health and Safety Arrangements (2 0 0 6)351 and 
subsequently the Heads of Workers' Compensation Authorities to issue an action 
plan to harmonise coverage and benefits between the different jurisdictions for the
Western Australia: Workers’ Compensation and Injury Management (Acts of Terrorism) Act 40 
of 2001. Retrieved on 30/06/2011 from
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/wa/consol_act/wcaimota2001629/.
Western Australia: Employer’ Indemnity Policies (Premium Rates) Act 96 of 1990. Retrieved on 
30/06/2011 from http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/wa/consol_act/toc-E.html.
Western Australia: Employers’ Indemnity Supplementation Fund Act 80 of 1980. Retrieved on 
30/06/2011 from http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/wa/consol_act/toc-E.html.
Western Australia: Waterfront Workers (Compensation for Asbestos Related Diseases) Act 22 
of 1986. Retrieved on 05/08/2011 from
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/wa/consol_act/wwfardal986644/.
Western Australia: Workers’ Compensation (Common Law Proceedings) Act 35 of 2004. 
Retrieved on 30/06/2011 http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/wa/consol_act/wclpa2004459/. 
South Australia: Workmen's Compensation Act 36 of 1971. Retrieved on 23/07/2011 from 
http: //www.austlii. edu.au/au/legis/sa/num_act/19 71 /.
Tasmania: Workers’ (Occupational Diseases) Relief Fund Act 45 ofl954. Retrieved on 
23/07/2011 from http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/tas/consol_act/wdrfal954404/. 
Australian Capital Territory: Workers Compensation Act 1951. Retrieved on 23/07/2011 from 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/act/num_ord/wcol951316/.
Common Wealth: Asbestos Related Claims (Management of Commonwealth Liabilities) Act 122 of 
2005. Retrieved on 23/07/2011 from
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/num_act/acocla2005550/.
Common Wealth: Veterans’ Entitlements Act 27 of 1986. Retrieved on 23/07/2011 from 
http: //www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/num_act/veal9862 61/.
349 Purse, K. 2011 . Winding back workers' compensation entitlements in Australia. Australian 
Journal o f  Labour Law, 24(3): 238-259. Hereinafter: Purse 2011. Retrieved on 03/05/2012 
from http://0-www.lexisnexis.com.oasis.unisa.ac.za/hottopics/lnacademic/?verb=sr&csi=267868.
350 Queensland Law Society Submission 2003. At 2 the Law Society stated in their submission: 
"Any statutory framework which inhibits the flexibility of the States to fix policy is unnecessary, 
counterproductive and must be opposed.”
351 Australian Capital Territory. 2006. Chief Minister and Treasury Directorate. Agreement by the 
States and Territories on harmonisation o f  workers' compensation and occupational health and 
safety arrangements. Retrieved on 12/05/2012 from
http://www.cmd.act.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0008/119483/caf-harmonisation-iga.pdf. 
See furthermore Chapter 4 paras 2.4; 3.4 & 4.4 and Chapter 5 paras 2.10; 3.7 & 4.7 on the effect 
of the inter-state arrangements in Canada and Australia and the lack thereof in South Africa.
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years 20 1 0-20 1 3.352 This is not accepted by all jurisdictions and implementation is 
varied with the Territories and three of the States on par with time limits, two 
States in progress and two States in resistance to harmonisation.353
The Constitution of Australia does not empower the Federal Government with 
respect to workers’ compensation over the States but it may use specific powers e.g. 
the “corporations power" to enable the implementation of a new national insurance 
scheme.354
A particular characteristic of the Australian compensatory legislative history is the 
repeated cycle355 of the development of seemingly too generous compensation 
benefits and access to compensation by means of too lenient measures causing 
problems of sustainability and affordability356 which then needs to be constrained 
in a continuous process357 of legislative changes358 which process was influenced by 
the philosophy of the government of the day.359
352 Safe Work Australia. 2010. The National Workers' Compensation Action Plan 2010—2012. 
Canberra: Safe Work Australia. Hereinafter: The National WC Plan 2010-2012. Retrieved 
on 30/07/2011 from http://safeworkaustralia.gov.au/AboutSafeWorkAustralia/WhatWeDo/ 
Publications/Pages/WCPlan2010-2013.aspx.
353 Cairns, A. 2012. Work health and safety harmonisation -  after the deadline. Electronic article 
retrieved on 05/05/2012 from http://www.moray.com.au/publications/work-health-and- 
safety-harmonisation-after-the-deadline/.
354 Productivity Commission Report (2004): 112.
355 Taylor, S. 2005. Workers' compensation amendments: for better or worse? Proctor 25(3):13-14. 
Retrieved on 05/05/2012 from http://0-search.informitcom.au.oasis.unisa.ac.za/fullText; 
dn=20051806;res=AGISPT. See further Fountain, J. 2009. Amendments to the weekly payments 
provisions of the Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 124 of 1986. Bulletin (Law 
Society o f  SA): 31(7): 16-17. Retrieved on 05/05/2012 from http://0-search.informit.com. 
au.oasis.unisa.ac.za/fullText;dn=20093437;res=AGISPT. Purse, K. 2003. Australian workers' 
compensation policy: Conflict, step-downs and weekly payments. International Employment 
Relations Review: 9(1): 23-44. Hereinafter: Purse 2003. Retrieved on 25/05/2012 from http://0- 
search.informit.com.au.oasis.unisa.ac.za/documentSummaiy;dn=165031633647043;res=IELBUS.
356 Williamson, BC, 1991. Amendments to New South Wales Workers Compensation Legislation. 
Australian Journal o f  Labour Law: 4(1): 62-72 . Retrieved on 03/05/2012 from 
http://0-www.lexisnexis.com.oasis.unisa.ac.za/hottopics/lnacademic/?verb=sr&csi=267868.
357 Adams, KL. 2005. Here we go again: The Accident Compensation Act 1985 (Vic) and the amendment 
merry-go-round. Australian Journal o f  Labour Law: 18(2): 158-172. Retrieved on 03/05/2012 from 
http://0-www.lexisnexis.com.oasis.unisa.ac.za/hottopics/lnacademic/?verb=sr&csi=267868.
358 pUrse, K. 2009. From WorkCover to WorkCover Light in South Australia. Australian Journal o f  
Labour Law 22(2): 188-206. Hereinafter: Purse 2009. Retrieved on 05/05/2012 from 
http://0-www.lexisnexis.com.oasis.unisa.ac.za/hottopics/lnacademic/?verb=sr&csi=267868.
3^  ISCRR 2.
59
5.6. Summary
Legislative developments on workers' compensatory legislation in Australia are 
notorious for periods of rapid amplification of benefits in favour of employees 
followed by periods of a limitation of such rights. It is greatly influenced by the 
political philosophy of the government of the day with Labour Governments 
enhancing benefits to workers and Conservative Governments retracting them.360 
The workers' compensatory system in Australia is characterised by fragmentation 
which is being addressed by a process of harmonisation which is inclusive of the 
Commonwealth Government and all the different States.361
6. CONCLUSION
In this chapter the historical development of workers' compensatory legislation was 
explored to identify the need for this type of laws. It is clear that although legislative 
provisions were made since antiquity for monetary compensation, the Industrial 
Revolution intensified the need for redress other than what was available at 
common law. Workers who could afford it participated in social assistance schemes 
since the Middle Ages but because not everybody could afford it, it too was 
unsatisfactorily. Actions under common law were known to be expensive, onerous 
and protracted processes with often unsuccessful outcomes due to the relatively 
solid common law defence principles that favoured employers. This led to the 
Bismarckian model of workers' compensation which has been refined by Meredith 
in Canada to develop legislation suigeneris to Canada.362
South Africa is a republic with a central government with a supreme Constitution 
including a Bill of Rights which protects the rights of its citizens and other people 
within its jurisdiction. COIDA and ODIMWA are the two workers’ compensatory 
laws enacted to provide social security benefits in times of distress to people in 
formal employment, which leaves people in other forms of employment without
360 Chapter 2 fn 305-333  supra.
361 Chapter 2 fn 333 & 355-353  supra.
362 Chapter 2 fn 211 supra.
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social security benefits.363 Canada364 and Australia365 have federal systems of 
government and although both also have written constitutions, Australia does not 
have a Bill of Rights similar to South Africa and Canada. The federal systems of 
government allow for jurisdictional enactments which in both Canada and Australia 
lead to multiple workers' compensatory laws.366 As the South African compensatory 
system is notorious for its fragmentation, it is equally true of Canada and 
Australia.367
All three countries fall within the common law legal tradition and all three countries 
have a judicial system that follows the stare decisis doctrine. Administrative review 
of decisions regarding workers' compensatory provisions is aimed at providing a 
review mechanism that is easy, accessible and cost effective. All three of the 
countries provide for a limited right of review often complicated by technicalities 
created by both statute and through interpretation.368
Although South Africa escaped the dreadful consequences of the Industrial 
Revolution, the equally dreadful consequences of the mining industry influenced 
and magnified the need for the enactment of workers' compensatory legislation.369 
South Africa took the lead with legislation pertaining at compensation for lung 
diseases due to mining but neither ODIMWA nor its antecedent acts were developed 
resulting in an outdated compensatory scheme in place at present.370 South Africa 
absorbed the principles laid down by Meredith in the 1941 Act which Act did not 
cover all employees or incidents.371 The definition of an employee was broadened 
over time with racial discrimination and fragmentation being some of the negative 
aspects characterising workers' compensatory legislation in South Africa from its 
inception.372
363 Chapter 2 fn 2-4 , 58-60 and Chapter 2 para 3.3 supra.
364 Chapter 2 fn 170 & Chapter 2 paras 4.1 & 4.2 supra.
365 Chapter 2 para 5.1 supra.
366 Chapter 2 paras 4.3; 4.3 & 5.1 supra.
367 Chapter 2 paras 3.5; 4.4 & 5.5 supra.
368 Chapter 2 paras 3.2; 4.2 & 5.2 supra.
369 Chapter 2 para 3.3 supra.
370 Chapter 2 fn 9 3 ,9 4  & 122-142  supra.
371 Chapter 2 fn 114-116  & 216 supra.
372 Chapter 2 fn 117-121  supra.
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Chief Justice Meredith laid down the principles that encompassed the historic trade­
off and still form the basis of workers' compensatory legislation in all three 
countries at present (although Australia did not follow the principles perse, it is also 
applied in Australian compensatory laws). The historic trade-off principle came 
under constitutional attack in both South Africa373 and Canada374 but in Australia a 
limited right to sue at common law can be exercised.375
Developments in Australian workers' compensatory laws were influenced by the 
political philosophy of the day which reveals the socio-economic foundation of 
workers' compensatory legislation as part of the social security framework.376 
Fragmentation and complicated systems have been identified as obstacles in all 
three countries but with Australia implementing an integrated system.377
The importance of administrative law cannot be denied and its specific applicability 
in the field of workers' compensation is real as it sets the limits for official decision 
makers and provides the mechanisms and principles that facilitate people to query 
and challenge an official's decision.378
In this chapter it was demonstrated how and why the right to workers’ 
compensation was developed and laid down in legislation. Furthermore the 
adjudicative structures of South Africa,379 Canada380 and Australia381 were 
introduced to enable an understanding of the stare decisis doctrine and ratio applied 
in court cases in the three countries under discussion. This chapter also explored 
the right of access to courts for the purposes of review and appeal.
The role of the tripartite relationship of social partners as regulated by legislation 
on occupational injuries and diseases in order to balance the interests of state,
373 Chapter 2 fn 2 & 141 supra.
374 Chapter 2 fn 2 42-246  supra.
375 Chapter 2 para 3.3 supra.
376 Chapter 2 fn 3 0 6 -3 3 4  supra.
377 Chapter 2 fn 3 35 -354  supra.
378 Chapter 2 fn 4; 280 -289  and Chapter 2 paras 3.2; 4.2 & 5.2 supra.
379 Chapter 2 para 3.2 supra.
380 Chapter 2 para 4.2 supra.
381 Chapter 2 para 5.2 supra.
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employer and employee by the creation of a right to no-fault compensation in the 
form of an administrative remedy which is categorised as a form of social security, 
was pointed out.382
The right to workers' compensation as provided for in COIDA and ODIMWA will be 
examined in relation to similar legislative provisions and juridical developments in 
Canada and Australia in the next chapters.
382 Chapter 2 paras 1 & 2 supra.
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CHAPTER 3
THE ADMINISTRATIVE NATURE, PURPOSE AND INTERPRETATION OF
COMPENSATORY LEGISLATION
1. INTRODUCTION
This chapter will specifically consider the administrative nature and purpose of 
workers' compensation from the viewpoint of the social stakeholders, statutory law 
and interpretation by the courts. In exploring the right to workers' compensation, 
the named aspects ought to be probed to have an insight in the circumstances that 
influence the right to compensation as represented in the effectiveness of the 
administrative remedy and how the courts are influenced by the purpose of the 
scheme when the right to compensation and the counter right to be protected 
against civil litigation is considered. It is significant to note the close relationship 
between the purpose of workers' compensatory laws, the administrative remedy 
and the protection afforded to employers against civil actions. This is clear from the 
ratio by the courts when faced with cases challenging the protective provisions. 
Case law discussed in this Chapter may therefore overlap with case law that will be 
dealt with elsewhere in this study, but in the current Chapter, only those parts of a 
ruling that relates to the purpose, administrative remedy and the bar against civil 
action will be explored.
2. THE ADMINISTRATIVE NATURE OF COMPENSATORY LEGISLATION
The administrative nature of workers’ compensatory legislation stems from the 
principle of speedy compensation, born from the need to provide continued 
financial support in times that the employee cannot provide for himself without any 
fault of his own.1 Because the court system is a slow and adversarial process, the 
remedy is to be executed by an administrative system intended to avoid breaks in 
financial income and reach speedy outcomes. The effectiveness of these bodies has
As shown from the historical development of workers’ compensatory law in Chapter 2.
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the potential to greatly impact on the parties that have to exercise their rights 
through the administrative body. It will be shown that dissatisfaction with the 
administrative bodies providing this service is growing in all three countries 
amongst employers and employees who are reliant on the effectiveness of these 
administrative bodies as the route of first instance. It also follows that the 
administrative nature rules dispute resolution processes and procedures.2
2.1. The administrative nature of compensatory legislation In South Africa
In Jooste,3 the South African Constitutional Court acknowledged the administrative 
nature of the statutory workers' compensatory remedy and contrasted it with the 
common law remedy available under the civil justice system.4 Noting that an 
occupationally-injured employee has the right to claim pecuniary loss (COIDA 
sections 47-64) "through an administrative process” (COIDA sections 38-4-6) that 
calls for the Compensation Commissioner to adjudicate on the claim and decide the 
monetary value to which the employee may be entitled (COIDA section 4).5
The administrative body in South Africa is the Director-General of the Department 
of Labour who delegates his functions6 to the Compensation Commissioner 
established in terms of section 2 of COIDA.7 The administrative ineptitude of the 
Compensation Commissioner is evident from the Commissioner's Annual Reports 
which reveal qualified audits from the Auditor General for a number of years8 for 
instance the Annual Report (2010/2011):9
Guthrie, R, Goldacre, L & Claydont, W. 2008. Workers' compensation dispute resolution 
procedures in Western Australia - The new regime. Queensland U. Tech. L. & Ju stJ. 8(1): 46-76. 
Retrieved on 26/05/2012 from http://0-www.heinonline.org.oasis.unisa.ac.za/HOL/Page7handle 
=hein.j ournals/qutlj8&div=8&collection=j ournals&set_as_cursor= 1 &men_tab=srchresults&terms= 
Workers.
Par 3.2.1 infra.
Jooste  [12]—[13],
Ibid [13].
COIDA s 3.
"2. Compensation Director-General and staff
(1) The Minister shall subject to such conditions as he or she may determine, in order to assist
the Director-General in the performance of his or her functions in terms of or under this Act
and subject to the laws governing the public service, appoint-
(a) an officer to be called the Compensation Commissioner;...”
South Africa (Republic). Department of Labour. 2010. Compensation Fund Annual Report
2009/2010. Pretoria: Government Printing Works. At 9, the report of the previous year's
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
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2.3 Basis for accounting opinion
The Auditor-General noted various instance [sic] where it was not possible 
to express an opinion and which led to a disclaimer. With regard to 
revenue contributions and assessment debtors,
a) Materially incorrect assessments recorded by the Fund;
b) Inadequate monitoring of controls over overdue assessment debtors 
resulted in the accumulation of incorrect provisional assessments 
and materially incorrect debtors with credit balances; and
c) Lack of a proper management framework for the continuous review 
of the ageing of assessment debtors which resulted in an unreliable 
ageing of assessment debtors being applied for purposes of 
determining the provision for credit losses.10
Interest and Penalties on assessment employers
8. I was unable to verify the accuracy and completeness of interest and 
penalties for late submissions of return of earning’s [sic] and late 
payment of assessment due to interest and penalties incorrectly charged
to assessment debtors....... Consequently, I did not obtain all the
information and explanations I considered necessary to satisfy myself as 
to the accuracy and completeness of interest and penalties on assessment 
[sic] employers amounting to R404- million.11
Medical claims
9. The Fund made a payment in the current year totaling [sic] R24 million to 
a medical claimant's service provider based on a court order. Of the R24 
million, invoices totaling [sic] R18,3 million were not processed on the E- 
claims systems to validate the accuracy of the payment made. Therefore,
1 was unable to verify accuracy of the medical claims for the year and no 
alternative procedures could be performed.12
Payment for medical treatment by the compensation scheme forms an inherent part 
of the right to compensation for occupational injuries and diseases and non­
qualified audit reads as follows: "Various materially incorrect assessments have been recorded 
by the Fund in the year under review and in previous years. Consequently, 1 am unable to 
express an opinion on: The completeness and accuracy of revenue contributions and valuation 
of assessment debtors.”
South Africa (Republic). Department of Labour. 2012. Compensation Fund Annual Report 
2011/2012. Pretoria: Government Printing Works. The 2011/2012 Annual Report at 71 reports 
on the disclaimed audit opinion received in the 2008/2009 financial year and the response of 
Parliament’s Standing Committee on Public Account’s to the qualified audit. Hereinafter: 
Compensation Fund Annual Report (2011/2012). Both Reports retrieved on 12/08/2011 from 
http://www.labour.gov.za/documents/annual-reports/annual-reports.
9 South Africa (Republic). Department of Labour. 2011. Compensation Fund Annual Report 2010/2011. 
Pretoria: Government Printing Works. Hereinafter: Compensation Fund Annual Report (2010/2011). 
Retrieved on 12/08/2011 from http://www.labour.gov.za/documents/annual-reports/annual- 
reports.
10 Compensation Fund Annual Report (2010/2011): 11.
11 Ibid 83.
12 Ibid.
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payment or belated payment for medical treatment severely impairs this right. In 
South Africa it caused medical practitioners to refuse or avoid treating patients who 
sustained occupational injuries or who contracted occupational diseases. In 
reaction to this stance by medical practitioners, the Director-General of the 
Department of Labour announced a turnaround strategy at the Compensation Fund 
to Parliament's Select Committee on Labour and Public Enterprises.13 At a summit 
of the South African Society of Occupational Medicine, he acknowledged the 
negative effect of non-payments and late payments of medical bills on workers in a 
presentation entitled "We hear your cries";14 claiming the lack of protection 
afforded to vulnerable employees "as a result of our problems in settling claims on 
time" to be a foremost source of frustration to the Compensation Fund and although 
the Fund "understand[s] their [medical practitioner's] frustration but equally, we 
have a duty for the care of injured workers". The overdue payments were due to 
inter alia an enormous backlog in the registration and adjudication of claims that 
was reported in December 2012 to the total of "an unprecedented ... 600 000".15 In 
addition to the backlog the Fund had to establish interventions aimed at combating 
criminal activities associated with corruption.16 The Compensation Fund incurred 
"fruitless and wasteful expenditure" of R1.5 million due to interest charged by 
suppliers on late payments for services rendered to the Fund and another R10.2 
million charged by the service provider for the late implementation of an 
information technology system during the 2 0 11/2 0 12  financial reporting period.17
13 South Africa (Republic). Department of Labour. 28 February 2013. Compensation Fund to undergo 
a turnaround strategy and an intensive forensic audit -  Department o f  Labour. Department of 
Labour: Media Desk. Retrieved on 25/08/2013 from http://www.labour.gov.za/DOL/media- 
desk/media-statements/2013/compensation-fund-to-undergo-a-turnaround-strategy-and-an- 
intensive-forensic-audit-2013-department-of-labour.
14 South Africa (Republic). Department of Labour. 17 March 2013. We hear your cries: Department 
o f  Labour DG Nhleko tells doctors over Compensation Fund. Department of Labour: Media Desk. 
Retrieved on 25/08/2013 from http://www.labour.gov.za/DOL/media-desk/media-statements/ 
2013/we-hear-your-cries-department-of-labour-dg-nhleko-tells-doctors-over-compensation-fund.
15 South Africa (Republic). Department of Labour. 07 December 2012. Department o f  Labour to 
prioritise elimination o f  claims backlog at Compensation Fund: Labour DG Nhleko. Department of 
Labour: Media Desk. Retrieved on 25/08/2013 from http://www.labour.gov.za/DOL/media- 
desk/media-statements/2012/department-of-labour-to-prioritise-elimination-of-claims-backlog- 
at-compensation-fund-labour-dg-nhleko.
16 South Africa (Republic). Department of Labour. 16 May 2013. Compensation Fund takes huge 
strides to tackle fraud and corruption and aims to reduce claims backlog. Department of Labour: 
Media Desk. Retrieved on 25/08/2013 from http://www.labour.gov.za/DOL/media-desk/ 
media-statements/2013/compensation-fund-takes-huge-strides-to-tackle-fraud-and-corruption- 
and-aims-to-reduce-claims-backlog.
17 Compensation Fund Annual Report (2011/2012): 55.
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In July 2013 the Compensation Commissioner informed Parliament’s Portfolio 
Committee on Labour that the information technology system of the Rand Mutual 
Assurance Company would be tested for use by the Fund.18 In addition to the 
administrative problems facing the Compensation Fund, a wave of fraud and 
corruption by employees and service providers hit the Fund. According to the 
Fund’s Annual Report 2011/2012, a total number of 208 cases were investigated to 
an estimated amount of R 71,766,067 of which 137 investigations were completed 
regarding actual loss to the amount of R 26,072,606 and 45 cases were referred for 
police investigation.19 During the previous year 3 cases of fraud against health care 
providers were prosecuted with 2 convictions and 4 health care providers under 
investigation while 6 ex-employees of the fund were on trial and 4- others under 
investigation.20
Poor service delivery by the Compensation Fund prompted an investigation by the 
Public Protector21 who found inter alia the Fund "failed to give effect to the right to 
procedurally fair administrative action, when it failed to give ... properly formulated 
written decisions regarding their claims, incorporation [sic] the principles of just 
administrative action as set out in the Constitution and PAJA."22
2.2. The administrative nature of compensatory legislation in Canada
Canadian law also acknowledged the administrative nature of the workers’ 
compensatory remedy in Henry v Saskatchewan [Workers' Compensation Board)23 
where the Court cited the words of Mitchell ]A in the earlier decision of Dowling v
18 South Africa (Republic). Department of Labour. 17 March 2013. Department o f  Labour's CF turning 
the comer to address claims backlog. Department of Labour: Media Desk. Retrieved on 25/08/2013 
from http://www.labour.gov.za/DOL/media-desk/media-statements/2013/department-of-labour 
2019s-cf-turning-the-corner-to-address-claims-backlog.
19 Compensation Fund Annual Report (2011/2012): 23.
20 Ibid 24.
21 South Africa (Republic). 2010. Public Protector. Report on a systemic investigation into allegations 
o f  poor service delivery by the Compensation Fund (Report 28 of 2009/10). Pretoria: Government 
Printing Works. Retrieved on 25/08/2013 from http://www.pprotect.org/library/investigation 
_report/investigation_report.asp.
22 Ibid 84.
23 Henry v Saskatchewan (Workers' Compensation Board), 1999 CanLII 12241 (SI< CA). 
Hereinafter: Henry. Retrieved on 28/04/2012 from http://canlii.ca/t/11777.
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Prince Edward Island Workers’ Compensation Board, [1994] (P.E.I.J. No. 113) 
saying:24
Accordingly, the Workers’ Compensation Act should be interpreted liberally 
so as to provide compensation for work-related injuries to as many as can 
reasonably be seen to fall within its purview, [italics added]
The Gourt interpreted the italicised phrase to "substrate that the Board is a public 
authority established to assist as many people as it can within the bounds of its 
constituent statute"25 and achieving the purpose for the Board's existence ought not 
to be measured in the number of claims repudiated.26
Dissatisfaction with the administrative management of workers’ compensation 
claims is not peculiar to South Africa but the Canadian scheme is also known for 
same. The Canadian Ombudsman for Ontario's statistics on the number of 
complaints received indicates a high level of dissatisfaction with the Compensation 
Board. Out of 15 provincial government organizations complained about in 2012­
2013 the Board rated at number 3;27 in 2011/2012 at number 2;28 in 2010/2011 
the Board took number 3 position29 and in 2009/2010 it rated again number 3.30In 
addition to formal complaints at ombudspersons, disgruntled workers publicised 
their experiences via social media for example Facebook,31 Youtube32 and 
newspapers.
24 Ibid [47],
25 Ibid [48].
26 Ibid [48].
27 Ontario (Provincial Government). 2013. Ontario Ombudsman: Annual Report 2012/2013.
Toronto: Ontario. At 78. Retrieved on 07/09/2013 from 
www.ombudsman.on.ca/Resources/Annual-Reports.aspx.
28 Ontario (Provincial Government). 2012. Ontario Ombudsman: Annual Report 2011/2012.
Toronto: Ontario. At 76. Retrieved on 07/09/2013 from 
http://www.ombudsman.on.ca/Resources/Annual-Reports.aspx.
29 Ontario (Provincial Government). 2011. Ontario Ombudsman: Annual Report 2010/2011.
Toronto: Ontario. At 79. Retrieved on 07/09/2013 from 
http://www.ombudsman.on.ca/Resources/Annual-Reports.aspx.
30 Ontario (Provincial Government). 2010. Ontario Ombudsman: Annual Report 2009/2010.
Toronto: Ontario. At 75. Retrieved on 07/09/2013 from 
http://www.ombudsman.on.ca/Resources/Annual-Reports.aspx.
31 Facebook: Occupy W.S.I.B. Justice fo r  injured workers. Retrieved on 07/09/2013 from 
https://www.facebook.com/groups/11868327550/.
32 The truth about WSIB. Retrieved on 07/09/2013 from 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Y7kRkUr6eeI and also: Justice for injured workers & WSIB. 
Retrieved on 07/09/2013 from http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8cRxOuVMYiY.
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The Windsor Star reported on an employee who informed the Ontario Attorney 
General of his intention to pursue an action for $2.7 million in damages for the 
manner in which he was treated by the Ontario Compensation Board, claiming the 
Board failed to afford him a "duty of care” and the staff "engaged in reckless 
behaviour" in a process that denied payment for certain treatment and proposed 
different treatment which left him worse off.33
Court action holding the Board liable for its decisions had been pursued by another 
employee earlier and in the first of no less than seven court rulings34 involving one 
claimant between 2001 and 2012, Shuchuk (his psychological injury originated 
after a work related motor vehicle accident),35 pursued a tort action against the 
Compensation Board and its officials. The Master in Chambers struck the 
Applicant’s claim as not disclosing a course of action36 and remarked that only 
someone who has been “living in a sealed glass bubble on an ocean floor for the last 
25 years" would be unaware of dissatisfaction with the Board.37
The Applicant successfully appealed38 the ruling with the Court recognising his tort 
action known in Canadian law as an "abuse of public office or misfeasance in public 
office"39 by pleading the conduct of the Defendants to be:40
vindictive, malicious, biased, made without any medical indication or basis, 
deliberately disregarded the Plaintiffs rights and the express opinions of his 
treating physician and psychologists that the conduct was medically 
contraindicated, was a breach of the Defendants' duty of good faith, and 
constituted an assault upon the Plaintiff as well as a defamation upon his 
character, all of which resulted in the worsening of his medical and 
psychological health.
33 Sacheli, S. 2013. Injured worker fights 16-year battle with WSIB. The Windsor Newspaper. 
Windsor: Ontario. Retrieved on 07/09/2013 from
http://blogs.windsorstar.com/2013/01/09/injured-worker-fights-16-year-battle-with-wsib/.
34 Shuchuk v Wolfert, 2001 ABQB 500; Shuchuk v. Wolfert, 2001 ABQB 937; Wolfert v Shuchuk, 
2003 ABCA 109; Shuchuk v Alberta (Workers' Compensation Board, Appeals Commission), 2005 
ABQB 526; Shuchuk v Alberta (Workers' Compensation Board), 2007 ABCA 213; Shuchuk v 
Alberta (Appeals Commission fo r  Workers' Compensation), 2010 ABQB 432 and Shuchuk v 
Alberta (Workers’ Compensation Board), 2012 ABCA 50.
35 Shuchuk v Alberta (W orkers’ Compensation Board, Appeals Commission), 2005 ABQB 526 
(CanLII). [2], Retrieved on 25/08/2013 from http://canlii.ca/t/118f2.
36 Shuchuk v Wolfert, 2001 ABQB 500 (CanLII). [l]-[6]. Retrieved on 25/08/2013 from 
http://canlii.ca/t/5m3b.
37 Ibid [1],
38 Shuchuk v Wolfert, 2001 ABQB 937 (CanLII). Retrieved on 25/08/2013 from http://canlii.ca/t/dwn.
39 Ibid [11],
«  Ibid[ 7]-[10],
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The Court held that neither the Board nor its officials will be protected out of 
necessity against an action for abuse of power or an intentional infliction of mental 
suffering41 acting in bad faith by exercising a public power in a vindictive manner 
with an intention to injure and real injury to follow from such conduct. 42 The action 
by an ex-employee of the Board43 against the Board and its officials originated due 
to insistence by the Defendants that the Applicant undergo an independent 
psychological assessment against the advice of his own and the Board's 
psychologists and after the Board had had the Applicant investigated by a private 
investigator.44
The Canadian workers' compensatory scheme is similarly to South Africa open to 
various forms of fraudulent claims (estimated at $ 1  billion annually)45 by 
employers,46 employees, providers of medical care and equipment and corrupt 
officials in the service of the Boards 47
The long-term social outcomes of permanently disabled workers are distressing as 
found in a survey done amongst these workers by the Thunder Bay and District 
Injured Workers' Support Group, which shows of the participants: 71% living under 
the poverty line, 42% receiving welfare, 18% receiving workers' compensation 
benefits, only 15% working and 15% who have contemplated suicide.48
Dissatisfaction with the scheme increases the danger of stakeholders questioning 
the workers' compensation system as the ultimate solution posed by occupational
«  Ibid [22] & [33],
«  Ibid [27] & [41].
«  Ibid [8],
44 ibid [9] & [31].
45 McCann, W. 1997. New investigators to probe compensation fraud. Canadian Press NewsWire. 
Toronto: Ontario. Retrieved on 28/08/2013 from http://0-search.proquest.com.oasis.unisa.ac.za/ 
docview/359533643/fulltext/140308574B82DlB37BE/l?accountid=14648.
46 Boyes, S. 1998. Fraud squad. OH&S Canada: 14(1): 28-33+. Reported of criminal investigations 
launched against bogus companies which were set up for the purpose of instituting false 
workers’ compensation claims for non-existent employees. Retrieved on 27/05/2012 from 
http://0-search.proquest.com.oasis.unisa.ac.za/docview/224625659/fulltextPDF/140308574 
B82DlB37BE/24?accountid=14648.
47 Ibid.
48 Thunder Bay and District Injured Workers' Support Group. 2011. Presentation to the WISB 
Funding Review. (Arthurs, H.: Chair). At 3. Retrieved on 28/08/2013 from 
http://www.injuredworkersonline.org/Documents/WSIBFR_Thunder_Bay_IWSG_Apr_2011.pdf.
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injuries and diseases to employees, employers and communities.49 Especially labour 
organisations like unions are starting to question the historical compromise as one 
of the principles underlying the compensation scheme.50
2.3. The administrative nature of compensatory legislation in Australia
Preference of administrative settlements to litigation was acknowledged as the 
underlying philosophy of workers’ compensatory legislation in Australian case law. 
This was confirmed in Berowra Holdings Pty Ltd v Gordon51 by the reflection of the 
Court to the "procedural history and context of the litigation" in a case that turned 
on non-compliance of the stipulated six months period by a worker before 
commencing with civil action against the employer. The honourable Court 
consequently refused to "confer upon the statute a character which its words do not 
readily bear and which is quite removed from facilitating non-litigated 
settlements."52
The Australian scheme is equally dissatisfying to the community it is intended to 
serve with medical practitioners questioning recent policy changes in New South 
Wales pertaining to work capacity creating a system of administrative decision­
making by non-medical administrative officials on medical opinions expressed by 
duly qualified medical practitioners.53 Employers are equally dissatisfied as is clear 
from a survey done by an industry association,54 indicating 28% of Queensland 
employers to be "very dissatisfied" and 31% to be "moderately dissatisfied" giving a
49 British Columbia Federation of Labour. 2008. Insult to injury, changes to the BC Workers' 
Compensation system (2002 - 2008): The impact on injured workers. 2. British Columbia. 
Retrieved on 07/09/2013 from
http://www.bctf.ca/uploadedFiles/Public/HealthSafety/WCB/InsultToInjuryExecSummary.pdf.
50 Ibid.
51 Berowra Holdings Pty Ltd v Gordon [2006] HCA 32; (2006) 225 CLR 364. [27]. Hereinafter: 
Berowra Holdings Pty Ltd. Retrieved on 24/08/2013 from 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/2006/32.html.
52 Ibid [27],
53 Injured Workers Support Network. 2006. Work capacity: Insurance company clerks, with no 
form al qualifications in health care, can now make decisions that render medical opinion invalid. 
Retrieved on 31/08/2013 from http://www.injuredworkerssupport.org.au/?p=3886.
54 Australian Industry Group. 2010. Ensuring sustainability and fairness in the Queensland Workers' 
Compensation scheme (Response to discussion paper). Retrieved on 31/08/2013 from 
http://www.aigroup.com.au/portal/binary/com.epicentric.contentmanagementservlet.ContentD 
eliveryServlet/LIVE_CONTENT/Policy%2520and%2520Representation/Submissions/OHS/2010 
/WorkCover_submission_March_2010.pdf.
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total of 59% of employers to be dissatisfied with the Queensland workers' 
compensation scheme as administered by the Authority.55 Employers strongly 
support limitations on access to common law redress because it undermines and 
compromises confidence in the scheme.56
After an annual increase of 27% in poor service delivery complaints57 received by 
the Victorian Ombudsman, he investigated record keeping at the six agencies58 
appointed by the WorkCover Authority59 to assist with performance of a number of 
its administrative functions.60 Conclusions included a finding of poor record keeping 
that resulted in delayed payments in respect of medical services delivered;61 and in 
poor or delayed decision making and breaches in the privacy of claimants as well as 
systemic inadequacies and outdated computer systems.62
Case studies done as part of the investigation showed administrative 
maladministration which strongly remind of the problems faced by the South 
African Compensation Fund as discussed supra. The Report noted the danger posed 
by delayed or non-payment for medical services as it may lead to refusal of 
treatment to occupationally-injured employees63 (as happened in South Africa) 
which concern was triggered by manipulation of the incentive system put in place 
by the Authority to promote prompt payment of medical bills within set 
timeframes.64 At one of the agencies, it was found that 10 000 medical bills were 
hidden in a locked cupboard to be filtered into the payment system over a period of
55 Ibid 2-3.
56 Ibid 4 & 8.
57 Victoria (State Government], 2011. Victorian Ombudsman. Investigation into record keeping 
failures by WorkSafe agents. Victorian Government Printer. Melbourne: Victoria. 10. 
Hereinafter: Victorian Ombudsman Report (2011). Retrieved on 31/08/2013 from 
http://www.ombudsman.vic.gov.au/resources/documents/new_-_report_investigation_into_ 
record_keeping_failures_by_worksafe_agents.pdf.
58 Allianz Australia Workers' Compensation (Victoria) Limited, CGU Workers Compensation 
(Victoria) Limited, GIO Australia (formerly known as the Government Insurance Office but since 
1989 the name changed to GIO Australia), QBE Workers Compensation (Victoria) Limited, 
Gallagher Bassett Services Workers Compensation Victoria Pty Ltd, and Xchanging Integrated 
Services Australia Pty Ltd.
59 As the Compensation Authority is known in Victoria.
60 Victorian Ombudsman Report (2011): 10.
si Ibid 52.
62 Ibid 53.
63 Ibid 41.
64 Ibid 34-38.
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11 months.65 Under the leadership of senior staff members, dated medical bills were 
not paid before or until duplicate accounts were received by the agency as it then 
could falsely be processed as newly-received bills66 because delayed payment of 
accounts would prompt a penalty from the Authority.67 In addition, both employers 
and employees complained about delayed reimbursements owed to them with 
smaller companies less able to await delayed payments and employees left destitute 
while waiting for income replacement benefit payments68 usually made on a weekly 
basis to enable workers69 to meet daily living expenses.70 One such case study 
showed a delay of 17 months in respect of a back payment in respect of additional 
income replacement benefits.71 The claim had in its initial stages been disputed by 
the agency but the dispute was settled by a Medical Panel advising the payment to 
be made. But as no administrative actions could be derived from the file notes and 
the case managers had been changed, it appears that nothing was done to give effect 
to the advice from the Medical Panel.72 The Ombudsman considered poor and 
delayed decision making as a reason for ineffectiveness in dealing with an employee 
in need of adjustment to his place of residence who had to wait for more than a year 
for the application to be considered despite submitting two different supporting 
reports, the first of which was considered by the agency as inadequate.73
Similar findings were made by the South Australian WorkCover Ombudsman in his 
Annual Report for the year 2011/2012.74 Of the 199 formal complaints received, 
about 35% related to delays in already-approved payments75 and a significant 
number of complaints related to poor ineffective administrative actions from the 
Authority's case managers on aspects like: repeated failures to acknowledge
65 Ibid 36.
66 Ibid 36.
67 Ibid 34.
68 Income replacement benefit payments are payments made as substitution for wages.
69 During the investigation by the Ombudsman, a case manager opined that delayed payments to 
workers adds to a "feeling of helplessness because they're not at work, providing for their 
family and it all snowballs". Victorian Ombudsman Report (2011): 40.
7» Ibid 39.
71 Ibid 40.
72 Ibid 40.
73 Ibid 43-45 .
74 South Australia (State Government). WorkCover Ombudsman. 2012. WorkCover Annual Report
2011/2012. Adelaide: South Australia. At 4. Retrieved on 31/08/2013 from http://www.wcom 
budsmansa.com.au/site/DefaultSite/filesystem/documents/Annual%20Report%202012.pdf.
7s Ibid 10.
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correspondence, failure to refund medical and travel expenses, failure to respond to 
phone messages within one business day, failure to adequately provide information 
and failure to inform claimants of progress made on claims.76
2.4. Summary
It can be concluded from the above that in all three countries, the workers' 
compensation schemes are under pressure due to systemic administrative 
problems created by human error and a lack of administrative effectiveness; and in 
South Africa and Australia aged or inadequate information technology resources 
persistently influence service delivery in a negative way.77
In all three countries, employers and employees are increasingly dissatisfied with 
the manner in which the compensation schemes are run and a growing measure of 
distrust can be detected.78
It is submitted that the right to compensation and the inverse right to be protected 
against civil action will be defeated in the long run if the administrative system 
meant to give effect to these rights is unreliable, corrupt, incompetent or delays 
monetary compensation to stakeholders at crucially important times rather than to 
provide a speedy and non-adversarial remedy as intended by the historical authors 
of the system.
3. SOUTH AFRICA: PURPOSE AND INTERPRETATION
As put forward in the previous chapter, legislation in general serves the community 
it rules and legislative measures are enacted in fulfilment of the needs of a specific 
community. As indicated in Chapter 2, workers' compensatory legislation in general 
was developed to fulfil a particular societal need, as was cited in the Australian case
76 Ibid 11-12  & 19.
77 Chapter 3 paras 2.1; 2.2 & 2.3 supra.
78 Chapter 3 paras 2.1; 2.2 & 2.3 supra.
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of Berowra Holdings Pty Ltd v Gordon79 that "all statutes give effect to some public 
policy." It will now be prudent to consider the statutory provisions pertaining to the 
purpose section included in a specific workers' compensation act and the 
interpretation the courts attach to it.
3.1. Purpose of COIDA
The Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act 130 of 1993 (COIDA) 
came into operation on 1 March 1994 and repealed the 1941 Act in its totality.80
In South African law, the long title of an act may be consulted to establish the nature 
and scope of that act;81 while the Preamble describes the conditions and objectives 
intended.82 The purpose of COIDA as included in the long title of the Act is:
To provide for compensation for disablement caused by occupational 
injuries or diseases sustained or contracted by employees in the course of 
their employment, or for death resulting from such injuries or diseases; and 
to provide for matters connected therewith.83
The main object of the Act is encapsulated in the first six words which refer to the 
provision of compensation for disablement caused by injuries and diseases caused 
specifically by employment.
Although the long title does not create any rights or obligations, it is seen as a 
guiding principle in interpretation of an act and may be considered by the courts. In 
the case of Kirtley v The Compensation Commissioner and Another,m the honourable 
Court noted that the long title of the Act predicts the purpose of the Act to include 
amongst others, compensation for temporary partial and temporary total 
incapacity85 and compensation for the permanent consequences of occupational
79 Berowra Holdings Pty Ltd [24],
so COIDA Schedule 1.
81 Burger 44. Burger at 26, based his opinion that the Constitution favours a purposive method of 
interpretation on s 39(2).
82 Burger 45.
83 Own emphasis.
84 (2005) 26 IL J1593 at [1],
85 Olivier et al (2003): 460 "Incapacity for work is usually conceived as the loss of the ability to 
earn and is classified under social insurance."
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injuries and diseases.86 It is submitted that by dealing with the purpose contextually 
in the long title of the Act, light is shed on the intention and scope of COIDA. The 
purpose, to compensate, provides direction to each provision that follows and 
should be kept in mind whenever COIDA is interpreted.87
While the purpose of an act reveals the intentions of the legislature, it is in the 
interpretation and execution of a statute that the purpose becomes significant. 
COIDA ought to provide a system beneficial to the South African society and the 
burden of cost caused by occupational injuries and diseases should not be 
transferred to employees. In this regard, the SCA held in the Mankayi ruling: 
"Interpretation seeks to give effect to the object or purpose of legislation. It involves 
an inquiry into the intention of the legislature".88
3.2. Interpretation through case law
3.2.1. Jooste  v Score Superm arket Trading (Pty) Ltd (Minister o f  Labour  
Intervening)
In Jooste v Score Supermarket Trading (Pty) Ltd (Minister o f  Labour Intervening),89 
the Court cited the purpose of COIDA as encapsulated in the long title of the Act and 
considered the position of an employee at common law before the enactment of 
compensatory legislation.
The Constitutional Court had to consider a challenge on the validity of COIDA's 
section 35 which bars civil action against employers.90 In considering the validity of 
section 35, the Court contrasted the administrative remedy provided by the Act to 
the common law situation. The legislated remedy available to an employee who 
suffered an occupational injury consists of a claim for pecuniary loss through an 
administrative system designed at speedy payment from a fund, is contrasted to a
86 Ibid 1.
87 Wetsuitleg 81. The court confirmed that the long title may be consulted to determine the 
intention of an act in Bhyat v Commissioner fo r  Immigration 1932 AD 125.
88 Mankayi (SCA] [25].
89 Jooste £13]—[14].
«> Ibid [2].
77
common law action through a process of civil litigation against a defendant 
employer by which damages will only be awarded upon proof of negligence on the 
part of the employer.91 Under common law, contributory negligence by the 
employee could result in a proportional reduction of damages without certainty of 
payment of the awarded damages by the defendant. Employees could also be held 
liable for legal costs if the case is unsuccessful. The legislated scheme’s intention is 
to provide limited compensation from a fund which is funded by mandatory 
contributions from employers.92 The Court held that the compensation scheme was 
rationally connected to a legitimate government purpose and the barring of the 
right is justified in the light of the purpose of compensatory legislation that was 
evident from historical context from which it developed.93
3.2.2. Davis v W orkm en 's Compensation Commissioner
In the well-known case of Davis v Workmen's Compensation Commissionerm 
Friedman JP when citing from Williams v Workmen's Compensation Commissioner 
1952 (3) SA 105 (C), expressly gave preference to an interpretation most favourable 
to employees while renouncing any prejudice to employees95
3.2.3. Healy v Compensation Commissioner and Another
In Healy v Compensation Commissioner and Another,96 Plasket J explained the 
purpose of COIDA is to be achieved through "give and take: it creates a no-fault 
system of compensation, channelled through an administrative process." The court 
appreciated the removal of compensation for occupational injuries and diseases 
from common law; and, while an employer is relieved from the burden associated
«  Ibid [13]—£15].
92 Ibid [16].
93 Ibid [12].
94 Davis v Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner 1995 (3] SA 689 (C], at 694 E-G. Hereinafter: Davis.
95 The honourable Judge stated at E-G: "The policy of the Act is to assist workmen as far as 
possible. See Williams v Workmen's Compensation Commissioner 1952 (3) SA 105 (C) at 109C. 
The Act should therefore not be interpreted restrictively so as to prejudice a workman if it is 
capable of being interpreted in a manner more favourable to him." This is supported by the rule 
that the legislature does not intend harsh, unjust or unreasonable legislative measures; Burger 
33.
96 Healy [ 11].
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with delictual actions, an employee may claim compensation without being 
burdened to prove negligence on the part of his employer. By replacing the court 
process by an administrative process, the nature of compensation was changed 
from adversarial to non-adversarial. This is a system intended at benefiting society 
at large.97
3.3. Summary
It is submitted that the protection of employers through the working of section 35 
was never the main purpose of COIDA; and is not as such included in the long title of 
the Act but is the product of the principle of balancing the interests of employers 
and employees without regard to fault The protection is extended to employers 
irrespective of failure to register and pay assessments to the Compensation Fund 
because an employee's right to claim remains unaffected by such failures98 as will 
be discussed in Chapter 5 when the definitions of an employee and employer for the 
purposes of COIDA will be explored.
4. CANADA: PURPOSE AND INTERPRETATION
4.1. Purpose of the Northwest Territories Workers' Compensation Act, 2007
The majority of Canadian workers' compensatory statutes deal with the purpose 
similarly to COIDA.99 With regard to the “purpose", the identical Acts of Nunavut100 
and the Northwest Territories101 will be discussed as they differ both in textual and 
contextual approaches from COIDA.
Unlike COIDA, the Northwest Territories Act102 does not contain a long title but the 
purpose is being dealt with in Part 1 which is devoted to "Interpretation, Purpose
97 Ibid.
98 Boer v Momo Development CC en 'n Ander 2004 (5) SA 291 (T). At 294.
99 The purpose section of the Worker’s Compensation Act of Saskatchewan, 1979, is very similar 
to COIDA and reads: "An Act to provide for Compensation to Workers for Injuries sustained in 
the Course of their Employment"
100 Nunavut: Consolidation of Worker’s Compensation Act S. Nu. 2007, c.15.
101 Northwest Territories: Worker's Compensation Act S.N.W.T, 2007, c. 21.
102 All references to the Northwest Territories Act include the Nunavut Act.
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and Application”. The human rights values applicable to disability, dignity and 
respect103 and the influence of the Meredith principles are evident from the 
balancing of the interests of the parties in the text:104
1.1. The purpose of this Act is to establish an open, fair, and comprehensive
system of compulsory no-fault mutual insurance for workers and
employers that
(a) provides for the sustainable payment of compensation to injured 
or diseased workers, the mitigation of the effects of workplace 
injuries and disease, and the eventual return of these workers to 
the workplace to perform work of which they are capable;
(b) ensures the quick and secure payment of compensation, without 
regard to fault and without court proceedings, to injured or diseased 
workers or, in the case of a fatality, to the dependents of the worker;
(c) provides for the independent administration of this compensation 
system and the adjudication of claims in a manner that treats 
employers, workers and claimants fairly, compassionately and 
respectfully;
(d) ensures the compensation system is accountable, through the 
Minister and the Legislative Assembly, to the public for its decisions 
and for the administration of this Act; and
(e) is dedicated to the continued improvement of this compensation 
system and the ultimate goal of eliminating workplace injuries and 
diseases.
The main noteworthy characteristics include inter alia no-fault compensation, 
challenges of sustainability, rehabilitation and re-integration into the workplace,105 
swift but just compensation,106 fair, kind, considerate treatment and an 
administrative system that is both accountable and transparent.107
The contextual approach in dealing with the purpose as part of the definition 
section indicates it to define the rest of the Act and interpretation of all provisions 
to be disseminated from the stated purpose.108
103 S l.l.(c).
104 S 1.1. Own emphasis.
105 S 1.1.(a].
106 S l.l.(c).
107 s 1.1.(d).
108 Botha 82. But Botha is of the opinion that care should be taken to avoid literalism.
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4.2. Interpretation through case law
The purpose of compensatory legislation cannot be removed from the history 
thereof. It has been discussed in a number of Canadian court cases with the court 
often referring to the so-called "historic trade o ff  whereby employers are 
indemnified from action in exchange for an administrative recourse to 
employees.109
4.2.1. Medwid v Ontario
In Medwid v Ontario,110 the history of compensatory law in the Canadian province of 
Ontario is discussed and the principles underlying it reiterated. Under the heading 
"The Act Today” at (b) the compensation scheme is examined based on the 
following four principles:111
a) compensation paid to injured workers without regard to fault;
b) injured workers should enjoy security of payment;
c) administration of the compensation schemes and adjudication of claims 
handled by an independent commission, and
d) compensation to injured workers provided quickly without court 
proceedings.
The four principles cited still form the backbone of Canadian compensatory 
legislation and are, to some extent, included in the purpose sections of all the acts.
4.2.2. Henry v Saskatchew an (W orkers' Compensation Board)
The purpose of compensatory legislation was referred to by the Court in Henry v 
Saskatchewan (Workers' Compensation Board)112 citing from MacLeod v Workers'
109 For example Medwid. Furthermore in Michelin North America (Canada) Inc. v Workers’ 
Compensation Board (N.S.), 2002 NSCA 166 the court refers to the "historic tradeoff’ [sic] at 14 
whereby employers are relieved from tort action by employees in exchange for a "legislated 
scheme providing accessible compensation for a range of broadly-defined workplace accidents 
without the necessity of proving the employer at fault." The court cautions against losing sight of 
the adversarial origins of compensation law. Retrieved on 30/05/2011 from http://canlii.ca/t/5f3p.
110 1988 CanLII 193 (ON S.C.).
111 The Meredith principles. The Yukon Act in its Preamble recognises these principles and 
maintains it as the underlying basis of the Act.
112 1999 CanLII 12241 (SK CA).
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Compensation Board o f  Prince Edward Island(1983), 40 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 138 (P.E.I.S.C. 
App. Div.)113 where it was ruled that:114
The Workers’ Compensation Act is obviously remedial legislation designed to 
protect workers and their dependents from the hardship of economic loss 
sustained through injuries suffered by the worker in the course of his 
employment.
The Court took into consideration the provisions of the Interpretation Act, S.P.E.I. 
1981, c. 18 guiding interpretation of remedial legislation to be "given such fair, large 
and liberal construction and interpretation as best ensured the attainment of its 
objects.”115 It follows that compensatory legislation should be given a liberal 
meaning and in doing so extend compensation for "work-related injuries to as many 
as can reasonably be seen to fall within its purview."116
In his dissenting ruling, Wakeling JA took into consideration the long title of the 
Act:117
An Act to provide for Compensation to Workers for Injuries Sustained in the 
Course of their Employment. This title goes some distance in establishing 
the approach to be taken when engaging in a purposeful interpretation of 
the Act.
The overall object and intent of the Act is clear from the definition of an injury i.e. to 
compensate workplace injuries and diseases.118 Taking into consideration the long 
title and the said definition, it can be deduced that the purpose is to compensate 
only those injuries and diseases that are work-related.119 The honourable Judge 
held that the long title "goes some distance in establishing the approach to be taken 
when engaging in a purposeful interpretation of the Act."120
113 Henry [34].
114 Ibid.
115 S 9.
116 Henry [34].
Ibid [95],
us Ibid [94].
iw Ibid [94]-[95].
izo Ibid [95].
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4.2.3. Budge v A lberta (W orkers' Compensation Board)
In Budge v Alberta (Workers' Compensation Board)121 the Court ruled that section 
18122 of the Workers’ Compensation Act violates sections 7123 and 15(1)124 of the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.125 According to the ruling the right to 
equality before the law and security of person was violated by the Workers' 
Compensation Act of Alberta because it protected "any employer” against civil 
claims for damages and not only the employer of a specific employee which means 
the limitation is not rationally connected to the purpose it seeks to serve.126 Section 
18 of the Act also violated the rights of the injured employee's wife as she was also 
affected by the bar against civil litigation.127
4.2.4. Wilson v City o f  Medicine Hat
In the decision of Wilson v City o f  Medicine Hat128 specific attention was given to the 
situation where a claim by an employee was repudiated by the Compensation 
Authority and all legal avenues exhausted but he still has no recourse in civil 
litigation against the employer.129 The Court cited the section that bars civil action 
against employers and noted that it ought to be construed remedially "given a fair, 
large and liberal interpretation" to achieve its objectives seen in the light of the
121 1987 CanLII 3184 (ABQ.B.).
122 "18(1) If an accident happens to a worker entitling him or his dependants to compensation 
under this Act, neither the worker, his legal personal representatives, his dependants nor his 
employer has any cause of action in respect of or arising out of the personal injury suffered by 
or the death of the worker as a result of the accident
(a) against any employer, or
(b) against any worker of an employer,
in an industry to which this Act applies when the conduct of that employer or worker that 
caused or contributed to the injury arose out of and in the course of employment in an industry 
to which this Act applies."
123 S 7: "Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be deprived 
thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice" as per Budge [29].
124 Budge at [46] indicates that s 15(1) of the Charter "declares that every individual is equal
before and under the law and has the right to equal protection and equal benefit of the law
without discrimination...."
125 Ibid [28].
126 Ibid [50]-[54] & [58],
127 Ibid [52]—[54] & [58],
128 City o f  Medicine Hat ruling .
129 Ibid [67],
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historic trade-off principle.130 It was held that the bar on civil litigation against 
employers by employees remains intact irrespective of a decision by the 
Compensation Board that compensation will not be payable because a different 
interpretation would obliterate the operation of the compensation scheme and the 
working of the historic trade-off; and would encourage employees to pursue a 
negative outcome at the Board to enable them to seek redress via civil actions and 
in doing so, the object of workers' compensatory law will be defeated.131
4.3. Summary
Human rights are embedded in the Canadian legislative provisions and case law on 
compensation reveals the deep-seated human rights culture. Workers and 
employers are entitled to be treated fairly and with dignity with an intended 
outcome that speaks of efficiency and transparency. A noteworthy aspect in 
realising the rights to dignity and equality is the benefit of rehabilitation and return- 
to-work programmes which is absent from COIDA.132
A liberal interpretation has been found to be appropriate when workers' 
compensatory legislation is interpreted in both South Africa and Canada. Balancing 
the interests of employers and employees was identified by both countries' courts 
as to be closely related to the objects and purpose of this type of social legislation.133
5. AUSTRALIA: PURPOSE AND INTERPRETATION
5.1. The purpose of the South Australian Workers Rehabilitation and 
Compensation Act, 1986
Generally Australian compensatory statutes deal with the purpose in the long title 
of the act but in some laws an additional section dealing with the objectives of the 
act provides more clarity. Long titles generally are similar to COIDA with some titles
130 Ibid [20]—[21],
131 Ibid [67]. The earlier decision of Wallace v United Grain Growers Ltd., 1997 CanLII 332 (SCC), 
[1997] 3 SCR 701. Retrieved on 23/03/2012 from http://canlii.ca/t/lfqxh yielded similar results.
132 Chapter 3 paras 4.1 & 4.2 supra.
133 Chapter 3 paras 4 .2 ,4.2.1,4.2.2,4.2.3 & 4.2.4 supra.
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shorter but wider in application.134 Some of the compensatory laws only have a long 
title but four of the acts contain a section dealing with the objective of the 
compensation scheme. These sections are characterised by an extensive set of goals 
aimed at what the acts purport to achieve and the manner in which to achieve it. 
The South Australian Act, 1986 contains both a long title as well as an object 
section135 similar but not identical to the Victorian Accident Compensation Act, 
198 5.136 The object sections aim to balance the interests of the parties (the same 
principle known as the historic trade-off in Canada) in a fair and transparent way as 
stated in the South Australian Act:137
2—Objects of Act
(1) The objects of this Act are—
(a) to establish a workers rehabilitation and compensation scheme—
(i) that achieves a reasonable balance between the interests of 
employers and the interests of workers; and
(ii) that provides for the effective rehabilitation of disabled workers and 
their early return to work; and
(iii) that provides fair compensation for employment-related 
disabilities; and
(iv) that reduces the overall social and economic cost to the 
community of employment-related disabilities; and
(v) that ensures that employers' costs are contained within reasonable 
limits so that the impact of employment-related disabilities on 
South Australian businesses is minimised; and
(b) to provide for the efficient and effective administration of the 
scheme; and
(c) to establish incentives to encourage efficiency and discourage abuses; 
and
(d) to ensure that the scheme is fully funded on a fair basis; and
(e) to reduce the incidence of employment-related accidents and 
disabilities; and
(f) to reduce litigation and adversarial contests to the greatest possible 
extent.
134 The long title of the Northern Territories’ Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 13 of
2008 reads: "An Act about workers' rehabilitation and compensation" which creates an open-
ended purpose. Similar purposes are to be found in the Tasmanian Workers Rehabilitation and 
Compensation Act 4 of 1988; the Western Australian Workers' Compensation and Injury 
Management Act 1981; the Australian Capital Territory’s Workers Compensation Act 1951 and 
the Commonwealth's Seafarers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 234 of 1992 and the 
Commonwealth's Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 75 of 1988.
1 3 5  workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act, 1986 s 2.
i3® No 10191 of 1985.
137 S 2. Own emphasis.
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(2) A person exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative powers 
must interpret this Act in the light of its objects without bias towards 
the interests of employers on the one hand, or workers on the other.
The relationship between the purpose of the workers' compensatory scheme, an 
effective and efficient administrative remedy coupled with a reduction in litigation 
is clear from the instructions given regarding interpretation in section 2(2). Sub­
section 2 instructs interpretation of the Act when exercising powers, to be in the 
"light of its objects" and favouring neither party but fairly balances the interests of 
employers and employees.
The objectives correspond to the Canadian Northwest Territories Act as discussed 
supra but with added appreciation for the negative impact of occupational injuries 
and diseases upon society in section 2 (l)(a)(iv).
5.2. Interpretation through case law
Purposive interpretation in contrast to a meticulously literal interpretation of 
workers’ compensatory law is a long-standing principle in Australia. An example of 
this approach can be seen from the case of Melanie Gillian Jefferts and Comcare 
Australia138 heard by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal of Australia where the 
Deputy President of the Tribunal cited from the case of McDermott v Owners o f  SS 
Tintoretto [1911] AC 35. In the latter Lord Shaw at 45, indicated already in 1911 
that interpretation of these types of remedial acts should not be "in the spirit of 
meticulous literalism."
The nature of compensatory legislation was described as "a liability neither in tort 
nor in contract. It is a responsibility positivi juris and is annexed by law to a 
relationship, that of master and servant" by Dixon J in the High Court of Australia in 
the case of Mynott v Barnard [1939] HCA13; (1939) 62 CLR 68.139
138 Melanie Gillian Jefferts and Comcare Australia [1996] AATA 358 at 18. Retrieved on 09/12/2011
from http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/AATA/1996/358.html. Hereinafter: Melanie
Gillian Jefferts.
139 Mynott as per Dixon J.
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5.2.1. Johnston v Commonwealth
In Johnston v Commonwealth140 Murphy J (in his consenting judgment) cautioned 
the Tribunal against "hair-splitting, over technical interpretation" as it conflicts with 
the remedial nature of compensatory legislation when interpreting the 
Compensation (Commonwealth Employees) Act 48 of 1971.141 The majority 
judgment held: "The object of the statute is to provide for the payment of 
compensation to employees who suffer injury or disease occurring in circumstances 
connected with their employment by the Commonwealth" with emphasis on the 
legislative provision for an "aggravation, acceleration or recurrence" pertaining to 
occupational diseases contracted through employment.142
5.2.2. Cloncurry Shire Council v W orkers' Compensation Regulatory Authority 
&Anor
The Supreme Court of Queensland considered the purpose of the Queensland Act in 
Cloncurry Shire Council v Workers' Compensation Regulatory Authority & Anor,143 a 
case dealing with the power of the Compensation Authority to extend time limits in 
applications for review of a decision by a self-insured employer. The Court 
specifically referred to section 4(2) of the Act which stipulates that the objects of 
the Act "are an aid to the interpretation of the Act."144
The Court reminded the parties that the main aim of the Act as beneficial legislation 
is the establishment of a workers compensation scheme aiming "to provide benefits 
for workers who sustain injuries in their employment as well as their dependants 
and to encourage improved health and safety performance by employers." 
Interpretation ought therefore not to be stricter than necessary.145
140 Johnston v Commonwealth [1982] HCA 54. Hereinafter: Johnston. Retrieved on 09/12/2011 
from http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1982/54.html.
i«  Ibid 24.
142 Ibid 15.
143 Cloncurry Shire Council v Workers' Compensation Regulatory Authority & Anor [2006] QSC 362. 
Retrieved on 25/08/2010 from http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/qld/QSC/2006/362.html. 
Hereinafter: Cloncurry Shire Council.
144 Ibid [8],
Ibid [24],
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The Court applied the dictum of Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting 
Authority146 regarding the interpretation of the Act147
'The primary object of statutory construction is to construe the relevant 
provision so that it is consistent with the language and purpose of all the 
provisions of the statute. The meaning of the provision must be determined 
"by reference to the language of the instrument viewed as a whole". In 
Commissioner for Railways (NSW) v Agalianos, Dixon CJ pointed out that the 
"context, the general purpose and policy of a provision and its consistency 
and fairness are surer guides to its meaning than the logic with which it is 
constructed". Thus, the process of construction must always begin by 
examining the context of the provision that is being construed.
A legislative instrument must be construed on the prima facie basis that its 
provisions are intended to give effect to harmonious goals.
The meanings of provisions with conflicting connotations need to be adjusted to 
accomplish that result which will best achieve the purpose and language of the 
provisions but simultaneously uphold the harmony between all the legislated 
provisions.148 Courts often have to determine the hierarchy of provisions i.e. which 
provision is more important and which is the subordinate to determine how to best 
give effect to the purpose and language though maintaining the unity of the 
statutory scheme.149
The Court held that in the light of the main aim of the Act as stated supra, provisions 
relating to timeliness are less important than provisions giving rights to 
compensation.150
5.2.3. Bird v Commonwealth ("Maralinga case")
In their consenting ruling in the High Court case of Bird v Commonwealth 
("Maralinga case")151 Deane and Gaudron JJ cautioned against reading words into
146 project Blue Sky Inc v ABA [1998] HCA 28 CLR 355. Retrieved on 25/08/2010 from 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1998/28.html.
147 Ibid [25].
Ibid [25].
Ibid [25],
«o Ibid [27],
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the text when interpreting the Compensation Act despite the remedial nature of the 
Act and beneficial interpretation to employees. They further cautioned that in cases 
where two possible competing interpretations are possible, the more beneficial 
interpretation ought to be construed in favour of the employee.152 The Justices 
approved of Lord Shaw’s remarks in the House of Lords in McDermott v Owners o f
S.S. Tintoretto (1911) AC 35, that he considered it "to be quite unsound, and to be 
productive of wrong and mischief to interpret such a remedial statute meticulously 
literally.153
5.2.4. M elanie Gillian Jefferts  and Comcare Australia
In Melanie Gillian Jefferts and Comcare Australia154 the Tribunal referred to the 
authority of the Australian Acts Interpretation Act No. 2 of 1901,155 section 15AA 
which provides clear guidance on the interpretation of the purpose of an Act:
Regard to be had to purpose or object of Act156
(1) in the interpretation of a provision of an Act, a construction that would 
promote the purpose or object underlying the Act (whether that purpose or 
object is expressly stated in the Act or not) shall be preferred to a 
construction that would not promote that purpose or object.
It follows that the preferred interpretation of Australian courts ought to be as 
enabling as can be and be as least restrictive as possible. A purposive interpretation 
consistent with human rights values is preferred.157
151 Bird v Commonwealth ("Maralinga case") [1988] HCA 23; (1988] 165 CLR 1. Retrieved on 
08/12/2011 from http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1988/23.htmI.
152 Ibid [5].
153 Ibid [5],
154 Melanie Gillian Jefferts 18.
iss Acts Interpretation Act 1901, Act No. 2 of 1901 as amended. Retrieved on 12/12/2011 from 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/aial901230/.
156 Acts Interpretation Act 1901, s 15AA. This section should be read together with s 15A which 
determines that "Every Act shall be read and construed subject to the Constitution."
157 Although Australia does not have a Bill of Rights, a longstanding protective culture of fundamental 
rights is prevalent See Byrnes, A, Charlesworth, H & McKinnon, G. 2009. Bills of Rights in Australia: 
History, Politics and Law. Australian Journal o f  Human Rights 15(1): 175-180. Book review by the 
Honourable Michael Kirby AC CMG (formerly of the High Court of Australia). Retrieved on 
29/05/2012 from http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/AUJlHRights/2009/14.html.
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5.3. Summary
Australian statutory interpretation is ruled by the Australian Acts Interpretation Act 
1901 which directs an interpretation that favours the objects of an Act.158 The main 
objective of workers' compensatory law "aim[s] to achieve a reasonable balance 
between the interests of employers and workers..." as stated in the Preamble to the 
National Workers' Compensation Action Plan 2010-2012. A purposive interpretation 
is favoured rather than a meticulously literal interpretation.
6. CONCLUSION
The purpose of compensatory legislation is represented by the four principles as 
expressed in the Canadian compensatory legal system; while the remedial nature 
found its expression in interpretation of the compensatory legislation. The 
principles underlying compensatory legislation surface in all three countries under 
discussion to a greater or lesser extent although it is not referred to in exactly the 
same terms. The four principles consist of:159
• A no-fault compensation system,
• Secure payment from a fund funded by employers,
• Administration of compensation schemes and adjudication of claims through 
an independent structure, and
• Compensation paid to employees, speedily and preferably without court 
litigation.
These principles form the basis of the compensation scheme and regulate the 
sensitive tripartite relationship of state, employer and employee by balancing the 
interests of employers and employees by an independent administrator. In the 
balancing of the parties' interests by replacement of the adversarial common law 
right of an employee with an administrative remedy, an employee should not be 
prejudiced by a narrow interpretation of compensatory legislation as ruled by all 
three countries' courts; but interpretation should be broad and beneficial to
158 Chapter 3 para 5.2.4 supra.
159 Chapter 3 para 4.2.1 supra.
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employees and society at large. Equal treatment of all social stakeholders through 
interpretation is important and the counter right of employers not to be held civilly 
liable requires an equally broad and remedial interpretation. But in instances where 
two competing interpretations are equally possible, the interpretation that most 
favoured the employee ought to be preferred in all three countries.160
Underlying the interpretation and execution of the compensatory statutes of the 
three countries are constitutional imperatives and it ought to speak of a human 
rights-based interpretation showing the different countries’ human rights cultures. 
As discussed above, some jurisdictions expressly include such values in their 
compensation legislation but in others (e.g. COIDA) although the compensatory law 
is silent on human rights values, it is derived from other sources of law and remains 
an integral part of the compensation scheme.161
In all three countries, a purposive interpretation is favoured rather than a 
meticulous literalism.162 COIDA compares favourably to the two other jurisdictions 
with regard to purpose and interpretation.
The administrative nature of the remedy in contrast to a litigious process is 
preferred in all three of the countries but the practical administrative procedures 
and processes in all three countries are under pressure and have become a major 
concern which is threatening the existence of the remedy as it limits access to 
courts in exchange for protracted ineffective administrative processes that deliver 
agony only.163 It is submitted that only an effective and just administrative system 
will be able to deliver a suitable and fair remedy that does not defeat the right to 
compensation.
160 Chapter 3 paras 3.2.2; 4.1; 4.2.2; 4.2.4; 5.1; 5.2; 5.2.1; 5.2.2; 5.2.3 & 5.2.4 supra.
161 Chapter 3 paras 3.2; 4.2 & 5.2 supra.
162 Chapter 3 paras 3.1; 3.2,4.1; 4.2 & 5.1 & 5.2 supra.
163 Chapter 3 paras 2.1,2.2 & 2.3 supra.
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CHAPTER4
CAUSALITY AND THE RELATIONSHIP WITH EMPLOYMENT
1. INTRODUCTION
Occupational injuries received historically more attention than occupational 
diseases; and compensation for injuries often remains more favourable than for 
diseases.1 Occupational diseases by their nature develop over time with some 
diseases which only present themselves after many years, which creates problems 
to workers to provide sufficient proof of workplace exposure. For the purposes of 
this study attention will now be turned to the concept of an "injury" (the concept 
"injury" may include "disease" except where it will obviously lead to absurdities), its 
definitions and application in workers' compensatory law.
The definition of an injury lays down the criteria and elements in the form of a test 
to determine if a specific injury is occupational in nature and will create a right to 
compensation.2 Not all injuries will fulfil the requirements as stated in the definition 
of an occupational injury, but only those that satisfy all the elements of the test. In 
the early years of workers’ compensation, all three countries under discussion 
followed the text of the definition in the English Workmen's Compensation Act, 
19063 and the subsequent interpretation through case law.4 Consideration will be
Ison, TG. 1994. Compensation systems fo r  injury and disease: The policy choices. Toronto: 
Butterworths. At 12-14  the distinction between injuries and diseases is portrayed as a moral 
issue which resulted in better compensation for injuries than for diseases rather than 
compensation for disablement irrespective of the cause thereof.
The Supreme Court of Canada approved the process followed by the Compensation Board in 
Pasiechnyk. The Board asked itself the following questions at [44]: “(1) was the plaintiff a 
worker within the meaning of the Act; (2) if so, was the injury sustained in the course of 
employment; (3) is the defendant an employer within the meaning of the Act; and, (4) if so, 
does the claim arise out of actions or defaults by the employer or the employer’s employees 
while engaged in, about or in connection with the industry or employment in which the 
employer or worker of such employer causing the injury is engaged.”
The English Workmen's Compensation Act provided as follows: "1 -(1 ) If in any employment 
personal injury by accident arising out of and in the course of employment is caused to a 
workman..." as retrieved on 01/07/2013 from http://nrs.harvard.edU/urn-3:HMS.COUNT:1076392.
Thom or Simpson v Sinclair, 1917 A.C. 127 (also cited by courts as Simpson v Sinclair, 1917 A.C. 
127) and Hewitson v St Helen’s Colliery Co. Ltd. (1923), 16 BWCC 230 are examples of case law 
of which the dicta were cited and applied in all three of the countries.
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given to the historical differences in development and interpretation of the 
definition in all three countries under discussion.
This Chapter will explore the tests applicable to the right to compensation and more 
specifically the test phrase "out of and in the course of employment" in the context 
of the definition of an "accident". Attention will be given to the development of the 
tests in the three countries following the basis laid down in the early English 
decisions. In exploring the tests, cognisance need to be taken of the limitations on 
the right to compensation as embodied in the test phrase and definitions as 
influenced by the purpose of compensatory laws within the context of the historic 
trade-off to determine whether South African employees are being treated equally 
to employees in the other two countries.
2. SOUTH AFRICA
It is submitted that Piron argued correctly, that although the courts have advanced 
different tests over time5 i.e. time and duty;6 control test7 and the place test,8 it can 
be concluded that all the tests can be categorised and included into the control test.
2.1. Statutory definition of an injury: the test
COIDA defines an occupational injury to “meanjs] a personal injury sustained as a 
result of an accident"9 and an accident is defined as "an accident arising out of and 
in the course of an employee's employment and resulting in a personal injury, 
illness or the death of the employee".10 These two definitions are closely linked and 
form a multi-faceted test.
5 Piron 24.
6 Ibid 24.
 ^ Ibid 33.
8 Ibid 34.
9 S l(xxx).
10 S l(i). Own emphasis.
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The test consists of two conjunctive elements different in meaning in the short 
phrase "out of and in the course of an employees employment" that requires an 
injury to be both related to the work environment and11 to arise as a result of 
work.12 If only one element is satisfied, the injury will not meet the criteria as an 
occupational injury because the necessary nexus will not have been established.13 
Although both elements are cause-based, a different meaning is to be attached to 
each, with "arising out of' broader in connotation than "in the course of."14
"Arising out of employment" relates to circumstances pertaining to the location 
where the accident happened. If it was his employment that necessitated the 
employee to be where the accident befell him, it can be said to have "arose out of his 
employment”.15 The question to be asked is: was the employee obliged by 
discharging his contractual employment duties to be where the accident happened? 
If so, the accident "arose out of his employment".16
"In the course of employment" relates to circumstances of discharging the duties 
under his contract of employment and that which is related to it, be it expressly or 
impliedly.17 When determining if an accident arose "in the course of employment," 
factors to be taken into consideration are: the time when employment commences, 
ends and the duration thereof.18
The criterion of "in the course o f  employment has a limiting effect on the scope of 
accidents fulfilling the test phrase and therefore on the right to compensation. As an 
example consider the situation where an employee attends a corporate function in 
fulfilment of his employment duties, consumes alcohol provided by the employer 
and is injured in an accident on his way home after the function, whilst intoxicated.
11 Own emphasis.
12 Piron 23.
13 Ibid 23.
w Ibid 22-23 .
15 Schaeffer, M & Heyne, JF. 1972. Workmen's compensation in South Africa. Pretoria: JL van Schaik.
At 12.
«  Ibid 12.
17 Ibid 13-14. In the unreported case of Etsebeth v Minister o f  Defence & Another (23698/2002) 
[2009] ZAGPHC, Ledwaba J remarked that the word "employment" has a broader meaning than 
"duties" at [13].
18 Ibid 13-14.
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Although the accident would arise from his employment it will not fulfil the 
requirement of “in the course of employment" and although it has the potential to 
result in serious disablement, it will not give rise to a right to compensation.
A third element "resulting in a personal injury, illness or the death" requires that an 
accident without consequences will not satisfy the test of an occupational injury. 
The latter is usually the first test to be applied as it often is the most obvious and 
easily observed.
The text on the test phrase remained essentially the same since the enactment of 
workers' compensatory law in South Africa in 1907. The 1907 Act provided for 
compensation if "any workman become permanently incapacitated by reason of a 
personal injury arising out of and in the course of his work caused by any 
accident..."19 which was amended by the 1934 Act to state if "an accident to a 
workman arising out of and in the course of his employment happens ... and results 
in such workman's disablement or death...."20 The 1941 Act further amended the 
test phrase in defining an "accident" to mean "an accident arising out of and in the 
course of a workman's employment and resulting in a personal injury",21 the text of 
which was left unaltered with the enactment of COIDA.
2.2. Interpretation through case law
South African compensatory law lacks secondary legislation in the form of policy 
documentation which can provide guidance on interpretation of the statute and 
consequential, it is necessary to extensively consult case law to follow precedence.22 
In this regard, a distinction should be drawn between true policy documentation in 
the form of secondary legislative instruments and awareness documentation in the
«  s 1(1).
20 S 2(1).
21 S2(i).
22 Piron 70-71 , criticised the lack of policies as the test phrase is rather vague.
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form of pamphlets which are available but does not contribute to legal 
interpretation.23
2.2.1. Early English case law
The courts in all three countries drew heavily on decisions by the English courts 
which were based upon a very similar Act in the early years of court 
interpretation24 A number of English rulings on the interpretation of the word 
“accident” are of importance as both were cited and applied often in South Africa 
e.g. Thom or Simpson v Sinclair, 1917 A.C. 12 725 and Hewitson v St Helen's Colliery Co. 
Ltd. (1923), 16 BWCC 2 3 026 and Powell v Great Western Railway Co. (1940) 1 All E.R. 
87;27 with Thom or Simpson v Sinclair also cited and applied often in Australia28 and 
Hewitson v St Helen's Colliery Co. Ltd.29 similarly in Canada30 and Australia.31
23 See for instance the "Basic Guides" as retrieved on 09/05/2012 from http://www.labour.gov.za/ 
DOL/legislation/acts/basic-guides/index.
24 Larson, A. 1973. The positional-risk doctrine in workmen's compensation. Duke Law Journal: 
1973(4): 761-819. Professor Larson showed how the phrase “arising out of' was broadened 
through interpretation that culminated in the "positional-risk" doctrine laid down in Thom or 
Simpson v Sinclair and confirmed in Powell v Great Western Railway Co. according to which the but- 
for rule was applied e.g. "This man suffered this casualty... and it arose out of the employment, 
because he was at that place. It was by its very nature a place which was rendered dangerous by the 
shooting of the gun as retrieved on 14/09/2013 from http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/ 
viewcontentcgi?article=2452&context=dlj.
25 For example Minister o f Justice v Khoza 1966 (1) SA 410 (AD) at 420 (hereinafter: Khoza) and Twalo 
v Minister ofSafety and Security and Another (2009) 3 0 ILJ1578 (Ck) at [16]. Hereinafter: Twalo.
26 For example Leemhuis & Sons v Havenga 1938 TPD 524 at 525-526 ; Ongevallekommissaris v 
Santam Versekeringsmaatskappy Bpk 1965 (2) SA 193 (T), (hereinafter: Ongevallekommissaris v 
Santam) and Workmen's Compensation Commissioner v Van Rooyen 1974 (4) SA 816 (T), 
(hereinafter: Van Rooyen).
27 For example Khoza 420, Van Rooyen 820 F-G and Twalo at [16]. Powell v Great Western Railway 
Co. applied the principles laid down in Thom or Simpson v Sinclair.
28 Smith v Australian Woollen Mills Ltd [1933] HCA 60; (1933) 50 CLR 504 at [6], Retrieved on 
14/06/2012 from http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1933/60.html. The judgments of 
Starke J, Evatt J and McTiernan J in Whittingham v Commissioner o f  Railways (WA) [1931] HCA 49; 
(1931) 46 CLR 22, (hereinafter: Whittingham v Commissioner o f Railways). Retrieved on 
16/05/2012 from http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1931/49.html. The ruling of 
Windeyer J in Kavanagh v Commonwealth [1960] HCA 25; (1960) 103 CLR 547 (hereinafter: 
Kavanagh). Retrieved on 11/05/2012 from http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1960/ 
25.html. Also in the judgments of Barwick CJ and Mason J in Favelle Mort Ltd v Murray [1976] HCA 
13; (1976) 133 CLR 580. Retrieved on 08/12/2011 from http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/ 
cth/HCA/1976/13.html. Furthermore, also in Badawi v Nexon Asia Pacific Pty Limited trading as 
Commander Australia Pty Limited [2009] NSWCA 324 at [31]. Retrieved on 14/05/2012 from 
http: //www.austlii.edu.au/au / cases/nsw/N S WCA/ 2009/324.html.
29 See further Chapter 4 paras 3.2.4 & 4.2.1 infra.
30 Betts and Gallant v The Workmen's Compensation Board, 1933 CanLII 46 (SCC), [1934] SCR 107
at 116-117. Retrieved on 11/09/2013 from http://canlii.ca/t/fslmr. Gellately v Newfoundland 
(Workers' Compensation Appeal Tribunal), 1995 CanLII 9896 (NL CA) at [9], Retrieved on
96
In Hewitson, Lord Atkinson held that "arising out of' implies "cause and effect" with 
the injury the effect that was caused by employment in the execution of 
employment duties but also that which is incidental to the employment.32 The 
phrase "in the course of' employment entails "doing something he was employed to 
do ... when he is doing something in discharge of a duty to his employer, directly or 
indirectly imposed upon him by his contract of service". This dictum of Lord 
Atkinson was applied inter alia in Leemhuis & Sons v Havenga,™ in Human v 
Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner34 and in Ongevalle Kommissaris v Santam 
Bpk.35 Williamson JA applied the dictum of Lord Shaw in Simpson v Sinclair36 (page 
142) in his minority judgment in the enquiry to determine whether the accident 
arose "out of employment" in the case of Minister o f  Justice v Khoza37 In Khoza, 
Rumpff JA noted the sometimes contradictory English decisions and he suggested 
they are not authoritative in interpreting the South African Act. In his judgment he 
did not rely on any authorities but in his concurring ruling, Williamson JA cited inter 
alia, Armitage v Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway, (1902) 2 K.B. 182,38 Thom or 
Simpson v Sinclair39 and Powell v Great Western Railway Co.40
Although the cases subsequent to Khoza refrained from citing or applying the 
English decisions in this regard, later cases again considered decisions like 
Hewitson41 and Sinclair.42
01/05/2012 from http://canlii.ca/t/2fl51. (Hereinafter: Gellately). Argued in Workmen's 
Compensation Board v C.P.R, 1952 CanLII 44 (SCC), [1952] 2 SCR 359 at 360, (hereinafter:
C.P.R.). Retrieved on 13/05/2012 from http://canlii.ca/t/22wr9.
31 See the decisions of Dixon CJ and Windeyer J in Kavanagh at [10] and the ruling of McTiernan J 
in Whittingham v Commissioner o f  Railways.
32 Leemhuis & Sons v Havenga 1938 TPD 524 at 526.
33 Ibid 526.
34 Human v Workmen's Compensation Commissioner 1956 (2) SA 461 (T) at 468-4-70.
35 Ongevallekommissaris v Santam 196.
36 Simpson v Sinclair 1917 A.C. 127 at 142. Also referred to as Thom or Simpson v Sinclair.
37 Khoza 419-420 .
38 Ibid 419.
39 Ibid 420.
40 Ibid 420.
41 Rauffv Standard Bank Properties (A Division o f  Standard Bank ofSA LTDj  and Another 2002 (6]
SA 693 (W), distinguished at [14.2]. Hereinafter: Rauff.
42 Ex Parte Workmen's Compensation Commissioner: In re Manthe 1979(4) SA 812, at 816 A. 
Hereinafter: Manthe.
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2.2.2. Briesch v Geduld Propriety Mines, Ltd
Interpretation of the test as presented in the definition yielded complications in 
interpretation from its inclusion in the earliest statute, The Workmen's 
Compensation Act 36 of 1907.43 However, it remained mainly unchanged 
throughout the history of compensatory legislation in South Africa. In one of the 
early cases, Briesch v Geduld Propriety Mines, Ltd,44 Smith J identified 3 
requirements: "(1) A personal injury, (2) that this injury arose out of and in the 
course of his work, and (3) that it was caused by an accident" 45 The Court noted 
that the English decision of Fenton v Thorley 1903 A.C. 44346 accepted the popular 
meaning of "accident" but it was not helpful as it was often used interchangeable to 
indicate cause and or effect47 The Court held that three determining factors need to 
be satisfied to constitute an "accident", namely: an untoward or unexpected event; 
an event explicit in "nature, time and place"; and that an external agency, like the 
bursting of a pipe, is not a pre-requisite.48
2.2.3. Minister o f  Justice v Khoza
In South African law, the classical Appeal Court case of Minister o f  Justice v Khoza49 
(hereinafter: Khoza) is the standard authoritative source on the test phrase “out of 
and in the course of’ as it revolved around the interpretation of section 2 (i) of the 
1941 Act,50 the predecessor of COIDA. The 1941 Act defined "accident" to mean "an 
accident arising out of and in the course of a workman's employment and resulting 
in a personal injury"; the text of which was left unaltered with the enactment of
43 The 1907 Act provided in s 17 as follows: "If any workman become permanently incapacitated by 
reason of a personal injury arising out of and in the course of his work caused by any accident..."
44 Briesch v Geduld Propriety Mines, Ltd, 1911 T.P.D. 707. Hereinafter: Briesch.
45 Ibid 712.
46 Fenton v Thorley 1903 A.C. 443 was considered to be the leading authority on this aspect by the
Supreme Court of Canada as per Workmen's Compensation Board v Theed 1940 CanLII 45 (SCC),
[1940] SCR 553 at 558 retrieved on 15/09/2013 at http://canlii.ca/t/fslvf.
47 Briesch 712.
«  Ibid 715.
49 1966 [1) SA 410 (AD).
50 "2. In this Act, unless inconsistent with the context -
(i) "accident" means an accident arising out of and in the course of a workman’s 
employment and resulting in a personal injury.”
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COIDA and thus remains authoritative. In Khoza, the court clearly distinguished 
between the two elements of the test phrase and found:51
Luidens Wet 30 van 1941 m oetd ie  ongeval u itdie werksman se diens ontstaan 
en in die loop daarvan plaasvind. 'In die loop daarvari beteken d a td ie  ongeval 
m oet plaasvind terwyl die werksman besig is m et sy w erksaam hede en dit 
ontstaan 'uit sy diens' as die ongeval in verband staan m et sy werksaam hede.
(See translation to English infra').
Rumpff JA, held that the legislator did not define the relationship between duties 
and accident; and a broad relationship would suffice.52 If the relationship between 
duties and accident is seen in the light of the purpose and far-reaching scope of the 
Act, the nexus between duties and accident will in general sufficiently be established 
if the accident occurs at the place where the employee was exercising his duties as 
required by his employment.53 The nexus will, however, be destroyed if the nature 
of the accident is such that the employee would have sustained the injuries although 
he was present somewhere else than required by his employment or when the 
employee through an action of his own, severed the nexus between employment and 
accident, or when the employee is injured by someone else and the motive for the 
assault is unrelated to the employee's duties.54
Williamson JA in his separate judgment formulated the test as an enquiry into 
"whether it was the actual fact that he was in the course of his employment that 
brought the workman within the range or zone of the hazard giving rise to the 
accident causing injury";55 which brings into play a consideration of the place where 
the accident took place.56
51 Khoza 417. Translated to English it means: According to Act 30 of 1941, the accident needs to 
arise out of the employee's employment and occur in the course thereof. "In the course o f " 
means that the accident must occur while the employee is engaged in his employment activities 
and it arises "from his service" if the accident is connected with his employment.
52 Ibid 417 D.
53 Ibid 417 D-F.
54 Ibid 417 G-H.
ss Ibid 419 H-420 B.
56 Ibid 419-420 .
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From the above, it can be deduced that the test phrase "out of and in the course of 
an employee's employment" refers to an open-ended spectrum of factors that 
include duties performed in discharging contractual employment duties, the place 
where the duties are executed and time of execution. It is submitted that the 
enquiry as formulated by the honourable Justice Rumpff requires employment to be 
a conditio sine qua non (the but-for test) in the broad sense for the accident. The 
broadness is necessitated by the extremely broad spectrum of accidents that may 
befall an employee out of and in the course of the performance of his duties as is 
evident from the uniqueness of the set of facts particular to each case.
2.2.4. Workmen's Compensation Commissioner v Van Rooyen
It is contended that Khoza did not create clarity on the application of the test phrase 
and in particular a number of cases followed that turned on the exceptions referred 
to by Rumpff JA. The then Transvaal High Court57 applied the test as formulated by 
Williamson JA in Khoza in the stated case of Workmen's Compensation Commissioner 
v Van Rooyen.58 The words of Rumpff JA cited supra in the Khoza decision were 
wrongly applied by the Applicant to repudiate the claim of a widow by reason that 
her husband destroyed the causal connection through his own doing.59 The reasons 
put forward by the Applicant included that the deceased was busy doing something 
totally unrelated to his duties, the deceased "went to the accident and the accident 
did not come to him"; the deceased abandoned his employment to assist the co­
worker; the deceased did not owe the co-worker a duty of care and if any duty of 
care existed at that moment, it was upon the railway track foreman not the 
deceased.60 The deceased was killed whilst trying to save the life of a co-worker, not 
a colleague but an employee of the South African Railways (SAR). The deceased was 
tasked to maintain equipment sold by his employer to SAR.61
57 Currently known as the Gauteng Division of the High Court of South Africa.
58 1974  (4) SA 816 (T).
59 Van Rooyen 819 A.
60 Ibid 816 F-H.
«  Ibid 818 C-819 A.
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Counsel for the “objector”62 argued that the test phrase was not defined in the Act 
but only a broad nexus in time and space needs to be established between 
employment and injury as was held in Khoza;63 and that the Applicant failed to 
appreciate the full meaning of the phrase "arose in the course of employment"; and 
even if the deceased acted contrary to the instructions of his employer, his actions 
would still satisfy the test.64
It was common cause that the accident occurred “in the course" of the deceased’s 
employment but the court had to determine if it also "arose out o f  the deceased's 
employment65 Galgut J applied the dicta of both Rumpff JA and Williamson JA from 
the Khoza decision and found that the principles given by the honourable judges 
were applicable in this case.66 In casu the circumstances of the case did not form 
part of the exceptions that Rumpff JA referred to when he indicated that an 
employee may destroy the causal relationship through his own doing. The Court 
found "the deceased was about his employment at the time of the accident and that 
the time and place brought him within the range of the peril he encountered" and 
thus it follows that the test had been satisfied.67
2.2.5. Kau v Fourie
Kau v Fourie68 turned on the last of the listed exclusions as per Rumpff AJ in Khoza 
referred to supra. In casu the Appellant (Claimant in the court of first instance)69 
sustained an injury when he was assaulted by the Defendant who was at all relevant 
times an employee of the Defendant.70 The Claimant instituted a claim for damages 
against the Defendant despite the fact that he received compensation from the 
Compensation Fund for his work incapacity due to the injury.71 The Defendant 
pleaded that the Claimant received statutory compensation for the incapacity and
«  Ibid 817 F.
«  Ibid 817 F.
6* Ibid 817 G-H.
“  ibid  819 G-H.
66 Ibid 820.
67 Ibid 820 G.
68 Kau v Fourie 1971 (3) SA 623 (T). Hereinafter: Kau v Fourie.
6‘J Ibid 624 E.
7° Ibid 624 E-H.
7i Ibid 624 E-H.
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that the Defendant was precluded from instituting a claim for damages in terms of 
section 7(a) of the 1941 Act; and no liability arises on his part pertaining to the 
incapacity of the Claimant.72 The Court cited the dicta of both Rumpff JA and 
Williamson JA in Khoza73 and noted that it will be applied as far as it is relevant to 
the facts at hand.74 The Court then rejected that for purposes of Rumpff JA’s 
dictum,75 the injury arose out of employment as it flowed from damage to the 
Defendant's truck of which the Claimant was the driver at the relevant time.76 In 
applying the but-for test, the Court reasoned that was it not for his employment, the 
Claimant would not have been assaulted by his employer after damaging the truck 
in a road accident.77 The Court avoided to give preference to a specific authority and 
held that the assault did not satisfy the test and did not arise out of the Claimant's 
employment relationship but was due to the employer's unlawful, deliberate and 
wrongful action.78 The Defendant assaulted the Claimant because he was aggrieved 
for the damage to his truck; the assault could have happened at any place where the 
employer and employee met, even after hours and the fact that the assault 
happened at the workplace was purely coincidental and incapable of rendering the 
required nexusP  The Act protects an employer even if the employer negligently 
exposed the employee80 but the Act is silent on instances when the employer acted 
deliberately, which convinced the Court that the Legislator did not intend protecting 
employers acting deliberately.81
2.2.6. Ex Parte Workmen's Compensation Commissioner; In re  Manthe
In the stated case of Ex Parte Workmen's Compensation Commissioner: In re Manthe 
1979(4) SA 812, the court, lead by previous decisions said: "the Act, as remedial 
legislation, should be given an [sic] broad and commonsense interpretation on this
«  Ibid 624 H-625 A.
73 Ibid 627-628 .
74 Ibid 628 D.
”  ibid 628 G.
76 Ibid 628 D-E.
77 Ibid 628 E-F.
78 ibid 628 H.
79 ibid 628 H-629 B.
so Ibid 629 H.
si Ibid 630 A.
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issue"82 taking into account factors such as "the time, place and circumstances of the 
accident”83 which all should be given a weight to ascertain whether a reasonable 
nexus exists between duties and accident.84 This case also flowed from the 
exclusions listed by Rumpff JA in Khoza and specifically the obiter dictum85 
indicating that the required nexus is severed when the employee sustained injuries 
through an assault by another person and the motive for the assault is unrelated to 
the employee's duties.86
The basic enquiry remained "whether it was the actual fact that he was in the course 
of his employment that brought the workman within the range or zone of the 
hazard giving rise to the accident" according to the dictum of Williamson AJ in 
Khoza.87 It was held that the risk of assault was incidental to the performance of the 
employee's duties at the particular time and place; and it is irrelevant that the 
public is subject to the same danger at that time and place88
It is clear that the decisions in the period following Khoza, were inconsistent in their 
approach and in application of especially the conditions blamed for severing the 
required nexus as noted by Rumpff JA in Khoza.
2.2.7. R au ffv  Standard Bank Properties (A Division o f  Standard Bank ofSA Ltd) 
an d  Another
Since the inception of workers' compensatory law, questions arose in deciding 
when employment starts, when it ends and what the influence would be of a break 
in working hours89 as in the English case of St. Helens Colliery Company v Hewitson 
1924 A.C. 59 as applied in Leemhuis90 and Ongevallekommissaris v Santam
82 Manthe 816 E.
83 Ibid 816 F.
84 Ibid 816 F-G.
85 Ibid 815 F, 816 G-H and 817 H.
86 Ibid 815 E-F.
87 Ibid 817 H.
88 Ibid 818 A-B.
89 Frank 15-20.
90 Ongevallekommissaris v Santam 196 D-F.
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Versekeringsmaatskappy B pk91 The Court in the latter cited Lord Romer in Weaver v 
Tredegar Iron Company (1940) 3 All E.R. 157 saying:92
In all cases, therefore, where a workman, on going to, or on leaving, his work 
suffers an accident on the way, the first question to be determined is whether 
the workman was at the place where the accident occurred in virtue of his 
status as a workman or in virtue of his status as a member of the public.
This aspect was under consideration by the Court in Rauff v Standard Bank 
Properties (A Division o f  Standard Bank ofSA Ltd) and Another.93 The Court had to 
decide if the employee (Rauff/Plaintiff) was injured "out of and in the course of' her 
duties when she was injured in a falling lift in the building in which she worked 
when she left her place of work at the end of the working day.94 The Plaintiff 
instituted a claim for damages against the Defendant, which claim would be 
defeated if she was injured "out of and in the course of employment"95 because the 
employer would then be protected against delictual liability.96 Flemming DJP crisply 
explained the application of the two legged test:97
[9.1] I focus on determining what relationship there was between the 
accident and the activity which the employee would be expected to 
do or not to do as a matter of executing the contract of employment.
It is of necessity factually related to know whether the accident was 
indeed ’arising out o f the employment or was unrelated to what the 
tasks of the employee entailed. The second leg is whether the accident 
was adequately integrated with the 'course o f . . .  employment'.
[9.2] The Legislature provides a gauge; it does not itself apply the gauge.
Sound practical judgment will establish that once an employee left office, the control 
of the employer is disrupted.98 The court applied Jeffery v Santam Insurance Ltd and 
Another 1992 (3) SA 835 (W) where it was held that in terms of the 1941 Act 
employment begins and ends "when an employee reaches his place of work and
91 1965 (2) SA 193 (T). Hereinafter: Santam.
92 Ibid 196 H.
93 2002 (6) 693 (W).
94 Rauff[ 1].
95 Ibid [4],
96 Ibid [13.3],
97 Ibid [9.1]-[9.2]. Own emphasis.
98 Ibid [9.2]—[10.1].
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ends when he leaves it."99 The Plaintiff left behind both her "place of employment 
and the course of execution of her duties" once she walked out through the doors of 
her employer's office.100
As this constitutes a general test which needs further consideration to determine if 
Plaintiff remained within the "sphere of her employment while going home and not 
whether she was still on a site of which the employer is the owner", the Court 
applied the Santam ruling.101 Flemming DJP strongly dismissed the notion that 
"employment sticks to the employee like a giant toffee..." as that would negate 
considering the duty to discharge employment duties and consequently considering 
whether the "accident arose out of employment."102 The Court considered the 
Defendant’s sine qua non argument to be inadequate because it did not take 
cognisance of what is expected from her in her capacity as an employee.103 That is 
despite that had the Plaintiff not been working in the specific building at the 
particular time, she could have escaped the accident.104
2.3. Extended right to compensation
The definition as discussed above is broadened by the provisions of COIDA’S 
sections 22 and 25 which introduce an extension to the test phrase, namely:
• employee behaviour that constitutes "serious and wilful misconduct";105
• employee actions taken in the interest of, or in connection with the 
employer's business but otherwise unlawful or contrary to instructions from 
the employer;106
Ibid [10.1].
io° Ibid [10.1].
ioi Ibid [11]—[13.1].
I®2 Ibid [13.3],
103 Ibid [14.5].
104 Ibid [14.5].
105 S 2 2 (3) (a)"If an accident is attributable to the serious and wilful misconduct of the employee, 
no compensation shall be payable in terms of this Act, unless-
(i) the accident results in serious disablement; or
(ii) the employee dies in consequence thereof leaving a dependant wholly 
financially dependent upon him.
(b) Notwithstanding paragraph (a) the Director-General may, and the employer 
individually liable or mutual association concerned, as the case may be, shall, if ordered 
thereto by the Director-General, pay the cost of medical aid or such portion thereof as 
the Director-General may determine."
105
• transport provided free of charge by the employer to his employee to and 
from work, in a vehicle provided for that purpose by the employer and 
driven by a person so instructed by the employer or by the employer 
himself;107
• participation by employees in training for and providing of first aid and 
emergency services with the consent of the employer either on the 
employer's premises or at another place by the employee.108
In the first two instances the test will be considered to be satisfied if serious 
disablement or death follows from the injury as COIDA provides for injuries 
sustained under those circumstances to be "deemed to have arisen out of and in 
the course of the employment."109
2.3.1. Serious and wilful misconduct
In terms of section 22(3), the right to compensation (except for payment of 
reasonable medical costs as under discretion of the Director-General) will be 
defeated if the injury was sustained in circumstances where the conduct of the 
employee constitutes “serious and wilful misconduct", save for accidents with 
seriously disabling consequences or death leaving a dependant who was totally 
financially reliant upon the deceased at the time of the accident.
106 S 22(4)"For the purposes of this Act an accident shall be deemed to have arisen out of and in 
the course of the employment of an employee notwithstanding that the employee was at the 
time of the accident acting contrary to any law applicable to his employment or to any order by 
or on behalf of his employer, or that he was acting without any order of his employer, if the 
employee was, in the opinion of the Director-General, so acting for the purposes of or in the 
interests of or in connection with the business of his employer.”
107 S 22(5). In the case of Gunter v Compensation Commissioner (2009) 30 ILJ 2341, the court 
examined the interpretation of s 22(5) and found that the injured employee acted in "the 
course and scope of his employment” (at 24) when he was injured in a motor vehicle accident. 
The vehicle was not provided by his employer and the employee did not claim on the basis of 
the provisions in s 22(5) but on the definition "out of and in the course of his employment" as 
he was fulfilling his duties whilst travelling to fetch parts needed for repairs. Hereinafter; 
Gunter.
108 S 25.
109 S 22(4). Own emphasis.
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The meaning of the phrase "serious and wilful misconduct" is therefore crucially 
important and COIDA defines it in section 1 to mean:110
(a) being under the influence of intoxicating liquor or a drug having a 
narcotic effect;
(b) a contravention of any law for the protection or the health of 
em ployees or for the prevention of accidents, if such contravention 
w as com m itted wilfully or with a reckless disregard o f the 
provisions of such law; or
(c) any other act or omission which the Director-General having regard to 
all the circumstances considers to be serious and wilful misconduct.
The Commissioner may condone transgressions by employees of labour legislation 
with the inclusion of occupational safety legislation or workplace rules and 
instructions by an employee as well as other acts or omissions in the light of the 
circumstances of the accident if the employee sustained serious disablement or dies 
as a result of the accident as it forms part of "serious and wilful misconduct.”111
2.3.2. Court interpretation of serious and wilful misconduct
The onus to prove serious and wilful misconduct rests on the Commissioner and it 
does not imply merely moral misconduct but rather heedless violation of a legal 
duty to follow safety measures.112 It has been held that it does not constitute a mere
110 The definition stayed in essence the same since the 1907 Act according to Frank 25 and the 
similarities to COIDA can be seen when comparing to the current definition. The 1934 Act 
provided as follows in s 2 :
" (1 )... provided that no compensation shall be recoverable -
(b) If the accident is attributable to the serious and wilful misconduct of the workman, 
unless the accident results in serious disablement, or the workman has died in 
consequence of the accident leaving as a child or any person dependent upon 
him..."
The 1934 Act defined "serious and wilful misconduct" in section 84 to mean:
"(a) drunkenness; or
(b) a contravention of any law or statutory regulation made for the purpose of ensuring
the safety or health of workmen or of preventing accidents to workmen, if the 
contravention was committed deliberately or with a reckless disregard of the 
terms of such law or regulation; or
(c) any other act or omission which the magistrate or a court of law may, having regard
to all the circumstances of an accident, declare to be serious and wilful 
misconduct".
111 S l(xlii)(b] and (c) and s 22(3] and (4).
112 Schaeffer 35.
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impulsive transgression of such rules but both knowledge and deliberate 
transgression have to be present.113
According to the test laid down by the Appeal Court in Vermeulen v Heyne 1913 AD 
542,114 serious and wilful misconduct will be present if the employer would be 
entitled to summarily dismiss the employee for the conduct.115 The Court set out the 
analytical process to be followed to determine if serious and wilful misconduct is 
present.116 The first step is to ascertain if one or more of the elements specified in 
the Act are present i.e. intoxication or wilful contravention of a safety law or 
regulation or any other act or omission in the light of all the circumstances of the 
accident. If it is established that one of the elements is present, the next step is to 
establish whether misconduct is present and if so, if the misconduct is both serious 
and wilful.117
2.3.3. Commuting injuries
It is submitted that when measured against the multi-faceted test for "out of and in 
the course of', it is clear that travelling to and from work cannot satisfy the test as it 
entails actions outside the work sphere and outside the contract of employment.118 
The Legislature, by virtue of the extension of the control of the employer over his 
employee,119 broadened coverage by providing that commuting injuries sustained 
under specified circumstances, will be deemed to satisfy the test.120 This will be in 
circumstances when the employer provides the transport costless to the employee 
and the vehicle is controlled by the employer or an employee in his service. In
113 Luipaardsvlei Estates v Byng 1 9 1 1 TPD 515.
iM Vermeulen v Heyne was decided on the 1907 Act but the text has in essence been retained in all
subsequent amendments including COIDA.
115 Ibid at 548 the Court followed the test in respect of the seriousness of the conduct as suggested
in the earlier English decision of Johnson v Marshall, Sons and Co. Ltd 1906 8 WCC 10.
Ibid 547.
117 Ibid 549.
118 Gunter contrasted accidents arising from travelling and accidents "arising out of and in the 
course of employment" by the performance of contractual duties.
119 Control is extended by the requirement that the transport be "controlled" by the employer in 
the 1941 Acts 27(3).
120 Xakaxa v Santam Insurance Co Ltd 1967 (4) SA 521 (E), at 522 H-523 B. The Court considered 
the meaning and extent of the control at 523 A-H.
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Western Platinum Ltd v Santam Insurance Ltd121 decided in terms of the 1941 Act, 
the Court found in favour of a right to compensation; although the employer who 
paid the costs, contracted the bus service out to a bus company. The vehicle 
involved in the accident was neither driven by the employer nor any of the 
employer's employees but it was not a requirement of the 1941 Act.122 This 
requirement, however, was introduced into South African compensatory legislation 
with the enactment of COIDA.
The difference in the meaning of the two elements of the test phrase "arise out of 
employment" and "in the course of employment" was explained by the court in the 
case of Sparg v Workmen's Compensation Commissioner123 by virtue of the dictum of 
Rumpff JA in the Khoza ruling.124 Kannemeyer JP held the Act deems "conveyance of 
a workman as therein provided to have taken place ’in the course of such 
workman's employment' but does not deem it to 'arise out o f the employment...."125 
In order for the employee to satisfy the test, he needs to proof the nexus with his 
employment because "arise out of employment" is not assisted by a deeming 
proviso.126 In casu the required nexus with the employee's employment could not be 
established although he was injured in an accident whilst using a vehicle provided 
by his employer.127 The reason for his journey lacked the required nexus with his 
employment duties as it was for a private errand.128 It ought to be noted that the 
Occupational Health and Safety Act section 1(1) defines "premises" to include "any
121 1994  ( 1 ) SA 480 (W).
122 The 1941 Act s 27(3) determines: "For the purposes of this Act the conveyance of a workman 
free of charge to or from his place of work by means of transport controlled and specially 
provided by his employer for the purpose of such conveyance, shall be deemed to take place in 
the course of such workman's employment" while COIDA s 22(5) increases the amount of 
control from the employer by requiring: "For the purposes of this Act the conveyance of an 
employee free of charge to or from his place of employment for the purposes of his employment 
by means of a vehicle driven by the employer himself or one of his employees and specially 
provided by his employer for the purpose of such conveyance, shall be deemed to take place in 
the course of such employee's employment.” (Own emphasis).
123 Sparg v Workmen's Compensation Commissioner 1990 (1) SA 169 (E), at 172 A. In this case the 
employee was injured in a car accident while driving a motor vehicle provided by his employer 
but the purpose of the journey was to run a private matter.
124 Ibid 172 C-F.
125 Ibid 172 A. S 27(3) of the 1941 Act provided as follows: "For the purposes of this Act the 
conveyance of a workman free of charge to or from his place of work by means of transport 
controlled and specially provided by his employer for the purpose of such conveyance, shall be 
deemed to take place in the course of such workman's employment."
126 Ibid 172 A-C.
127 Ibid 170 C-F.
Ibid 172 E-F.
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building, vehicle, vessel, train or aircraft" which brings transport within the control 
of the employer and connotes a broader requirement than COIDA.
2.4. Migrant labour
It is clear from the discussion supra that the place where the accident happens and 
the place where the employee is executing his services are important aspects in 
determining whether an accident "arose out of and in the course of employment." 
Workers moving across state borders for work purposes deserve attention. For 
purposes of this study, attention will be given to two groups of people: those 
entering South Africa, particularly from the SADC countries to work in South Africa 
and South Africans that work abroad but whose families remain in South Africa and 
who will be returning to the Republic after a period of absence.
COIDA section 23 enables an employee to validly claim under COIDA if an accident 
happens to him whilst working in another country provided that working outside 
South Africa is of a temporary nature, the normal work environment is within South 
Africa and the employer's main business is in South Africa "such employee shall, 
subject to paragraph (c), be entitled to compensation as if the accident had 
happened in the Republic". However, if it is required from the migrating employee 
to work outside the South African borders for longer than twelve months 
continuously,129 the provision will cease to apply. It is submitted that this approach 
is outdated considering current global employment trends and considering the 
position of employees who do not qualify as previously disadvantaged candidates; 
and whose career prospects are limited within South Africa due to the impact of 
employment equity in the South African labour market.130 These employees often 
work outside the borders of South Africa. If such an employee sustains an 
occupational injury or contracts an occupational disease, the employee returns to 
South Africa and without appropriate compensation to enable a sustainable living
129 In instances where the right to compensation entails a pension, s 60 of COIDA determines that 
the pension may be commuted to a lump sum award if the pensioner is domiciled outside or is 
absent from the RSA for a period(s] totalling more than six months.
130 Employment Equity Act No. 55 of 1998.
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while recovering and compensation in cases of permanent disability, the burden of 
costs shifts to his family and the community.
The portability of compensation paid to employees injured in South Africa but 
leaving the Republic thereafter, is limited by the Act. Section 60 of COIDA provides 
for the suspension of a pension that was awarded for permanent disablement or 
death; and replacing it with a lump sum payment, if that employee leaves the 
Republic for a continuous period longer than six months or is resident outside the 
Republic. However, the Director-General is required to notify the recipient of the 
pension of his intention and request representations to be made.
A further consideration to be taken into account is the South African Government's 
policy to promote financial integration in the SADC region with free movement of 
migrant labour and the transport of goods across borders in the region.131 It is 
submitted that sections 23 and 60 of COIDA are contradictory to the spirit of the 
founding Treaty of the SADC's objective to “support the socially disadvantaged 
through regional integration"; the social security protection afforded pursuant to 
the Charter of Fundamental Social Rights and the Code on Social Security in the 
SADC132 as well as the Draft Protocol on the facilitation of Movement of Persons.133 
The Code on Social Security specifically provides for migrant workers in Article 17 
which states as follows:
17 .2  Member States should ensure that all lawfully employed immigrants 
are protected through the promotion of the following core principles.
These principles should be contained in both the national laws of 
Member States and in bi- or multilateral arrangements between 
Member States:
(a) Migrant workers should be able to participate in the social security 
schemes of the host country.
(b) Migrant workers should enjoy equal treatment alongside citizens 
within the social security system of the host country.
131 Mlambo-Ngcuka, P. 2008. Keynote address. New Partnership for Africa's Development (Nepad) South 
African Development Community (SADC) Infrastructure Projects Conference. Delivered on behalf of 
HE Ms Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka, Deputy President of the Republic of South Africa by Radebe, J. 
Retrieved on 01/05/2012 from http://www.info.gov.za/speeches/2008/08081108451002.htm.
132 Olivier et al (2003): 635 refers to an agreement between South Africa and Mozambique 
permitting payment of compensation for occupational injuries and diseases to migrant 
employees from Mozambique injured while working in South Africa, in Mozambique. See also 
Chapter 2 paras 3.5 & 5.5 and Chapter 4 paras 3.4 & 4.4 and Chapter 5 paras 2.10; 3.7 & 4.7.
133 Jordaan eta l  47-51 .
I l l
(c) There should be an aggregation of insurance periods and the 
m aintenance of acquired rights and benefits betw een sim ilar 
schem es in different M em ber States.
(d) M em ber States should ensure the facilitation of exportability  of 
benefits, including the paym ent of benefits in the host country.
(e) M em ber States should identify the applicable law for purposes of 
the im plem entation of the above principles.
(f) M em ber States should ensure coverage of self-em ployed m igrant 
w orkers on the sam e basis as em ployed m igrants.
The high prevalence of tuberculosis amongst mine workers in the SADC region led 
to the acceptance of the Declaration on Tuberculosis in the Mining Sector on 18 
August 2012 .134 It inter alia acknowledged that mineworkers in the Region 
contributed and continue to contribute to the wealth of the Region “at great 
personal cost to their health and welfare and that of their families and 
communities"; and the "positive contributions made by intra-regional migrant 
workers to the mining sector of the regional economy...." The positive contributions 
are, however, destroyed by the high burden of disease with its costs implications; 
and that mineworkers and ex-mineworkers face obstacles in accessing health care, 
the absence of proper cross-border systems to provide continued treatment 
regimes. The Preamble (at "Aware"), furthermore acknowledged problems facing 
these workers, such as:
d) inadequate or no legal fram ew orks to protect the rights of m inew orkers 
ex-m ine w orkers including occupational disease com pensation for TB,
Silicosis and other occupational respiratory diseases;
e) inadequate or no m echanism s for financial com pensation for m inew orkers 
and ex-m inew orkers with TB, Silicosis and other occupational respiratory 
diseases;
f) lack of or inadequate medical surveillance program m es and system s for 
post-em ploym ent follow-up;
g) lack of inform ation among m inew orkers, ex-m inew orkers, em ployers, 
trade unions and governm ent about their roles, rights and responsibilities
In addressing the identified problems, the Declaration promotes inter alia the 
creation of a legislative framework to include mandatory reporting of the said
134 Southern African Development Community. 2012. Declaration on Tuberculosis in the Mining 
Sector. Retrieved on 30/09/2013 from http://www.stoptb.org/assets/documents/news/ 
Declaration%20on%20Tuberculosis%20in%20the%20Mining%20Sector2012English.pdf.
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diseases135 and development of the legislative framework to improve compensation 
for the workers.136
No right to compensation will arise on the part of an employee usually working 
outside the borders of South Africa but temporarily working within the country for 
a period of less than twelve months unless the employer made arrangements with 
the Director-General.137 It should be noted that covered employees returning in an 
unhealthy or injured state will become a burden upon their families and their 
respective communities as was the case before the enactment of workers' 
compensatory legislation, if the person has no entitlement to compensation or if 
compensation awarded, is terminated upon leaving the source country thereof. It is 
submitted that COIDA be amended to provide for optional coverage to South African 
workers working abroad in countries, SADC or otherwise, that do not provide 
adequately for social security benefits.
2.5. Summary
The definition and test phrase has a limiting effect upon the right to claim 
compensation but is broadly interpreted by the courts consistent with the purpose 
of the Act.138
The elements identified to be taken into consideration for fulfilling the 
requirements of the test are:139
• an injury due to an accident; and
• sustained in circumstances that need to be arsing out of and
• in the course of employment.
Certain exclusions to the test that resulted in a broadened right to compensation 
have been enacted in the form of:
135 ibid 3(b)(ii)-(iii).
136 Ibid 3(b)(iv).
137 S 23(3).
138 Chapter 4 paras 3.1 & 3.2 supra.
139 Chapter 4 paras 2.1 & 2.2 supra.
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• commuting injuries if the vehicle is provided free of charge and controlled by 
the employer;140
• serious disablement sustained during acts of misconduct;141
• transgression of labour laws;142
• training in and provision for emergency services with the approval of the 
employer.143
A serious limiting factor for employees in the SADC region is COIDA's limitation on 
trans-border compensation despite different SADC instruments that guide 
otherwise.144
It is clear that the how,145 when, where and what146 surrounding the accident will 
determine whether the injury is considered to be an accident arising “out of and in 
the course of employment" and if the test cannot be satisfied, the employee's right 
to compensation is frustrated. It is put forward that the elements of time, place and 
duties inherent to the test culminate in the control an employer exercises over his 
employees.
3. CANADA
3.1. Statutory definition of an injury: the test
The Canadian compensatory laws tend to deal with the definition in a similar way to 
COIDA but for small differences which include the conjunctive form of the test phrase. 
The test is a pre-requisite for compensation and in statutes where it is not included in 
the definition section; it is being dealt with in the section that recognises the right to 
compensation. Corresponding determinations can be found in nearly all the Canadian
140 Chapter 4 para 2.3.3 supra.
141 Chapter 4 para 2.3.1 & Chapter 4 fn 140 supra.
142 Chapter 4 para 2.3.2 & Chapter 4 fn 111 supra.
143 Chapter 4 fn 108 supra.
144 Chapter 4 para 2.4 supra.
145 "How" relates to "arising out of' as it refers to the nature of the employment.
we "When," "where" and "what" relates to the "arising in the course o f’ as it refers to the
circumstances of time, location and activity surrounding the accident.
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compensatory acts147 but for small differences regarding mental stress; while 
Yukon148 specifically excludes ordinary diseases of life from the definition.
Quebec,149 Newfoundland and Labrador150 extend the definition to include a 
"recurrence, relapse or aggravation” giving a wider scope of injury to fulfil the test; 
while Saskatchewan151 also includes a "potentially disabling condition caused by an 
occupational disease." Quebec's test phrase differs by the use of the disjunctive 
noun "or" and by defining an "employment injury" to mean an employment injury 
caused by a "sudden and unforeseen event" irrespective of the cause thereof and 
"arising out of or in the course of his work."152 It follows then that the test is 
broadened with one less element that needs to be satisfied in Quebec.
The (Federal) Government Employees Compensation Act153 defines an accident to 
include "a wilful and an intentional act, not being the act of the employee, and a 
fortuitous event occasioned by a physical or natural cause" but includes the test 
phrase "out of and in the course of' in section 4 154 where the Act deals with the right 
to compensation.155
All the other Canadian Acts156 contain a presumption157 with the working that if a 
person was injured or died in the course of his employment, it is presumed to arise
147 New Brunswick s 1; Ontario s 2(1); Manitoba s 4(1); British Columbia s 5(1); Nova Scotia s 2; 
Prince Edward Island s 1(1); Yukon s 3(1) & Nunavut s 10.
148 S 3(1).
149 Quebec s 2.
iso Newfoundland and Labrador s 2(1)(0).
151 Saskatchewan s 2(k).
152 Quebec s 2. Own emphasis.
153 RSC 1985, c G-5.
154 "4. (1) Subject to this Act, compensation shall be paid to
(a) an employee who
(i) is caused personal injury by an accident arising out of and in the course of his 
employment”
155 The complex nature of the phrase is recognised by the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal in 
Puddicombe at 25 when the court criticised the habit of courts to reduce the phrase to a "set of 
rules." The court at 26 indicated that the phrase should be interpreted within the context of 
"workers’ compensation law."
156 Alberta s 24(4); British Columbia s 5(4); Manitoba s 4(5); New Brunswick s 7(2); Quebec s 28; 
New Foundland and Labrador s 61; Nunavut s 14(2)(3); Nova Scotia s 10(4); Ontario s 13(2); 
Prince Edward Island s 6(4); Saskatchewan s 29 & Yukon s 17.
1 57 The Saskatchewan Act does not stipulate the presumption to be rebuttable.
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out of employment and vice versa unless the contrary is proved.158 This has led to a 
number of court decisions such as Gellately v Newfoundland (Workers' Compensation 
Appeal Tribunal), 1995 CanLII 9896 (NL CA) to be discussed infra.159
Ison160 criticises the manner in which claims are declined by the application of the 
rebuttable presumption by the compensation authorities with the consequence of 
an opposite application of the presumption in claims where deficient affirmative 
evidence on the causal relationship between the injury and the employment is 
available.161 The misapplication of the presumption has the effect of rebutting the 
presumption which is meant to favour the required nexus between injury and 
employment; and effectively places the onus on the employee to prove the injury to 
be work-related although the onus to rebut the presumption rests on the 
compensation authority.162
The standard of proof needed to rebut the presumption is a balance of probabilities 
after weighing all relevant evidence.163 If the evidence shows, on a balance of 
probabilities, both elements of the test phrase to be satisfied, the presumption is not 
applied. Where on a balance of probabilities, evidence is found to be equal in weight, 
the benefit of the doubt will decisively favour the right to compensation. Evidence 
to rebut the presumption should have sufficient weight to positively affirm "an 
alternative cause, and evidence that the employment was not contributory"; and not 
simply alludes to evidence of a non-causal relationship between the accident and 
the injury.164
158 Own emphasis.
159 In Michelin, at 29, the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal discussed the implications of the 
presumption as contained in s 10(4) of the Act and says it "creates a rebuttable presumption 
that 'arising out of employment’ is an equivalent term to 'arising ... in the course of 
employment." The court held that although the consequences of shift work (mal-adaptation 
syndrome) caused symptoms of tiredness at work, the injury did not “arise out of and in the 
course of employment."
iso Ison 1989: 37-38.
ifil Ison 1989: 37-38. See also Bouchard v Workers Compensation Board o f Manitoba, 1997 CanLII
11523 (MB CA), at 5 & 10. Retrieved on 27/04/2012 from http://canlii.ca/t/lpflO.
162 Ibid.
163 Bouchard v Workers Compensation Board o f Manitoba, 1997 CanLII 11523 (MB CA), at 10 & 12.
164 MacLaren v P.E.I. (Workers' Compensation Board), 1995 CanLII 2090 (PE SCAD). Retrieved on 
27/04/2012 from http://canlii.ca/t/lc21j. At 2, the court considered Dunham v Workmen's 
Compensation Board (1967), 67 D.L.R. (2nd) 726 (N.B.C.A.) in this respect.
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Although the phrase "out of and in the course of employment" remained the test, the 
word "accident" was replaced in some jurisdictions by “injury".165 "Injury" is 
broader in application than "accident" and includes more instances of disablement 
than "accident".166
The test phrase remains vague167 and inconclusive of the requirement of only a 
single criterion but some primary indicators that have been identified and applied 
include inter alia:16s
• place where the injury happened (the work site);
• if the action taken was for the benefit of the employer;
• did it follow from the use of equipment or material provided by the 
employer?
• was the level of risk exposed to similar to the risk associated with normal 
production?
• was the worker paid for the period during which the injury was sustained?
• was the injury caused by actions of the employer or a colleague?
Only a broad nexus with employment is required and the injury need not necessarily 
result from a work-related action if it can be shown to have arose out of 
employment.169
3.2. Interpretation through case law
The Canadian Compensation Boards have the assistance of a number of policies 
published as part of compensatory legislation because the different workers' 
compensatory laws enable the publication of policies. These policies deal 
extensively with interpretation of phrases and parts of the enabling act; and are
165 Nunavut; Saskatchewan; Yukon & Newfoundland and Labrador.
166 Henry [35]—[36].
167 Puddicombe [25]—[26].
168 ison 1989: 26-27.
169 It was held that the test phrase "in the course of employment" refers to actions done in 
discharging of a contractual duty and to actions "reasonably incidental to performance of the 
contractual duty" at [27] and [50] of Puddicombe.
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used on a daily basis by the different Boards to adjudicate and administrate claims, 
thus in the execution of the administrative remedy.170
It is submitted that the publication of policy documents creates certainty and clarity 
for the three stakeholders.
This is contrary to the situation in South Africa where no policies have been 
published to assist in interpretation of COIDA except for Regulations on
170 Alberta: Policy No. 02-01: Chapter: Work-relatedness: Arises out o f and occurs in the course o f  
employment Stating the legal basis and setting out in detail the factors normally taken into 
account in consideration of a claim. Retrieved on 15/05/2011 from http://www.wcb.ab.ca/ 
public/policy/manual/claimantasp.
Manitoba (Provincial Government). Workers Compensation Board. 2006. Policy No. 44.05: 
Adjudication and compensation: Arising out o f  and in the course o f  employment. Retrieved on 
15/05/2011 from http://www.wcb.mb.ca/policy-manual.
New Brunswick: Policy No. 21-100: Conditions fo r  entitlement -  General principles. Retrieved 
on 18/05/2011 from http://www.worksafenb.ca/view-all-policies?alttemplate=Printable&. 
Newfoundland and Labrador (Provincial Government). Workplace Health, Safety and 
Compensation Commission. 2001. Policy No. EN-19: Arising out o f  and in the course o f 
employment and Newfoundland and Labrador (Provincial Government). Workplace Health, 
Safety and Compensation Commission. 2001. Policy No. EN-20: Weighing evidence. Retrieved on 
18/05/2011 from http://www.whscc.nf.ca/policiesandprocedures.whscc.
Northwest Territories and Nunavut (Provincial Government). Workers' Safety and 
Compensation Commission. 2008. Operational Policy Manual: Policy No. 03.02: Entitlement 
(defining the concept of “Balance of Probabilities” as "A degree of proof which is more likely 
than not.”). Retrieved on 10/03/2013 from http://www.wsib.on.ca/en/community/WSIB/ 
230/PolicyHome/24345?vgnextoid=cc08b411bel2ell0VgnVCM1000000el8120aRCRD.
Nova Scotia (Provincial Government). Workers' Compensation Board. 2009. Policy No. 1.3.7.: 
General entitlement -  Arising out o f  and in the course o f  employment. Retrieved on 18/05/2011 
from http://www.wcb.ns.ca/policy/index_e.aspx?DetailID=1069.
Ontario (Provincial Government). Workplace Safety and Insurance Board. 2004. Operational 
Policy Manual: Decision Making-. Policy No. 11-01-01: Adjudicative process. Retrieved on 
15/05/2011 from http://www.wsib.on.ca/en/community/WSIB/230/PolicyHome/243457vgn 
extoid=cc08b411bel2ell0VgnVCM 1000000el8120aRCRD.
Prince Edward Island (Provincial Government). Workers' Compensation Board. 2009. Policy No. 
POL-71: Arising out o f and in the course o f employment and Prince Edward Island (Provincial 
Government). Workers' Compensation Board. 2006. Policy No. POL-68: Weighing o f  evidence. 
Retrieved on 23/08/2012 from http://www.wcb.pe.ca/Information/Policies.
Saskatchewan (Provincial Government). Workers' Compensation Board. 2001. Policy No. POL 
13/2001: Arising out o f  and in the course o f  employment. Retrieved on 19/05/2011 from 
http://www.wcbsask.com/WCBPortalWeb/ShowProperty?nodePath=/WCBRepository/pdfs/ 
PolicyManual.
Yukon (Provincial Government). Workers' Health and Safety Board. 2009. Policy Manual: Policy 
No. EN-01: Arising out o f  and in the course o f employment. Retrieved on 19/07/2012 from 
http://www.wcb.yk.ca/ActsPoliciesAndRegulations/Policies/EN/Default.aspx.
The Canadian courts take cognisance of the existence and applications of these policies which is 
binding as in Macoon v Alberta (Workers' Compensation Board), 1993 ABCA 9 (CanLII), at [12]. 
Retrieved on 27/04/2012 from http://canlii.ca/t/2d9j8.
118
adjudication of a number of occupational diseases. In Odayar v Compensation 
Commissioner171 the Court held that COIDA:172
does not confer upon the Director-General of the Department of Labour the 
power to issue regulations. Despite being published in the Government 
Gazette, the circular is no more than an internal memorandum setting out 
guidelines on the manner in which compensation claims relating to post- 
traumatic stress disorder ought to be dealt with.
3.2.1. Canada Post Corp. v Nova Scotia (W orkers’ Compensation A ppeals 
Tribunal)
In Canada Post Corp. v Nova Scotia (Workers' Compensation Appeals Tribunal),173 
Cromwell JA discussed this phrase174 and sets it out as follows:
The requirement that the accident arise ‘in the course of employment’ is 
concerned with the time, place and circumstances of the accident while the 
requirement that it arise ‘out of employment’ is concerned with the origin of 
the cause of the injury.175
The test phrase clearly consists of two interrelated but distinct elements. Only a 
broad causal relationship (similar to the South African ruling in Khoza) with 
employment is required as it needs to be established that the employment "made a 
significant contribution to the occurrence of the injury."176
” 1 2006 (6) SA 202 (N).
172 Odayar [16].
173 Canada Post Corp. v Nova Scotia (Workers' Compensation Appeals Tribunal), 2007 NSCA 129. 
Retrieved on 05/06/2011 from (CanLII), http://canlii.ca/t/lvgvO.
w  Ibid.
175 The Court in Gellately considered the application of the test phrase in the Canadian historical 
context and explained the position as: "[9] The words 'in course of employment’ refer to the 
time, place and circumstances under which the accident takes place. The words 'arising out of 
employment’ refer to the origin of the cause of the injury. There must be some causal 
connection between the conditions under which the employee worked and the injury which he 
received. (Blacks Law Dictionary) In MacKenzie v. Grand Truck Pacific Railway Co., [1926] 1
D.L.R. 1 (S.C.C.), Mignault, J., cited with approval the statement of Lord Atkinson in St. Helens 
Colliery Co. v. Hewitson, [1924] A.C. 58, that the words ‘arising out of suggest the idea of cause 
and effect, the injury by accident being the effect and the employment, i.e., the discharge of the 
duties of the workman's service, the cause of that effect....' Today doing something incidental to 
his or her employment would be sufficient, the discharge of a duty having been rejected as too 
narrow a view."
176 Douglas eta l  17.
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3.2.2. Puddicom be v W orkers' Compensation B oard  (N.S.)
The ruling of Puddicombe v Workers' Compensation Board (N.S.) identified a two- 
folded test in a factual inquiry177 to be applied: "the nature of the work and the link 
between the activity of the employee giving rise to the injury and the risk of the 
work."178 In citing Gellately v Newfoundland (Workers' Compensation Appeal 
Tribunal),179 (discussed infra), the Court explained that "in the course of 
employment" has reference to the time, place and circumstances of the accident; 
while "arising out of employment" refer to the source of the cause of the injury and 
there needs to be a nexus between the conditions of the work and the injury 
sustained.180 In the process of the enquiry, the strength of the nexus between the 
injury and the risk brought about by the employment is taken into consideration 
with emphasis on the scope of the risk and the nexus between the risk and the 
injury.181 This is the practical approach in establishing the "arising out of 
employment" element of the test-phrase.182
The Court described the statutory requirement as purposively very broadly phrased 
in general terms to be applicable to a virtually limitless array of situations, jobs and 
types of injuries.183 Courts avoided reducing the phrase "out of and in the course of 
employment" to a set of rules or guidelines not to limit the generalisation and the 
array of situations covered.184 The Court referred to earlier decisions that have 
produced "... a bewildering vagueness in interpretation and conflict in judicial 
application"185 that may defeat the purpose of workers' compensatory legislation as 
a means of providing compensation in a simple and speedy way.186 Unless the test 
phrase is applied within the context of workers' compensatory law, "in the course of 
employment" will be concerned with only the worker's contractual duties and "arise 
out of employment" be seen as if it is the work that caused the injury which is
177 Puddicombe [34].
ibid [37],
179 1995 CanLII 9896 (NL CA).
180 Puddicombe [37].
181 Ibid [40].
Ibid [40].
183 ibid [24].
ibid  [25].
iss Ibid [25].
186 Ibid [25].
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considered to be too limited and inappropriate in the context of this type of 
legislation.187 "In the course of employment" also refers to "things reasonably 
incidental to the performance of the contractual duty";188 while the Supreme Court 
of Canada refused to purely transplant the common law causation principles to 
"arising out of employment" as it has different goals which may not be suitable in a 
no-fault scheme.189
The Court very importantly remarked on an aspect lying "at the root of the entire 
statutory scheme" in the test phrase forming not only the gateway to the right to 
compensation but being central to the applicability of the bar against common law 
proceedings as it lies at the centre of the historic trade-off according to which 
employees exchanged the right to sue for access to a no-fault scheme and employers 
are obliged to contribute to the fund and in turn are absolved from civil actions.190
3.2.3. Gellately v Newfoundland (W orkers' Compensation A ppeal Tribunal)
The interpretation and application of the presumption191 in relation to the test 
phrase as well as the application of "serious and wilful misconduct" in the light of 
the no-fault principle has been under scrutiny by the Supreme Court of 
Newfoundland and Labrador in the case of Gellately v Newfoundland (Workers' 
Compensation Appeal Tribunal).192 The Court held that "serious and wilful 
misconduct" is to be distinguished from the test phrase out of and in the course of 
employment with firstly an enquiry to establish if the test phrase is satisfied; and if 
not, no consideration arise into the existence of "serious and wilful misconduct."193
“ 7 ibid [26].
lea Ibid [27],
189 Ibid [28].
wo Ibid [29].
191 "61. Where the injury arose out of the employment, it shall be presumed, unless the contrary is 
shown, that it occurred in the course of the employment, and where the injury occurred in the 
course of employment, it shall be presumed, unless the contrary is shown, that it arose out of 
the employment."
192 1995 CanLII 9896 (NL CA).
W3 Gellately [10].
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The Court criticised the reasoning of the inferior Courts in this case and held194 that 
the additional test applied by the Appeal Tribunal with regard to the degree of 
intoxication constituted an added peril to the nexus between injury and 
employment and derived from the early decision by Lord Sumner in Lancashire & 
Yorkshire Railway Co. v Highley, [1917] A.C. 3 5 2195 is outdated.196 The Court rejected 
the application of the section as an error in law and held that following a finding 
that the injury did occur in the course of employment and the presumption 
applied197
the question which should have been asked is whether it had been proven 
that the employment was not a significant causative factor in the injury. As 
noted above a finding that the applicant was the sole cause of the injury 
does not preclude a finding that the injury arose out of the employment.
The Court held that once it is an established fact that the injury arose out of 
employment or in the course of employment, the next part of the enquiry is to apply 
the presumptive section and not follow it with an enquiry into the fault of the 
employee in the form of "serious and wilful misconduct."198
3.2.4. Workmen's Compensation B oard  v C.P.R.
To determine if an injury arose out of and in the course of employment, cognisance 
needs to be taken of when employment starts, ends and the duration thereof. The 
Supreme Court of Canada had to interpret the test phrase in the case of Workmen's 
Compensation Board v C.P.R199 where an employee during a period of break in work 
hours sustained serious injuries when she went for a swim on the employer's 
premises.200 In this case, the Appellant Board relied on the early leading English 
decisions inter alia, St. Helen's Colliery v Hewitson referred to supra at par 1.2.1.
Ibid [15].
195 A case that was also cited in South African courts.
196 Gellately [12],
ibid [15].
Ibid [17]—[18],
i "  1952 CanLII 44 (SCC), [1952] 2 SCR 359.
2°° C.P.R. 368.
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Rand J cited the despair expressed in courts since the inception of workers 
compensatory legislation in interpretation of the test phrase and noted: "These 
words have produced a bewildering vagueness in interpretation and conflict in 
judicial application since they were first introduced into the Compensation Act of 
England."201 It is especially difficult in cases where an employee is injured during 
activities not directly flowing from his contractual employment duties which then 
leave the task to the Courts to interpret the test phrase from the viewpoint of the 
"broad conceptions underlying the legislation."202 Rand J quoted203 Viscount 
Haldane when he said in Davidson v M'Robb [1918] A.C. 304 (at 316):204
My lords, the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1906, appears on the face of it 
intended to afford a simple and speedy method of claiming compensation in 
the cases to which it relates... [sic]. But around the principle which 
Parliament laid down in this language there is already spreading itself in 
Courts of Justice an atmosphere of legal subtlety which bids fair to defeat 
the obvious purpose of the Legislature... [sic] we are bound to follow our 
previous decisions when they form really binding precedents, we ought, in 
applying the statute to particular facts, to direct our efforts rather to giving 
effect to broad principles with freedom in applying them to individual 
circumstances...
Normally it is at his place of work that the employee is exposed to risk, "including 
means of approach and departure; but it may be elsewhere as in the case of a truck 
driver."205 But while on his way to or from his place of work, the employee is 
obviously in his personal domain but when at his workplace and his actions are not 
furthering the interests of the employer, difficulties relating to interpretation 
arise.206 Injuries sustained during activities incidental to employment, for instance 
injured through an explosion while eating lunch as permitted in a workshop, will be 
considered as "in the course of employment."207 Privileges conferred by the 
employer upon employees need to be differentiated from actions incidental to 
discharging contractual employment duties as it is "prima facie, an act within the
2°i Ibid.
202 Ibid.
2°3 Ibid.
204 Ibid.
205 Ibid 369.
206 Ibid.
207 ibid.
123
range of her own responsibility."208 Rand J held that to fulfil the requirements of the 
test phrase "the employee must be where she is either in carrying out a duty or 
under the coercion of the contract or in an exercise of conduct that is intimately 
involved, as an incident, with action in those two spheres."209
3.3. Extended right to compensation
3.3.1. The presumption and death
In addition to the presumption discussed supra, some of the Canadian Acts presume 
the discovery of the body of an employee in the workplace, at a place where that 
employee had a right to be, the death to arise out of and in the course of 
employment.210 This presumption formed the theme of a number of court decisions, 
some of which dealt with the possibility of suicide by the deceased.211 The question 
whether it remained open to be rebutted was under scrutiny by the Saskatchewan 
Court of Appeal in Henry v Saskatchewan (Workers' Compensation Board], Bayda CJS 
fully examined the amended Act where the wording was changed and the previous 
reference to a rebuttable presumption deleted. The Chief Justice ruled that in spite 
of the exclusive jurisdiction of the Compensation Board to enquire into and decide 
on matters relevant under the Act,212 the presumption was intentionally changed 
from rebuttable to irrefutable and therefore even suicide could be covered.213 A 
clear distinction is drawn between the words "injury" and "accident," the first wider 
in meaning than the last.214
208 Ibid 370.
209 Ibid 370-371.
210 Alberta s 24(3); Nunavut s 14(4); Nova Scotia s 36; Quebec ss 95, 96, 97 & Saskatchewan s 30.
211 See for example Henry; Gagnon v Saskatchewan (Workers' Compensation Board), 2007 SKQB
250 (CanLll); retrieved on 27/04/2012 from http://canlii.ca/t/lspkx; Goertzen v 
Saskatchewan (Workers’ Compensation Board], 2000 SKQB 362 (CanLll), retrieved on 
27/04/2012 from http://canlii.ca/t/119dc; Goertzen v Saskatchewan (Workers' Compensation 
Board), 2002 SICCA 125 (CanLll), retrieved on 27/04/2012 from http://canlii.ca/t/5g0s & 
Truitt v Saskatchewan Workers' Compensation Board, 2003 SKQB 257 (CanLll), retrieved on 
27/04/2012 from http;//canlii.ca/t/56zg.
212 Henry [15]—[26].
2« Ibid [30]—[32] & [35].
2«  Ibid [33], [39]—[42], [50],
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3.3.2. Other instances of extended coverage
Coverage for occupational injuries is extended to include attending of classes or 
courses required by the employee's employment;215 occupational diseases include 
(unless the contrary is proven) specific types of cancer in fire fighters216 and 
“myocardial infarction within 24 hours after attendance at an emergency response" 
by fire fighters;217 the use of recreational facilities provided by the employer;218 and 
attendance of social functions as part of employment responsibilities.219
3.3.3. Serious and wilful misconduct
Similar to South Africa, all the Canadian jurisdictions provide for workers to be 
eligible for compensation in circumstances of "serious and wilful misconduct" only 
if it results in serious disablement or death.220 If serious disablement is established, 
the misconduct becomes immaterial. It is interpreted similar to South Africa and it 
is required to be an intentional act not merely carelessness or a lack of prudence; 
and as the act should be "wilful", it does not include acts done on impulse or 
spontaneously.221 Horseplay, intoxication222 and instigating a fight are categorised 
as actions of "serious and wilful misconduct."223
215 Alberta s 24(5).
216 Alberta s 24.1(2); British Columbia s 6.1(1.1); Manitoba s 4(5.2); Nunavut s 14.1; Ontario s 
15.1(3) & Saskatchewan s 29.1.
217 Alberta s 24.1(7); Manitoba s 4(5.6); Nunavut s 14.1; Ontario s 15.1 & Saskatchewan s 29.1.
218 Ison 1989: 32.
2w Ison 1989: 34.
220 Alberta s 24(1)(2); British Columbia s 5(3); Manitoba s 4(3) limits benefits by the non payment 
of medical costs and loss of earnings for the first three weeks from the date of the injury; New 
Brunswick s 7(1); Newfoundland and Labrador s 43(2); Nunavut s 12(c); Nova Scotia s 10(3); 
Ontario s 17; Prince Edward Island s 6(3); Quebec s 27; Saskatchewan s 31 & Yukon s 4 ,17 .
221 Decision No. 535/95, 1996 CanLII 9302 (ON WSIAT), fully discussed "serious and wilful 
misconduct” with an addendum setting out previous decisions. Hereinafter: Decision No. 
535/95. Retrieved on 30/04/2012 from http://canlii.ca/t/200q6.
222 Gellately showed that intoxication may take the employee outside the employment relationship, 
something which will defeat his right to compensation at [5] and [6] where the reasoning of the 
court a quo was quoted: "The appellant’s gross intoxication constituted an act that was not work- 
related and as a consequence broke the employment nexus and takes the appellant outside the 
scope of his employment The appellant introduced an additional risk which was not 
employment-related and by such act, removed himself from an employer/employee relationship 
with his employer." But this reasoning was held by the Supreme Court of Newfoundland and 
Labrador to defeat the no-fault principle because it attached fault to the employee at [12].
223 Ison 1989: 35 & 64-67.
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3.3.4. Court interpretation of serious and wilful misconduct
The Supreme Court ruling in Gellately224 critically looked at the proper application 
of the concept of "serious and wilful misconduct". It held that it should be applied in 
a phased manner, firstly determining whether the accident arose in circumstances 
that fulfil the test laid down in the test phrase "out of and in the course of 
employment"; and, if so determined, the next phase would entail an enquiry into the 
conduct of the employee in relation to the role it played in his injury:225
However, one cannot interpret the words "arising out of employment" in 
isolation of the fact that the legislature clearly contemplated that one could 
suffer an injury arising out of employment which is caused solely by the 
serious and wilful misconduct of the applicant. In the one case under s.
43 (1 ) of the Act the misconduct can be used to preclude recovery, in the 
other, under s. 43(2), it cannot. At the stage of considering whether the 
injury arose out of and in the course of employment one is not addressing 
fault. It is only if there need be a consideration of whether the injury is 
attributable solely to the serious and wilful misconduct of the worker that 
one considers fault. One must therefore guard against allowing a 
consideration of cause under the first stage becoming an assessm ent of fault, 
suitable only under the second stage.226
It is submitted that although compensatory legislation is in principle a no-fault 
compensation system, fault does play a part under certain circumstances of which 
"serious and wilful misconduct" is one such circumstance.
The Court concluded that the intoxication did not cause the Appellant’s injuries but 
it was caused by the motor vehicle as a "hazard o f  his employment and as it 
contributed to a material degree to his injury, it did arise out of employment.227 The
224 Discussed also supra at Chapter 4 para 3.2.3.
225 Gellately [10], [16]-[17].
226 The applicable sections of the Act provide as follows:
"43(1) Compensation under this Act is payable
a) to a worker who suffers personal injury arising out of and in the course of 
employment, unless the injury is attributable solely to the serious and wilful 
misconduct of the worker; and
b) to the dependents of a worker who dies as a result of such an injury.
(2) The commission shall pay compensation to a worker who is seriously and permanently 
disabled as a result of an injury arising out of and in the course of employment 
notwithstanding that the injury is attributable solely to the serious and wilful misconduct 
of the worker."
227 Gellately [17].
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Court compared the circumstances of a person who might have been injured in an 
accident after falling gravely ill whilst driving and the present circumstance of 
driving whilst intoxicated and consequently held the nexus between the injury and 
employment to be identical save for the "element of fault." The Court concluded that 
in cases where injuries resulted in serious permanent disablement, fault is 
extinguished and the right to compensation restored. 228
3.3.5. Transgression of employment laws or rules
Deliberate transgression of labour law or rules, including an employer's rules to 
protect the health and safety of employees, will be considered as serious and wilful 
misconduct which will be considered as fulfilling the requirements of the test if 
serious disablement or death results from it.229
3.3.6. Commuting injuries
Similar to South Africa, normally, employment begins when the employee arrives at 
his workplace and ends when he leaves.230 Travelling to and from work will for 
obvious reasons not satisfy the test of out of and in the course of employment but if 
the employer provides the transport or the type of transport and the journey is 
controlled by the employer it will be considered to be in the course of 
employment.231 If an employee is summoned to the workplace by his employer 
outside his normal working hours, it will satisfy the test;232 as will payment of 
commuting costs bring the journey within the ambit of the test.233 This is similar to 
COIDA.
228 Ibid [18]. See Chapter 4 para 2.3.3 supra.
229 In Decision No. 535/95, the employee’s injury was considered to be "out of and in the course of 
employment" although she contravened a known rule of the employer in using the freight lift. 
Her actions resulted in her injury to be held not to constitute "serious and wilful misconduct." 
At: "ISSUE 2: Did the worker engage in 'serious and wilful misconduct'?".
230 Puddicombe [7] & [36].
2si Ison 1989: 29-30.
232 Puddicombe [5] & [8],
233 Ison 1989: 29-30 . Harris v Saskatchewan (Workers' Compensation Board), 1996 CanLll 6825 
(SK QB), 18. Retrieved on 30/04/2012 from http://canlii.ca/t/lns8c.
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3.3.6.1. Court interpretation on commuting injuries
In Puddicombe, the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal extensively used the principles laid 
down in C.P.R. and Gellately as discussed supra. Due to the general language used in 
the test phrase, courts refuse to limit the test phrase to a "set of rules or even firm 
guidelines."234 The test phrase has to be applied in the particular context of 
workers' compensation law and if not interpreted in that light could be "viewed as 
being concerned simply with the employee's contractual duties."235 In the context of 
workers' compensation law, interpretation will be too narrow and inappropriate if 
"arising out of employment" is purely seen as a question of whether the work was 
the cause of the injury.236
Generally, injuries sustained on the way to and from work fall in the employee's 
personal domain and "do not arise out of or in the course of employment."237 This is 
so because working hours normally start upon reaching the workplace and the 
employee is not paid for travel time as it does not form part of his contractual 
duties. Furthermore, the risks involved in travelling to work are not causally 
connected to the employment.238
In citing Gellately, two aspects of the enquiry are identified: "the nature of the work 
and the link between the activity of the employee giving rise to the injury and the 
risk of the work."239 In addition, to consider whether the employee was discharging 
his duties under his employment contract, all factors incidental to it should be taken 
into account; and if applied to the facts of the case, it became clear that the 
employee was exposed to an additional risk when travelling to work on an 
emergency call out by his employer although he was neither paid for it nor did 
travelling from his residence form part of his contractual duties.240
234 Puddicombe [25].
235 Ibid [26].
23<5 Ibid [26],
237 Ibid [36] and as cited from C.P.R.
23s Ibid [36],
239 Ibid [37],
2«  ibid [38]—[41],
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3.4. Migrant labour
Migrant labour in Canada includes not only inter-province migration within the 
Canadian federation but also immigrants from other countries working in Canada. 
Canada established the Seasonal Agricultural Worker Program in 1966 according to 
which agricultural workers241 from Jamaica could work for a maximum of eight 
months at a time in Canada but could return each year.242 By 1970 the program was 
extended to include Mexicans and currently the program (according to which all 
working conditions and benefits of employment should be equal to Canadian 
citizens and permanent residents) includes workers from Mexico and the Caribbean 
countries of: Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda as well as Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, 
Jamaica, Montserrat, St. Kitts-Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines and 
Trinidad and Tobago.243 In 2002 a pilot immigration project was introduced and 
currently immigrants from about 80 countries enter Canada to take up lower skilled 
job opportunities.244 However, it is not limited to lower skilled staff as highly 
trained and skilled people in information technology in the banking sector as well as 
health care providers are hired under the Temporary Foreign Worker Program.245 
As the immigrants, temporary or other, may not be treated less favourably than 
Canadian citizens and permanent residents, it follows that equal treatment of 
occupational injuries and diseases and the benefits attached to it, have to be equally 
favourable and it will be adjudicated upon according to the applicable 
compensatory act with jurisdiction.
241 Dean, D. 2013. Canada treats migrant workers horribly. Vice website: Ontario: Canada. The 
website reports that although more than 50 agricultural immigrants died in workplace 
accidents since 1996, no coroner’s inquests have been held in connection with the death of farm 
workers. Retrieved on 20/09/2013 from http://www.vice.com/en_ca/read/canadas-migrant- 
workforce-has-very-few-rights. See further Chapter 4 paras 2.4 & 4.4 and Chapter 5 paras 2.10; 
3.7 & 4.7.
242 CBC News. 2012. Migrant workers: Who they are, where they're coming from. Toronto: Ontario. 
Retrieved on 20/09/2013 from http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/migrant-workers-who-they- 
are-wher e-they-re-coming-from-1.1137930.
243 Ibid. See also Canada (Federation) website. Employment and Social Development. [Sa], Hiring 
seasonal agricultural workers. Retrieved on 21/09/2013 from http://www.esdc.gc.ca/eng/ 
jobs/foreign_workers/agriculture/seasonal/index.shtml.
244 Ibid.
245 Valiani, S. 2013. RBC only one o f  many Canadian employers misusing temporary migrant workers. 
Toronto: Star Newspapers. Retrieved on 28/09/2013 from http://www.thestar.com/opinion/ 
commentary/2013/04/15/tempor ary_foreign_worker_problem_goes_well_beyond_rbc.html.
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Immigrants from countries other than the Canadian Federation should be 
distinguished from citizens and people with permanent residency moving between 
jurisdictions within Canada. The federal governmental system of Canada could have 
had the unjust result of prohibiting employees from compensation when injured in 
the course of employment while moving or working in a different jurisdiction than 
the one in which they are usually employed or normally reside. To prevent such, 
provision has been made for a right to compensation to cover trans-border injuries 
by entering into the Interjurisdictional Agreement on Workers' Compensation by all 
the Workers’ Compensation Boards. The Boards undertake to:246
ensure that through the provisions of this Agreement and mutual co­
operation, no worker disabled as a result of injury or disease causally 
related to employment in Canada, is denied fair and equitable 
compensation..
Specific provision is made in the Government Employees Compensation Act247 for 
federal government employees by providing their claims to be administered and 
adjudicated by the provincial compensation authority in which the employee is 
normally employed.248 Government employees normally employed outside the 
borders of Canada e.g. diplomatic services are compensated by the Ontario 
compensation authority. People employed by the Canadian Federal Government in 
foreign countries who are citizens of the host country, will be covered by the 
compensatory scheme of the foreign country unless such country does not have a 
scheme, in which case, the foreign worker will be covered by the Government 
Employees Compensation Act section 7.249 COIDA does not have similar provisions.
246 Association of Workers' Compensation Boards of Canada. 2008. Interjurisdictional Agreement on 
Workers’ Compensation. 1.4.1. Retrieved on 25/05/2012 from http://www.awcbc.org/common/ 
assets/english%2 Opdf/ija_consolidated_agreement.pdf.
247 Government Employees Compensation Act, RSC 1985, c G-5.
248 Ibid. The Act defines "compensation" to include "medical and hospital expenses and any other 
benefits, expenses or allowances that are authorized by the law of the province where the 
employee is usually employed respecting compensation for workmen and the dependants of 
deceased workmen."
249 Ibid at s 6: ‘‘Where an employee, other than a person locally engaged outside Canada, is usually 
employed outside Canada, the employee shall for the purposes of this Act be deemed to be 
usually employed in the Province of Ontario.” See also Canada (Federation). [Sa]. Labour 
Program. Retrieved on 25/05/2012 from http://www.labour.gc.ca/eng/health_safety/ 
compensation/local.shtml.
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Alberta specifies in section 52 that payment of compensation may be terminated by 
the Compensation Board if an employee to whom compensation was awarded 
resides outside Canada unless:
(a) the worker provides medical evidence in a manner satisfactory to the 
Board confirming the continuation of the disablement and the Board is 
satisfied that the period of disablement is not prolonged by the worker 
leaving Alberta, or
(b) the worker has been granted an award for permanent disability arising 
out of the accident
This section differs thus to section 23 of COIDA in that it is not limited by time and 
that the pension may be continued upon the submission of prove of the continued 
permanent disability. However, section 53 of the Alberta Act, provides for the 
continuation of payment of compensation to persons residing outside Canada.
However, the Acts of Ontario, Prince Edward Island, Quebec and Yukon are silent on 
the portability of compensation should a worker leave the jurisdiction after 
compensation for permanent disablement has been awarded.
Manitoba provides extensively for workers who are injured outside their 
jurisdiction in section 5(3) which, similarly to COIDA, provides for accidents during 
temporary absence from Manitoba. Section 5(4) refutes compensation to workers 
injured during non-work-related activities whilst outside Manitoba and who are 
employed by employers whose main businesses are not within Manitoba. In 
contrast to this provision, section 6(4) specifically provides for the Board to pay 
compensation subject to its discretion if an injustice would otherwise result where 
an employee failed to make an election if entitled to claim compensation in another 
country or place. New Brunswick (section 9) specifically includes accidents that 
happen in the "United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland". 
Newfoundland and Labrador covers the workers of employers who carry on 
business within their area of jurisdiction if injured at work outside the province 
(section 51) and, very importantly, according to section 50 provides that 
compensation will not cease if a worker leaves the jurisdiction.
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The Northwest Territories’ Act (section 21), on the other hand, requires a worker to 
return to its jurisdiction for purposes of medical examinations at the workers' own 
costs if the claim is lodged after leaving Canada and provides for compensation if 
the worker is injured in a foreign country in sections 22-23. Saskatchewan requires 
the worker to present himself periodically for continuation of compensatory 
benefits (section 37).
Similarly to COIDA, The Acts of Nova Scotia (section 19-25), Ontario (sections 18­
20), Prince Edward Island (sections 7-8), Quebec (section 8) and Saskatchewan 
(section 35-36) require the worker to be domiciled within its jurisdiction or the 
employer to have his establishment within the area of their jurisdictions, while 
Ontario (section 19), Prince Edward Island (section 7) and Yukon (section 7) limit 
the right to a claim, similarly to COIDA, to temporary absence for work from their 
respective provinces.
It follows that although extensive provisions are in place for coverage of employees 
within the Canadian Federation, cognisance is being taken of the needs of immigrants 
from other foreign countries. This is so because Canada provides for similar 
treatment and benefits of employees entering Canada (irrespective of the province) 
to employees who are citizens or permanent residents of Canada for both temporary 
as well as permanent employment. The requirement of similar treatment and benefits 
includes the realm of compensation for occupational injuries and diseases.
Although a number of the provisions referred to supra are similar to COIDA, the 
general trend is a wider coverage than COIDA with specific provisions made for 
Government employees working abroad, foreigners working for the Canadian 
Government in foreign countries and the provisions made for the portability of 
compensation benefits.
3.5. Summary
It is clear from the discussion above that Canadian compensatory legislation finds 
broad application with extended coverage.
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Elements to be taken into account in fulfilling the requirements in the definition and 
test phrase are:250
• an injury; and
• sustained in circumstances that need to be arising out of and
• in the course of employment.
An important added feature is the inclusion of a rebuttable presumption with 
regard to the two elements of the test phrase that has the working of one element 
having been satisfied, the other will be presumed to be satisfied unless otherwise 
proven.251
Despite the limiting effects of the test phrase, Canadian Acts provide for a 
broadening of eligibility for claims in the form of:
• commuting injuries;252
• serious disablements sustained despite misconduct;253
• transgression of labour laws;254
• provision for emergency services;255
• an irrefutable presumption in respect of a dead body found at the 
workplace;256
• trans-border compensation.257
Canada and South Africa share a historical connection both in the applicable 
principles on compensatory legislation as well as certain early English rulings.258 It 
has however been differently developed in each of the countries.
The definition of an injury and the test phrase in the Canadian compensatory 
legislation is nearly as limited as the South African equivalent but in Canada as in 
South Africa, the courts interpret it broad and generous259 and the Canadian right to
250 Par 3.1 supra.
251 Chapter 4 fn 156-164 supra.
252 Chapter 4 para 3.3.6 supra.
253 Chapter 4 paras 3.2.3; 3.3.3 & 3.3.4 supra.
254 Chapter 4 para 3.3.5 supra.
255 Chapter 4 fn 217 supra.
256 Chapter 4 para 3.3.1 supra.
257 Chapter 4 para 3.4 supra.
258 Chapter 4 para 3.2.4 supra.
259 Chapter 4 para 3.2 supra.
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compensation is much broader than the South African right due to the working of 
presumptions260 and the inter-jurisdictional agreement.261
4. AUSTRALIA
4.1. Statutory definition of an injury: the test
The Australian compensatory laws with its common law history initially used the 
test phrase similar to COIDA but it developed very broadly in legislation and case 
law to a point where the need was identified for amendments intending to narrow 
the test and limit the right to compensation to injuries sustained in circumstances 
where the nexus with employment can be proved.
The Australian compensatory laws (except South Australia which uses the term 
"disability"262) require the existence of an "injury" and not an "accident" and define 
it in the New South Wales Act as:263
In this Act: "injury":
(a) means personal injury arising out of o r  in the course of employment,
(b) includes:
(i) a disease which is contracted by a worker in the course of 
employment and to which the em ploym ent w as a con tribu ting  
factor, and
(ii) the aggravation, acceleration, exacerbation or deterioration of any 
disease, where the em ploym ent w as a contribu ting  factor to the 
aggravation, acceleration, exacerbation or deterioration, and
(c) does not include (except in the case of a worker employed in or about a 
mine) a dust disease, as defined by the W orkers’ Compensation (Dust 
Diseases) Act 1942, or the aggravation, acceleration, exacerbation or 
deterioration of a dust disease, as so defined.264
260 Chapter 4 fn 156 -164  supra,
261 Chapter 4 para 3.4 supra.
262 South Australia s 30. Western Australia refers to "a personal injury by accident arising out of or 
in the course of employment..."
263 New South Wales s 4.
264 Own emphasis.
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"Injury" bears its normal meaning, interpreted liberally but an additional 
requirement is introduced by the term "contributing factor".265 The nexus between 
employment and injury is a requirement of all the Acts to establish a right to 
compensation. However, all the jurisdictions in Australia changed266 the text of their 
legislation from the conjunctive phrase "out of and in the course o f  to the 
disjunctive form: "out of or in the course of';267 and in doing so broadened the test 
through reducing the two-folded test to a single test if an injury has been proved.
The test has recently been narrowed by the introduction268 of a further requirement 
in the form of "a substantial employment relationship" the extent of which is clear 
from the New South Wales Act,269 in section 9A:
9A No compensation payable unless employment substantial
contributing factor to injury
(1) No compensation is payable under this Act in respect of an injury unless 
the employment concerned was a substantial contributing factor to the 
injury.
(2) The following are examples of matters to be taken into account for the 
purposes of determining whether a worker’s employment was a 
substantial contributing factor to an injury (but this subsection does not 
limit the kinds of matters that can be taken into account for the 
purposes of such a determination):
(a) the time and place of the injury,
(b) the nature of the work performed and the particular tasks of that 
work,
265 Own emphasis. Commonwealth s 5A; Australian Capital Territory s 31(1}; New South Wales s 1;
Victoria s 4(1); Queensland s 32; Western Australia s 5; South Australia s 30(2); Tasmania s 25;
Northern Territory s 3(1) & New South Wales s 4(1).
266 Safe Work Australia. 2011. Comparison o f workers’ compensation arrangements in Australia and 
New Zealand. Canberra: Safe Work Australia. At 10 it is indicated that the wording was changed 
already in 1946 in Victoria. Hereinafter: Comparison o f  WC arrangements 2011. Retrieved 
on 30/07/2011 from http://safeworkaustralia.gov.au/AboutSafeWorkAustralia/WhatWeDo/ 
Publications/Pages/comparison2011.aspx.
267 Own emphasis. Commonwealth s 5A; Australian Capital Territory s 31(1); New South Wales s 1;
Victoria s 4(1); Queensland s 32; Western Australia s 5; South Australia s 30(2); Tasmania s 25;
Northern Territory s 3(1) & New South Wales s 4(1). Purse 2011 at 239 considers the change to the 
test phrase by replacing "and" by "or" as one of the two most important changes to Australian 
compensatory law post World War II; the other being coverage for journeys to and from work sites.
268 This limiting requirement has been introduced by all the jurisdictions in various ways with 
wording such as : "substantial contributing factor" in New South Wales and the Australian 
Capitol Territory; "a significant contributing factor" in Victoria and Queensland; "a significant 
degree” in Western Australia and the Commonwealth; “on the balance of probabilities" in South 
Australia; "a substantial degree" in Tasmania and "a material degree" in the Northern Territory 
but all with the intention to require prove of the employment relationship in order to exclude 
diseases and injuries of ordinary origin of life.
269 In following the Victorian example.
135
(c) the duration of the employment,
(d) the probability that the injury or a similar injury would have 
happened anyway, at about the same time or at the same stage of 
the worker’s life, if he or she had not been at work or had not 
worked in that employment,
(e) the worker's state of health before the injury and the existence of 
any hereditary risks,
(f) the worker’s lifestyle and his or her activities outside the 
workplace.
(3) A worker's employment is not to be regarded as a substantial 
contributing factor to a worker’s injury merely because of either or both 
of the following:
(a) the injury arose out of or in the course of, or arose both out of 
and in the course of, the worker's employment,
(b) the worker's incapacity for work, loss as referred to in Division 4 
of Part 3, need for medical or related treatment, hospital 
treatment, ambulance service or workplace rehabilitation 
service as referred to in Division 3 of Part 3, or the worker’s 
death, resulted from the injury.
(4) This section does not apply in respect of an injury to which section 10,
1 1  or 12  applies.
In some jurisdictions, the requirement of employment to be a "substantial" or 
"significant" contributing factor applies to both injuries and diseases while in others 
only to diseases.270
4.2. Interpretation through case law
Although other aspects have the benefit of more or less a hundred years of 
authorities, some aspects previously decided still need to be reconsidered by the 
courts as the aspect of injuries happening during an interlude between periods of 
work. The Australian Compensation Authorities have, similar to the Canadian 
Authorities, the benefit of policy manuals that fully explain the ordinary 
interpretation and application of the different compensatory Acts.271
270 Western Australia s 5; South Australia s 30A(a); Tasmania s 3(2A); Northern Territories s 4(7); 
Australian Capitol Territory s 31(2) & Commonwealth s 5B.
271 Australian Government (Commonwealth). Minister for Employment and Workplace Relations. 
2002. Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Directions 2002. Retrieved on 24/08/2012 from 
http://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/F2008B00376.
Commonwealth of Australia: Comcare Regulation Policy 2011. Retrieved on 10/02/2012 from
http://www.comcare.gov.au/_data/assets/pdf_file/0008/127745/OHS50_00772_Augl0_v31F
INALpdf.
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Interpretation by the courts is still to be settled on the recently-introduced requirement 
that the employment relationship needs to be a "substantial contributing factor"272 to 
the injury.
4.2.1. Kavanagh v Commonwealth
The High Court of Australia interpreted "injury by accident" and "in the course of his 
employment" in Kavanagh v Commonwealth273 (hereinafter: Kavanagh) with Dixon 
CJ citing the Act providing that if an employee sustained an injury by accident 
arising out of or in the course of employment, liability will arise for the payment of 
compensation with the word “injury" to mean "any physical or mental injury" 
inclusive of an "aggravation, acceleration or recurrence" of a prior injury.274 
Kavanagh died in hospital as a result of bronchopneumonia and heart failure due to 
the rupture of his oesophagus caused by vomiting of which the cause could not be 
established, at his workplace.275 The question to be determined was whether the
Australian Capital Territory (State Government). Parliamentary Counsel. 2010. Workers 
Compensation Regulation 2002 (with notes). Retrieved on 10/02/2012 from 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/act/consol_reg/wcr2002346/notes.html.
New South Wales (State Government). WorkCover Authority NSW. 2009. Workcover guides for  
the evaluation o f  permanent impairment 2009. Retrieved on 12/02/2012 from 
http://www.workcover.nsw.gov.au/formspublications/publications/Pages/WC00970_Evaluati 
onofPermanentImpairmentGuideline_.aspx.
Northern Territories (State Government). Work Health Authority. 2012. Bulletins: Eligibility for  
workers compensation. Retrieved on 12/02/2012 from http://www.worksafe.nt.gov.au/ 
Bulletins/HealthAndSafetyTopics/Workers%20Compensation/Forms/AllItems.aspx. 
Queensland (State Government). Department of Justice and Attorney-General. 2007. A guide to 
cross border workers’compensation arrangements. Retrieved on 14/02/2012 from 
http://www.deir.qld.gov.au/worlqjlace/resources/pdfs/cross_border_workerscomp_guide_2006.pdf. 
Queensland (State Government). Department of Industrial Relations. 2010. A death in the 
workplace -  a guide for families and friends. Retrieved on 14/02/2012 from 
http://www.deir.qld.gov.au/workplace/resources/pdfs/a-death-in-the-workplace.pdf.
South Australia (State Government). WorkCover SA. 2012. WorkCover SA Claims Operational 
Guidelines 2012. Retrieved on 17/02/2012 from
http://www.workcover.com/worker/reference-library/claims-operational-guidelines. 
Tasmania (State Government). Department of Justice. 2010. A guide to workers' compensation in 
Tasmania. Retrieved on 17/02/2012 from http://www.workcover.tas.gov.au/employers/ 
what_to_do_about_workers_compensation/workers_compensation_explained.
Victoria (State Government). WorkCover Authority. 2008. The Victorian WorkCover Authority 
Claims Manual. Retrieved on 18/02/2012 from 
http://wwwl.worksafe.vic.gov.au/vwa/claimsmanual/default.htm.
272 Western Australia s 5; South Australia s 30A(a); Tasmania s 3(2A); Northern Territories s 4(7); 
Australian Capitol Territory s 31(2) & Commonwealth s 5B.
273 [1960] HCA 25; (1960) 103 CLR 547.
274 Kavanagh 2.
275 Ibid 3.
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rupture of the oesophagus constituted a personal injury by accident arising in the 
course of employment.276 Although it happened at his place of work the word "in" 
contained in the phrase "in the course of employment" requires a causal connection 
with employment.277 The resemblance of the Commonwealth Employees' 
Compensation Act 24 of 1930 with the English Workmen's Compensation Act is 
acknowledged by the Court.278 The honourable Chief Justice traced the history of the 
phrase "in the course of' to as early as 1687 in an old English ruling.279 Dixon CJ in 
citing St. Helen's Colliery Co. v Hewitson [1924] AC 59; 16 BWCC 230, noted that the 
amendment from the conjunctive to the disjunctive version of the test phrase might 
not have intended the consequences of the change “to compensate sufferers from 
injuries unconnected with industry if and only if the injuries occurred during 
working hours."280 In casu, the appeal succeeded and the death was accepted with 
Dixon CJ explaining th a t"... it seems to me that when the conjunctive was dropped 
for the disjunctive, the result was to entitle the worker to compensation if no more 
is shown than that the personal injury by accident arose while he was doing 
something that was part of or incidental to his service."281
4.2.2. Dayton v Coles Superm arkets P/L
One of the important rulings pertaining to "a substantial contributing factor" was 
handed down in the Supreme Court of New South Wales in the case of Dayton v 
Coles Supermarkets P/L282 in which all three judges separately ruled on the 
interpretation thereof:
MEAGHER JA:
16 . Many judges have spent a great deal of time and difficulty analysing and 
pondering the meaning of the word ’’substantial”. But this word is a 
plain English word which is understood by anyone who is not a judge.
Nor have the endless judicial lucubrations on the word contributed to 
anyone's understanding of it.
276 Ibid 3.
277 Ibid 7.
278 Ibid 9.
279 Ibid 9.
28° Ibid 10.
281 Ibid 11-13.
Dayton v Coles Supermarkets P/L [2001] NSWCA 153. Retrieved on 06/05/2012 from 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/sinodisp/au/cases/nsw/N SWCA/2 001/15 3.html.
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Giles JA in citing from Mercer v ANZ Banking Group Ltd [2000] NSWCA 138; (2000) 
48 NSWLR 740 (hereinafter: Mercer) noted that the word "a" in "a substantial 
contributing factor" means there is not a limitation on the number of substantial 
contributing factors to be taken into account and:283
“substantial" qualifies "contributing factor", indicating that it is the strength 
of the causal linkage that is in question; and it is "the employment 
concerned" which must be a substantial contributing factor, meaning not the 
fact of being employed but what the worker was doing in his employment.
Giles JA continued that it was further held in Mercer that the correct interpretation 
of "substantial" is "more than minimal, large or great"; which is consistent with the 
Attorney General's second reading speech in which the intention of this phrase was 
presented to be:284
in line with the primary objective of compensating workers who suffer 
injuries that have a proper link with the workplace, rather than those whose 
injuries have only a remote or tenuous connection with work" (also at 747).
And it was also said that "a substantial contributing factor" is not a concept 
as stringent as or more stringent than that of "arising out o f  the 
employment, and it appeared to be accepted that a worker's employment 
would be a significant contributing factor to his injury if he was struck by a 
bolt of lightning at his work place [sic] (at 747-8).
Davies AJA in his ruling approvingly drew attention to the listed factors to be taken 
into account in terms of s 9A(2) when consideration is given to the degree in which 
employment contributed to the injury in determining if it is “substantial."285 The 
intention is to :286
exclude those many instances where, as a result of legal theory and extension of 
thought, liability has been found in cases where, as a matter of practical reality, 
the contribution which employment has made to the injury has little substance.
It is submitted that the meaning and interpretation of this newly-introduced phrase 
will still be developed by the courts in future.
283 ibid 22.
284 Ibid 23.
285 Ibid 37.
28<5 Ibid 37.
139
4.2.3. Hatzimanolis vAMI. Corporation Limited
Injuries during interludes between periods of work may in certain circumstances 
qualify as injuries arising out of or in the course of duty. The High Court of Australia 
found in Hatzimanolis v AM/. Corporation Limited287 a worker to be injured on duty 
in an accident that happened during a sightseeing journey in his leisure time and 
after examining section 4 of the Act, explained the development of tests applied by 
Australian courts over time. Already in 1918, the court recognised that the course of 
employment also included "natural incidents connected with the class of work."288
The majority decision recognised the need to scrutinise how the tests developed 
through the years and to apply it to the situation of an employee working in a 
remote area and attending an excursion organised by the supervisor on a day off 
and injured on the way back from it.289
The ruling was made under the New South Wales Act sections 4290 and 9 .291 In 
citing from early cases, the Court held that it was already in 1918 accepted that "in 
the course of employment" also includes what is called "’the natural incidents 
connected with the class of work.'"292 The Court further cited from the 1931 ruling 
by Dixon J in Whittingham v Commissioner o f  Railways (W.A) (2) [1931] HCA 49; 
(1931) 46 CLR293 that the action of the employee must be "something which is part 
of or is incidental to his service," the connection of which can be established as a 
"degree in which time, place, practice and circumstances as well as the conditions of 
employment had to be considered."294 Dixon J in 1937 held that "incidental to his 
service” did not help the interpretation of the test phrase and proposed it to be
287 Hatzimanolis v A.N.I. Corporation Limited (1992) 173 CLR 473. Hereinafter: Hatzimanolis. 
Retrieved on 25/08/2010 from http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1992/21.html.
288 Ibid 7. In his concurring minority judgment Toohey J cited from Kavanagh, indicating the 
expression "in the course o f’ to "be seen as early as 1687 in the headnote to Turberville v 
Stampe which reads (31)(1687) [1792] EngR 2684; 1 Ld Raym 264 (91 ER 1072): "A master is 
responsible for all acts done by his servant in the course of his employment, though without 
particular directions" at [7],
^  Ibid [5],
290 S 4 defines an injury to mean "personal injury arising out of or in the course of employment."
291 S 9 provides for the right to compensation in instances of injuries sustained on duty.
292 Hatzimanolis at [7] in citing from Company vM'Robb (1918) AC 304 at 321.
293 Whittingham v Commissioner o f  Railways at 29.
294 Hatzimanolis [7].
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determined by whether the employee's actions formed part of activities he was 
"reasonably required, expected or authorized to do in order to carry out his actual 
duties,"295 The change from the conjunctive "and" to the disjunctive "or" did not 
encourage a narrow interpretation and "arising out of' indicated a "causal 
relationship” and "in the course of' a temporal nexus.296
The Court referred with approval to the flexibility of this test in determining 
whether or not the nexus with employment was sufficient to satisfy the test phrase 
even in modern times 297 It was, however, realised that it is not applicable to the 
modern concept of the course of employment and a reformulation was necessary 
regarding the principles ruling instances of injuries sustained during periods of 
interludes.298
A common characteristic is the role of the employer who has "authorised, 
encouraged or permitted the employee to spend his time during that interval at a 
particular place or in a particular way."299 The Court considered the nature of the 
periods of interludes to be an important factor and held it to be more readily 
accepted to be in the course of employment if the employee is required by his 
employment to be in a remote area and he is injured although during a period or a 
series of periods of interludes.300
The Court accepted that if the employer "expressly or impliedly, has induced or 
encouraged the employee to spend" the period at a specific location or manner, it 
will be considered as fulfilment of the test phrase unless it is defeated by serious 
and wilful misconduct by the employee. Regard should also be had to the general 
"nature, terms and circumstances of the employment."301
295 Ibid [9] in citing from Henderson v Commissioner o f  Railways (W.A)(3) [1937] HCA 67; (1937)
58 CLR 281.
296 Ibid [6].
297 Ibid [10]-[12],
298 Ibid [13].
299 Ibid [14].
300 Ibid [15]. The shorter the period, the more easy will it be considered to satisfy the test phrase.
301 Ibid [16].
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4.2.4. PVYW v Comcare
The Hatzimanolis ruling has been applied by the Federal Court of Australia in the 
case of PVYW v Comcare;302 which involved an employee sent by her employer to a 
distant work site requiring her to sleep over.303 The employer arranged her 
accommodation at a motel where she engaged in sexual activities and during which 
a glass light fitting broke lose and injured her.304 Her claim was denied and she 
appealed successfully to the Federal Court of Australia where Nicholas J ruled:
What is of critical importance under the organising principles developed in 
Hatzimanolis is the temporal relationship between the applicant’s 
employment and the injuries suffered by her. Here the temporal 
relationship between the applicant's injuries and her employment is that 
they were suffered by her while she was at a particular place where her 
employer induced or encouraged her to be during an interval or interlude 
between an overall period or episode of work.305
In the absence of any misconduct, or an intentionally self-inflicted injury, the 
fact that the applicant was engaged in sexual activity rather than some other 
lawful recreational activity while in her motel room does not lead to any 
different result.306
The Court held that based on Hatzimanolis, in the context of the particular 
provisions of the Act and the absence of serious and wilful misconduct or any 
intentionally self-imposed injuries, when an employee is at a specific place due to 
his employer "during an interval or interlude in an overall period or episode of 
work will ordinarily be in the course of employment."307 The Court, however, 
remarked that it is necessary to have regard to the general nature, terms and 
circumstances of employment during the process of determining if an injury arose 
in the course of employment.308
302 PVYW v Comcare (No 2) [2012] FCA 395, at [3], Hereinafter: PVYW. Retrieved on 23/04/2012 
from http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/FCA/2012/395.html.
303 An appeal against PVYW has been dismissed as per Comcare v PVYW [2012] FCAFC 181. 
Retrieved on 19/09/2013 from http://www.austiii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/FCAFC/2012/181.html.
3 0 4  PVYW 3-5.
305 Ibid 53.
3 0 6  Ibid 55.
30 7  ibid 54.
308 Ibid 54.
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It is submitted that this decision shows the need for the introduction of limiting 
measures in the Australian compensatory legislation to preserve the right to 
compensation for the purpose it was historically intended for as the sexual activities 
the applicant engaged in, clearly did not form part of fulfilment of duties connected 
to the employment relationship which forms the basis of entitlement to 
compensation benefits although she was present at a venue and at a specific time 
because of arrangements made by her employer. The activities she was engaged in 
has no employment relationship other than the place and time; and the irrationality 
of the Federal Court's decision becomes clear when one takes into consideration the 
number of diseases that may flow from a night of passion in similar circumstances 
as in this case. The phrase out of and in the course of employment is rationally 
connected to the purpose of compensatory legislation.
It is important to note that the High Court set aside the decision of the Federal Court 
in Comcare v PVYW [2013] HCA 41,309 explaining the reasoning in Hatzimanolis to 
still require a connection with an employment related activity in [35]:
Because the em ployer’s inducem ent or encouragem ent o f an em ployee, to 
be present at a particular place or to engage in a particular activity, is 
effectively the source o f the em ployer's liability, the circum stances o f the 
in jury m ust correspond w ith w hat the em ployer induced or encouraged the 
em ployee to do. It is to be inferred  from  the factual conditions stated  in 
H atzim anolis  ... that for an in jury to be in the course o f em ploym ent, the 
em ployee m ust be doing the very thing that the em ployer encouraged the 
em ployee to do, when the injury occurs.
Based on Hatzimanolis, the High Court held the relevant question to be answered is 
whether the employer induced or encouraged the employee to be engaged in the 
specific activity310 and not whether the employer "induced or encouraged the 
employee to be at a place."311 It is submitted that the High Court restored the 
required causal connection with this ruling but the vagueness of the test is 
simultaneously evident from the two dissenting rulings of Bell J and Gageler J.312
309 Comcare v PVYW [2013] HCA 41. Date of decision: 30 October 2013. Retrieved on 30/10/2013 
from http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/2013/41.html.
310 Ibid [38],
3«  Ibid [39].
3i2 Ibid [64] & [109],
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4.3. Extended right to compensation
Most jurisdictions provide for an "aggravation" of a pre-existing injury,313 giving 
clarity on the situation of a person injured pre-employment or in the personal 
domain but where employment aggravates the pre-existing condition. Specific 
circumstances that will satisfy the test in the Commonwealth Act are described in 
section 6 which specifies instances of "violence”,314 periods of "recess",315 
"travelling",316 "education"317 and medical treatment318 In addition to the described 
circumstances, certain categories of people doing voluntary emergency services,319 
mine rescue,320 fire fighting,321 ambulance assistance322 and police323 services will 
be deemed as employees for the purposes of workers' compensation.
4.3.1. Serious and wilful misconduct
Generally, most Acts deal with "serious and wilful misconduct" similar to South 
Africa and Canada; and provide that the right to compensation will be frustrated if 
the injury is caused by the "serious and wilful misconduct" of the employee. Hoever, 
if serious disablement or death results from the injury so sustained, the right to 
compensation will be revived.324 In addition to the phrase "serious and wilful 
misconduct", the Australian Acts exclude benefits to employees when injury or 
death is "caused by an intentionally self-inflicted injury."325 The Commonwealth Act 
is a good example:
313 Commonwealth s 5A (l)(c); Australian Capital Territory s 4(1}; Victoria s 5; Queensland s 32(3);
South Australia s 3; Tasmania s 3(1); Northern Territory s 3(1).
314 Commonwealths 6(1) (a).
315 Commonwealth s 6(l)(b ).
316 Commonwealth s 6(1) (d),
317 Commonwealth s 6(1) (e).
318 Commonwealth s 6(l)(f).
319 Northern Territory s 3(7).
320 New South Wales Schedule 1.
321 Tasmania s 5; Northern Territory s 3(8) & s 3(8A).
322 Tasmania s 6;
323 Tasmania s 6A;
324 Commonwealth s 14(2)(3); Victoria s 82(4); Western Australia s 22; Australian Capital 
Territory s 82(3); New South Wales s 14; Northern Territory s 57(1); Queensland s 130(1); 
South Australia s 30B & Tasmania s 25(2).
325 Commonwealth s 14(2); Queensland s 129; Victoria s 82(3); Northern Territory s 57(1); 
Australian Capital Territory s 82(2) & New South Wales s 14(3).
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(1) Subject to this Part, Comcare is liable to pay compensation in accordance 
with this Act in respect of an injury suffered by an employee if the injury 
results in death, incapacity for work, or impairment.
(2) Compensation is not payable in respect of an injury that is intentionally 
self-inflicted.
(3) Compensation is not payable in respect of an injury that is caused by the 
serious and wilful misconduct of the employee but is not intentionally 
self-inflicted, unless the injury results in death, or serious and 
permanent impairment.
14 Compensation for injuries
4.3.2. Court interpretation of serious and wilful misconduct
Similar to South Africa and Canada, the right to compensation is extended to include 
situations of "serious and wilful misconduct."326 In Whittingham v Ascott Air 
Conditioning Ply Ltd327 a number of previous rulings were considered dealing with 
the term. It was held the word "wilful"328 contains an element of calculation in its 
meaning and although the worker was highly intoxicated and his conduct 
inappropriate, it did not constitute "misconduct" as the employer provided the 
alcohol free of charge and the manager was equally intoxicated.329
In Workcover Authority o f  NSW v Walsh,330 the use of illicit drugs to vitalise the 
employee to work continuously for extremely long hours without rest331 formed the 
subject matter of the case 332 The employee used drugs regularly for a long time and 
the autopsy revealed toxic levels of "methamphetamine" as well as "cannabinoids” 
present in his body; with the first named known to cause cardiac arrhythmias which 
was the probable cause of the employee's death.333 The Supreme Court of New 
South Wales had to determine whether the employment contributed substantially
326 Commonwealth s 14(3); Australian Capital Territory s 82(3); Northern Territories s 57; Queensland 
s 130; South Australia s 30B; Tasmania s 25(20); Victoria s 82(2C) & Western Australia s 22.
327 Whittingham v Ascott Air Conditioning Pty Ltd [2010] NSWWCCPD 36. A Presidential decision of 
the Workers Compensation Commission. Retrieved on 22/01/2011 from 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/nsw/NSWWCCPD/2010/.
328 Ibid 73.
329 Ibid 72.
330  Workcover Authority o f  NSW v Walsh [2004] NSWCA 186. Hereinafter: Walsh. Retrieved on 
11/05/2012 from http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/nsw/NSWCA/2004/186.html.
331 Ibid 17.
33 2  Ibid 12-15.
33 3  Ibid 19.
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to the i n j u r y , 3 3 4  whether the injury was intentionally "self-inflicted"335 and if serious 
and wilful misconduct was present.336 If any of these factors were present, the right 
to compensation would be defeated.
Tobias JA held that misconduct which will "take an employee outside the scope of 
their employment must in all the circumstances be foreign or repugnant to the 
employment.’’337 Hodgson JA in agreeing with Tobias JA ruled that the intentionally 
self-inflicted harm of section 14(3) will apply only if the harm is done with intent 
and "without advertence to, or wish for, its injurious effect."338
4.3.3. Transgression of employment laws or rules
Only one of the Australian jurisdictions, South Australia, has a similar section to 
COIDA pertaining to contravention of labour laws or conduct without instructions 
or contrary to the instructions given by employers in section 30B of the Act. This 
section provides for such conduct to be "presumed to be acting in the course of 
employment." The presumption is rebuttable by conduct constituting serious and 
wilful misconduct or voluntary intoxication.339
4.3.4. Commuting injuries
As discussed supra, commuting between residence and workplace is pima facie  not 
out of or in the course of employment but rather falls in the personal domain of the 
employee and it does not pose a special risk other than what the general public is 
exposed to. However, journeys undertaken for work purposes will be considered to 
be out of or in the course of employment in all the Australian jurisdictions, with 
some providing for journeys between the place of residence and the workplace.340
334 As in New South Wales Act s 9A.
335 As in New South Wales Act s 14(3).
336 As in New South Wales Act s 14(2).
337 Walsh 56.
338 Ibid 3.
339 S 30B(2).
340 Commonwealth s 9(2)(e); Australian Capital Territory s 36; New South Wales s 10; Northern 
Territory s 4; Queensland s 35 & South Australia s 30(5 )—(7).
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4 .3 .4 .I . Court interpretation on commuting injuries
In the case Taylor v State o f  Tasmania,^1 the Supreme Court of Tasmania considered 
the developments in Tasmanian compensatory law regarding journeys to and from 
the worker's place of work. In 1948 the Act provided a right of compensation if an 
employee is injured whilst "travelling between his place of residence or place of 
employment and any trade, technical, or other school which he is required to attend 
by the terms of his employment...”342 In 1955 an amendment, similar to the current 
provision in COIDA, widened the right to compensation by providing:343
While the worker is travelling between his place of residence and his place
of employment on or in any vehicle -
(a) Belonging to or hired by his employer and used: or
(b) Used under contract with his employer,
for the conveyance of workers to and from their places of employment.
In 1964 a further broadening was enacted to include injuries sustained whilst "the 
worker is travelling to his place of employment from his place of residence" 
irrespective of the vehicle; and in 1966 the journey home was also included.344 At 
paragraph 9 the Court noted that this provision has been limited by section 25 of 
The Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Reform Act 16 of 1995 which 
removed the right to compensation for many categories of commuting injuries that 
were previously compensable. The section has been retained in the current Act and 
it denies compensation for injuries sustained during journeys between the 
employee’s residence and his worksite unless the journey is undertaken: 345
6(a) (i) at the request or direction of the employer; or
(ii) if the journey is work related, with the authority (expressed or 
implied) of the employer; or
341 Taylor v State o f  Tasmania [2002] TASCC 118. Retrieved on 08/05/2011 from 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/tas/TASSC/2002/118.html.
342 Ibid 6.
343 Ibid 7.
344 ibid 7.
345 provisions with similar effect are contained the Acts of the Commonwealth s 6; Western Australia 
s 19; Victoria s 83; South Australia s 30; Tasmania s 25; while an injury sustained while travelling 
to or from the place of work will be deemed to arise out of or in the course of employment in the 
Acts of New South Wales s 10; Australian Capitol Territory s 36; Northern Territories s 4 & 
Queensland s 35. See further Chapter 4 paras 2.4 & 3.4 and Chapter 5 paras 2.10; 3.7 & 4.7.
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(b) while the worker is travelling between places where the worker is 
employed by different employers; or
(c) while the worker, on a working day, is temporarily absent from the 
worker’s place of employment, except where that absence occurs at the 
request or direction, or, if it is work related, with the authority 
(expressed or implied), of the employer; or
(d) during a social or sporting activity which takes place away from the 
worker's place of employment, except where the worker's involvement 
in that activity forms part of the worker's employment or is undertaken 
at the request or direction, or with the authority (expressed or implied), 
of the employer.
It is respectfully submitted that by the creation of a right to compensation benefits 
irrespective of the employment relationship for commuting injuries sustained in 
accidents between home and work, the Australian compensatory legislation created 
too broad a test. This situation had to be curbed by an amendment to narrow the 
test and limit commuting injuries to those sustained in circumstances where a clear 
relationship with employment exists.
4.4. Migrant labour
As indicated supra, it is necessary to distinguish between a country's citizens and 
permanent residents and migrant workers from other countries entering that 
country for employment. Australia and Canada are the two countries with the 
highest number of migrant workers from other countries seeking employment in 
either Canada or Australia, per capita worldwide.346 These non-citizens of Canada 
and Australia include lower skilled workers as well as highly skilled professionals 
comprising about 27% of immigrants.347 Employment trends in Western Australia, 
Queensland and New South Wales show that persons born outside Australia were 
appointed in more than half of new vacancies totalling to thousands (64,500 in 
Western Australia and New South Wales ±43 450).348 The Australian migration
346 Clarkey, A, & Skuterudz, M. 2012. Why do immigrant workers in Australia perform better than 
thosein Canada? Is it the immigrants or their labour markets? At 1. Retrieved on 10/10/2013 from 
http://arts.uwaterloo.ca/~skuterud/Milcal_Skuterud/Research_files/clarke_skuterud_census.pdf.
347 Hernandez, V. 2012. Migrant workers benefit most from Australia's mining boom. International 
Business Times global headquarters: New York City. Retrieved on 30/08/2013 from 
http://au.ibtimes.com/articles/280563/20120112/migrant-workers-benefit-australia-s-mining- 
boom.htm.
348 Ibid.
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pattern clearly is not only inter-state within the Commonwealth but also across 
international borders.
The fragmented system of workers' compensation in Australia affected migrant 
work, migrant workers and employers conducting business in multiple Australian 
states as the rules, coverage, benefits and assessments in each jurisdiction differs 
from the other although a process of harmonisation has been put in place.349 It is a 
requirement of all Australian jurisdictions that a nexus to the jurisdiction where the 
claim is lodged be established, tested according to the following incremental 
enquiry:350
1. the jurisdiction where the employee usually works in that 
employment; or
2. the jurisdiction where the employee is usually based for employment 
purposes; or
3. the jurisdiction where the employer's principle place of business is 
located.
South Australia effected an amendment in 2007 requiring employers to register 
each worker with only one scheme but to ensure each worker is registered with a 
scheme to prevent non-insurance.351
In section 34, the Australian Capital Territory (Victoria has a similar provision in 
section 84) provides for injuries sustained “outside Australia” and not only outside 
the Territory, as follows:
349 National Council for Self Insurers. 2010. Surveying the way forward: Commentary on future 
workers compensation policy in Australia. At 5 the question is raised if workers’ compensation 
in Australia ought to follow the example of what was done with regard to health and safety by 
enacting a national Model Work Health and Safety Bill which aims at the harmonisation of 
health and safety in all Australian jurisdictions. It is acknowledged that the agreement to cross­
border arrangements is the only progress that was made with regard to harmonisation of 
workers' compensation arrangements in Australia. Retrieved on 12/05/2012 from 
http://wwwl.lawcouncil.asn.au/LPS/images/pdfs/SurveyingtheWayForward.pdf.
350 Known as the "state connection test” according to Comparison ofWC arrangements 2011 at 171.
Australian Capital Territory s 36B; New South Wales s 9AB; Northern Territory s 53AA; 
Queensland s 113; South Australia s 6; Tasmania s 31A; Victoria s 80 & Western Australia s 20.
351 Ibid 17-18.
149
Compensation is payable in relation to an injury to a territory worker 
suffered while the worker is outside Australia only if compensation would 
be payable in relation to the injury if the worker suffered the injury in 
Australia.
Contrary to the last named provision, Queensland (section 115) has a similar 
provision to COIDA which refutes an entitlement to compensation if a worker is not 
working outside of Australia purely in a temporary capacity at the time that the 
injury is sustained.
Double compensation is precluded e.g. if compensation is payable pursuant to 
another compensatory law, no entitlement arises in terms of a claim in another 
jurisdiction irrespective whether within or outside Australia: Queensland (section 
116-118), South Australia section 55; Tasmania section 31E; Victoria section 84B 
and Western Australia section 23.
Continuation of compensation benefits when the employee leaves Australia is 
reliant on proof of continued disability (Australian Capital Territory sections 44-45; 
New South Wales section 53 and Western Australia section 69). The Northern 
Territory (section 65B) requires the worker's rehabilitation to be concluded before 
leaving the Territory as a prerequisite for the continued payment of compensation. 
Queensland discontinues payment of compensation benefits if a worker decides to 
leave Australia but, similar to COIDA, the compensation is commuted into a lump 
sum (section 173).
It is clear that Australia strictly requires a connection with one of the Australian 
States before the entitlement to a claim will arise. It is submitted that the high 
number of immigrant workers in Australia required legislation to concentrate on 
providing compensatory benefits to people injured within the jurisdiction of 
Australia similar to South Africa. Although the portability of benefits is less 
restricted than in COIDA, it is not as broad as the provisions in the Canadian 
compensatory laws.
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4.5. Summary
It is clear from the discussion supra that in attempting to extend the right to 
compensation to all situations of occupational injuries, Australia broadened the test 
phrase extensively and in doing so created a right to compensation too broadly and 
consequently included injuries sustained in non-work related activities.352
Australia requires the following elements to be taken into account in fulfilling the 
requirements in the test phrase:353 *
• an injury; and
• in circumstances that need to need to be arising out of or
• in the course of employment.
In addition to the effects of the test phrase, Australian workers' compensatory laws 
provide for a broadening of the right to compensation in the form of:
• commuting injuries;354
• serious disablements sustained despite misconduct;355
• transgression of labour laws;355
• provision of voluntary emergency services;357
• trans-border compensation.358
5. CONCLUSION
5.1. Statutory definition of an injury; the test phrase
All three countries share early English Court decisions on compensatory legislative 
interpretation and it was applied and developed to suit the requirements of each of 
the different countries.359
352 p a r  4 . 1  supra.
353 Chapter 4 para 4.1 supra.
354 Chapter 4 paras 4.3.4 & 4.3.4.1 supra.
355 Chapter 4 paras 4.2.3; 4.2.4; 4.3.1 & 4.3.2 supra.
356 Chapter 4 para 4.3.3 supra.
357 Chapter 4 para 4.3 supra.
358 Chapter 4 para 4.4 supra.
359 See Chapter 4 fn 28 & Chapter 4 paras 2.2.1; 2.2.2; 2.2.7; 3.2.4 & 4.2.1.
151
South Africa and Canada are using the conjunctive version of the test phrase "out of 
and in the course of employment" while Australia is using the disjunctive "or" which 
has the effect of a very broad test in Australia.360
The definition and test phrase in COIDA is the strictest and most limiting of the 
three countries because the definition requires an "accident" to cause an "injury" 
and the test phrase strictly requires a further dual test to be satisfied; but the Courts 
have through interpretation, in the light of remedial legislation, given it a "broad 
and commonsense"361 application so as not to defeat the purpose of the legislation. 
Application of the COIDA definition and test phrase strictly requires employment to 
be the only cause of the accident.362
The Canadian compensatory laws broadened the right to compensation by 
amending the definition by the use of the word "injury" by some jurisdictions and 
not an "accident" as in COIDA; and the disqualifying working of the test phrase was 
limited irrespective of the conjunctive noun "and," by the working of two 
presumptions, one rebuttable and the other irrefutable.363 The Canadian Courts 
gave a broad interpretation to the definition, test phrase and the presumptions; and 
held that employment need not be the sole cause of the injury although it needs to 
be substantial.364 Application of the presumption in cases of death at the workplace 
is particularly broad and lenient towards the right to compensation, as it is 
irrefutable if an employee is found in a deceased state at a workplace where he had 
the right to be.365 The word "injury" is used in the Australian compensatory 
legislation, giving it a wider definition and application than the use of "accident" in 
COIDA.366 The right to compensation was broadened by the introduction of the 
disjunctive noun "or" into the test phrase which had the effect of the dual test to be 
reduced to a single test to be satisfied.367 An effort to limit the right to compensation 
to injuries sustained in the work environment was made by the introduction of the
360 Chapter 4 paras 2.1; 2.1 & 4.1 supra.
361 Chapter 4 para 2.2.6: Manthe supra.
362 Chapter 4 paras 2.1; 3.1 & 4.1 supra.
363 Chapter 4 para 3.1 supra.
364 Chapter 4 fn 164 (MacLaren) at 2 & Chapter 4 para 3.1 supra.
365 Chapter 4 para 3.1.1 supra.
366 Chapter 4 para 4.1 supra.
367 Chapter 4 para 4.1 supra.
152
additional test in the form of "a substantial contributing factor."368 COIDA does not 
have a similar phrase as the definition and test phrase create a three-fold test.
The Australian Courts interpret the test very broadly to the benefit of employees as 
is evident from the ruling in PVYW.369 Although the South African Courts interpret 
the Act broadly to assist employees as far as possible, common sense prevails as 
expressed by the Court in Manthe,370
5.2. Extended right to compensation
All three countries extended the right to compensation to include instances of 
serious and wilful misconduct, transgression of employment law or rules and 
commuting injuries. All these constitute conduct performed prima facie  not out of or 
in the course of employment. It is handled very similar and a right to compensation 
will be established if serious disablement or death follows.371
5.3. Migrant labour
COIDA's provisions pertaining to migrant workers limit the right to compensation in 
a way that is not supportive of current international or regional employment 
trends; and by termination of payment of compensation pensions if the employee 
leaves South Africa for a period or periods longer than six months. Employees 
sustaining injuries outside of South Africa will only have a right to compensation if 
the employer's head office is situated within South Africa and the employee is only 
temporarily employed outside South Africa. No specific provision is being made for 
government employees employed outside the Republic372
Canadian compensatory legislation provides for a right to compensation if 
employees are injured outside the borders of their jurisdiction and specific
368 Chapter 4 para 4.1 supra.
369 Chapter 4 para 4.2.4 supra.
370 Chapter 4 para 2.2.6 supra.
371 Chapter 4 paras 2.3, 3.3 & 4.3 supra.
372 Chapter 4 para 2.4 supra.
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provision has been made for government employees working outside the borders of 
Canada to be considered as employees of Ontario and to be compensated in terms of 
the Ontario Act. Foreigners working in their home countries for the Canadian 
Government will be compensated according to the Government Employees 
Compensation Act if their local legislation does not provide for it. Measures are in 
place to prevent double compensation from more than one jurisdiction.373 It is 
submitted that this approach is preferable to the approach of COIDA.
Australian compensatory legislation provides for a right to compensation if an 
employee sustains injuries outside the borders of the jurisdiction where he is 
domiciled. Measures are in place to prevent double compensation in the form of 
compensation from more than one jurisdiction.374 The right to compensation in 
both Canada and Australia is more reasonable and less restrictive pertaining to 
compensation in respect of migrant workers than the South African system; and it is 
submitted that COIDA needs to be amended to provide for a right to compensation 
for injuries sustained in migrant work.
It is submitted that the inter-jurisdictional agreements in Canada and Australia 
serve as examples of regional cooperation and can be used to inform agreements 
between the members of the SADC. As the SADC region not only provides a 
structure and forum for the negotiation and entering into of regional agreements 
but requires its members to "adequately" provide for social security to migrant 
workers, it is comparable to the inter-state situation prevailing within the 
federations of Canada and Australia. The inter-jurisdictional arrangements in 
Canada and Australia can thus be used as an example to South Africa and the SADC 
region. Bi-lateral and multi-lateral agreements between SADC members will have to
provide for inter alia similar workers' compensatory schemes with similar benefit
structures, the recognition of claims across borders, systems providing for the 
portability and continuation of benefits and compensation payments etc. to ensure 
"equal treatment" as required by the Code on Social Security Article 17.2. It follows 
that an agreement between SADC states on cross-border compensation for work-
373 Chapter 4 para 3.4 supra.
374 Chapter 4 para 3.4 supra.
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related injuries and diseases will benefit the region as it will reduce poverty. One 
existing example is the current agreement between South Africa and Mozambique. 
However, the terms and conditions also need to include a right to compensation of 
South Africans working in a neighbouring state to prevent disabled people from 
falling into poverty upon return to the Republic.375 It should be noted that 
agreements between SADC members are international agreements and as such soft 
law instruments which are not enforceable in a court with similar jurisdiction as the 
Federal Court of Canada and the High Court of Australia discussed supra in Chapter 2. 
Over time, agreements ought to be extended to include the members of the African 
Union but in the interim a system of optional coverage to South Africans working 
abroad in countries without appropriate compensatory schemes ought to be put in 
place.
5.4. Policy documents
The lack of secondary legislation in the form of published Regulations and Policies 
to COIDA is a serious limiting factor for South African employees who are often 
uninformed and ignorant of their rights and more specifically the right to 
compensation for occupational injuries and diseases. It is noteworthy that all the 
Canadian and Australian Compensation Authorities, employers and employees have 
the assistance of secondary legislation to fully inform and explain all rights and 
responsibilities in terms of the different Acts. It is submitted that COIDA needs to be 
amended to enable the promulgation of such secondary legislation.376
It is submitted that the phrase out of and in the course of employment and the 
definition of either "accident" or "injury" need to be rationally connected to the 
purpose of compensatory legislation by requiring a nexus between the injury and 
employment.
375 Chapter 1 para 3 and Chapter 4 para 2.4 supra and also Chapter 4 fn 129 & 132.
375 Chapter 4 paras 2.2 & 3.2 & 4.2 supra.
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CHAPTER 5
THE SCOPE OF APPLICATION OF COMPENSATORY LEGISLATION
1. INTRODUCTION
Compensatory legislation can only protect persons falling within the ambit of the 
law. The importance of the legal nature of the employment relationship for the 
purposes of compensatory legislation becomes evident when the consequential 
rights and obligations arising from fulfilling the definitions of employer and 
employee are taken into consideration. Only a person who is able to satisfy the 
definition of an employee will have a right to compensation; and only an employer 
fulfilling the applicable definition will be immune against common law claims for 
damages and will be liable for registration with the administrative compensation 
body and the payment of levies, pursuant to compensatory law. These two 
definitions form the gist of the principle of balancing-of-interests (the historic 
trade-off).1
When the definition of one of the parties is amended, it automatically affects the 
other party as the definitions share a corresponding meaning, i.e. if more employees 
or categories of employees are included within the ambit of the definition, it effects 
the assessment rates of employers or it may include employers not previously 
included, for example, private households that are currently excluded from the 
ambit of COIDA. The State as a party is also affected as an increase in employees 
and employers covered has a consequence on the administration and 
administrative costs of the statutory body responsible for the administration. The 
contrary is also true, if one party is excluded, the other will be affected accordingly.
This Chapter will explore the nature of the employment relationship with reference 
to the common law contract of service, legislative provisions, case law and the 
different tests applied by the courts to determine the true nature of the relationship. 
It will furthermore be shown that the definition of an employee for the purposes of
1 Discussed in Chapter 2 & also Chapter 6.
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compensatory legislation is closely related to the employment status of a person 
and that it defines the scope of persons who will have a right to compensation 
benefits and it influences which employers will be immune against civil liability.
2. SOUTH AFRICA
2.1. Statutory definition of an "employee"
The South African Constitution provides for the right of access to social security in 
section 27(1}2 to "everyone.." and places the State under an obligation to "take 
reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to achieve 
the progressive realisation of each of these rights"3 as well as the SADC instruments 
referred to in Chapter 4 paragraph 2.4. supra.
The word "everyone" has certain implications for compensatory legislation as it is 
directly related to the definition of an employee if that employee is "unable to 
support themselves and their dependants..."4 while access to compensation should 
be extended progressively to more people. "Everyone" has been interpreted in 
Khosa & Others v Minister o f  Social Development & Others; Mahlaule & Others v 
Minister o f  Social Development & Others5 to include South African citizens and 
people who acquired permanent residence status in South Africa6 (migrant workers 
and non-South African citizens). In Khosa, the constitutionality of the provisions of 
the Welfare Laws Amendment Act 106 of 1997 was challenged, which limited 
payment of social welfare grants (e.g. pensions for the aged and child-support 
grants), to South African citizens only. At [40]-[44] the Constitutional Court
"27. Health care, food, water and social security.-(l) Everyone has the right to have access to-
(a) healthcare services, including reproductive healthcare;
(b) sufficient food and water; and
(c) social security, including, if they are unable to support themselves and their 
dependants, appropriate social assistance."
(2) The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available 
resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of each of these rights.”
Constitution 1996 s 27(2).
Ibid s 27 (l)(c ).
Khosa & Others v Minister o f Social Development & Others; Mahlaule & Others v Minister o f  Social 
Development & Others 2004 6 BCLR 569 (CC). Hereinafter: Khosa.
Ibid [95],
2
3
5
6
157
acknowledged the inter-relatedness of socio-economic rights and the "founding 
values of human dignity, equality and freedom" in the light of the influence of the 
rights to life, dignity and equality implied in socio-economic rights. The Court said 
that the right to equality is directly implicated by the exclusion of "permanent 
residents" because the Constitution confers the right to social security on 
"everyone" at [49]. The exclusion of permanent residents was at [85] held to be 
inconsistent with section 27 of the Constitution as it materially affected their rights 
to dignity and equality.
Based on the reasoning of the Court in Khosa, it is submitted that for purposes of 
compensatory law, "everyone" includes or ought to include, every legitimate worker 
in South Africa, although compensatory law falls within the realm of social 
insurance within the bigger milieu of social security and not as in Khosa within the 
realm of State-provided social assistance. In this sense, "everyone" comprises of an 
even wider group because some migrant workers may not acquire the status of 
permanent residency but may be exposed to occupational risks. It is submitted that 
employees currently excluded should over time be included within the ambit of the 
Act in a process of "progressive realisation" of the right to conform to the 
constitutional standard.
COIDA defines an employee to include workers in formal employment, irrespective 
of the form of the contract of service or how remuneration is quantified. This also 
includes casual employees, directors working under a contract of service, a curator 
acting on behalf of a disabled employee and dependants of deceased employees in 
cases of fatalities. However, it excludes employees in the South African Defence 
Force and the South African Police Services if they are doing service in defence of 
the country and further excludes persons working under a contract for service 
[section l(xix)(d)(iv)] and domestic workers working in private households 
[section l(xix)(d)(v)].7
7 COIDA s l(xix). The differences between a contract for service and a contract of service will be 
discussed in more detail below.
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Definitions
In this Act, unless the context indicates otherwise-
(xix) "employee" means a person who has entered Into or works under a 
contract of service or of apprenticeship or learnership, with an employer, 
whether the contract is express or implied, oral or in writing, and whether the 
remuneration is calculated by time or by work done, or is in cash or in kind, 
and includes-
(a) a casual employee employed for the purpose of the employer's business;
(b) a director or member of a body corporate who has entered into a 
contract of service or of apprenticeship or learnership with the body 
corporate, in so far as he acts within the scope of his employment in 
terms of such contract;
(c) a person provided by a labour broker against payment to a client for 
the rendering of a service or the performance of w o rk , and for which 
service or work such person is paid by the labour broker;
(d) in the case of a deceased employee, his dependants, and in the case of 
an employee who is a person under disability, a curator acting on 
behalf of that employee; but does not include-
(i) a person, including a person in the employ of the State, performing 
military service or undergoing training referred to in the Defence 
Act, 19 57  (Act No, 44 of 1957), and who is not a member of the 
Permanent Force of the South African Defence Force;
(ii) a member of the Permanent Force of the South African Defence 
Force while on "service in defence of the Republic" as defined in 
section 1  of the Defence Act, 19 5 7 ;8
(iii) a member of the South African Police Force while employed in 
terms of section 7 of the Police Act, 1958  (Act No. 7 of 1958), on 
"service in defence of the Republic" as defined in section 1  of the 
Defence Act, 19 57 ;
(iv) a person who contracts for the carrying out of work and 
himself engages other persons to perform such work;
(v) a domestic employee employed as such in a private household;9
A separate definition defines "dependant of an employee" to mean:10
(a) a widow or widower who at the time of the employee's death was 
married to the employee according to civil law;
(b) a widow or widower who at the time of the employee's death was a 
party to a marriage to the employee according to indigenous law and 
custom, if neither the husband nor the wife was a party to a subsisting 
civil marriage;
8 The Defence Act No. 44 of 1957 has been repealed by the Defence Act No. 42 of 2002. The 1996 
Constitution provides in s 201(2)(b) for employment of the defence force "in defence of the 
Republic" while the Defence Act, 2002, in s 18 provides for humanitarian relief operations, the 
provision of essential services, social-economic upliftment and border control.
9 Own emphasis.
i° S l(xv).
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(c) if there is no widow or widower referred to in paragraph (a) or (b), a 
person with whom the employee was in the at the time of the 
employee's death living as husband and wife;
(d) a child under the age of 18 years of the employee or of his or her 
spouse, and includes a posthumous child, a step-child, an adopted 
child and a child born out of "wedlock’;
(e) a child over the age of 18 years of the employee or of his or her 
spouse, and a parent or any person who in the opinion of the Director- 
General was acting in the place of the parent, a brother, a sister, a half­
brother or half-sister, a grandparent or a grandchild of the employee;
(f) a parent of the employee or any person who in the opinion of the 
commissioner was acting in the place of the parent, and who was in 
the opinion of the Director-General at the time of the employee's death 
wholly or partly financially dependent upon the employee;
It is thus evident that certain categories of dependants will not be considered to be a 
dependent of an employee and will be excluded from the right to compensation, for 
instance children over the age of 18 years. In South Africa, not all children at age 18 
years have completed their school education and although provision has been made 
in section 54 for the continuation of compensation after the age of 18 years 
depending upon continued education, no right to compensation arises if the child is 
already 18 years at the date of death of the parent (employee). This may leave the 
child destitute with incomplete school education and without the prospect of 
further education or training. It is submitted that the section l(xv)(e) of the 
definition is unclear regarding the rights of a child older than 18 years at the time of 
the death of his parent as he does not have a right to statutory compensation if the 
paragraphs (d) and (e) are read together. However, if (e) is read alone it might hold 
the meaning that a child older than 18 years who stand in loco parentis to a younger 
(under the age of 18 years) child does have a statutory right to compensation by 
reading the subsection as: "a child over the age of 18 years of the employee or of his 
or her spouse... who in the opinion of the Director-General was acting in the place of 
the p a r e n t , T h e  definition is furthermore complicated by paragraph (f) referring 
to "any person" who was financially dependent upon the deceased employee, may 
have a right to statutory compensation pursuant to the Act. In this regard, note should 
be taken of the provisions of section 54 and Schedule 4 of COIDA which limit 
compensation to a spouse and a maximum of three children. It is submitted that a 
child over the age of 18 years who does not have any right to statutory compensation
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does not fall within the ambit of the Act and may retain his common law right to a 
civil claim. Section 54(l)(c)(iv) and (v) determines that a pension payable to a child 
shall lapse at the end of the month in which the child turns 18 except if the child 
suffers from a disability in which case it will continue until such time as it could 
reasonably be expected that the parent would have supported the child.
2.2. Statutory definition of an "employer"
The definition of an "employer” corresponds with the definition of an "employee. 
Employers have certain rights and obligations in terms of COIDA e.g. registration 
with the Compensation Fund,11 record keeping,12 submission of "returns of 
earnings"13 and payment of assessments (levies).14 Contravention of these 
provisions may lead to criminal liability and penalties imposed upon such an 
employer.15 True to the principle of balancing-of-interest, employers are absolved 
from common law claims for damages against them in terms of section 35 and the 
only legal remedies available to defined employees are those provided for in 
COIDA.16 Section 3617 provides for civil claims against third parties by the employee 
and the Director-General.18
11 s 80.
12 s 81.
13 s 82.
w S 83-86 .
15 Ss 39(6), 80(6), 82(5) & 87. See also Jooste  [16].
16 "35. Substitution of compensation for other legal remedies
(1) No action shall lie by an employee or any dependant of an employee for the recovery of 
damages in respect of any occupational injury or disease resulting in the disablement or 
death of such employee against such employee's employer, and no liability for 
compensation on the part of such employer shall arise save under the provisions of this Act 
in respect of such disablement or death.
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1) a person referred to in section 5 6 (l)(b ), (c), (d) and (e) 
shall be deemed to be an employer."
17 "36. Recovery of damages and compensation paid from third parties
( 1 ) If an occupational injury or disease in respect of which compensation is payable, was 
caused in circumstances resulting in some person other than the employer of the employee 
concerned (in this section referred to as the "third party") being liable for damages in 
respect of such injury or disease-
(a) the employee may claim compensation in terms of this Act and may also institute 
action for damages in a court of law against the third party; and
(b) the Director-General or the employer by whom compensation is payable may institute 
action in a court of law against the third party for the recovery of compensation that he 
is obliged to pay in terms of this Act.
(2) In awarding damages in an action referred to in subsection (l)(a ) the court shall have 
regard to the compensation paid in terms of this Act.
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(xx) "em ployer" means any person, including the State, who employs an 
employee, and includes-
(a) any person controlling the business of an employer;
(b) if the services of an employee are lent or let or temporarily made 
available to some other person by his em ployer, such em ployer 
for such period as the employee works for that other person;
(c) a labour broker who against payment provides a person to a 
client for the rendering of a service or the performance of work, 
and for which service or work such person is paid by the labour 
broker.19
Balancing the interests of employers and employees, lies at the centre of the 
definitions of "employer" and "employee" as the Act regulates the relationship 
between these two parties in instances of occupational injuries and diseases by 
removing the adversarial process and replacing it with an administrative remedy.20
Interpretation of the definitions of "employer" and "employee" ought to be seen in 
the light of the historical development of the contract of service and the historical 
development of the definitions in compensatory legislation itself.21 "Contract of 
service" has not been defined in COIDA except for providing that the form thereof is
(3) In an action referred to in subsection (l)(b ) the amount recoverable shall not exceed the 
amount of damages, if any, which in the opinion of the court would have been awarded to 
the employee but for this Act.
(4) For the purposes of this section compensation includes the cost of medical aid already 
incurred and any amount paid or payable in terms of section 28, 54(2) or 72(2) and, in the 
case of a pension, the capitalised value as determined by the Director-General of the 
pension, irrespective of whether a lump sum is at any time paid in lieu of the whole or a 
portion of such pension in terms of section 52 or 60, and periodical payments or 
allowances, as the case may be.
18 The SCA ruled in favour of the appellant in Rand Mutual Assurance Co LTD v Road Accident Fund 
2008 (6) SA 511 (SCA) in interpreting s 36 to allow a mutual association to litigate in its own 
name against third parties although s 36 (l)(a )  specifies that "the employee" and s 36 (l)(b ) 
"the Director-General or the employer by whom compensation is payable" are allowed to 
institute legal action to recover compensation paid by virtue of COIDA. The Court at [24]—[25], 
allowed the mutual association to litigate in its own name as it will not cause prejudice to the 
respondent. The Court considered the three rules of the lex mercatoria i.e. "that the wrongdoer 
is not entitled to benefit from the fact that the person wronged was insured; that the insured 
may not be enriched at the expense of the insurer by receiving both the insurance indemnity 
and damages from the wrongdoer; and that the insurer replaces the insured" in applying at [17] 
the dictum of Commercial Union Insurance Co ofSA Ltd v Lotter 1999 (2) SA 147 (SCA).
19 Own emphasis.
20 See also Chapter 3 para 2.
21 The Court in Smit v Workmen's Compensation Commissioner 1979 (1) SA 51 (A) gave an 
extensive overview of the development of the common law contract of service to determine 
whether Smit was an employee for the purposes of the 1941 Act. Hereinafter: Smit.
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irrelevant for the purposes of the Act.22 In establishing the existence and nature of 
the contract of service, regard needs to be taken of labour legislation, the common 
law and case law.
2.3. Requirements regarding the contract of service
It is suggested that the contract of service as presented in the COIDA definition23 of an 
"employee" is applicable to all the categories of employees or deemed employees for 
the purposes of COIDA. Both dependents24 and a curator25 will be bound by the 
nature of the employment relationship between the injured or deceased employee 
and the employer; and requirements of the definition need to be satisfied before his 
curator or dependents will be deemed an "employee" and a right to compensation 
arises.
The common law contract of service forms the basis of the employment 
relationship.26 The foundation of the contract of service lies in the Roman Law view 
of an agreement between two parties in terms of which one party renders personal 
services to the other party in exchange for remuneration, as a form of contract of 
letting and hiring (Iocatio-conductio).27 The Romans distinguished between three 
types of hire contracts:28
- locatio conductio rei meaning the hire or letting of a thing;
- locatio conductio operarum  meaning the hire or letting of personal services 
(the modern contract of employment); ,
- locatio conductio operis meaning the hire or letting of a specific piece of work 
(the current independent contractor or agency).
22 "'employee' means a person who has entered into or works under a contract of service or of 
apprenticeship or learnership, with an employer, whether the contract is express or implied, 
oral or in writing, and whether the remuneration is calculated by time or by work done, or is in 
cash or in kind, and ..."
23 S l(x ix)(a)-(d ) & Chapter 5 para 2,2 supra.
24 S l(xv) & Chapter 5 para 2.2 supra.
25 S l(xix)(d) & Chapter 5 para 2.2 supra.
26 Mischke, C, Christianson, M and Strydom, EML (eds). 2005. Essential labour law. 4th edition.
Pretoria: Mace Labour Law Publications. At 19. Hereinafter: Mischke et al.
27 Du Plessis, JV & Fouche, MA. 2008. 'n Praktiese handleiding tot die Arbeidsreg. Durban: Lexis 
Nexis. At 9. Hereinafter: Du Plessis etal.
28 Mischke eta l  20.
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A contract of service (employment) should be differentiated from a contract for 
service29 as represented in the definition by section l(xix)(d)(iv) in the words "a 
person who contracts for the carrying out of work"30 which is excluded from the 
definition of an "employee".
From very early on in the history of compensatory legislation the courts had to 
determine whether the employment relationship fulfilled the requirements of a 
contract of service.31 The nature of the employment relationship is characterised as 
that of master and servant. Therefore the measure of control exercised by the 
employer over the employee was considered from the inception of compensatory 
legislation to be a very important feature of a contract of service.32
2.3.1. Smit v Workmen's Compensation Commissioner
In Smit v Workmen's Compensation Commissioner,33 Joubert JA detailed the history 
of the contract of service in the light of its Roman origins as:34
two species of locatio conductio, viz locatio conductio operarum and locatio 
conductio operis [facie.ndi). Since a slave was a mere thing (res) he himself 
was incapable of letting his labour or services but if his owner did so then 
such a contract was construed as a letting of the slave as a thing (res), i.e. 
locatio conductio rei.
The Court carefully examined the development of the different contracts in Roman 
as well the Roman Dutch legal history in determining the nature of the contract 
entered into by the employee (Smit) and the employer, an insurance company, to
29 According to Du Plessis et al at 9 -10 , the contract for service is an agreement between an 
employer and an independent contractor in terms of which the contractor undertakes to do a 
specified piece of work within a specified period of time and the employer in turn undertakes to 
remunerate the contractor for the work.
30 Own emphasis.
31 Frank 39 & 156.
32 Frank at 39 & 156 refers to the English decision Simmons v Heath Laundry Company (1910) 3 
BWCC 200 where Fletcher-Mouton LJ explained: "The greater the amount of control exercised 
over the person rendering the services by the person contracting for them, the stronger the 
grounds for holding it to be a contract of service, and similarly the greater the degree of 
independence of such control, the greater the probability that the services rendered are of the 
nature of professional services and that the contract is not one of service."
33 1979 (1) SA 51 (A).
34 Smit 56 D.
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determine if it was a contract o f  service or a contract fo r  service.35 The Court found 
that the legal relationship between Smit and the company was one of a contract for 
service as the company was only interested in the outcome of Smit's work without 
being prescriptive on the manner in which it has to be achieved.36 The Court 
declined the argument by the Appellant to apply the control test and made the 
following decision in the light of the true nature of the work:37
The aforestated features of the contract concerning its object, the lack of 
supervision and control over an agent, the non-requirement of personal 
performance of his duties by an agent, the remuneration by commission and 
the position of independence of an agent in the performance of his 
contractual duties are strong indicia in the present matter that the contract 
is one of work (locatio conductio opens) and not one of service (locatio 
conductio operarum).
This was despite the presence of indicia directing at benefits in kind afforded to 
Smit e.g. the use of a company vehicle, office, telephone and typing facilities; and the 
requirement by the company that leave had to be arranged with the company in 
advance.38
2.4. Labour legislation and the definition of an employee
In an effort to provide clarity of the interpretation of an “employee" in labour 
legislation, the Code of Good Practice; Who is an Employee39 codified the dominant 
(multiple) impression test favoured by the courts.40 The Code explains in Item 4 its 
applicability to COIDA41 Part 6 of the Code identifies the main question to be 
answered in an enquiry involving the COIDA definition as "whether a person is 
employed in terms of a contract o f  service and has not been specifically excluded in
35 Ibid 56-62.
36 Ibid 67 A-H.
37 Ibid 68 A-C.
38 Ibid 68 G-H.
39 The Code of Good Practice: Who is an Employee, Notice No. 1774 of 2006 issued in terms of the
LRA s 200A and the BCEA s 83A.
40 Mischke e ta l  25.
41 The Code relies on statutory provisions and case law and Item 11 instructs "... every person
applying or interpreting one of these statutes must take the Code into account, the Code is not a
substitute for applying binding decisions of the courts."
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terms of the definition."42 The interpretation of the said definition requires 
consideration of the rebuttable presumption provided in the LRA43 and BCEA 
favouring the worker as an employee44 and lists seven indicia as advised in the ILO 
Recommendation 198, The Employment Relationship Recommendation, 2006. Only 
one of the factors needs to be present for the presumption to take effect.45
Part 3 of the Code, give preference to the "dominant impression test"46 to determine 
whether a person is an independent contractor or an employee by a process of 
weighing of all relevant factors (regard should be had of all indicia that could 
indicate the true nature of the relationship)47 without viewing the absence or 
presence of a single factor to be indicative of the nature of the relationship and 
without allocating an equal weight to every factor.48 The South African courts give 
preference in the determination of the legal nature of the employment relationship 
to the dominant (multiple) impression test49 The test requires the weighing of all 
the relevant factors (indicia) in each individual case to decide if the dominant 
impression is that of an independent contractor or an employee.50 Factors to 
consider may include:51
42 The Code of Good Practice: Who is an Employee, Notice No. 1774 of 2006, at Item 69-70 .
43 "200A. Presumption as to who Is employee
(1) Until the contrary is proved, a person, who works for or renders services to any other 
person, is presumed, regardless of the form of the contract, to be an employee, if any one or 
more of the following factors are present:
(a) the manner in which the person works is subject to the control or direction of another 
person;
(b) the person's hours of work are subject to the control or direction of another person;
(c) in the case of a person who works for an organisation, the person forms part of that
organisation;
(d) the person has worked for that other person for an average of at least 40 hours per 
month over the last three months;
(e) the person is economically dependent on the other person for whom he or she works or 
renders services;
(f) the person is provided with tools of trade or work equipment by the other person; or
(g) the person only works for or renders services to one person.”
44 The presumptions are applicable only to employees who earn less than the prescribed 
threshold as announced periodically by the Minister of Labour in terms of s 6(3) of the BCEA.
45 The Code of Good Practice: Who is an Employee, Notice No. 1774 of 2006, at Items 12-20.
46 Mischke et al at 25 indicates the dominant impression test as the standard test applied by the 
courts.
47 Mischke eta l  25.
48 The Code of Good Practice: Who is an Employee Items 27-52.
49 Mischke eta l  25.
so Ibid 26.
51 The Code of Good Practice: Who is an Employee Items 27 -52  and Mischke et al 25.
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• the right of the employer to supervise the worker;
• the independence of the employee in the performance of his duties;
• if the employee is permitted to work for another employer;
• the manner in which remuneration is paid e.g. salary, commission or other;
• whether the employee is expected to provide his own equipment or tools;
• whether the employee is obliged to fulfil his duties personally;
• working hours and if such is prescribed by the employer.
These factors referred to in the Code represent the interpretation of the statutory 
provisions by the courts.52
2.5. Validity of the contract of service
This aspect provides a good example of the broadening of the definition of an 
employee for the purposes of compensatory legislation in South Africa.
The pre-1941 compensatory laws had as pre-requisite the requirement that the 
contract of service in all aspects be valid and, if defective, the right to compensation 
would have been defeated as in Havenga v Rabie 1916 TPD 466. In this case the 
employee was not in possession of a valid driver's license although he was engaged 
as a driver of the employer's vehicle.
The 1941 Act broadened the definition of a "workman" by replacing this 
requirement with the discretion of the Compensation Commissioner according to 
which the Commissioner is empowered to sanction a defective contract so as to be 
considered valid in all respects.53 COIDA retained the essence of the 1941-provision 
but moved it from the definition of a "workman" to Chapter IV, section 27 headed as 
"Special circumstances in which Director-General may make award.''54
52 Ibid.
53 "3(1) .....  Provided that if in any claim for compensation under this Act it appears to the
commissioner that the contract of service or apprenticeship or learnership under which the 
injured workman was working at the time when the accident causing the injury happened was 
invalid for any reason whatever, the commissioner may in his discretion deal with the matter as 
if such contract had at the time aforesaid been valid."
54 "27. If in a claim for compensation in terms of this Act it appears to the Director-General that 
the contract of service or apprenticeship or learnership of the employee concerned is invalid, 
he may deal with such claim as if the contract was valid at the time of the accident."
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2.5,1, Van Wyk obo Van Wyk v Daytona Stud Farms & Others
It is submitted that the amendment did not result in the provision of the right to 
compensation in all instances and it is doubtful that a strict interpretation by the 
Court is always in the best interest of workers.
The special plea raised by virtue of section 35 of COIDA against the plaintiffs claim 
for damages in Van Wyk obo Van Wyk v Daytona Stud Farms & Others [2007](C)55 
was dismissed. The Court had to decide if a valid contract of service existed in a case 
involving an eleven year old girl who lost a leg while working during a school 
holiday as a fruit picker on a farm at her parent's employer. The Court considered 
the purposes of both the BCEA56 and of COIDA and relied on the ruling of Swart v 
Smuts 1971 2 All SA 153 (A)57 which held that the Court in reaching its decision 
needs to have regard to the intention of the Legislature. The Court reasoned that the 
purpose of eradicating child labour as intended by the BCEA, will be defeated if the 
contract of service was not held to be ab initio void. The Court considered the 
purpose of eradication of child labour of more importance than the interests and 
social security benefits an individual child could gain from holding the contract to 
be valid.58
It is submitted that cognisance should be taken of children working as waiters, 
delivering newspapers and magazines, acting, singing etc. who are engaged in the 
informal sectors and exposed to risks without the safety net of social security 
benefits in the form of compensation for occupational injuries and diseases.
55 Case no. 20730 (unreported). Case discussed by Smit, N. 2010. Towards social justice: an
elusive and a challenging endeavour. Journal o f  South African Law 1 :1 -36 . Hereinafter: Daytona.
Retrieved on 26/05/2012 from http://heinonline.org.
56 Act 75 of 1997.
57 Swart v Smuts at 32-33.
58 The BCEA s 43 prohibits employment of children younger than 15 years of age while the child
(Van Wyk) was 11 years when injured when employed of the farm. Section 43 reads:
"43. (1) No person may employ a child—
(a) who is under 15 years of age; or
(b) who is under the minimum school-leaving age in terms of any law, if this is 15 or 
older."
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2.6. The role of remuneration
Remuneration plays an important role in compensatory legislation as it is closely 
associated with the contract of service and definition of an employee. It furthermore 
forms the basis of the calculation of the monetary value of compensation, it forms 
part of the financial risk and consequently employer's levies are influenced by the 
earnings of their employees. Injuries and diseases affect the ability to earn and it is 
the loss of the ability to earn that needs to be made good by the awarding of 
compensation.59 The form remuneration takes does not influence the requirement 
as it may be in cash or in kind, for work done or periodically received by the worker 
but it needs to be regular in nature.60
The definition of a "workman"61 in terms of the 1941 Act was dependent upon the 
quantum of earnings of an employee; and if it exceeded the threshold promulgated 
periodically by law, the employee did not fulfil the requirements set to be 
considered as a "workman" and no valid claim arose.52 Such a person still had the 
recourse of civil litigation and had to prove negligence on the part of his employer 
with the negative consequences related to such claims in order to effect 
compensation and address his losses.
Calculation of remuneration also proved difficult as the 1941 Act defined "earnings" 
to have the meaning of "the average remuneration of the workman at the time of the 
accident, calculated in the manner provided in section forty-one" and section 41 
required the inclusion of all regular income to determine the monthly rate of 
earnings of the employee.63
59 S 47 of COIDA provides for compensation for temporary disablement be it partial or a total 
disability.
60 COIDA s 63.
61 It is submitted that the term "employee" in COIDA which replaced the term "workman” in the 
1941 Act, more correctly represents the employment status of the person than "workman" who 
might not have a person in an employment relationship.
62 S 3(2) contains certain categories of people excluded from the ambit of the Act including:
"(b) persons whose annual earnings calculated in the manner set forth in section 41 exceed 
R24 000 or, from a date 1 determined by the Minister by notice in the Gazette, such 
higher amount 2 as he may so determine.”
63 "41 Method of calculating earnings
(1) For the purpose of determining the compensation payable, the commissioner shall 
compute the earnings of the workman in such manner as, in his opinion, is best calculated
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It is submitted that a significant number of employees were excluded from the 
ambit of the Act in this way as the inclusion of overtime earnings and other 
allowances often resulted in the employee not to be considered as a "workman” in 
terms of the Act. As a huge shortage of artisans existed, it was normal practice at the 
time for artisans to work overtime on a regular basis which often resulted in their 
earnings to exceed the maximum quantum to be considered as "workmen."64
2.6.1. Workmen's Compensation Commissioner v Crawford And Another
In Workmen's Compensation Commissioner 1/ Crawford And Another65 the Court 
construed "the words 'of a constant character' as a qualification of the words 'any 
overtime payments'" as well as "other special remuneration" preceding it in section 
4 1 (l)(b )66 that reads as: "any overtime payments or other special remuneration of a 
constant character or for work habitually performed" meaning that only 
remuneration of a regular nature qualified for inclusion as earnings pursuant to the 
1941 Act.67 COIDA relies on the calculation of earnings in a similarly phrased section 
63 which determines for the inclusion of overtime and bonuses of a regular nature.
to give the monthly rate at which the workman was being remunerated by his employer 
at the time of the accident including-
(a] the value of any food or quarters supplied by the employer save for the purpose of 
determining the amount of any periodical payment payable in respect of any period of 
temporary disablement during which the workman receives both food and quarters to 
the satisfaction of the commissioner from his employer, or as part of the medical aid to 
which he is entitled;
(b) any overtime payments or other special remuneration of a constant character or for 
work habitually performed,
but excluding remuneration for intermittent overtime and casual payments of a 
nonrecurrent [sic] nature, sums paid by an employer to a workman to cover any special 
expense entailed on the workman by the nature of the work, or any ex gratia payment to 
the workman, whether given by the employer or any other person."
64 South Africa (Republic). Department of Labour. 2008. Scarce and critical skills research project At
43-47 . Retrieved on 22/09/2012 from http://www.labour.gov.za/DOL/downloads/documents/ 
research-documents/Artisans%20 trades_DoL_Report.pdf.
55 Workmen's Compensation Commissioner v Crawford And Another 1987 [1] SA 296 (A).
Hereinafter: Crawford. 
e6 The 1941 Act.
67 Crawford 309 A-C.
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2.6.2. Davis v Workmen's Compensation Commissioner
In Davis v Workmen's Compensation Commissioner68 the Court emphasised the wide 
discretion conferred upon the Compensation Commissioner in section 41(3)ter, to 
calculate the earnings of the employee.69 The Commissioner needs to derive 
guidance from the "principles laid down in the preceding provisions. 'Practicable' 
means 'capable of being effected or accomplished'".70 The Court warned against 
calculation of the employee's earnings by merely having regard to what he earned at 
the time of the accident. "To do so gives a false and unrealistic picture of what 
applicant's annual earnings in fact were."71
The Court then emphasised the importance to assist to an employee "as far as 
possible" and the Act not to be:72
interpreted restrictively so as to prejudice a workman if it is capable of 
being interpreted in a manner more favourable to him. In my judgment the 
Act does not lend itself merely to the restricted interpretation placed upon it 
by respondent. It is equally capable of being interpreted as affording 
respondent, on facts such as those in the present case, a discretion to look 
beyond the amount applicant happened to be earning at the time of the 
accident.
In COIDA the definition of an employee was broadened by omitting the threshold,73 
although remuneration still fulfils an important role and restricts the quantum of 
compensation to a maximum and minimum amount promulgated annually by the 
Minister of Labour and forms the basis of the calculation levies.74
68 Davis.
69 Ibid 694 A-E.
70 Ibid 694 A-E.
71 Ibid 694 A-E.
72 Ibid 694 E-G.
73 Although the requirement relating to a maximum earnings level was removed by COIDA with
its commencement date on 1 March 1994, the legacy of this exclusion from benefits are still felt
by employees and their next of kin who were excluded from the ambit of the Act, irrespective of 
the seriousness of their injuries or even death. The inclusion of all employees irrespective of 
earnings was not retrospectively done. Personal knowledge by the author hereof shows an 
employee who lost both his hands at the end of 1993 and is still in dire need of compensation in 
the form of pension, prosthetic devices and a care allowance to enable him to hire assistance 
twenty years later, at the time of this work.
74 COIDA ss 5 5, 83 & Schedule 4.
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2.7. Employer registration and payment of levies
2.7.1. Boer v Momo Development CC en ‘n Ander
The High Court ruled in Boer v Momo Development CC en 'n Ander75 that the 
definitions of employer and employee do not require an employee to be in the 
employment of a registered and paid up employer for the employee to have a 
rightful claim.76 The definition "employer" does not refer to a "registered employer" 
but rather the employment relationship with an employee. According to the Court, 
"employer" and "employee" has its respective plain language meaning because the 
purpose of the Act as revealed in the long title, is to compensate employees for 
occupational injuries and diseases.77
As an employee has the right to compensation conferred by section 22(1), his right 
to claim damages under common law from his employer has been removed in terms 
of section 35.78
2.8. Third party employers
2.8.1. Rieck v Crown Chickens (Pty) Ltd t/a Rocklands Poultry
The High Court as well as the SCA analysed the definitions of "employee" and 
"employer" as defined in COIDA in the two Rieck rulings. The worker (Rieck), 
employed by a labour broker, instituted legal action to claim damages against the 
employer where she was sent to work, in terms of section 36 of COIDA.
The High Court held in Rieck v Crown Chickens (Pty) Ltd t/a Rocklands Poultry79 that 
the legislator specifically defined certain categories of employees e.g. civil servants, 
employees lent or let to another employer and employees in the service of a labour
75 Boer v Momo Development CC en 'n Ander 2004 (5} SA 291 (T). Hereinafter: Boer v Momo.
™ Ibid 294 F-I.
77 Ibid 294 F-I.
™ Ibid 294 I-I & 295 A-B.
79 Rieck v Crown Chickens (Pty) Ltd t/a  Rocklands Poultry (2005) 26 IL J1240 (SE).
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broker as referred to in the COIDA definition of an "employer."80 The Court held that 
in the circumstances of an employee’s services being lent or let to another, "the 
'permanent' employer, rather than the person to whom the employee's services are 
let or lent, remains the employers for purposes of the Act".81
The Court further scrutinised section l(xx)(c) and concluded that the labour broker 
remained the employer for the purposes of COIDA because the contract of service 
was entered into between the labour broker and the employee and no contractual 
agreement came into existence between the employer where the employee was sent 
to work, although the latter had more control over the employee than the labour 
broker; and secondly the labour broker registered with the Compensation fund and 
paid the levies into the Fund.82 The Court held that this will be the case, irrespective 
where the services of the employee are rendered and irrespective who "controls the 
employee's day-to-day conduct in the workplace."83
The company, against whom the claim for damages was instituted, appealed the 
decision to the SCA where the Full Bench upheld the ruling.
2.8.2. Crown Chickens (Pty) Ltd t /a  Rocklands Poultry v Rieck
The SCA considered the historical development of the two definitions in 
compensatory law in South Africa in Crown Chickens (Pty) Ltd t/a  Rocklands Poultry 
v/ Rieck.84 Nugent JA held that the 1914 Act, which consolidated the pre-union 
compensatory legislation, recognised only one employer for each employee at any 
specific time and that is the employer with whom a contract of employment has 
been entered into.85 This will be the situation irrespective whether services are 
rendered for that employer or someone else.86
80 Ibid [20]. See also Chapter 5 para 2.2 supra for the definition,
si Ibid [20].
82 Ibid [20].
83 Ibid [20].
84 Crown Chickens (Pty) Ltd t/a  Rocklands Poultry v Rieck 2007 (2) SA 118 (SCA).
as Ibid [20]—[21].
“  /6M[20]-[21].
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The definitions of the 1914 Act were retained in the 1934 Act.87 The 1941 Act 
preserved the material part of the 1934-definition of an employee, but the definition 
of an employer was amended, although the essence of the definition was retained.88 
Any uncertainties were removed by the additional specification applicable to when 
the services of an employee is "temporarily lent or let on hire to another person 
then the employer would 'be deemed to continue to be the employer of such 
workman whilst [the workman] is working for that other person'".89 The Court 
concluded that all the Statutes preceding COIDA recognised only one employer as 
the employer of an employee at a specific moment and that is the employer with 
whom a contractual nexus exist90
Nugent JA proceeded to examine the definitions in terms of COIDA.91 The applicant 
argued that the work relationship that existed at the relevant time consisted of 
three parties and is best represented by subsection (b) of the definition of an 
"employer" with the relevant parties as the employer (labour broker), employee 
and the client as "some other person".92 It was contended on behalf of the applicant 
that the employee was an employee (for the purposes of COIDA) of the client of the 
labour broker at the relevant time of rendering services to the client.93 The SCA 
rejected this interpretation94 as favoured in South African Labour Law95 The Court 
held the words "such employer" in subsection (b) refers to the word "employer" 
immediately preceding it and "not the phrase ‘some other person'".96 It is held that 
the interpretation submitted by the applicant is inconsistent with the plain language 
meaning of the subsection and would change the historical construction which 
existed for more that hundred years, without good reason and it would furthermore
87 ibid [22],
sa Ibid [22].
89 Ibid [22],
9° Ibid [23],
Ibid [23]—[26].
92 Ibid [26],
93 Ibid [26],
94 ibid [26].
95 Volume 2 H1-N15, para 12 by Thomson, C & Benjamin, P.
96 Ibid [26],
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be inconsistent with the Act.97 The proper meaning of the definition in COIDA 
supports the historical position that:98
... an employee generally has only one employer at any time, which is the 
person with whom he is in a contractual relationship of employment, even 
when he performs his contractual obligations for some other person.
2.8.3. Some practical implications: Rieck  rulings
The scenario as discussed supra is also applicable to union representatives when 
engaging in union activities.
The LRA protects employees' rights in the workplace and prohibits hinderance of, 
disadvantaging of and discrimination against employees excercising their rights in 
terms of the LRA99 inclusive of the right of representation by unions. Union 
representatives are authorised to excercise union functions whilst in
97 Ibid [26],
ibid [28],
99 S 5 provides: "Protection of employees and persons seeking employment.—
(1) No person may discriminate against an employee for exercising any right conferred by this Act
(2) Without limiting the general protection conferred by subsection (1), no person may do, or 
threaten to do, any of the following-
(a) require an employee or a person seeking employment-
(i) not to be a member of a trade union or workplace forum;
(ii) not to become a member of a trade union or workplace forum; or
(iii) to give up membership of a trade union or workplace forum;
(b) prevent an employee or a person seeking employment from exercising any right
conferred by this Act or from participating in any proceedings in terms of this Act; or
(c) prejudice an employee or a person seeking employment because of past, present or
anticipated-
(i) membership of a trade union or workplace forum;
(ii) participation in forming a trade union or federation of trade unions or 
establishing a  workplace forum;
(iii) participation in the lawful activities of a trade union, federation of trade unions 
or workplace forum;
(iv) failure or refusal to do something that an employer may not lawfully permit or 
require an employee to do;
(v) disclosure of information that the employee is lawfully entitled or required to 
give to another person;
(vi) exercise of any right conferred by this Act; or
(vii) participation in any proceedings in terms of this Act. (3) No person may 
advantage, or promise to advantage, an employee or a person seeking 
employment in exchange for that person not exercising any right conferred by 
this Act or not participating in any proceedings in terms of this Act. However, 
nothing in this section precludes the parties to a dispute from concluding an 
agreement to settle that dispute.
(4) A provision in any contract, whether entered into before or after the commencement of 
this Act, that directly or indirectly contradicts or limits any provision of section 4, or this 
section, is invalid, unless the contractual provision is permitted by this Act."
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employment100 and provision is made in section 15 for time to attend to union 
activities by providing for leave.101
It is submitted that application of the principles laid down in the Rieck rulings 
implies that the employer with whom the union representative has entered into a 
contract of service will be indemnified against common law claims for damages 
should the representative be injured while the representative is engaging in union 
activities. However, the union which is represented, might be exposed to actions for 
damages taken against it in such circumstances as a third party. The inference can 
also be drawn from the facts that election as a union representative is only possible 
when employed at a specific employer and exercising union rights and functions 
pertaining to that employer.
2.9. Atypical employment arrangements
COIDA excludes "a person who contracts for the carrying out of work and himself 
engages other persons to perform such work",102 which then effectively excludes a
100 S 14, with subsections 4 & 5 providing for:
(4) A trade union representative has the right to perform the following functions-
(a) at the request of an employee in the workplace, to assist and represent the employee in 
grievance and disciplinary proceedings;
(b) to monitor the employer's compliance with the workplace-related provisions of this 
Act, any law regulating terms and conditions of employment and any collective 
agreement binding on the employer;
(c) to report any alleged contravention of the workplace-related provisions of this Act, any 
law regulating terms and conditions of employment and any collective agreement 
binding on the employer to-
(i) the employer;
(ii) the representative trade union; and
(iii) any responsible authority or agency; and
(d) to perform any other function agreed to between the representative trade union and 
the employer.
(5} Subject to reasonable conditions, a trade union representative is entitled to take reasonable 
time off with pay during working hours-
(aj to perform the functions of a trade union representative; and
(b) to be trained in any subject relevant to the performance of the functions of a trade 
union representative."
101 “15 Leave for trade union activities.—
(1) An employee who is an office-bearer of a representative trade union, or of a federation of 
trade unions to which the representative trade union is affiliated, is entitled to take 
reasonable leave during working hours for the purpose of performing the functions of that 
office.
(2) The representative trade union and the employer may agree to the number of days of leave, 
the number of days of paid leave and the conditions attached to any leave.”
102 S l(xix)(d)(iv).
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self-employed person and contractors from the scope of the Act. It is submitted that 
COIDA does not provide for the changing circumstances in the world of work and 
may become irrelevant if amendments do not correspond to the needs of the 
community it is intended to serve.
In appreciating the changing world of work globally which is marked by a growing 
number of atypically103 employed people, the ILO adopted Recommendation 198, 
The Employment Relationship Recommendation, 2006104 to address the issue of 
determining who an employee and who an employer is, in situations where the 
respective rights and obligations of the relevant parties are uncertain; where an 
attempt has been made to mask an employment relationship; and to address 
inadequacies or limitations in an existing legal framework or regarding 
interpretation or application thereof.105 Member States are advised to effectively 
address the plight of female workers, the most vulnerable workers, young, old and 
migrating workers as well as disabled workers in national policies, to prevent 
abuses and protect the rights of workers.106
In determining whether an employment relationship exists, cognisance needs to be 
taken of the facts pertaining to the performance of work and remuneration of the 
worker irrespective of the cloak the relationship was draped in by the parties;107 
with attention to an open-ended list of indicia suggesting the existence of an 
employment relationship, inclusive of whether:108
103 Smit, N & Fourie, E. 2009. Perspectives on extending protection to atypical workers, including 
workers in the informal economy, in developing countries. Journal o f South African Law 3: 516­
547. Hereinafter: Smit etal. Retrieved on 26/05/2012 from http://heinonline.org. The authors 
contrast "employees" as protected by labour legislation to the term "atypical” employees which 
refers to "new forms of non-standard employment” also referred to as ‘"non-standard", or even 
"marginal"' workers.
104 International Labour Organisation. 2006. R198 Employment Relationship Recommendation. 
Hereinafter: Employment Relationship Recommendation. Retrieved on 21/09/2012 from 
http://www.ilo.org/ifpdial/areas-of-work/industrial-and-emplojmient-relations/WCMS_172417/ 
lang-en/index.htm. This Recommendation was included in the LRA's s 200A and the BCEA’s s 83A 
but not in COIDA but the Code of Good Practice: Who is an Employee Notice No. 1774 of 2006, 
addresses it
105 Employment Relationship Recommendation, at the Introduction.
106 Ibid Articles 5-8.
107 Ibid Article 9.
108 Ibid Article 13.
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(a) the fact that the work: is carried out according to the instructions and 
under the control of another party; involves the integration of the 
worker in the organization of the enterprise; is performed solely or 
mainly for the benefit of another person; must be carried out 
personally by the worker; is carried out within specific working hours 
or at a workplace specified or agreed by the party requesting the work; 
is of a particular duration and has a certain continuity; requires the 
worker's availability; or involves the provision of tools, materials and 
machinery by the party requesting the work;
(b) periodic payment of remuneration to the worker; the fact that such 
remuneration constitutes the worker's sole or principal source of 
income; provision of payment in kind, such as food, lodging or 
transport; recognition of entitlements such as weekly rest and annual 
holidays; payment by the party requesting the work for travel 
undertaken by the worker in order to carry out the work; or absence of 
financial risk for the worker.
It is submitted that for labour legislation to remain relevant and purposive, it needs 
to provide for current labour trends.109 According to Smit and Fourie,110 atypical 
employment is the norm in developing countries within a growing informal 
economy that functions parallel to the formal economic system, with the atypically 
employed persons in growing need for social security protection.111 Fultz and Pieris 
contend that the SADC region has lost a large number of jobs in the formal 
employment sector to the extent that the informal economy bigger than the formal 
economy is.112 Informal employment is characterised by low earnings and little or 
no social security provisions.113 The informal economic sector in sub-Saharan Africa 
increased from 30% (1990) to 39% (2003) of the total GDP;114 while in 2005 total 
employment in the South African informal economic sector constituted 29.8%, of
109 Smit concluded that labour law is in danger of becoming outdated and irrelevant in the 
changing world of work; and that protection afforded to employees under labour law are 
threatened by new forms of working arrangements expressly aimed at extinguishing such 
rights. Smit e ta l  516.
110 Smit e ta l  516.
111 Smit et al at 516 -617  argue that it is of particular importance for developing countries that 
labour legislation continues to protect vulnerable workers in the rapidly changing international 
market. It will furthermore comply with the ILO’s policy of "decent work" which encompasses 
four objectives namely: "employment opportunities, workers' rights, social protection and 
representation".
112 Fultzeta/ix.
113 Ibid.
114 Smit e ta l  519.
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which 7% represents domestic workers.115 The Taylor Committee expressed 
concern for the high unemployment rate and rise in informally-employed persons 
that increased between 1996 and 2001 from 1 million to 2,7 million people.116
The scope of persons employed in atypical employment becomes clear if consideration 
is taken of the different sectors of the economy for example, building and construction 
with skilled and semi-skilled persons working in brick laying, plastering, tiling and 
painting. According to the Labour Force Survey, employment in the construction 
industry in 2003 totalled 626 000, of which 259 000 were informally employed.117
Women118 are particularly vulnerable as a huge number of domestic workers and 
self-employed persons working in the cosmetic, fashion and hair industry are 
mostly females.
Mpedi recommends the gradual inclusion of currently excluded categories of people 
for example the self-employed and people in the informal sector.119 It is submitted 
that, ironically, although atypically employed workers are the most vulnerable and 
in need of protection, this category is the least unionised without protection by 
labour legislation (inclusive of compensatory laws); however, in most developing 
countries, social security remains limited to persons in formal employment 
although a comprehensive system is needed to cover the whole population.120 
Atypical employment is characterised by a higher level of employment insecurity 
and precarious working conditions with unskilled females, forming the major part 
of this group.121 The SADC Code on Social Security requires in Article 6 that:
115 Benjamin, P. 2008. Informal work and labour rights in South Africa Indus. L.J. 29: 1579-1604. 
Retrieved on 26/05/2012 from http://0-heinonline.org.oasis.unisa.ac.za/HOL/Page?handle= 
hein.journals/iljuta29&id=1635&collection=)ournals&index=journals/iljuta.
116 Taylor Report 20.
117 South Africa (Republic). Department of Labour. 2004. Report: Non-standard employment and its 
policy implications. At 43. Retrieved on 27/09/2012 from http://www.wits.ac.za/files/61j0m_ 
267499001348046308.pdf.
118 Smit e ta l  516.
119 Mpedi, LG. 2008. Pertinent social security issues in South Africa. At 28 -29  & 32-33 . Community 
Law Centre [University Western Cape). Retrieved on 26/05/2012 from
http://www.communitylawcentre.org.za/projects/socio-economic-rights/Research%20and%
20Publications/Research%20Series/Pertinent%20social%20security%20issues%20in%20Sou
th%20Africa.pdf/view.
120 Smit et al 516 & Olivier et al (1999) 49.
121 Smit eta l  518.
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6.4 Member States should extend social insurance coverage to the entire 
working population,
6.5 Member States should provide and regulate social insurance 
mechanisms for the informal sector.
6.6 Member States should encourage and regulate private and public sector 
participation, with regard to both the provision and management of 
social insurance, as well as the payment of social insurance benefits.
Private sector participation can be either occupational-based or of an 
individual or group nature.
COIDA provides for the inclusion of a person “who has entered into ... 
apprenticeship or learnership, with an employer"122 but the system according to 
which employers provided apprenticeships has to a great extent fallen into 
disuse;123 and no provision has subsequently been made to protect artisans-in- 
training at the training institutions who provide some form of practical training that 
may be as dangerous as an employer’s workplace.
2.10. Migrant labour
The previous discussion on migrant labour in Chapter 4 is equally relevant in 
determining the scope of compensatory law. Employees usually residing and 
working within South Africa but injured during a period of absence from the 
Republic shall "be entitled to compensation", providing that the period of 
continuous absence from the Republic does not exceed 12 months unless an 
agreement to that regard was entered into between the Director-General, the 
employee and employer.124 COIDA does not provide for a system of optional 
coverage except for the provision in section 23; and of importance is the 
acknowledgement of the three parties in the "agreement between the Director- 
General, the employee and the employer concerned" albeit conditions may be laid 
down by the Director-General.125 It is submitted that particularly South Africans 
working abroad ought to have the option of self-coverage with a reputable 
independent workers compensation structure to prevent employees disabled as a
122 S l(xix). Own emphasis.
123 Van Rensburg, D. 2012. Reinventing the apprenticeship system in South Africa. Retrieved on 
10/09/2013 from http://www.leader.co.za/article.aspx?s=2&f= l& a=4115.
124 S 23(1). See also Chapter 4 paras 2.4; 3.4 & 4.4 supra and Chapter 5 paras 3.7 & 4.7 infra.
S 2 3 (l)(c ).
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result of work exposure, to return to the Republic and burdened their communities 
and the health care system due to a lack of relevant compensation. African countries 
e.g. the compensatory law of Sierra Leone only covers persons within a prescribed 
income bracket.
COIDA's sections 23(1), (2) and (3 )126 differ on the following points: section 23(1) 
applies to employers whose business entities are mainly carried out in the Republic 
and employees normally employed within the Republic but injured while 
temporarily outside the country; section 23(2) applies to employees who reside in 
the Republic and sustain an injury while working "in, on or above the continental 
shelf"127 and section 23(3) restricts the right to compensation to employees of 
employers in agreement with the Director-General and payment of the applicable 
levies,128 in an inverse situation to section 23(1) (a) where the employer's business 
are mainly outside the Republic and the employee usually works outside the
126 "23. Accidents outside Republic
(1)(a) If an employer carries on business chiefly in the Republic and an employee of his 
ordinarily employed in the Republic, meets with an accident while temporarily 
employed outside the Republic, such employee shall, subject to paragraph (c), be 
entitled to compensation as if the accident had happened in the Republic.
(b) The amount of compensation contemplated in paragraph (a) shall be determined on the 
basis of the earnings which the employee, in the opinion of the Director-General, would 
have received if he had remained in the Republic.
(c) This subsection shall cease to apply to an employee after he has been employed outside 
the Republic for a continuous period of 12 months, save by agreement between the 
Director-General, the employee and the employer concerned, and subject to such 
conditions as the Director-General may determine.
(2) If an employee resident in the Republic meets with an accident while employed in, on or 
above the continental shelf, such employee shall be entitled to compensation as if the 
accident had happened in the Republic.
(3) (a] If an employer carries on business chiefly outside the Republic and an employee of his
ordinarily employed outside the Republic, meets with an accident while temporarily 
employed in the Republic, such employee shall not be entitled to compensation unless 
the employer has previously agreed with the Director-General that such employee shall 
be entitled to compensation and, where applicable, has paid the necessary assessments 
in respect of him.
(b) An employee referred to in paragraph (a) who is so temporarily employed in the 
Republic for a continuous period of more than 12 months, shall be deemed to be 
ordinarily employed by such employer in the Republic.
(4) If, in terms of the law of the state in which an accident happens, an employee, in the 
circumstances referred to in subsection (1 ), is entitled to compensation or if an employee 
meets with an accident in the circumstances referred to in subsection (2) or in the 
Republic and he would be entitled to compensation in terms of the law of any other state 
as well as in terms of this Act, he shall by written notice to the Director-General elect to 
claim compensation either in terms of this Act or in terms of the law of the other state.”
™ S 23(2).
128 The Court in Boer v Momo held that the Act does not require registration by an employer and
payment of assessments as a precondition for the right to compensation at 294 G-I.
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country but is injured while working within the Republic. Subsection (b) deems an 
employee working for a continuous period of longer than 12 months in the Republic 
to be usually employed in the Republic.
Section 23(4) provides for an elective process in a situation where an employee 
might be entitled to compensation in more than one country in terms of either 
section 23(1) or (2), in which case he is obliged to exercise his choice of country in 
writing to the Director-General. No time frame is set in the Act for the exercise of 
the elective process; and it is submitted that the choice will have to be exercised 
within a reasonable period of time from the date of the accident or diagnosis of the 
occupational disease.129
The Taylor Committee reported that migrant workers need to be treated equally 
based on ILO standards.130 Millard argues the protection of migrating workers to be 
"one of the most pressing social security issues" facing Southern Africa131 in current 
times involving a significant number of people.132 Migrants include a broad spectrum 
of people, ranging from unskilled labour to highly-trained and skilled professionals; 
and globalisation is characterised by inter alia mobility.133 Immigrant labourers from 
surrounding countries like Mozambique and Lesotho working on South African 
mines and injured are compensated through the Rand Mutual Assurance Ltd; and 
receive compensation benefits via an arrangement with TEBA Ltd.134
The author submits that current economic trends, with new emerging forms of the 
employment relationship, require a broadening of the definitions to fulfil the 
historical objectives of compensatory legislation; and more particular COIDA 
because the current provisions applicable to migrant workers do not take into
129 COIDA s 23 and Mpedi 28.
130 Taylor Report at 114.
131 The SADC Instruments discussed in Chapter 1 of this study ought to guide on how to deal with 
migrant employees who sustain occupational injuries or contract occupational diseases while 
working in one of the SADC countries.
132 Millard, D. 2008. Migration and the portability of social security benefits: The position of non­
citizens in the Southern African Development Community. African Human Rights Law Journal 
8(1): 37-59 . Retrieved on 24/05/2012 from http://heinonline.org.
133 Ibid 39.
134 TEBA (The Employment Bureau of Africa). 2008. Retrieved on 08/08/2011 from 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TEBA_(Southern_African_Company).
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account the reality of a growing mobile workforce. It is especially true for South 
African professionals in industries like mining and medicine and who work for 
international companies with operations in multiple countries.135
In a report commissioned by the Department of Labour136 on the shortage of critical 
skills in South Africa, it is reported that more than 23 000 South African healthcare 
professionals are working in Australia, Canada, the USA and the United Kingdom.137 
It is submitted that a growing number of employees normally work outside the 
borders of the Republic and are exposed to various risks; and if injured or diseased 
through employment exposures, are sent home with the resulting negative 
consequences for the South African society as referred to supra in this study.138
Mpedi argues the current bilateral agreements between South Africa and 
Mozambique to be unsatisfactory.139 Millard concluded that migration should not be 
prevented because freedom of movement is an internationally-recognised human 
right but the limitation on the portability of social security benefits has the 
consequence that people may be left destitute irrespective of a lifetime of hard 
labour.140
It is clear that these limitations in the portability of compensatory benefits ought to 
be addressed. It may be done through economic and regional clusters like the SADC 
to enhance movement of people and money through legally-binding multilateral 
agreements but taking into account the region's particular needs.141
135 Erasmus, J & Breier, M (eds). 2009. Skills shortages in South Africa: Case studies o f  key 
professions. 2. Cape Town: HSRC Press. Retrieved on 23/09/2012 from
http://www.hsrcpress.ac.za/product.php?productid=22 57
136 Ibid 120 & 145.
137 ibid.
138 Mpedi 34 recognised the problematic situation and proposed addressing this aspect as a
"pressing matter.” He proposed social security provisions to be extended to include risks of
illness, maternity benefits, invalidity, old age and occupational injuries and diseases to South 
Africans working outside the borders of the country irrespective if it be temporary or 
permanent and specifically in the African countries.
139 Mpedi 34. COIDA s 94 provides agreements with foreign states to deal with compensatory 
matters and claims in terms of either COIDA or the foreign state.
wo Millard 58.
i «  Ibid 58-59.
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2.11. Domestic workers
The definitions of "employee"142 and "employer" have been broadened over time 
but the current definition in COIDA still excludes domestic workers. However, 
648 807143 domestic workers were registered with the Department of Labour for 
purposes of the Unemployment Fund in December 2011.144 The 1934 Act 
emphasised the nature and role of the contract of service in determining the status 
of "employee" and "employer" in section 6 that stated:
Persons who are regarded as Workmen and Employers for the purposes of 
this Act.
(1) A person shall be regarded for the purposes of this Act as a workman if 
he has entered into, or works under, a contract of employment or of 
apprenticeship with an employer, whether the contract is expressed or 
implied, is oral or in writing, and whether the remuneration is calculated 
by time or by work done. For the said purposes "workman" shall include 
any person whose occupation is conveying for gain, persons or goods by 
means of any vehicle, vessel or aircraft, the use of which he has obtained 
from the owner thereof under any contract other than a purchase or 
hire-purchase agreement, whether or not the remuneration of such 
person under such contract be partly an agreed sum and partly a share 
in takings, but shall not include any such person whose remuneration is 
fixed solely by a share in takings:
Section 84 of the same Act defined "employment” as:
'Employment' means work of any kind whatsoever in the Union, but does 
not include domestic service unless in connection with hotels or boarding 
houses in respect of which a licence referred to ...., is required nor 
employment in agriculture unless such employment be in connection with 
any engine driven or machine worked by mechanical power.
An employer is furthermore defined to "mean[s] any person who gives, or has given 
employment to any person."145
M2 previously referred to as "workman".
143 Not all domestic workers need to register with the Unemployment Fund thus the figure is not 
all inclusive.
144 South Africa (Republic). Department of Labour. 2012. Job opportunities and unemployment in the 
South African Labour Market 2011-2012. Pretoria: Government Printing Works. At 8. Retrieved on 
12/08/2013 from http://www.labour.gov.za/DOL/downloads/documents/annual-reports/job-op 
portunities-and-unemployment-in-the-south-african-labour-market/2012/jobopporeport2 0 1 1 12 . 
pdf.
145 Section 84 (the definition section) of the 1934 Act.
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2.11.1. Van Vuuren v Pienaar
In the case of Van Vuuren v Pienaar,146 the High Court of the Transvaal147 examined 
the meaning of the definition "employment" and had to decide if "domestic service" 
included the services of an assistant matron working at a boarding school.148 
Although the assistant matron was seriously injured out of and in the course of her 
duties during an explosion in the kitchen, she had no valid claim in terms of the 
1934 Act, as she was found to be employed in "domestic service" but the term 
"domestic service" was not defined in the 1934 Act.149 Barry J and Millin J 
(concurring in a separate ruling)150 applied the interpretation of "domestic servant" 
by Roche J in old English decisions with regard to the English Unemployment 
Insurance Act. Roche J is cited from In re Junior Carlton Club (1922, 1 KB 166) 
describing the nature of domestic service to be:151
...servants whose main or general function it is to be about the employers' 
persons or establishments, residential or quasi-residential, for the purpose 
of ministering to their employers' needs or wants, or to the needs or wants 
of those who are members of such establishments, or of those resorting to 
such establishments, including guests.
Rambottom }, although concurring with the outcome of his colleagues’ decisions, 
differentiated between "domestic service" and a "domestic servant."152 The 
honourable Judge explained that the construction of the Act by which the 
Legislature did not deal with the exclusion in the definition of a "workman" but 
dealt with it in the definition of "employment," indicated certain risks to be 
excluded from the ambit of the Act.153 By excluding domestic service from the 
categories of employment, the "Court is concerned only with the nature of the work 
which the employee has been contracted to perform and not with the question 
whether he would, in the popular sense, be called a servant..."154
146 Van Vuuren v Pienaar 1941 TPD 122. Hereinafter: Van Vuuren.
147 As it was then known.
148 Ibid 124.
149 Ibid 123-124.
iso ibid 127.
151 Ibid 125 & 127.
152 Ibid 129-130.
153 Ibid 130.
154 Ibid 130.
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Although the definition was broadened by the 1941 Act, it continued to exclude 
domestic workers by stipulating:
3(2) The following persons shall not be regarded for the purposes of this Act 
as workmen-
(f) domestic servants employed as such-
(i) in a private household; or
(ii) in a boarding house or institution in which are ordinarily 
employed not more than five such servants;
COIDA does not exclude the risk of domestic work but differentiate on the basis of the 
place of employment by exclusion of domestic workers in "private households" which 
include persons working as cleaners, care-givers, gardeners etc.155 The Minister of 
Labour announced in her Budget Vote Address (2013) intended amendments to 
COIDA that may include domestic workers within the ambit of the Act.156
2.12. Summary
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa calls for the provision of social 
security to "everyone" and places an obligation on the State to expand the provision 
of such benefits in a progressive manner.157
Although the definition of an employee has historically been broadened over time, 
the following workers remain excluded from the definition of an employee and are 
thus excluded from the right to compensation:
• independent contractors;158
• members of the Defence Force and Police in defence actions;159
• children older than 18 years at the death of his parent;160
• voluntary workers (inclusive of voluntary emergency workers);161
• workers in informal employment;162
155 S l(xix)(d)(v).
156 Oliphant.
157 Chapter 5 para 2.1 supra.
158 Chapter 5 paras 2.3,2.4 supra.
159 Chapter 5 para 2.1 supra.
160 Chapter 5 para 2.1 supra.
161 Chapter 5 para 2.1 supra.
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• wokers in atypical employment;163
• domestic workers in private households;164
• migrant workers;165
• child labourers (the Daytona ruling).166
No provision is being made for voluntary inclusion within the ambit of COIDA I 
directors of companies are included within the definition of an employee.167
The historical principle of balancing-of-interests is central to the definitions 
employer and employee but:
• the employee’s right of compensation is not dependent upon the registrati 
and payment of levies by the employer;168
• third party employers will not be protected against common law claims 
damages when utilising the services of labour brokers or borrowi 
employees from other employers as COIDA only recognises one employ 
per employee at any given time.169
The basis of the definition remains the common law contract of service which rr 
be tested according to the applicable indicia as contained in the Code of Go 
Practice: Who is an Employee, with special attention to the dominant impressi 
test which requires a weighing of all relevant factors.170
3. CANADA
The federal Canadian jurisdictions vary in their definitions of a “worker" a 
"employer" for the purposes of compensatory legislation. However, similar to Soi 
Africa, the common law contract of service forms the basis of the employm<
162 Chapter 5 para 2.5.1; 2.9 supra.
163 Chapter 5 para 2.9 supra.
164 Chapter 5 para 2.9; 2.11 & 2.11.1 supra.
165 Chapter 5 para 2.10 supra.
166 Chapter 5 para 2.5.1 supra.
167 Chapter 5 para 2.1 supra.
168 Chapter 5 para 2.1 & 2.7.1 supra.
169 Chapter 5 para 2.8; 2.8.1; 2.8.2 supra.
170 Chapter 5 para 2.4 supra.
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relationship which is the ultimate requirement for satisfying the said definitions.171 
Different tests have been applied by the courts with the Ontario Appeals Tribunal 
showing preference for the "business reality" test that takes cognisance of an open- 
ended list of factors.172
3.1. Statutory definition of an "employee"
The Government Employees Compensation Act173 expressly provides for workers of 
the Canadian Government as the only employees entitled to rights in terms of that 
Act.174 However, similar to COIDA, it excludes members of the Canadian Forces and 
the Royal Canadian Mounted Police in the application section.175
All the other Canadian compensatory laws correspond to the text of Alberta176 by 
stating:
1 ( 1 )  (z) "worker" means a person who enters into or works under a 
contract of service or apprenticeship, written or oral, express or 
implied, whether by way of manual labour or otherwise, and 
includes 
(i) a learner, ...
Although all the other Acts contain almost identical definitions, every Act also 
provides for the particular needs of its own province which is supplemented by 
policy documents.177 A common characteristic is voluntary coverage through an
171 Fudge, J, Tucker, E & Vosko, L. 2003. Employee or independent contractor? Charting the legal 
significance of the distinction in Canada. CLELJ: 10(2): 193-230. Retrieved on 10/09/2013 
from http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1888625.
172 Ibid 217.
173 R.S.C. 1985, c. G-5.
i ™  Ibid s 2.
175 S 3(1).
176 Workers' Compensation Act, RSA 2000, c W-15.
1 77 Alberta (Provincial Government). Workers Compensation Board. 2008. Policy No. 06-01 Part II - 
Application 3: Student coverage. Retrieved on 28/07/2012 from
http: / / www.wcb.ab.ca/public/policy/manual/060 Ip2a3.asp.
See also Alberta (Provincial Government). Workers Compensation Board. 2008. Worker fact 
sheet: Student coverage. Retrieved on 28/07/2012 from 
http://www.wcb.ab.ca/workers/workers_facts.asp.
British Columbia (Provincial Government). Workers’ Compensation Board. 2013. Rehabilitation 
services and claims manual volume I: Chapter 2. Retrieved on 20/09/2013 from 
http://www.worksafebc.com/publications/policy_manuals/rehabilitation_services_and_claims 
_manual/volume_i/default.asp.
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application process whereby approved workers are deemed to be employees178 for 
the purposes of the Act. Persons who are eligible to apply for optional coverage in 
terms of the Act include voluntary emergency workers,179 fire fighters,180 a partner 
in a partnership,181 a proprietor,182 a director,183 independent contractors,184 non-
Manitoba (Provincial Government). Workers Compensation Board. 2011. Policy Manual. 
Retrieved on 27/03/2012 from http://www.wcb.mb.ca/policy-manual.
New Brunswick: Policy No. 26-010: Definition o f  employee. Retrieved on 24/09/2012 from 
http://www.worksafenb.ca/view-all-policies7al ttemplate=Printable&.
Northwest Territories and Nunavut (Provincial Government). Workers' Safety and 
Compensation Commission. 2004. Operational Policy Manual. (See for example: Northwest 
Territories and Nunavut (Provincial Government). Workers' Safety and Compensation 
Commission. 2013. Policy No. 12-04-03: Emergency workers; Northwest Territories and Nunavut 
(Provincial Government). Workers' Safety and Compensation Commission. 2013. Policy No. 12­
01-06: Expanded compulsory coverage in construction and workers and Northwest Territories 
and Nunavut (Provincial Government). Workers' Safety and Compensation Commission. 2004. 
Policy No. 12-02-01: Independent operators). Retrieved on 17/03/2013 from 
http://www.wsib.on.ca/en/community/WSIB/230/PolicyHome/24345?vgnextoid=cc08b411b 
el2ell0VgnVCM 1000000el8120aRCRD,
Nova Scotia (Provincial Government). Workers' Compensation Board. 1995. Policy No. 1.3.4.: 
General entitlement- Volunteer fire fighters. Retrieved on 18/05/2011 from 
http://www.wcb.ns.ca/policy/index_e.aspx?DetailID=1509.
Ontario (Provincial Government). Workplace Safety and Insurance Board. 2013. Operational 
Policy Manual: Coverage: Policy No. 12-03-02: Optional insurance; Policy No. 12-03-03: Who can 
obtain optional insurance? Ontario (Provincial Government). Workplace Safety and Insurance 
Board. 2013. Policy No. 12-02-01: Workers and independent operators. Retrieved on 
26/04/2013 from http://www.wsib.on.ca/en/community/WSIB/230/PolicyLanding/24346? 
vgnextoid=883c8588e7a4ell0VgnVCM1000000el8120aRCRD.
Prince Edward Island (Provincial Government). Workers’ Compensation Board. 2009. Policy No. 
POL-74: Worker and Prince Edward Island (Provincial Government). Workers' Compensation 
Board. 2009. Policy No. POL-94: Learners. Retrieved on 23/08/2012 from 
http: / / www.wcb.pe.ca/Information/Policies.
Saskatchewan (Provincial Government). Workers' Compensation Board. 1971. Policy Manual: 
Coverage: Policy No. POL 31/71: Personal. Saskatchewan (Provincial Government). Workers' 
Compensation Board. 2000. Policy No. POL 03/98: Trade unions. Saskatchewan (Provincial 
Government). Workers' Compensation Board. 1981. Policy No. POL 12/81: Exchange o f  farm  
labour and Saskatchewan (Provincial Government). Workers' Compensation Board. 2000. 
Policy No. POL 47/83: Community service order participants. Retrieved on 19/05/2013 from 
http://www.wcbsask.com/WCBPortalWeb/ShowProperty?nodePath=/WCBRepository/pdfs/ 
PolicyManual.
Yukon (Provincial Government). Workers' Health and Safety Board. 2008. Policy Manual: Policy No. 
EA-02 Determining the status o f a person: employer, worker, sole proprietor or non-working director. 
Retrieved on 19/07/2012 from http://www.wcb.yk.ca/ActsPoliciesAndRegulations/Policies/EA/ 
FinalEA-02DetermtheStatusofaPerson.pdf.pdf.
178 Alberta s l(l)(z )(ii) , (iii); Saskatchewan ss 6 ( l) - (2 ) ; Manitoba s l ( l ) (k )  & (1); Ontario s 12; 
Quebec ss 9 -1 9 ; British Columbia s 3; New Brunswick s 4, 5; Nova Scotia ss 4 -8 ; Prince Edward 
Island ss 2-4 ; Newfoundland and Labrador ss 38(3) & 41; Nunavut s 6 & Yukon s 5(1).
179 Alberta s 14(3) & Newfoundland and Labrador s 40(l)(g ).
180 Alberta s 14(3); Saskatchewan s 2; Manitoba s 1; Ontario s 2; Quebec s 12; British Columbia s 1;
New Brunswick s 1, 5; Nova Scotia s 2, 5; Prince Edward Island s 1; Newfoundland and 
Labrador s 39; Yukon s 3(b) & Nunavut s 4.
181 Alberta s 15(1), 16(1) & Ontario s 12(1).
182 Alberta s 15(1), 16(1) & Yukon s 3 (l)(f) , 3(2)(d).
183 Alberta s 15(1), 16(1); Manitoba s 1, 74; Ontario s 12; Quebec s 18; Prince Edward Island s 1, 3;
Newfoundland and Labrador s 2(z)(iv) & Yukon s 3 (l)(d ), 3(2)(b).
184 Manitoba s 1, 75(3); Ontario s 12(1); Nova Scotia s 4 & Prince Edward Island s l(z)(vi), 4.
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profit organisations,185 an association of independent operators186 and domestic 
workers.187 Failure to follow the application procedure will exclude a person from 
benefits irrespective of the existence of a contract of service.188 COIDA specifically 
excludes independent contractors but does not distinguish between employees and 
directors or proprietors. It includes these categories of persons into the definition of 
an employee provided these categories entered into a contract of service with the 
business entity which in practice means a person may simultaneously be considered 
to be both an employer and employee.189
In some of the workers' compensatory laws, certain designated categories of people 
are defined as workers; giving certainty to especially voluntary emergency 
workers190 and domestic workers.191 Although domestic workers are expressly 
excluded from the working of the Act in two jurisdictions,192 they are included in the 
other jurisdictions e.g. under the pre-condition of minimum working hours in 
Manitoba.193
It is significant that all Canadian statutes include "learners" or "students" exposed to 
the hazards of occupation,194 as workers, contrary to COIDA which only includes 
employees employed under apprenticeship or learnership contracts.195
185 Saskatchewan s 6; Manitoba s 75 & British Columbia s 3.
186 Quebec s 19.
187 Quebec ss 18 ,19  & New Brunswick ss 2, 4 & 6.
188 See discussion at Chapter 5 para 2.10.1: Homes by Avi v Alberta (Workers' Compensation Board, 
Appeals Commission), 2007 ABQB 203 (CanLll).
189 Chapter 5 paras 2.1 & 2.3 supra.
190 British Columbia s 1; Manitoba s 1, s 4(5.1); New Brunswick s 1; Nova Scotia s 2(ae)(v); Ontario 
s 2(1); Prince Edward Island s l(l)(z )(iii)  & Saskatchewan s 2(t)(ii).
191 Manitoba s 1; Ontario s 2 where an industry is defined to include a household if domestic staff 
is employed & Yukon s 3(1) defines an employer to be an employer for the purposes of the Act 
if he hires a domestic worker on a full time basis.
192 New Brunswick s 2(3)(d) & Quebec s 2.
193 Manitoba s l( j) .
194 Alberta s l( l)(o )(z ); British Columbia s 1; Manitoba s 1(1) definitions of ''learner" and
"worker"; New Brunswick s 1 definitions of "learner" and "worker"; Newfoundland and
Labrador s 2(z)(ii); Nunavut s 1(1), 4 (l)(b )(i) ; Nova Scotia s 2(q), 2(ae)(iii); Ontario s 2
definitions of "learner” and "worker”; Prince Edward Island s l ( l ) (p ) , (z)(ii); Quebec s 10;
Saskatchewan s 2(m )(t)(i) & Yukon s 3(1) definitions of "learner” and "worker”.
195 In Booyens N.O. v O.F.S. Provincial Administration 1924 OPD 120, the Court clearly differentiated 
between a student at a trade school and an apprentice employed under a contract of apprenticeship.
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Certain benefits are extended to special categories of persons, deemed to be 
workers for the purposes of compensatory legislation irrespective of remuneration. 
These include persons doing compulsory community service under a penal code,196 
confined persons,197 children executing tasks,198 students at a variety of educational 
institutions199 e.g. technical institutions and vocational training institutions and a 
patient while participating in a work training programme.200 These categories of 
persons are not entitled to all benefits; and specifically excluded is the right to 
return-to-work which for logical reasons does not form part of the applicable 
benefits.201
Canadian compensatory legislation has very similar provisions202 with regard to 
dependents of deceased employees. They differ, however, from COIDA in that they 
do not have an age limitation pertaining to minors.203 An example is the Act of 
Manitoba204 which defines dependents as:
... those members of the family of a worker who were wholly or partly 
dependent upon his earnings at the time of his death or who, but for the 
incapacity due to the accident of the worker would have been so 
dependent, but a person shall be deemed not to be partially dependent 
upon the earnings of another person unless he was dependent partially 
on contributions from that other person for the provision of the 
ordinary necessaries of life;
3.2. Statutory definition of an "employer"
The definition of an employer in Canadian compensatory law is closely related to 
the economic sector in which the employer conducts his business. If the sector in 
which the employer functions forms part of the compensation system, he will fall
196 Quebec s 11.
197 Quebec s 12 & Nunavut s 4(l)(e ).
198 Quebec s 11.
199 Nova Scotia s 6; Newfoundland and Labrador s 42 & Nunavut s 4 (l)(b )(c).
200 Nunavut s4 (l)(d ).
201 Quebec s 12.
202 Alberta s l( l) (h ) , British Columbia s 1, New Brunswick s 1, Newfoundland and Labrador s 2 (l)(f), 
Nunavut s 1(2), Nova Scotia s 2(1), Ontario s 2(1), Prince Edward Island s l( l) (h ) , Quebec s 2 
which defines a "spouse" but not the other family members, Saskatchewan s 2(e) & Yukon s 3(1).
203 S l(xv)(c), the definition of "dependent of an employee".
204 S 1(1).
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within the ambit of the rights and obligations applicable to an employer i.e. to be 
protected from claims for damages and liable for payment of assessments. 
Employers, who work as employees in the same industry, have the option to be 
included in the definition of an “employee" for the purposes of compensatory 
legislation.205
The fishing industry is a particularly difficult industry for the purposes of defining 
employers and employees as it mainly consists of independent contractors 
(fishermen) and buyers of fish in an industry vulnerable to economic and 
environmental fluctuations.206 For the purpose of the British Columbian Act, "each 
buyer, recipient or payor is deemed to be the employer of all commercial fishers 
who contributed in any manner to the catching or landing of the fish bought, 
obtained or paid for by or through that person."207 This is despite the fact that the 
distinctive characteristics of an employer-employee relationship are not present 
between the fisherman and the buyer who is deemed to be the employer.208
3.3. Requirements regarding contract of service
Ison209 sheds light on the fact that although it is a requirement of the definition of an 
employee to be engaged under a contract of service, the commencement of the right 
to compensation and the corresponding right to protection against claims for 
damages are not dependent upon the "common law concepts of offer and 
acceptance."
In a number of Tribunal Decisions it was held that a worker fulfils the definition in 
situations where a prospective employee was engaged in an activity related to the 
employer notwithstanding that the common law contract of service had not yet
205 Ison 1989 :14 .
206 British Columbia (Province). Workers' Compensation Board. 1997. Fishing industry and Workers 
Compensation: A briefing paper. At 1 & 5. WorkSafeBC: Richmond. Hereinafter: British Columbia 
Fishing Industry Briefing Paper. Retrieved on 09/08/2012 from http://www.worksafebc.com/ 
regu!ation_and_policy/archived_information/policy_discussion_papers/defauItasp.
207 British Columbia s 4 (1 )(c).
208 British Columbia Fishing Industry Briefing Paper at 2.
209 Ison 1989:11 .
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commenced. In Decision No. 775/92 of 1993,210 it was explained that it is not the 
existence of the contract of service as such that is the determinant of the 
designation of "an employee" but the material question to the existence of an 
employment relationship.211 The Court in citing the earlier Decision No. 26 of 1974 
(British Columbia), reasoned that the Act specifically refers to "a contract of service" 
to clearly differentiate it from the concept of "a contract for service” applicable to an 
independent contractor.212 The contract of service does not constitute the 
commencement date of the right to compensation and therefore also not the 
commencement date for fulfilment of the definition of an employee. The Court 
considered the commencement of the employment relationship as213
... the employment relationship for compensation purposes had begun at the 
point of dispatch. It was there that the deceased allocated his time to the 
service of this employer rather than another, and began to act pursuant to 
arrangements made with the employer. Thus, the deceased was a worker of 
the employer within the meaning of the relevant legislation.
It is proposed that the ratio of the Court relates to a silent agreement between the 
worker and the employer and that a silent contract of service was entered into at 
the time of agreement.
The Appeals Tribunal applied in Decision 192/89214 the “business reality" test which 
corresponds with the South African dominant impression te st215 Eleven indicia are 
listed as part of the business reality test to be taken into consideration when 
determining the status of a worker:216
210 Decision No. 775/92, 1993 CanLII 5984 (ON WSIAT). Hereinafter: Decision No. 775/92. 
Retrieved on 10/08/2012 from http://canlii.ca/t/206fv.
211 Ibid at (i)(b).
212 As explained supra at Chapter 5 para 3.3 when dealing with the development of the contract of 
service.
213 Decision No. 775/92 at (i)(b).
214 Decision No. 921/89, 1990 CanLII 5261 (ON WSIAT). Hereinafter: Decision No. 921/89. 
Retrieved on 30/09/2012 from http://canlii.ca/t/20fjx.
215 Chapter 5 para 2.4 supra.
216 Decision No. 921/89 at (d) "Worker" versus "independent operator" - evolution of Tribunal test”.
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1. Ownership of equipment needed for the work;
2. The form of remuneration paid to the worker or contractor e.g. is it a 
fixed rate or dependent upon profit or loss;
3. The business structure (partnership etc.), advertising, business cards etc.;
4. Control over "where" and “when” work is to be performed;
5. The intention of the parties as may be derived from agreements, 
contract for service or contract of service, fixed term contracts etc.;
6. Business and government records e.g. tax records;
7. The economic market e.g. a highly skilled person is highly marketable 
and may be indicative of an independent contractor but a long-standing 
arrangement may be indicative of an employer-employee relationship.
8. Other persons categorised as "workers" in terms of the Act who 
provides similar services to an "employer";
9. If it is allowed to delegate the services, it is indicative of a contractor;
10. The size of remuneration: large payments over a pre-determine period 
of time may indicate the person to be a contractor;
11. The degree of integration of the service into the overall business.
The named eleven indicia are not an exhaustive list but rather form part of an open- 
ended list of factors to be determined by the circumstances of each individual case.
3.3.1. Joey's Delivery Service v New Brunswick (W orkplace Health and Safety  
Compensation Commission)
The Court of Appeal of New Brunswick had to consider in Joey's Delivery Service v 
New Brunswick (Workplace Health and Safety Compensation Commission)217 whether 
drivers delivering fast food on behalf of Joey's Delivery Service, worked under a 
contract of service or a contract for service; and if the last named is true, the drivers 
would fall within the category of independent contractors.218
217 Joey ’s Delivery Service v New Brunswick (Workplace Health and Safety Compensation 
Commission) 2001 NBCA 17 (CanLII). Retrieved on 30/09/2012 from http://canlii.ca/t/4vjb. 
Hereinafter: Joey’s Delivery Service.
218 Ibid [1 ].
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All of the drivers worked only part-time, were entitled to make use of substitute 
drivers without prior authorisation, were responsible for their own vehicles, fuel, 
maintenance and insurance and also had to rent a radio from Joey's Delivery 
Services and were not subject to discipline by Joey’s Delivery Service.219 Drivers 
were restricted from making deliveries besides deliveries for Joey's during the same 
shift and no deductions were made for tax, pension or employment insurance and 
workers considered themselves as independent contractors for tax purposes.220 The 
company arranged with fast food restaurants for the provision of a delivery service 
and dispatched the drivers upon an order by a restaurant.221 The driver picked up 
the food from the restaurant, delivered it to the customer and returned to the 
restaurant with payment for the order minus the delivery fee. Upon completion of 
the shift, the driver pays a percentage of the delivery fees over to Joey's Delivery 
Services who kept a log of the orders delivered during that shift.222
The Appeals Tribunal (the court a quo) held that enough control was exercised over 
the drivers to be considered as employees of Joey's Delivery Services.223
The Court of Appeal inter alia considered the definition of “industry" and held it to 
be "disturbingly vague as to how one goes about determining what constitutes an 
"industry"'.224 The Court further examined the definitions of "employer" and 
“employee" and held that the difference between having a worker under a "contract 
of hire" and working under a "contract of service" to be insignificant as a "contract 
of hire is a contract of employment".225 Both definitions require the application of 
the common law principles,226 with the point of departure, the four-folded test laid 
down in Montreal v Montreal Locomotive Works Ltd. et al., [1947] 1 D.L.R. 161 (P.C.) 
on the following aspects: “(1) control; (2) ownership of tools; (3] chance of profit; 
and (4] risk of loss."227 The last aspect relates to the true nature of the relationship
Ibid [7]-[9].
220 Ibid [10]—[11].
221 ibid [5] & [9].
222 ibid [9]—[10 ].
223 Ibid [13],
2 2 4  Ibid [17] —[18].
2 2 5  Ibid [31].
2 2 6  Ibid [32],
22 7  Ibid [33] & [44],
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i.e. is the person an entrepreneur carrying on business for his own account in which 
case it constitutes a contract for service.228
3.3.2. University of Lethbridge v Alberta (Workers' Compensation Board, 
Appeals Commission)
The Court of Queen's Bench of Alberta had to decide whether a student 
(Larreynaga) of the University of Lethbridge, injured when a light fixture fell on her 
while she was in the University’s library, could be deemed a "worker” as defined in 
the Act in University o f  Lethbridge v Alberta (Workers' Compensation Board, Appeals 
Commission).229
The Appeals Commission interpreted the Act based on a plain reading that the 
student was "not a worker, the University was not her employer, and the injury did 
not occur in the course of her employment with the University”230 as an 
employment or quasi-employment relationship is a precondition for fulfilment of 
the statutory definition of a "worker." Besides the conventional employment 
relationships, three additional types of persons are included into the definition i.e. 
learners, persons applying in terms of section 10 and "any other person” so deemed 
by the Board.231 The Appeals Commissioner reasoned that as the first two types are 
based on an employment relationship it followed that the third (any other person) 
also needs an employment or quasi-employment relationship to be deemed a 
worker by the Board.232 This led to a finding that Larreynaga could not be deemed a 
worker and even if she was deemed to be a worker, the accident did not arise "out 
of and occur in the course of employment" because no employment relationship 
existed between her and the University and therefore she could not be considered 
to be a "worker" in terms of the Act.233
228 Ibid [43]—[44].
229 University o f  Lethbridge v Alberta (Workers' Compensation Board, Appeals Commission), 2007 
ABQB 551 (CanLII). At [2]. Hereinafter: University o f  Lethbridge. Retrieved on 11/08/2012 from 
http: //canliixa/1 / 1  svtp.
230 ibid [18].
231 Ibid [19] & [96]—[98].
232 Ibid [20] & [99].
233 Ibid [20] & [99].
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The Court of Queen’s Bench, in referring to the purpose of the Act,234 examined the 
policy to include university students in the definition of a "worker" and described it 
as "a policy decision involving classes of persons and the balancing of public and 
private interests and is properly described as 'polycentric'."235 The reasoning of the 
Court a quo was held to be untenable and an interpretative error of the word 
"worker" and furthermore the finding that the accident did not arise "out of and 
occur in the course of employment" was incorrect.236
The finding by the Court a quo in respect of the pre-condition of an employment 
relationship "simply does not accord with a plain reading of the Act" as the deemed 
provision is specifically directed at persons who would not otherwise be considered 
as "workers" in terms of the Act due to an existing employment relationship 237 The 
Court of Queen's Bench repudiated the reasoning and held "that the super-added 
requirement of an express employment relationship misapprehends the nature and 
purpose of a deeming provision and renders redundant the deeming provisions 
contained in s. l(l)(y )(iii) of the Act."238 A legal fiction is being created by the 
inclusion of students within the definition but the only requirement for a student to 
satisfy the definition of a "worker" in terms of the Act is to be registered with and 
attend a university as defined in the Universities Act RSA 2000, c U-3.239
In terms of section 147(3), deemed workers are considered to be employees of the 
Government of Alberta and therefore the accident arose out of and occurred in the 
course of employment as she was engaged in studies at the library.240 It followed 
that the University is immune to a tort action against it by the student.241
234 ibid [58].
235 Md [61].
236 Ibid [95],
237 Ibid [99],
238 Ibid [100],
239 Ibid [101].
2«  Ibid [109]—[110].
2«  Ibid [114].
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3 .4 . Validity of contract of service
An unlawful employment contract will not destroy the right to compensation even 
in cases of employment of under age children, except in Nova Scotia242 and Prince 
Edward Island243 where the claim of a parent in respect of the death of a child 
whilst unlawfully employed, will be void.
3.4.1. Decision 20053860 (Re), 2005  CanLll 6 3 1 9 6  (NB WHSCC)
The background of this decision244 strongly reminds of the circumstances of the 
South African Daytona case, with the appellant a fourteen year old child whose arm 
was amputated subsequent to an injury while working on a potato farm.245
In the case heard by the New Brunswick Appeals Tribunal, the employee argued that 
the employer contravened the Employment Standards Act, SNB 1982, c E-7.2. by 
employing an under aged child which in turn rendered the employment contract 
invalid and he therefore ought to be allowed to proceed with a common law claim for 
damages against the employer.246
It was common cause that the employer did not comply with the applicable 
provisions of the Employment Standards Act but the Tribunal could not find any 
provisions in the same Act or the Occupational Health and Safety Act, SNB 1983, c 0 ­
0.2 that renders the contract of employment of a person younger than 16 years of age 
void.247
The Tribunal cited the case of Still v M.N.R., 1997 CanLll 6379 (FCA), [1998] 1 FC 549 
and applied the principle as follows:248
242 Nova Scotia s 80.
243 Prince Edward Island s 54.
244 Decision No. 20053860 (Re), 2005 CanLll 63196 (NB WHSCC). Retrieved on 30/09/2012 from 
http://canlii.ca/t/211wj. Hereinafter: Decision No. 20053860.
245 Ibid 2.
Ibid 3.
247 Ibid 6.
248 Ibid 6.
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The following principle reflects both the modern approach and its public 
law milieu: where a contract is expressly or impliedly prohibited by statute, 
a court may refuse to grant relief to a party, when in all of the circumstances 
of the case, including regard to the objects and purposes of the statutory 
prohibition, it would be contrary to public policy, reflected in the relief 
claimed, to do so.
The Tribunal viewed the purpose of the compensation scheme and the specific 
provisions of the Employment Standards Act as providing protection to young 
workers and in holding the contract invalid would be contrary to public policy and 
would defeat the protection rendered by compensatory legislation.249 As the 
Employment Standards Act does not render such a contract invalid and the 
Appellant relied on the employment relationship to establish the existence of a duty 
of care by the employer, it constitutes an avoidance of the immunity extended by 
the compensatory Act to the employer which is closely related to the purpose of 
compensatory law. Consequently, the contract of employment was found not to be 
invalid and the employee was barred from instituting a common law claim for 
damages against his employer.250
The reasoning in this case is clearly in contrast to the Daytona case251 decided in 
South Africa although both are based upon the weighing of interests.
3.5. The role of remuneration
Contrary to COIDA, the Canadian compensatory laws do not refer to earnings as part 
of the definition of either employee or employer. Only the two identical Acts of 
Nunavut and the Northwest Territories refer to remuneration in respect of a 
designated employee by empowering the Commission to exercise its discretion with 
regard to determining the work, period, remuneration, assessments payable and 
who will be considered as the employer of that person.252
2«  Ibid 7 & 9.
250 ibid  7 ,9  & 10.
251 Chapter 5 para 2.5.1 supra.
252 Nunavut s 6(2).
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Remuneration forms the basis of the calculation of compensation and is either 
based on the earnings of the employee at the date of the accident or the loss of 
future earnings potential. It plays a role in the determination of the assessment as it 
constitutes the potential financial risk to the compensation fund from which 
benefits are to be paid.253 It is for this reason that the rate of remuneration of 
"deemed workers" might be problematic.
The general rule is the determination of the quantum that best constitutes the 
"average earnings" or "net average earnings" of the employee in the pre-injury time 
period.254 With regard to designated employees, the Compensation Authority is 
vested with the discretion255 to determine the amount considered to be the 
employee's "average earnings" led by information such as the amount for which 
coverage is paid and or in a manner considered appropriate.256
3.5.1. Decision: 2010-385-AD (Re), 2 0 1 0  CanLII 69811  (NS WCAT)
It is submitted that the form which remuneration takes, may be an indication of the 
legal status of the employment relationship but it is not the sole indicator as can be 
derived from the ruling by the Nova Scotia Workers' Compensation Appeals 
Tribunal in Decision: 2010-385-AD (Re),257 where the worker was indebted to the 
employer and tendered his time and work to pay off his dept.
253 Alberta s 97; British Columbia s 39; Manitoba s 80; New Brunswick s 53; Newfoundland and 
Labrador s 97; Nunavut s 70; Nova Scotia s 124; Ontario s 81; Prince Edward Island s 63(1); 
Quebec s 292; Saskatchewan ss 136 ,137  & Yukon s 66.
254 Ison 1989: 82.
255 In New Brunswick s 34(1) the discretion is exclusive in nature and not open to review in any court
256 Manitoba ss 1(8) and 75.1(3); New Brunswick s 34; Newfoundland and Labrador s 101; 
Nunavut s 72 & Nova Scotia s 130. See the British Columbian Act which reads as follows: 
"Exception to section 33.1 — person with coverage under section 2 (2)
33.6 If an independent operator or employer, to whom the Board directs that this Part applies 
under section 2 (2), has purchased coverage under this Act, the Board must determine the 
amount of average earnings under section 33.1 from the date of injury based on the gross 
earnings for which coverage is purchased.
Exception to section 33.1 — person without earnings
33.7 If a worker had no earnings at the time of the injury, the Board must determine the amount 
of average earnings of a worker under section 33.1 from the date of injury in a manner 
that the Board considers appropriate."
257 Decision No. 2010-385-AD (Re), 2010 CanLII 69811 (NS WCAT). Retrieved on 11/08/2012 from 
http://canlii.ca/t/2dmq7. Hereinafter: Decision No. 2010-385-AD.
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The Appeals Commissioner had to determine whether the worker was an 
independent contractor or an employee working under a contract of service.258 The 
worker normally worked as a subcontractor installing roofs and he was paid on a 
per job basis and had completed more or less seven roofs in a period of 
approximately 12 weeks.259 The worker was injured whilst working as such and 
counsel for the employer raised the question whether an employment relationship 
existed in the given circumstances.260
Although the worker was instructed by the employer not to climb onto the roof 
before the arrival of the employer, he proceeded to do so irrespective of a snow 
covered roof. While on the roof, the worker answered an incoming cell phone call 
and he fell from the roof.251 It was argued on behalf of the employer that no 
employment relationship existed between the worker and the employer and the 
reason for the presence of the worker at the worksite was to do an assessment and 
determine the type of work that could be done to pay off the debt.262
The Commissioner ruled that on a balance of probabilities there can be no other 
reason for the presence of the worker at the work site besides the performance of 
labour; and ruled that the true legal relationship that existed constituted an oral 
contract of service whereby the definition of a "worker" for the purposes of the Act 
is satisfied.263
The climbing onto the roof against instructions, lack of protective wear and 
answering of the cell phone did not constitute "misconduct"264 in terms of section 
10(3) of the Act.265
258 Ibid at "ISSUES AND OUTCOMES: Is the definition of “worker” satisfied?".
259 Ibid at: "Analysis: Is the definition of "worker" satisfied?"
260 Ibid.
261 Ibid.
262 Ibid.
263 Ibid.
264 Discussed in Chapter 4.
265 Decision No. 2010-385-AD at: “Analysis: Is the Worker’s claim barred by subsection 10(3] of the
Workers' Compensation Act?”
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3.6. Employer registration and payment of levies
3.6.1. Isaac v British Columbia (Workers' Compensation Board)
The Court of Appeal for British Columbia266 had to decide if an Indian widow and her 
children were entitled to compensation when her husband (a member of the Necoslie 
Indian Band) died whilst working for Necoslie Band in a logging operation on the 
reserve.267 The widow’s claim was based upon section 5(1) of the Act as in force at the 
time of the fatal accident in 1984 and which provision stated:268
5.(1) Where, in an industry within the scope of this Part, personal injury or 
death arising out of and in the course of the employment is caused to a 
worker, compensation as provided by this Part shall be paid by the 
board out of the accident fund.
The employee was engaged in "an industry within the scope of this Part" being Part 
I .269 The Board had a policy which denied coverage to bands that have not applied for 
coverage and did not pay levies to the compensation fund. It was common cause that 
the Band did not apply.270 The Board refused the claim based on the grounds that the 
deceased was not a "worker" and the Band not an "employer” within the definitions in 
section 2 of the Act; and argued that the payment of compensation from the 
compensation fund and payment of levies by employers are closely linked and acts as 
"counterparts of a social contract" by which a right to sue an employer or colleague 
has been removed in exchange for "the right to no-fault compensation."271 The Court 
held that on a "literal reading" of the Act, the widow is entitled to compensation as a 
dependant of the deceased whom worked under a contract of service; and the 
employer engaged the deceased "under a contract of hiring a person engaged in work 
in or about an industry" and in doing so, fulfilled the requirements of the definitions.272
266 Isaac v British Columbia (Workers' Compensation Board), 1994 CanLII 1444 (BC CA).
Hereinafter: Isaac. Retrieved on 19/08/2012 from http://canlii.ca/t/ldcxg,
“ 7 Md 1- 2 .
268 Ibid 4.
Ibid 5.
270 Ibid 6.
271 Ibid 16 & 26.
272 ibid  28-43.
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In this ruling which resembles the South African Boer v Momo ruling, the Court held 
that the Compensation Board was neither endowed with the discretionary power to 
refuse compensation based on the grounds that the employer failed to pay levies to the 
fund nor when uncertainty prevails whether levies can be collected from the 
employer.273 In distinguishing between the different Parts of the Act, the Court 
considered the historical development of the legislation and held that the 1916 Act 
demonstrated the same principles as the Act at the time of the accident pertaining to 
the right to compensation and the liabilities of employers.274 The Court held that on 
the plain reading of the Act, the right to compensation is independent of the payment 
of levies seen in the light of the remedial purpose of the Act.275
3.7. Migrant labour
Contrary to COIDA, the Canadian jurisdictions provide for compensation for migrant 
workers. Migration does not in itself disqualify an employee from fulfilling the 
requirements of the definition and it therefore does not form an exclusion to the 
definition. The Interjurisdictional Agreement on Workers' Compensation came into 
effect in all jurisdictions on 1 October 1993 except for Quebec where it became 
effective on 1 January 1995 and Nunavut, 1 April 199 9.276 The Agreement aims:277
a) To promote and ensure the effective, efficient and timely administration 
and resolution of interjurisdictional issues that are the subject matter of 
this Agreement;
b) To facilitate the acceptance of all compensable claims so that no injured 
worker will be denied compensation benefits except in accordance with 
the applicable Statutory Authority and Board policy; and
c) To ensure that employers are not responsible for the payment of 
assessments to more than one Board in respect of the earnings or some 
portion thereof of their employees who are employed in more than one 
jurisdiction.
The main purpose is the achievement of equity for workers and employers 
pertaining to workers who need to perform their duties in more than one
273 Ibid 44.
274 Ibid 53-62.
275 Ibid 68.
276 Interjurisdictional Agreement on Workers' Compensation.
277 Ibid Part 1 Section 1.2.
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jurisdiction and who are exposed to occupational hazards in more than one 
jurisdiction; and to achieve equity of payment of assessments by employers 
conducting business in multiple jurisdictions.278 The previous discussion on this 
aspect in Chapter 4 is also of importance in the current Chapter.
3.8. Fishers
3.8.1. Mime'j Seafoods Ltd. v Nova Scotia (W orkers’ Compensation A ppeals 
Tribunal)
The definition of "employer" was considered by the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal in 
Mime'j Seafoods Ltd. v Nova Scotia (Workers' Compensation Appeals Tribunal), 279 a case 
where a tribal band formed an Aboriginal community organisation known as Mime'j, to 
fulfil requirements by the Canadian law on fishing licenses. Mime'j held interests in 
fishing licences, vessels and equipment on behalf of the Aboriginal community who 
made use of the assets through a number of joint venture agreements.280
On behalf of Mime'j it was conceded that the captains and crew members satisfied 
the definition of a "worker" but Mime'j argued that this dispensation does not 
inevitably make Mime'j an employer. Mime'j insisted that it’s "type of leasing 
arrangement allows it to engage workers (as defined in the Act) without necessarily 
becoming their employers."281
Arguments on behalf of Mime'j contended to correctly interpret the definition of 
"employer"; every word in the statute needs to bear meaning and the particular 
definition is not aimed at "workers" as defined in the Act but is rather aimed at the 
type of "worker" i.e. a worker in the fishing industry.282 If so interpreted, it will have 
the emphasis to be placed as follows:283
278 Ibid Part 1 Section 1.3.
279 Mime'j Seafoods Ltd. v Nova Scotia (Workers' Compensation Appeals Tribunal), 2007 NSCA 115 
(CanLII). Retrieved on 11/08/2012 from http://canlii.ca/t/lvgtt.
Ibid [3] & [13].
281 Ibid [35].
282 ibid [36]—[41].
283 Ibid [36].
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2(n) "employer" means an employer within the scope of Part I and includes
(ix) any person operating a boat, vessel, ship, dredge, tug, scow or 
other craft usually employed or intended to be employed in an 
industry to which Part I applies and, with respect to the industry 
of fishing, the owner or operator of a boat or vessel rented, 
chartered or otherwise provided to a worker em ployed  in the  
fishing industry and used in or in connection with an industry 
carried on by the employer to which Part I applies,
A further argument on behalf of Mime'j was raised, contending that a common law 
analysis of the situation shows that no master and servant relationship existed 
between Mime'j and the captains and deckhands; and because the crew could thus 
not be seen as "employees," it follows that Mime'j could not be viewed as an 
"employer."284 The captain and crew operated independently from Mime'j and the 
catch did not constitute an asset nor did it belong to Mime'j.285
The Court concluded that the presumption against tautology remains applicable,286 
it "is a presumption that can in appropriate circumstances be rebutted"287 
depending upon the circumstances of each case and the "words employed in the 
fishing industry cannot be seen, as Mime'j suggests, to have the concept of worker 
restricted to someone employed in the common law master-servant sense."288 The 
Court held that as the definition of a "worker" is broad and comprehensive and 
reaches beyond the fishing industry, the Legislator found it necessary to "clarify 
their target" by identifying the employers "i.e. owners who provide vessels to 
workers engaged or involved in the fishing industry."289 The verb "employed" ought 
to be interpreted as synonymous with "engaged or involved" as the words have in 
Canadian jurisprudence been used interchangeably290 The Court concluded that the:291
clear legislative intent, the text, and the entire context, the phrase [w orker] 
em ployed in the fishing industry cannot reasonably be seen to exclude Mime'j as 
an em ployer. The result is inescapable. Mime'j is an employer under the Act.
284 Ibid [39].
2ss ibid [39].
286 Ibid [41].
287 Ibid [42],
288 Ibid [43].
289 Ibid [43].
290 Ibid [44].
291 Ibid [47].
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3.9. Domestic workers
Contrary to COIDA, most Canadian compensatory laws define the terms "worker" 
and "employer” to include persons working as domestic workers in private 
households.292 Manitoba defines an "employer” to include:293
(a) a person
(i) who has in service under a contract for hiring or apprenticeship, 
written or oral, expressed or implied, a person engaged in work 
in or about an industry, or
(ii) who employs a person for more than 24 hours a week
(A) in domestic service,
(B) as a sitter or companion to attend primarily to the needs of a 
child who is a member of the household, or
(C) as a companion to attend primarily to the needs of an aged, 
infirm or ill member of the household;
and "worker" includes:294
0) a person who is employed for more than 24 hours a week by the same 
employer
(i) in domestic service,
(ii) as a sitter or companion to attend primarily to the needs of a 
child who is a member of the household, or
(iii) as a companion to attend primarily to the needs of an aged, 
infirm or ill member of the household,...
The definition of an "employer" in Ontario requires the existence of a contract of 
service by a person engaged in an "industry" to which the Act applies with the 
definition of an "industry" inclusive of a household if a domestic worker is employed
292 Alberta: Employers of domestic workers may voluntarily register to include their employees as
per https://my.wcb.ab.ca/rm/wcb.ratemanual.webserver/ExemptIndustries.aspx (retrieved 
on 30/03/2013]. British Columbia: an employer hiring a domestic worker for more than 8 
hours per week as per http://www.worksafebc.com/insurance/need_coverage/emp_05.asp 
(retrieved on 20/10/2012). New Brunswick excludes domestic workers in s 2(3). Manitoba s 
l ( l ) (a )  & (j) includes domestic workers. Nova Scotia: Workers' Compensation General 
Regulations 9(1) excludes domestic workers from the ambit of the Act. Ontario includes 
domestic workers in s 2(1). Quebec s 2 excludes domestic workers unless a successful 
application for inclusion has been lodged. Saskatchewan also has optional coverage in terms of 
ss 2 & 3 and Yukon includes domestic workers in the definition of an "employer" s 3 (l)(c ). 
Newfoundland and Labrador: WHSCC provides for optional coverage upon application as per 
http://www. whscc.nf.ca / employers/Emp_Register ingY ourBusiness. whscc (retrieved on
20/ 10/2012).
293 Manitoba s l ( l ) (a )  & (j).
294 Manitoba s l ( l ) ( j) .
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by that household.295 According to the Ontario Operational Policy Manual, the term 
domestic worker may refer to "babysitters, nannies, and nursemaids, bodyguards, 
butlers, chauffeurs, cleaning persons, companions, cooks, gardeners, handy persons, 
housekeepers" and "maids". It may even include a family member if he/she is 
employed in "their own home for more than 24 hours per week..." depending on 
whether the family member receives a stated wage, the normal statutory 
deductions are made and employment records are duly kept by the employer. 
Where the employee works for more than one employer and the combined working 
hours exceed 24 hours per week, the domestic worker will be deemed a "worker" 
for the purposes of the Act.296
In New Brunswick the contrary position is true with domestic workers expressly 
excluded from the ambit of the Act.297
3.10. Third party employers
The text of the New Brunswick Act with regard to the lending out or hiring out of an 
employee to a third party, is unambiguous and clear (contrary to COIDA)298 by 
stating in section 2.1:
If an employer temporarily lends or hires out the services of a worker to 
another employer, the first employer shall be deemed to be the employer of 
the worker while he or she is working for the other employer.
The same cannot be said about the text of the Act of Alberta which was considered 
by the Court of Queen’s Bench in Homes by Avi Ltd. v Alberta (Workers' 
Compensation Board, Appeals CommissionJ .299
295 Ontario s 2(1).
296 Ontario (Provincial Government). Workplace Safety and Insurance Board. 2003. Operational Policy 
Manual: Coverage: Policy No. 12-04-14: Domestic Workers. Retrieved on 14/05/2011 from 
http://www.wsib.on.ca/en/community/WSIB/230/OPMDetail/24347?vgnextoid=d3f3fcea9bfc72 
lOVgnVCM 100000449c710aRCRD.
297 New Brunswick s 2(3) dealing with the application of the Act which reads ... "this Part does not 
apply to the following: ...(d) persons employed as domestic servants."
298 Chapter 5 para 2.8 supra.
299 Homes by Avi Ltd. v Alberta (Workers' Compensation Board, Appeals Commission), 2007 ABQB 
203 (CanLII). Retrieved on 11/08/2012 from http://canlii.ca/t/lr044.
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The Court of Queen's Bench of Alberta gave a combined ruling regarding the appeal 
on three different cases,300 [Quattro Oilfield Construction Ltd. and Lucky Lee Stotz v 
Appeals Commission and the Workers' Compensation Board and Sharon Lee Pederson, 
Personal Representative o f  the Estate o f  Kenneth Paul Pederson, Deceased;301 Homes 
by Avi Ltd. v Appeals Commission and the Workers' Compensation Board and Jam es 
Donald Miller;302 and Michael Joseph Labby and Maiko's Trucking (1990) Ltd. v 
Appeals Commission and Calvin Philip Speakman303]. The cases were combined into 
one by reason of the similarity regarding the question of law and the case is 
reported as: Homes by Avi Ltd. v Alberta (Workers' Compensation Board, Appeals 
Commission) in respect of inclusion as employees into the ambit of the Workers' 
Compensation Act, RSA 2000, c W-15.304
All the persons who formed the subject of the applications were involved in 
unrelated occupational accidents while executing duties for companies of which 
they were also appointed as directors. In each instance the Board determined and 
the Appeals Commission confirmed the decisions that the provisions of the 
Compensatory law is not applicable in each individual’s case because they were 
directors who did not apply for the optional coverage. The cases were heard 
together with the consent of the parties but had only the subject matter in 
common.305
3.10.1. Homes by Avi Ltd. v Alberta (W orkers' Compensation Board, Appeals
Commission)
300 Quattro Oilfield Construction Ltd, and Lucky Lee Stotz v Appeals Commission and the Workers' 
Compensation Board and Sharon Lee Pederson, Personal Representative o f  the Estate o f  Kenneth 
Paul Pederson, Deceased; Homes by Avi Ltd. v Appeals Commission and the Workers'Compensation 
Board and Jam es Donald Miller; and Michael Joseph Labby and Maiko's Trucking (1990) Ltd. v 
Appeals Commission and Calvin Philip Speakman reported as Homes by Avi Ltd. v Alberta 
(Workers' Compensation Board, Appeals Commission), 2007 ABQB 203 (CanLII).
301 Hereinafter: Quattro.
302 Hereinafter: Homes by Avi Ltd.
303 Hereinafter: Labby.
304 Homes by Avi Ltd. [1].
3°s Ibid [2],
208
In addition to the definition, the Act provided for three alternative ways to acquire 
the status of a worker in sections 15(1) and 16(1); with section 15(1)306 upon 
application to the Board and section 16( l ) 307 "in situations where a contract of 
service is not clearly established on the evidence."308 The Act provides for a fourth 
way whereby worker status can be gained in section 16(2)309 determining that the 
Board may order a worker to be deemed a worker in terms of the Act.310
The reasons for judgment appears from the Labby appeal, which involved M. Labby, 
a director of Maiko's Trucking (1990) Ltd., driving a tractor and trailer which was 
struck by a vehicle operated by Speakman. Labby failed to apply for inclusion as a 
worker in terms of the Act311 and Speakman instituted tort action against Labby and 
Maiko's Trucking (1990) Ltd.312 The Commissioner ruled that even if a person 
works under a contract of service, section 15(1) excludes a director if he did not 
apply to be included into the ambit of the Act; while section 16(1) (c) exempts 
directors from being deemed to be workers irrespective of the task they perform, be 
it manual labour or not.313
306 "Application to have Act apply
15(1) Subject to section 16, an employer, a partner in a partnership, a proprietor and a director 
of a corporation are not workers for the purposes of this Act unless they apply to the 
Board in accordance with the regulations to have the Act apply to them as workers and 
the Board approves the application.”
307 "Persons deemed workers
16(l)W here an individual performs any work for any other person in an industry to which this 
Act applies, that individual is deemed to be a worker of the other person, except when the 
individual
(a) is performing the work as the worker of another employer,
(b) is an employer and is performing the work as part of the business of the employer, 
whether by way of manual labour or otherwise,
(c) is a director of a corporation and is performing the work as part of the business of the 
corporation, whether by way of manual labour or otherwise,
(d) is a partner in a partnership who is a worker under section 15(1) and is performing 
the work as part of the business of the partnership, whether by way of manual labour 
or otherwise, in the industry for which coverage has been approved, or
(e) is a proprietor who is a worker under section 15(1) and is performing the work as 
part of the business of the proprietorship, whether by way of manual labour or 
otherwise, in the industry for which coverage has been approved."
308 Homes byAvi Ltd. [11].
309 «(2) Notwithstanding anything in this Act, the Board may, in its discretion or on the application of
any interested party, by order deem any person or class of persons who have performed or are 
performing work for or for the benefit of another person to be workers of that other person for 
the purposes of this Act for the period or periods of time that the work was or is performed.”
310 Homes by Avi Ltd. [11].
311 Ibid [30].
312 Ibid [32].
313 Ibid [38].
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The Court of Queen’s Bench identified the questions to be answered as:314
whether a director of a corporation who has no personal coverage can fall 
within the definition of worker under s.l(l)(z) when performing work as 
part of the business of the corporation of which he or she is a director; and, 
if so, (2) whether the individual who is the subject of the appeal was a 
worker under the s. l(l)(z) definition, which requires a determination of 
whether he was working under a contract of service.
The Court then proceeded to answer the questions in the light of the purpose of the 
Act.315 Under the heading of "General principles of interpretation of the WCA" the 
Court in applying Pasiechnyk said that when interpreting the Act, the historic trade­
off must be taken into consideration as employees retained no action against their 
employers in exchange for an efficient claims adjudication system, handled by an 
independent organ with compensation paid irrespective of the financial ability to 
pay by the employer and very importantly, without regard to fault.316 A broad and 
liberal interpretation favouring the claimant should be preferred.317
The Applicants argued that the enquiry to determine whether a worker satisfies 
the test is concluded once the definition in section 1(1) (z) is satisfied and no need 
arises to include section 15 and 16 in the enquiry once the requirements of section 
1(1)(z) are satisfied.318 The Court rejected the argument and held that on a proper 
interpretation, the Act ought to be read as a whole and sections within their 
context.319 The Court held that the section 1 definition should not be read in 
isolation and the scope of the term "worker" is limited by the working of section 
14(1).320 Section 14(1) determines that the Act applies to "all employers and 
workers in all industries in Alberta except the employers and workers in the 
industries designated by the regulations as being exempt."321 Similar to the 
limitation placed by section 14(1) on the section l( l) (z )  definition, sections 15(1)
Ibid [47],
315 Ibid [70]—[76].
3w Ibid [91].
3i7 ibid [92]—[95].
3w Ibid [96],
3W Ibid [97],
32 0  Ibid [98],
321 Ibid [98],
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and 16 limit the working of the definition [section l( l) (z )]  to directors who 
applied to the Board to be included within the ambit of the Act.322
The Court confirmed the previous findings that there is no ambiguity pertaining to 
the word "includes" between sections l( l) (z )  and 15(1); that the Act does not 
distinguish on the basis of the duties performed by directors taking into account 
the "benefits-conferring" nature of the legislation.323
The Applicant’s argument that ignoring the type of work done by a director at the 
relevant time, removes a benefit and denies protection while they are equally 
exposed to the hazards of the applicable industry as other workers, was declined 
by the Court of Queen’s Bench.324 Contextual interpretation of sections 1(1) (z), 
15(1) and 16(1)(c) means section 15(1) limits section l ( l ) z  and section 16(l)(c) 
excludes a director from being deemed a worker of the company of which he is a 
director, save for a successful application in terms of section 15 (I) .325
The exclusion of company directors is contra the South African law which views 
directors and chief executive officers as well as owners of corporations to be the 
employer and employee of a company if they work under a contract of service for 
that company.
3.11. Atypical employment arrangements
Canada did not escape the international trend of growing atypical employment, 
generally referred to as "precarious employment" which is described by Vosko326 as:
In Canada, precarious employment normally involves those forms of work 
involving atypical employment contracts, limited social benefits and 
statutory entitlements, job insecurity, low job tenure, low wages and high 
risks of ill health. Precarious employment is shaped by tendencies in late 
capitalism whereby employers use subcontracting and other strategies to 
minimise labour costs and thereby lower the bottom of the labour market.
322 Ibid [99].
323 Ibid [100]-[104],
32* Ibid [120].
325 Ibid [123],
326 Vosko, LF. 2003. Precarious employment in Canada: Taking stock, talcing action./ust Labour 3 :1 -5 . 
Retrieved on 07/09/2012 from http://www.justlabour.yorku.ca/volume3/voskojustlabour.PDF.
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The tendency is not limited to people at career entrance level (young people) or 
people at the end of their working life times, but increasingly mid-career workers 
are finding themselves in atypical employment relationships, usually engaged in 
sectors that are less unionised and less protected.327
The scope of atypical work is clear from the Economic Council of Canada's study 
entitled “Good Jobs, Bad Jobs” in 1990 which found that 50% of newly created jobs 
between 1980 and 1988 was not in the form of standard employment.328 
It is argued by Quinlan and Mayhew that the trend by companies of contracting out 
leaves workers without the intended safety net of a right to compensation and the 
company liable while shifting costs to public health care and society.329 Sub­
contracting and leasing or agency workers (also known as labour hire workers), 
creates ambiguity with the result that difficulties arise to determine who the 
principal employer is.330 Additional complications arise when illegal immigrants are 
the workers.331 The authors share the opinion expressed supra that workers in 
atypical employment usually are engaged in sectors that are less unionised and for 
this reason are even more exposed to exploitation.332 The right to workers’ 
compensation means nothing if it is not exercised and some American studies 
indicated that the right is neither exercised in cases of fatalities nor serious injuries, 
with the possible number of unreported fatalities as high as between 30% and 
60%.333 A South African study in the Salt River mortuary showed that about 20% of 
fatal work-related accidents are not reported and the right to compensation is not 
exercised.334 Reasons for the silence include fear of victimisation or reprisal in some
327 Clarke, M, Lewchuk, W, de Wolff, A, & King, A. 2007. 'This just isn’t sustainable': Precarious 
employment, stress and workers' health. International Journal o f Law and Psychiatry 30: 311­
326. Retrieved on 26/05/2012 from www.sciencedirect.com.
328 Cranford, C, Vosko, LF, & Zukewich, N. 2003. Precarious employment in the Canadian labour 
market: A statistical portrait. Just Labour: 3: 6 -22 . Retrieved on 07/09/2012 from 
http://amillionreasons.ca/Statisticalportrait.pdf.
329 Quinlan, M, Mayhew, C. 1999. Precarious employment and workers’ compensation. International 
Journal o f  Law and Psychiatry: 22: (5-6]: 491-520. Retrieved on 26/05/2012 from 
http://0-www.sciencedirectcom.oasis.unisa.ac.za/science?_ob=ArticleListURL&_method=list&_ 
ArticleListID=2010854194& sort=r&_st=13&view=c&_acct=C000030438&_version=l&_urlVersion 
=0&_userid=593394&md5=7dlal8905986afl8b69cbddf72500a75&searchtype=a.
33° Ibid.
331 Ibid.
332 Quinlan: 505 -506  & 515.
333 Ibid.
334 Rees: 176.
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form.335 In an effort to combat this trend, British Columbia amended its 
compensatory law to extend coverage to independent contractors and other 
groupings of contingency workers e.g. labour hire and domestic employment.336
Currently 97.6% of the workforce in British Columbia is included in the definition of 
an employee for the purposes of compensation.337 In 1959, industrial workers 
previously excluded were included into the ambit of the Act338 with voluntary 
employees included in 1968.339
This is contrary to the situation in Ontario where despite the pioneering work of 
Chief Justice Meredith, certain categories of employees are still excluded e.g. 
employees in the banking and financial sectors.340 It is estimated that one third of 
employees in Ontario is excluded from the ambit of the Act.341
The Office of the Chief Actuary reported the following percentages of the workforce 
to be included within the definition in 2007: Alberta (89.7%); British Columbia 
(93.1%); Manitoba (69.5%); New Brunswick (93.9%); Newfoundland and Labrador 
(97.0%); Northwest Territories and Nunavut (100.0%); Nova Scotia (72.6%); 
Ontario (72.6%); Prince Edward Island (96.2%); Quebec (93.4%); Saskatchewan 
(74.1%); Yukon (99.9%) and the average for Canada as 89.6%.342 These 
percentages increased minimally according to statistics derived from the different 
jurisdictions' financial reports by 2009.343
335 Quinlan: 494-495.
336 Ibid.
337 Royal Commission briefing papers 21.
338 British Columbia (Province). 1999. Royal Commission on Workers'Compensation in British Columbia: 
Final Report. Victoria: British Columbia Queen’s Printer. At 18. Retrieved on 24/05/2012 from 
http://www.qp.gov.bc.ca/rcwc/Vol_I/vl-ch01a.pdf.
339 Ibid 20.
340 In South Africa, the economic sector does not form part of the criteria in the definitions.
341 McKinnon, J. 2010. Workers' Compensation finances -  Crisis or smokescreen? Ontario Network of 
Injured Workers' Groups (ONIWG). Retrieved on 10/08/2012 from
http: //www.injuredworkersonline.org/Documents/WSIB_Funding_Backgrounder_N ov2 010.pdf.
342 Canada (Federal Government). Office of the Chief Actuary. 2010. Brief summary o f  Canadian 
Workers' Compensation System. 2. Ottawa: Ontario. Retrieved on 28/09/2012 from 
http://www.actuaries.org/CTTEES_SOCSEC/Documents/Canada_Workers_Comp.pdf.
343 Institute for Work & Health. 2009. Fact sheets: 2009. Retrieved on 28/09/2012 from 
http://www.iwh.on.ca/compensation-fact-sheets.
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3.12. Summary
The Canadian workers' compensatory laws do not extend protection against tort 
claims to directors, chief executive officers or owners of companies unless they 
applied successfully for inclusion to the applicable Compensation Authority with 
jurisdiction.344
Similarly to the South African definition in COIDA, the following workers do not 
satify the definition of an employee:345
• members of the Canadian Forces and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police;
• workers in informal employment;
• wokers in atypical employment;
Contrary to the South African exclusions, the following catogories are included 
within the definition of an employee:
• voluntary workers upon application;346
• independent contractors upon application;347
• students when registered with a recognised learning institution;348
• financially dependent children at the death of his employed parent;349
• domestic workers in private households;350
• migrant workers;351
• child labourers;352
• directors dependent upon application.353
344 Chapter 5 paras 3.1 & 3.10.1 supra.
345 Chapter 5 para 3.1 supra.
346 Chapter 5 para 3.1 supra.
347 Chapter 5 paras 3.1; 3.2; 3.3; 3.3.1; 3.5.1 & 3.11 supra.
348 Chapter 5 paras 3.1 & 3.3.2 supra.
349 Chapter 5 para 3.1 & Chapter 5 fn 203 supra.
350 Chapter 5 paras 3.1 & 3.9 supra.
351 Chapter 5 paras 3.1 & 3.7 supra.
352 Chapter 5 paras 3.4.1 & 3.9 supra.
353 Chapter 5 paras 3.1; 3.8 & 3.10.1 supra.
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The historic trade-off principle is central to the definitions of employer and 
employee but similar to South Africa:
• the employee's right of compensation is not dependent upon the registration 
and payment of levies by the employer;354
• third party employers will not be protected against common law claims for 
damages when utilising the services of particularly directors who did not follow 
the presribed procedure to apply for inclusion within the ambit of the Act.355
The basis of the definition remains the common law contract of service which may 
be tested according to the applicable indicia as included in the Joey's Delivery 
Services ruling; and with the point of departure, the four-folded test laid down in 
Montreal v Montreal Locomotive Works Ltd. et a l, which requires a weighing of all 
relevant factors similarly to South Africa.356
4. AUSTRALIA
Like South Africa357 and Canada,358 the basis of the Australian definition of an 
employee is the common law definition of a worker.359 The Heads of Workers' 
Compensation Authorities included in their Final Report to the Labour Ministers' 
Council, recommendations pertaining to the definition of a "worker" and identified 
the common law definition of an employee as the basis of the definition in 
Australia.360 Although the definition is based in common law, every jurisdiction 
extends or limits the definition to suit its own needs.361
354 Chapter 5 paras 3.6 & 3.6.1 supra.
355 Chapter 5 paras 3.10; 3.10.1 supra.
356 Chapter 5 para 3.3.1 supra.
357 Chapter 5 para 2.3 supra.
358 Chapter 5 para 3.3 supra.
359 Productivity Commission Report (2004): XLII & 155-162.
360 Ibid 154.
361 Ibid.
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4.1. Statutory definition of an "employee"
All government employees in Australia are covered by the Safety, Rehabilitation and 
Compensation Act 75 of 1988 which includes Federal Police and Defence Force 
employees362 as well as employees of "a licensed corporation."363
The workers' compensatory laws of the different jurisdictions in Australia define a 
worker similarly to the Act of Tasmania364 which states:
3(1) "worker" means -
(a) any person who has entered into, or works under, a contract of service 
or training agreement with an employer, whether by way of manual 
labour, clerical work or otherwise, and whether the contract is express 
or implied, or is oral or in writing; and...
In Australia as in South Africa and Canada, interpretation of the meaning of 
"worker" for the purposes of compensatory laws gave rise to a number of court 
cases as in Protective Security Pty Ltd v Bedelph365 heard in the Supreme Court of 
Tasmania. The Appellant (employer) contended that the worker who died, was an 
independent contractor and not a "worker" as defined in the Act. The Supreme 
Court examined inter alia the nature of the employer’s business, the workers’ work 
history, the written agreement between the employer and the deceased. It noted the 
fact that the employer described the deceased on occasion as "an employee" and by 
applying the "control test" as well as other relevant indicia e.g. the written 
agreement, and found the deceased to be a "worker" for the purposes of the Act.366
3 6 2  S 2.
363 S 5(lA )(b).
364 Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 4 of 1988.
365 Protective Security Pty Ltd v Bedelph [2004] TASSC 128. Hereinafter: Bedelph. Retrieved on
16/03/2011 from http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/tas/TASSC/2004/128.html.
366 Similar facts were previously considered in Brock Plaster Pty Ltd v Jenkins [2003] TASSC 96 by the 
Supreme Court of Tasmania and the Court weighed the factors in favour of a finding of a contract 
of service (employer-employee relationship) against the factors indicating a finding of a contract 
for service. Hereinafter: Brock Plaster Pty Ltd. Retrieved on 16/09/2010 from 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/tas/TASSC/2003/96.html. The control test was also applied 
as one of a number of criteria used by the Court in determining if a person is a "worker" in terms 
of the Act in Cox Logging v Rigby [2003] TASSC 26. At 14. Retrieved on 18/09/2010 from 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/tas/TASSC/2003/26.html.
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Similar to Canada,367 the different Australian jurisdictions provide for persons 
considered to be workers who would not otherwise have been so considered, 
inclusive of timber contractors,368 family day care workers,369 workers for religious 
organisations,370 commercial voluntary workers,371 public interest voluntary 
workers and voluntary ambulance workers,372 voluntary emergency workers,373 
voluntary fire fighters,374 community service order under the Youth Justice Act or a 
penal code,375 house workers earning above a certain amount,376 students377 and 
jockeys.378
South Australia defined the term "self-employed worker” to mean "a person to 
whom the Corporation has extended the protection of this Act pursuant to section 
103".379 In South Africa a self-employed person will not be considered to be an 
employee for the purposes of COIDA because he is considered to be an independent 
"contractor"380 although the director of a company is included in the definition of an 
employee if he works under a contract of service for the company.381
Similar to the RSA382 and Canada,383 the definition of a "worker" for the purposes of 
compensatory laws is inclusive of dependents of a deceased worker384 and may also 
include the "legal personal representative of a deceased worker"385 in some of the 
jurisdictions. Western Australia determines in this regard:386
367 Chapter 5 paras 3.1 & 3.2 supra.
368 Australian Capital Territory s 16.
369 Australian Capital Territory s 16A.
370 Australian Capital Territory s 17; Queensland s 18 & Western Australia ss 8, 9 & 10.
371 Australian Capital Territory s 18.
372 Australian Capital Territory s 19; Queensland s 18,19; South Australia s 103A & Tasmania s 6.
373 Northern Territory s 3(7) & Queensland s 17.
374 Northern Territory s 3(8)(8A); Queensland s 15 & Tasmania s 5.
375 Northern Territory s 3(4) & Queensland s 21.
376 Northern Territory s 3(5).
377 Queensland s 22.
378 Tasmania s 4DC & Western Australia s 11 A.
379 South Australia s 3(1).
38° COIDA sl(xix)(d)(iv).
381 COIDA sl(x ix )(b ).
382 Chapter 5 para 2.1 supra.
383 Chapter 5 para 3.1 supra.
384 Commonwealth s 4(1); New South Wales s 3(1A) & Western Australia s 5(1).
385 New South Wales s 3(1A); South Australia s 3(1); Victoria s 5(1C)(4) & Western Australia s 5(1).
386 Western Australia s 5(1).
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dependants means such members of the worker's family as were wholly or 
in part dependent upon the earnings of the worker at the time of his death, 
or would, but for the injury, have been so dependent;
To give clarity to the definitions of a worker and employer, Queensland added 
Schedules to the Queensland Act. Schedule 2 is entitled "Who is a worker in 
particular circumstances" which Schedule is divided into two parts with Part 1 
dealing with inclusions into the definition and Part 2 dealing with exclusions from 
the definition and Schedule 3 dealing with "Who is an employer in particular 
circumstances".387 The provisions of the Schedules codified the common law 
contract of service.388 COIDA does not have similar schedules but has the use of the 
Code of Practice389 and the Canadian jurisdictions make use of published policies390 
to clarify the concepts of "employee" and "employer."
In Brock Plaster Pty Ltd v Jenkins391 the Supreme Court of Tasmania ruled that a 
liberal interpretation on the status of a person is to be applied when interpreting 
protective legislation.392 This indicates a purposive interpretation ought to be given
387 Queensland Schedules 2 & 3.
388 Queensland Schedule 2 "Part 2 Persons who are not w orkers
1 A person is not a worker if the person performs work under a contract of service with—
(a) a corporation of which the person is a director; or
(b) a trust of which the person is a trustee; or
(c) a partnership of which the person is a member; or
(d) the Commonwealth or a Commonwealth authority.
2 A person who performs work under a contract of service as a professional sportsperson is 
not a worker while the person is—
(a) participating in a sporting or athletic activity as a contestant; or
(b) training or preparing for participation in a sporting or athletic activity as a contestant; or
(c) performing promotional activities offered to the person because of the person’s 
standing as a sportsperson; or
(d) engaging on any daily or other periodic journey in connection with the participation, 
training, preparation or performance.
3 A member of the crew of a fishing ship is not a worker if—
(a) the member's entitlement to remuneration is contingent upon the working of the ship 
producing gross earnings or profits; and
(b) the remuneration is wholly or mainly a share of the gross earnings or profits.
4 A person who, in performing work under a contract, other than a contract of service, supplies 
and uses a motor vehicle for driving tuition is not a worker.
5 A person participating in an approved program or work for unemployment payment under 
the Social Security Act 1991 (Cwlth), section 601 or 606 is not a worker."
389 Chapter 5 paras 2.4 & 2.5 supra.
390 Chapter 5 paras 3.1; 3.3.2; 3.6.1; 3.7 & 3.9 supra.
391 [2003] TASSC 96.
392 Brock Plaster Pty Ltd 17.
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when the definition is interpreted,393 similar to the South African case of Daw's394 
and the Canadian case of University o f  Lethbridge,395
4.2. Statutory definition of an "employer"
The Supreme Court of Queensland explained the two definitions in Appo v Stanley & 
Anor [2010]396 as:
[81] Those definitions show that to be an "employer” within the meaning of 
the WCRA one must employ a "worker" as defined and, to be a "worker" 
as defined, one must either work under a contract of service or be 
included, and not excluded, by the extended definition.
A number of Australian jurisdictions included into the term "employer" a person by 
whom a worker is employed under a contract of service,397 a deemed employer398 
and the "legal personal representative of a deceased employer”399 as in the 
definition of the Victorian Act in section 5(1):
employer includes—
(a) the legal personal representative of a deceased employer;
(b) the Crown in right of the State;
(c) any person deemed to be an employer by this Act;
(d) any public, local or municipal body or authority; and
(e) where the services of a worker are temporarily lent or let on hire to 
another person by the person with whom the worker has entered into a 
contract of service or apprenticeship or otherwise, that last-mentioned 
person while the worker is working for that other person;
393 A liberal interpretation has also been confirmed by the South African (Chapter 5 para 2.6.2 
supra) and Canadian (Chapter 5 para 3.10.1 supra) Courts.
394 Davis discussed supra at Chapter 5 para 2.6.2.
395 University o f  Lethbridge discussed supra at Chapter 5 para 3.3.2.
396 Appo v Stanley & Anor [2010] QSC 383. At [81]. Retrieved on 02/02/2013 from 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/qld/QSC/2010/383.html.
397 Queensland s 3 0 (l)(a ); South Australia s 3 (l)(a ); Tasmania s 3(1) & Western Australia s 5(1).
398 Australian Capital Territory s 5(c); Queensland s 30(2) read together with Schedule 3; South
Australia s 3 (l)(b )(c); Tasmania s 3 (l)(b ); Victorias 5 (l)(c )  & Western Australia s 5(1).
399 Australian Capital Territory s 5(b); Queensland s 30(4)(b); South Australia s 3 (l)(c ) ; Tasmania 
s 3 (l)(c ) ; Victoria s 5 (l)(a ) & Western Australia s 5(1).
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4.3 . Requirements regarding contract of service
The common law contract of service forms the basis of the employment relationship 
in Australia similar to the RSA400 and Canada 401 In Australia, as in the other two 
countries, determining the legal nature of the employment relationship created 
similar difficulties. Efforts have been made to provide clarity by enacting the 
requirements pertaining to a contract of service by some of the jurisdictions 402
Different tests403 were applied over time with the control test as one of the first to 
be applied by the Courts. Early case law emphasised the assertion of control as 
conclusive to determine the legal nature of the relationship between the worker and 
presumed employer.404 This was later expanded by recognising the right to control 
rather than effective control exercised by an employer over a worker.405
The organisation test is less applied with no consensus on its place in workers 
compensation law but it refers to a question of whether the activities of the worker 
form an integral part of the activities of the presumed employer.406
400 Chapter 5 paras 2.1; 2.2 & 2.3 supra.
401 Chapter 5 paras 3.1; 3.2 & 3.3 supra.
402 Australian Capital Territory: Notes to Chapter 3 of the Workers Compensation Act (although s 3
determines the legal status of Notes to be explanatory and does not form part of the Act).
Queensland Schedules 2 & 3. South Australia s 3(1).
New South Wales (State Government). WorkCover Authority NSW. [Sa], Policies: Who to insure. 
Retrieved on 20/08/2012 from http://www.workcover.nsw.gov.au/insurancepremiums/ 
Policies/Whotoinsure/Pages/defaultaspx.
Northern Territory (State Government). Work Health Authority. 2011. Workers compensation 
best practice guidelines. Retrieved on 23/08/2012 from http://www.worksafe.nt.gov.au/ 
Publications/Documents/best_ practice, guidelines_approved_insurers.pdf.
Tasmania s 4E read together with A guide to workers rehabilitation and compensation in 
Tasmania. (See Chapter 4 para 3.2 supra).
Victoria (State Government). WorkCover Authority. Worker rights & responsibilities. Retrieved 
on 20/08/2012 from http://www.worksafe.vic.gov.au/laws-and-regulations/worker-rights- 
and-responsibilities.
Western Australia (State Government). WorkCover WA. 2012. Workers’ compensation & injury 
management: A guide for workers. Retrieved on 18/01/2013 from http://hr.curtin.edu.au/local/ 
docs/WCIM_a_guide_for_workers_sept_LR.pdf.
403 These tests included inter alia the results test, control test and organisational test.
404 Apostolidis v Victorian WorkCover Authority [2012] VCC 1529. At 99. Hereinafter: Apostolidis. 
Retrieved on 04/02/2013 from http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/vic/VCC/2012/1529.html.
405 Zuijs v Wirth Bros Pty Ltd [1955] HCA 73. At 2. Hereinafter: Zuijs. Retrieved on 31/01/2013 
from http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1955/73.html.
406 Stevens v Brodribb Sawmilling Company Pty Ltd [1986] HCA 1. At 15. Hereinafter: Stevens. 
Retrieved on 02/09/2012 from http://www.austlii.edu.aU/au/cases/cth/HCA/1986/l.html.
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The results test is a broadened control test in which control or the right to control is 
only one of an open-ended list of indicia, the application of which will be 
determined by the specific circumstance of the case.407 The test is based upon 
concepts utilised by the Australian Taxation Office and excludes persons who satisfy 
all three of the following conditions from the definition of a worker:408
a. the person is paid to achieve a specified result or outcome; and
b. the person is expected to provide the tools, plant and equipment needed 
in performance of the work; and
c. the person is liable to remedy defects in the work or for resulting damages.
4.3.1. Humberstone v Northern Timber Mills
The driver of a truck, Humberstone, carried timber for one company for a period of 
close to fourteen years before he died in an accident at work 409 His wife claimed 
compensation and contended that he was a worker within the definition of the Act 
and an employee of the timber company.410
The full Bench of the High Court of Australia in applying the "control test" found that 
he was an independent contractor.411 This was in spite of Humberstone’s regular 
working and lunch hours ruled by the firm and he worked only on rare occasions 
for other persons.412 Factors indicating that he was an independent contractor 
were, he owned his truck, paid for fuel, maintenance and insurance for the truck and 
obtained the necessary license to carry on the business.413
The Court applied the control test and found Humberstone to be an independent 
contractor:414
407 Apostolidis 99-100 .
408 Queensland Act, Schedule 2, Part 1, Items 2 & 3.
409 Humberstone v Northern Timber Mills [1949] HCA 49; (1949) 79 CLR 389. Hereinafter: Humberstone.
Retrieved on 02/09/2012 from http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1949/49.html.
410 Ibid 2.
411 Ibid 4.
412 Ibid 2.
Ibid 3.
414 Ibid 4.
221
If the work done by one person for another is done subject to the control and 
direction of the latter person as to the manner in which it is to be done the 
worker is a servant and not an independent contractor. If, however, the 
person doing the work agrees only to produce a given result but is not subject 
to control in the actual execution of the work he is an independent contractor.
4.3.2. Stevens v Brodribb Sawmilling Company Pty Ltd
In the now classic ruling, Stevens v Brodribb Sawmilling Company Pty Ltd, the High 
Court of Australia guided in an appeal from a Full Bench of the Supreme Court of 
Victoria on the indicia to be used in determining whether the legal nature of an 
employment relationship is one of a contract o f  service or one of a contract fo r  
service.415
The ruling of the Compensation Court (sitting as Court of first instance) which 
determined that both the applicant as well as the co-worker whose negligent acts 
caused Stevens' injuries, were employees for the purposes of the compensation law, 
was set aside by the Supreme Court of Victoria.416
The High Court considered first of all, the degree of and the right to exercise control 
by the company over the co-worker.417 The Court applied the words of Dixon J from 
the ruling in Humberstone:418
The question is not whether in practice the work was in fact done subject to 
a direction and control exercised by an actual supervision or whether an 
actual supervision was possible but whether ultimate authority over the 
man in the performance of his work resided in the employer so that he was 
subject to the latter's order and directions.
The Court did not rely on the degree of control exercised by the company over the 
workers but used it as but one of a number of indicia including the method of 
remuneration, provision and maintenance of equipment, obligation to work, 
working hours, provision for leave, deduction of income tax and the delegation of
415 Stevens 1.
416 Ibid 1 & 7-8.
417 Ibid 9.
418 Ibid 9.
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work by the deemed employee.419 It is submitted that this approach corresponds 
with the South African application of the "dominant impression" test and the 
Canadian "business reality test” 420
Both workers provided their own equipment and maintained it at own costs, set 
their own working hours, received payment every fortnight based on the volume of 
timber they delivered, no income tax was deducted and Stevens' was able to provide 
profits and loss accounts for the financial years of 1977 and 1978 421 Work was not 
guaranteed and workers were free to engage in other work or contracts and to 
employ helpers. The sawmill company co-ordinated activities and was responsible 
for organising a steady flow of timber delivered to the mill but could not stipulate 
the manner in which workers had to perform tasks and it was left to the exercise of 
their skilfulness and judgment.422 The High Court confirmed the Supreme Court's 
finding that neither the co-worker nor the Applicant was employees of the 
company. No inference could be drawn by the Court that the company could 
lawfully exercise authority over either of the two workers 423 The power to delegate 
by employing others to do the work was a factor of considerable importance to the 
Court in reaching its decision 424
The Court dismissed the "organization test" as the sole criterion in deciding 
whether a worker is an employee or independent contractor or whether the worker 
is "part and parcel" of the company 425 It was submitted that the organisation test is 
relevant to the measure of control but the Court considered the other indicia as of 
more importance.426
The High Court, while recognising the difficulties with the control test, defended the 
common law test as one that is flexible and adaptable to changing social
« 9 Ibid 9 -12.
420 Chapter 5 paras 2.4 & 3.3. supra.
421 Stevens 10-13.
422 Ibid 11.
«3 Ibid 12 .
424 Ibid 13.
42 5  Ib(d 14-15.
« 6 Ibid 15.
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circumstances; referring to the changes made from actual control to the right to 
control.427 The Court added:428
Furthermore, control is not now regarded as the only relevant factor. Rather 
it is the totality of the relationship between the parties which must be 
considered.
4.3.3. Hollis v Vabu Pty Ltd [2001] HCA 44
The majority of the High Court of Australia overturned a decision by the Supreme 
Court of New South Wales and found the workers of Vabu (a courier company) to be 
employees of Vabu and not independent contractors in Hollis v Vabu Pty Ltd429 
According to the honourable Court, terminology such as "employee" and 
"independent contractor" refer to a broad range of possible legal relationships 
embodied in the terminology which does "not necessarily display their legal content 
purely by virtue of their semantic meaning."430
The Court dealt with the development of the relationship from medieval times 
where it had its basis in the feudal relationship of master and servant which was 
applied to hold a master vicariously liable for the negligent actions of his servant.431 
The control test in case law started with Humberstone,432 continued in Zuijs v Wirth 
Brothers Pty Ltd [1955] HCA 73 433 and was further broadened in Stevens434 The 
control test originated from a predominantly agricultural society and had to be 
adjusted to the modern employment milieu which is characterised by vagueness 
between employees and other categories of workers engaged in professions and 
services which do not attract supervision.435 The test has been broadened in Stevens 
with the right to exercise control; and in Zuijs v Wirth Brothers Pty Ltd, the Court
4 2 7 Ibid 19.
428 Ibid 20.
429 Hollis v Vabu Pty Ltd [2001] HCA 44. Hereinafter: Hollis. Retrieved on 05/02/2013 from 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/2001/44.html.
430 Ibid 36.
431 Hollis 33.
432 Humberstone. See Chapter 5 para 4.3.1 supra.
433 Zuijs. See Chapter 5 para 4.3.1 & Chapter 5 fn 405 supra.
434 Stevens. See Chapter 5 para 4.3.2 supra.
«s Hollis 43.
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broadened the test further by adding "'so far as there is scope for it', even if it be 
only in incidental or collateral matters'".436 The totality of the employment 
relationship needs to be scrutinised of which control in all its shades, represents but 
one of the indicia.437
The New South Wales Compensation Court applied the Hollis ruling in the case of 
Cartner v Barclay438 and took "a broad overview of both the nature and operation of 
the putative employers business and the totality of the relationship between the 
parties within that business operation.”439
4.3.4. A braham  Abdalla re  A braham  A bdalla v Viewdaze Pty Ltd t /a s  Malta 
Travel PR927971
The Australian Industrial Relations Commission gave clear guidance on the indicia 
to be considered in a case440 that did not specifically turn on compensation but in 
which the Court acknowledged that it had to follow Stevens.441 The importance of 
the control test was duly considered by the Honourable Court442
The Court utilised the indicia as applied in the cases of Stevens, Hollis and 
Sammartino v Mayne Nickless Express t/a  Wards Skyroad443 and advised the 
following approach and principles to distinguish between independent contractors 
and employees with due regard to the general character444 of the relationship:445
436 Ibid 44.
437 Ibid 44.
438 Cartner v Barclay [2002] NSWCC 9. Retrieved on 05/02/2013 from 
http://www.austlii.edu.aU/au/cases/nsw/NSWCC/2002/9.html.
439 Ibid 38.
440 Abraham Abdalla re Abraham Abdalla v Viewdaze Pty Ltd t/as Malta Travel PR927971 [2003] 
AIRC 504. Hereinafter: Abraham Abdalla. Retrieved on 04/09/2012 from
http: //www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases / cth/AIRC/2003/504.html.
441 Ibid [17]-[18].
4«  Ibid [18]-[19],
443 Sammartino v Mayne Nickless Express t/a Wards Skyroad 904/98 M Print Q3706 [1998] AIRC 
1009. Retrieved on 08/09/2012 from www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/AIRC/1998/1009.html.
444 Abraham Abdalla [18].
4«  Ibid [34],
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1. The ultimate question to determine whether the person is an independent 
contractor or an employee turns on whether the legal character of the 
relationship between the parties is one of a contract of service or a contract 
for service;
2. Secondly the nature of the work performed and the way in which it is 
performed as to identify the relevant indicia and the weight assigned to the 
relevant factors;
3. Thirdly the terms and terminology used in the contract should be considered 
but with due regard to the true nature of the relationship and the real 
intention of the parties.
4. The fourth step will be to consider the open-ended list of indicia in a process 
of weighing up of all the relevant aspects with due regard to the following 
factors of which none is conclusive on its own:446
a. Control: the presence, extent of or absence of control;
b. Whether the worker performs work for other or has the right to do so;
c. Is the worker's place of work separate to the employer's and/or the 
manner of advertising their services to the outside world;
d. Does the worker provide significant tools and equipment and does it 
constitute a substantial investment, skills or training;
e. Is the worker obliged to supply the services personally;
f. Is the worker subject to discipline or dismissal by the presumed 
employer?
g. Whether the presumed employer presents the worker to the world as 
part of the business by for instance require the worker to wear the 
company's corporate clothing;
h. If income tax is deducted from the worker's remuneration;
i. The manner of calculation of remuneration e.g. periodic wages, salary 
or per completed task;
j. Whether the worker is entitled to paid sick and or annual leave;
k. Does the work involve a profession, trade or distinct calling by the 
worker;
1. Does the worker create goodwill or commercial assets through his work;
446 Chapter 5 paras 2.3. & 3.3. supra discuss the indicia as per South Africa and Canada.
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m. Does the worker spend a significant portion of his income on business 
expenses;
5. If, after consideration of the indicia uncertainty still persists, then it is a 
practical matter of whether the worker was running their own independent 
business rather than as a representative of another business with little or no 
independence in their conduct;
6. Lastly, if clarity could still not be reached, the decision should be guided by 
"matters which are expressive of the fundamental concerns underlying the 
doctrine of vicarious liability" as per Hollis .447
4.3.5. Yu Cang Zhao v Monlea Pty Ltd trading as Nordex Interiors
The Court discussed a variety of indicia (of which none is conclusive on its own) and 
the provisions in law to determine whether the legal nature of the relationship 
between the parties could be described as one of an employer-employee or an 
independent contractor relationship448 in Yu Cang Zhao v Monlea Pty Ltd trading as 
Nordex Interiors 449
The concept of a worker in terms of the Act was considered with reference to the 
definition of a "worker,"450 and a "deemed worker,"451 as provided for in section 2 of 
the Act and categorised under "outworkers and other contractors."452 The Court in 
citing from the Stevens ruling, examined the nature of the relationship between the 
parties and in referring to the control test relied on the words of Dixon J in 
Humberstone which indicated that the control test does not constitute the sole 
criterion, the relevance of which is rather to be found in the right to exercise 
control, "whether ultimate authority over the man in the performance of his work 
resided in the employer so that he was subject to the latter's order and
447 Hollis [41]—[42].
448 Ibid 3 7 & 4 1 .
449 Yu Cang Zhao v Monlea Pty Ltd trading as Nordex Interiors [2003] NSWWCCPD 11. Hereinafter: 
Yu Cang Zhao. Retrieved on 09/12/2011 from http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/nsw/ 
NSWWCCPD/2003/ll.html.
450 Ibid 38.
451 Ibid 39.
452 [\[ew South Wales: Workplace Injury Management and Workers Compensation Act 86 of 1998.
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directions."453 According to Dixon J other factors to be taken into consideration 
include the method of remuneration, supply and maintenance of equipment, duty to 
work, working hours, provision of leave, deduction of income tax and assignment of 
work by the presumed employee.454
The Court considered three categories of indicia i.e. control,455 skills456 and financial 
arrangements457 to conclude the legal nature of the employment relationship.
4.4. Validity of contract of service
The Acts of New South Wales458 and Western Australia459 deal with a tainted 
contract of employment similar to the South African460 and Canadian461 
compensatory laws by providing for discretion to condone the invalidity of a 
contract of service:462
24. Illegal employment
If, in any proceedings for the recovery of compensation under this Act, it 
appears that the contract of service or training contract under which the 
injured person was engaged at the time when the injury happened was 
illegal, the matter may be dealt with as if the injured person had at that time 
been a worker under a valid contract of service or training contract.
None of the other jurisdictions have enacted a discretionary provision and the effect 
of an invalid contract of service on eligibility to compensation has been referred to 
the Courts in a number of cases, some with conflicting outcomes specifically in the 
cases of illegal immigrants.
453 Yu Cang Zhao 40.
454 Ibid 44.
4ss Ibid 54-57.
456 Ibid 59.
ibid 40 & 60-61.
458 New South Wales s 24.
459 Western Australia s 192.
460 Chapter 5 para 2.5 supra.
461 Chapter 5 para 3.4 supra.
462 New South Wales s 24.
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4.4.1. Workcover Corporation (San Remo Macaroni Co Pty Ltd) v Liang Da Ping
The basis of the contract of employment founded in the common law requires it to 
be for a legal purpose and be performed in compliance with the law.463 Illegality 
may arise from statutory provisions, where it is established that a breach of a 
statutory provision has occurred, or at common law where the courts consider that 
public interest is hurt by the terms of the contract464 Australian immigration is 
ruled by the Commonwealth Migration Act No. 62 of 1958 and a number of cases 
revolved around the application of the Migration Act upon claims for 
compensation.465
In Liang Da Ping, heard by the Supreme Court of South Australia, the respondent 
entered Australia on a temporary student visa and worked for San Remo Macaroni 
Co Pty Ltd for longer hours of employment than permitted by his visa conditions 466 
After expiration of the visa, he stayed on in the employment although his status was 
then that of an illegal immigrant in terms of the Migration Act section 14(2).457 More 
or less two years later, on 12 June 1992, he injured his hand whilst performing 
duties for his employer.468 The Migration Act provides in section 83(2):459
Where a person who is an illegal entrant performs any work in Australia 
without permission, in writing, of the Secretary of the Department of 
Immigration the person commits an offence.
The Court ruled this section to render any contract entered into by an illegal 
immigrant unenforceable, unlawful and therefore ab initio void.470 Due to the fact 
that the contract of employment is void, the essential requirement of being a
463 Workcover Corporation (San Remo Macaroni Co Pty Ltd) v Liang Da Ping [1994] SASC 4466.
At [5] & [10]. Hereinafter: Liang Da Ping. Retrieved on 06/02/2013 from
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/sa/SASC/1994/4466.html.
464 Guthrie, R. 2004. Tourists overstaying their welcome: When the visa runs out and the workers 
stay on. Legal Issues in Business: The Tourism Industry: 6: 1-17. Hereinafter: Guthrie (2004). 
Retrieved on 06/02/2013 from http://business.curtin.edu.au/research/publications/journals/ 
lib/table_of_contents.cfm.
465 Ibid 1.
466 Liang Da Ping [2].
467 Ibid [2].
« s  Ibid [2].
469 Ibid [3],
47° Ibid [5] & [10].
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“worker" pursuant to the definition required in terms of the South Australian 
Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act cannot be satisfied and the right to 
compensation is defeated.471 By mouth of King J it was held at [10] :472
The purported contract o f service betw een the respondent and Sian Remo 
could not be lawfully perform ed by the respondent. He w as not obliged to 
perform  it, because perform ance would have been an illegal act, and San 
Remo could not insist on perform ance for the sam e reason. The statute 
discloses an intention o f the legislature to prohibit such perform ance in the 
public interest. That being so the im plication that the contract itse lf is 
prohibited  and void seem s plain.
Contrary to the ruling in Liang Da Ping, the New South Wales Court of Appeal 
upheld the applicants' right to compensation in similar circumstances in Non-Ferral 
(NSW) Pty Ltd v Taufia473 although he was illegally employed in Australia on a 
tourist visa that had expired.474 In interpreting section 83(2) of the Migration Act, 
the Court held that the purpose of the section is not to render an employment 
contract void but to penalise non-compliance of the Migration Act.475 The objectives 
of the Migration Act will not be served by rendering the employment contract illegal 
and will be disproportional to the gravity of the unlawful activity.476 Guthrie argues 
that Taufia follows the principles laid down by the High Court in Fitzgerald v F.J. 
Leonhardt Pty Ltd (1997) 7 1 ALJR 653 and Yango Pastoral Co Pty Ltd v First Chicago 
Australia Ltd & Ors. (1978) 139 CLR 410 in respect of a contract tainted by an aspect 
of illegality due to a statutory provision.477 The Compensation Tribunal of South 
Australia declined to follow Liang Da Ping in the matter of Riley v Workcover/Allianz 
Australia (Robinvale Transport Group (SA) Pty Ltd).478
ibid [11].
472 Quoted in South Australia (State Government], WorkCover SA. 2013. Claims Operational 
Guidelines, Chapter 3: Entitlement to compensation at 7. Retrieved on 06 /02/2013 from 
http: / /www. workcover.com/worker/reference-library/claims/operational-guidelines.
473 Non-Ferral (NSW) Pty Ltd v Taufia Matter [1998] NSWLR 43. Hereinafter: Taufia. Retrieved on 
16/02/2013 from http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/nsw/NSWSC/1998/49.html.
474 Guthrie (2004) 4.
475 Ibid 5.
47s Ibid 5.
477 Ibid AS.
478 Riley v Workcover/Allianz Australia (Robinvale Transport Group (SA) Pty Ltd) [2002] SAWCT 79. 
Retrieved on 04/09/2012 from http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/sa/SAWCT/2002/79.html. 
Hereinafter: Riley.
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4.4.2. Riley v W orkcover/Allianz Australia (Robinvale Transport Group (SA) 
Pty Ltd)
The South Australian Workers’ Compensation Tribunal ruled in a dispute, Riley v 
Workcover/Allianz Australia (Robinvale Transport Group (SA) Pty Ltd), against a 
decision by Allianz Australia Workers Compensation (SA) Ltd rejecting a claim for 
compensation479 by a truck driver by reason of an illegal contract of service as the 
worker's driving license was suspended due to unpaid fines 480 Allianz argued that 
in Australian compensatory law, the right to compensation is dependent upon a 
valid contract of service, which means the contract must both be valid and 
enforceable; and contracts entered into for an illegal purpose or contracts 
prohibited by law will bar a right to compensation 481 Allianz in relying on the Liang 
Da Ping ruling argued that the contract of service was ab initio void, because of the 
suspension of the employee's driver's license, the employee was incompetent to 
perform the duties he was contracted to perform and he was therefore not in 
employment on the date of the accident and could not be considered to fulfil the 
requirements of the definition of a "worker" for the purposes as envisaged in 
section 3 the Act482
The Tribunal took notice of the ruling in Non-Ferral (NSW) Pty Ltd v Taufia483 but in 
considering the validity of the contract, applied the High Court decision in Fitzgerald 
v FJ Leonhardt Pty Limited [1997] HCA 17 in distinguishing between situations 
where the parties deliberately and knowingly enter into agreements with the 
purpose to breach statutory provisions and situations of incidentally committing an 
illegality in the course of performing the terms of an otherwise lawful contract484 
Four categories in which the enforceability of a contract may be affected by a 
statutory provision which cause specific conduct to be illegal, have been identified 
by the Court i.e.:485
479 Riley [1].
«o Ibid [23]-[26].
Ibid [54],
482 ibid [54]—[59].
Ibid [60]—[62].
484 Ibid [63]—[67].
485 ibid [6 8 ].
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(1) The contract may be to do something which the statute forbids;
(2) It may be one which the statute expressly or impliedly prohibits;
(3) Though lawful on its face, it may be made in order to effect a purpose 
which the statute renders unlawful; or
(4) Though lawful according to its own terms, it may be performed in a 
manner which the statute prohibits.
The Tribunal held that this case is concerned with the fourth category486 which 
means that the contract will not be rendered illegal due to an unlawful act in the 
course of its performance and the penalty will be coming from the relevant 
statute.487 While a person intentionally in breach of the law will not be assisted by 
the Court, unwitting acts in contravention of the law are dissimilar 488
The Tribunal dealt with the different exceptions to the rule with regard to relief by 
the Courts and remarked that it "would be doubly absurd if the courts closed their 
doors to a party seeking to enforce its contractual rights without regard to the 
degree of that party’s transgression, the deliberateness or otherwise of its breach of 
the law and its state of mind generally relevant to the illegality."489 The Tribunal 
found that the entry into the contract of service was not contaminated with any 
unlawfulness at the applicable date for the suspension had not yet commenced, but 
even if it had commenced it would not render the contract ab initio unlawful.490 The 
worker could have the suspension lifted by merely paying the fines or arrange for it 
to be paid 491 It is not the purpose of the Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act in terms of 
which the fines and suspension have been issued to prohibit the creation of 
employment relationships or to render workers' compensation rights 
unenforceable and if so, it would be wholly disproportionate in relation to the 
severity of the worker's actions 492 Furthermore, there is no public policy which 
requires a denial of the right to compensation or alternatively to refuse the worker 
to rely on the existence of a contract of service in fulfilment of the requirements of 
the definition of a "worker" by reason of the suspension of his driver's licence 493
«6 ibid [69].
487 Ibid [70].
488 Ibid [72],
489 Ibid [76]—[77].
« °  Ibid [80]—[81].
4«  Ibid [80]—[81].
492 Ibid [83].
493 Ibid [86].
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The Tribunal held the rejection of the claim based on “the alleged illegality of the 
contract of employment or the mode of its performance" as inappropriate.494
4.4.3. Singh v TAJ (Sydney) Pty Limited
The New South Wales Court of Appeal also followed a more lenient approach in the 
case of Singh v TAJ (Sydney) Pty Limited495 by setting aside the decision of the 
Workers Compensation Commission of New South Wales. The Court of first instance 
denied the Appellant continuation of compensation because the Appellant's visa 
status changed subsequent to an occupational accident disallowing the appellant 
employment496 The Appellant did not breach the provisions of his visa at the time 
of the accident but because he was not allowed to enter into employment, the 
respondent argued continuing compensation in respect of loss of earnings would 
mean compensating the ex-worker for unlawful conduct because an employment 
contract entered into will be illegal.497
The Court viewed the approach of Nonferral v Taufia as appropriate498 and 
resubmitted the case back to the Court below for a rehearing taking into 
consideration the questions of illegality of the Appellant's employment, if any and 
the severity and relevance of i t 499
4.5. The role of remuneration
The Productivity Commission of Inquiry identified the differences in compensatory 
legislation between the Australian jurisdictions as problematic.500 The different 
definitions of "employee" and "employer" and the manner of calculation of earnings 
and levies were identified as some of the impediments in harmonising occupational 
health and safety legislation in Australia which includes compensatory
494 Ibid [88],
495 Singh v TAJ (Sydney) Pty Limited [2006] NSWCA 330. Retrieved on 09/02/2013 from 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/nsw/NSWCA/2006/330.html.
496 Ibid 1.
497 Ibid 39-41 .
498 Ibid 46.
499 Ibid 48.
5°° Productivity Commission Report (2004]: 14-15.
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legislation.501 It further creates uncertainties with regard to who is considered an 
employee or employer and who might be entitled to compensation as well as 
whether an employer will be protected against common law suits.502 It is thus a 
hindrance pertaining to the principle of the balancing of interests of the parties.
The Australian compensatory laws do not refer to remuneration as part of the 
definition of "worker" or “employer"; and it does not form part of the requirements 
set in law. Similar to Canada, it informs the calculation of compensation benefits and 
the rate of assessments to be paid by employers;503 and similar to Canada, calculating 
the remuneration of deemed "workers" may be problematic.504 Uncertainties are 
prevented by legislated provisions to that regard.505 The earnings of a contractor will 
be calculated at a rate which he would have earned had he been working as an 
employee and consideration will be given to industrial agreements if any.506
4.6. Employer registration and payment of levies
Employers are obliged to obtain workers’ compensation insurance to cover their 
workers,507 but the Australian workers' compensation system expressly provides 
for a "nominal insurer" to ensure coverage should an employer omit to register and 
insure.508 The Productivity Commission is of the view that it poses a threat in the 
form of an unsustainable cost burden to fund the Workers Compensation Nominal 
Insurer.509 Workers lodge a claim with the Compensation Authority and the 
Nominal Insurer may institute a claim against the employer to recover the costs 
incurred on behalf of the employer.510
sol jbid 1 4 - 1 5 .
502 Productivity Commission Report (2004): 14-15.
503 Australian Capital Territory ss 176-177  & 179; New South Wales s 155(1B)(2); Queensland s 
54(6); South Australia s 4(8); Tasmania s 97(1C)(6) & Victoria s 9 (l)(f).
504 Commonwealth s 8(3); Australian Capital Territory ss 21 -24 ; New South Wales s 20; Northern 
Territory s 49(1); Queensland s 106; South Australia s 4; Tasmania s 4DC; Victoria ss 5(1) & 5A 
& Western Australia s 10A.
505 Australian Capital Territory s 22; New South Wales s 43; Northern Territories s 127; South Australia 
s 4(7); Tasmania ss 4DC(2); 5(2); 6(2) & 6A(2); Victoria s 5A(9)-(12) & Western Australia s 7.
506 South Australia s 4(7).
507 Australian Capital Territory s 147; New South Wales s 155; Northern Territory s 126; 
Queensland s 48; South Australia s 59; Tasmania s 97; Victoria s 19 & Western Australia s 160.
sob Productivity Commission Report (2004): 335-337.
509 Ibid 335.
510 Australian Capital Territory s 30; New South Wales ss 142; 142A & 145; Northern Territory s 
150; Queensland ss 57 -62 ; Tasmania s 121; Victoria s 20 & Western Australia s 57B.
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4.7. Migrant labour
The definition of "an employee" moving between the different jurisdictions in 
Australia will not constitute a bar to compensation because all the jurisdictions 
provide for eligibility to compensation if the worker can establish a link to a 
particular State. Therefore it does not exclude workers or employers from 
fulfilling the requirements of the definitions. Movement between jurisdictions is 
governed by principles laid down by the Heads of Workers Compensation 
Authorities in the National Cross-Border Model and agreed upon by all the 
jurisdictions, inclusive of:511
• elimination of the need for an employer to obtain coverage for a worker in 
more than one State;
• a worker is only entitled to compensation in the worker’s “home” jurisdiction;
• certainty for workers pertaining to workers compensation rights;
• the elimination of forum shopping;
• ensure that each worker is connected to one State.
Criteria laid down to determine the "home" jurisdiction are to be tested in a 
hierarchical manner:512
(a) the State in which the worker usually works in that employment
(b) if no State or no one State is identified by (a), the State in which the 
worker is usually based for the purposes of that employment
(c) if no State or no one State is identified by (a) or (b), the State in which 
the employer's principal place of business in Australia is located
(d) if no State or no one State is identified by (a), (b) or (c), the State in 
which the worker was injured, provided that they are not entitled to 
compensation for the same injury under the laws of another country.
All the jurisdictions entered into the Agreement by legislative amendments513 to 
achieve the objectives with Queensland in July 2003, the Australian Capital
511 South Australia (State Government], WorkCover SA. 2012. Cross-border Workers Compensation 
Provisions Guidelines. At 11. Retrieved on 30/01/2013 from 
http://www.workcover.com/workcover/documents-a-z?filter=C.
512 Ibid 4-5.
513 Queensland s 113; Australian Capital Territory s 36B; Victoria s 80; Tasmania s 31A; Western 
Australia s 20 (Part III, Division I); New South Wales s 9AA; South Australia s 6 & Northern 
Territory s 53AA.
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Territory in June 2004, Victoria in September 2004, Tasmania in December 2004, 
Western Australia in December 2004, New South Wales in January 2006, South 
Australia in January 2007 and the Northern Territory in April 2007.514
The current position of non-citizens working within the RSA or South African 
citizens working abroad can be compared to the situation in both Canada and 
Australia before the inter-jurisdictional arrangements were made. Canada has a 
similar system of inter-jurisdictional arrangements to Australia515 but in seeking 
solutions, it should be kept in mind that South Africa and the SADC countries are 
independent states while Canada and Australia are federal constituencies.
4.7.1. Mynott v Barnard
The need for the National Cross-Border Model is clear from the facts of this case 
where the employer and employee both lived in Victoria at all material times, 
entered into the employment agreement in Victoria but the employee was fatally 
injured in an accident that arose out of and in the course of his duties at the work 
site in New South Wales.516 His dependents claimed compensation under the 
Victorian Workers' Compensation Act (1928).517
The claim failed in both the County Court as well as the Supreme Court because the 
test applied by the Courts was the applicability of the Act to the place of the 
accident. The question to be answered on appeal was whether application of the 
Victorian Act was limited to accidents within the borders of Victoria and what 
territorial limitation should be applied as the Act cannot be applicable to "all 
employers, all workers and all accidents everywhere."518 The Court observed that 
the question essentially addresses a question of construction of a statute.
514 QBE Insurance (Australia) Limited. [Sa]. Connect Fact Sheet: QM3288-0413 Cross Border 
Provisions. Retrieved on 30/01/2013 from www.qbe.com.au/Australia/Useful-Resources/Fact- 
Sheets/Insurance.html.
515 See Chapter 4 paras 2.4; 3.4 & 4.4 and Chapter 5 paras 2.10 & 3.7.
516 Mynott 1.
517 ibid 1.
sis ibid 3-4.
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Although each of the five honourable Justices of the High Court of Australia gave a 
separate ruling, they were unified in dismissing the appeal by the dependents and 
found that the right to compensation does not attach to the contract of employment 
because the right is not founded in the contract but in the accident itself.519
The Court cited and followed the English case of Tomalin v S Pearson & Son Ltd 
(1909) 2 K.B. 61 in which it was held that a United Kingdom employer would not be 
held liable pursuant to the British Workmen's Compensation Act if a worker suffers 
an injury out of and in the course of his duties in a foreign country.520 Dixon J, in his 
ruling, turned to the American judgment of Cameron v Ellis Construction Co. (1930) 
252 N.Y. and applied the then internationally-accepted test of the place where the 
employment is located in all cases.521
COIDA does not explicitly require the contract of employment to be entered into 
within South Africa but it is implied in the requirement that the employer’s chief 
business unit be within the South African border and an employee will be covered if 
the accident happens outside the borders if the employer duly registered and the 
employee did not work for a period exceeding 12 months outside South Africa.522 
COIDA is thus dissimilar on this point.
4.8. Fishers
In South Australia, crew members of fishing vessels are excluded from the ambit of 
the Act if the worker is remunerated by way of a share in the profits or gross 
receipts earned by fishing.523 However, if a contract of service exists, the worker will 
be deemed an employee. In addition to the definitions of employer and worker, the 
South Australian Act also defines "contract of service" to mean:524
519 Ibid 34.
520 Ibid 40.
ibid 47.
522 Chapter 5 paras 2.1 & 2.10 supra.
523 South Australia s 3(3).
524 South Australia s 3(1).
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(a) a contract under which one person (the worker) is employed by another 
(the employer);
(b) a contract, arrangement or understanding under which one person (the 
worker) works for another in prescribed work or work of a prescribed 
class;
(c) a contract of apprenticeship;
(d) a contract, arrangement or understanding under which a person (the 
worker)—
(i) receives on-the-job training in a trade or vocation from another 
(the employer); and
(ii) is during the period of that training remunerated by the employer;
The Supreme Court of South Australia interpreted the words "contract, 
arrangement or understanding" as they appear in the definition of "contract of 
service" with emphasis on the need for interpretation of the expression in the 
context of the whole Act525 in Warrior v Workcover Corporation.526
The words are capable of including the full spectrum of possibilities, from formal 
contracts of service to "circumstances as informal as a mere understanding."527 As 
the definition of a contract of employment is defined in paragraph (a), the contract 
referred to in paragraph (b) must intend something else than a contract of 
employment.528 Paragraph (b) includes an "arrangement which falls short of a 
contract or an agreement whereby a worker works for another person"529 and an 
"understanding" is more informal than a contract or an arrangement and might 
include situations where the parties have not officially agreed for the worker to 
work for the other individual.530 The nature of an "understanding" is even less 
formal than that of an "arrangement” and might flow from customary conduct 
without addressing the conditions that gave rise to the relationship.531
5Z5 Ibid 39.
526 Warrior v Workcover Corporation No. Scgrg-98-279 Judgment No. S6893 [1998] SASC 6893. At 38­
40. Retrieved on 07/09/2012 from http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/sa/SASC/1998/6893.html.
527 ibid 39.
sa* ibid 39.
sm Ibid 39.
530 ibid  40.
531 Ibid 40.
238
The purpose of the Act532 pertaining to the people who stand to benefit from it is 
explained as:
...to ensure the widest coverage of persons who work for others so that if 
they suffer injury and consequent disability they will be entitled to 
economic protection during the period of the disability.
The purpose of compensatory law stands thus in relation to the people it is meant to 
benefit and therefore the more people falling within its ambit the greater the 
fulfilment of its purpose.
4.9. Domestic workers
Domestic workers are included in the definition of a "worker".533 However, in terms 
of the South Australian Regulations, it is optional for employers of domestic 
workers to register with the Compensation Authority if the domestic worker earns 
less than a prescribed threshold and is not employed for business purposes.534
4.10. Third party employers
A number of Australian jurisdictions have an equivalent provision to COIDA535 
pertaining to lending, letting or hiring the services of an employee to another 
employer and the meaning of "employer" is defined in the Australian Capital 
Territory to include:536
(c) if the services of the worker are temporarily lent or let on hire to 
someone else (the temporary employer) by the person (the original 
employer) with whom the worker has entered into a contract of 
service or apprenticeship—the original employer is, for this Act, taken 
to continue to be the employer of the worker while the worker is 
working for the temporary employer.
532 Ibid 41.
533 Australian Capital Territory s 11; Northern Territory s 3(5); Queensland s 3; South Australia
Regulations s 5; Tasmania s 4(5); Victoria s 5(1) & Western Australia s 5(1).
534 South Australia, Regulation 9 of the Regulations 2010.
535 See Australian Capital Territory s 5; Queensland Schedule 3(1); Tasmania s 4A; Victoria s 5 &
Western Australia s 5.
536 Australian Capital Territory s 5.
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The New South Wales Act in section 12 specifically provides for situations in which 
representatives of trade unions are injured when on official union duties to be covered 
that will prevent situations as discussed under the Rieck rulings in South Africa:
1 2  Claims by t r a d e  union representatives
If:
(a) a worker is an accredited representative of a trade union of employees, 
or other organisation of employees, of which any person employed by 
the worker’s employer is a member,
(b) with the consent of or at the request of that employer or pursuant to an 
industrial award or agreement, the worker is carrying out his or her 
duties as such a representative (whether at the worker’s place of 
employment or elsewhere) or is on an associated journey, and
(c) the worker receives a personal fn iu rv  while carrying out those duties 
or on that journey,
the in iu rv  is, for the purposes of this Act, an In ju ry  arising out of or in the
course of employment, and compensation is payable accordingly.
4.10.1. Workcover Corporation & Ors v Fogliano
The Supreme Court of South Australia ruled on this stated case537 in answering 
three of the seven questions formulated by the full bench of the Workers 
Compensation Appeal Tribunal.538 All the questions turned on the type of training 
that would entitle a person to be deemed a worker,539 working under a contract of 
service540 for the purposes of the Act and specifically the meaning of the words "on- 
the-job training" in section 3(d).541 The specific definition is cited supra at 
paragraph 4.8.
The Supreme Court criticised the formulation of the stated questions as they 
constituted questions of a general nature and some of the questions is answerable
537 Workcover Corporation & Ors v Fogliano No. SCGRG-99-1168 [2000] SASC 28. Retrieved on 
16/04/2011 from http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/sa/SASC/2000/28.html. Hereinafter: 
Fogliano.
538 Jbid 13-17.
539 South Australia (State Government). WorkCover SA. 2008. Changes to the WorkCover Scheme. 
Retrieved on 08/05/2012 from https://www.workcover.com/workcover/documents-a-z?filter=C. 
From 2008 the South Australian Act exempts employers who employ trainees and apprentices from 
paying assessments in respect of apprentices and trainees in their employ.
540 South Australia: Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 124 of 1986 s 3.
541 Fogliano 8.
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by applying the law to the facts.542 The Court therefore considered it appropriate to 
only answer three of the questions as it entails the limitations set by the statute 
rather than the meaning of specific words.543
The worker was a trainee participating in a skills development training programme 
by Quality Training Company which did it on behalf of the Commonwealth 
Government. Fogliano (trainee) and Quality Training entered into a "contract of 
participation" and he was subsequently sent to do practical training experience at a 
hotel where he was injured.544
The Court held that "on-the-job training" as in section 3(d) supra, extends the 
common law principles characterising a master and servant relationship; and it 
does not define the type of work to be productive in nature or the place of work but 
only requires training to be instructive or educational in nature irrespective of the 
place where it occurs.545 The employer was identified as the legal entity with which 
the contractual arrangement was made for the on-the-job training in a trade or 
vocation and who was responsible for remunerating the trainee, although the trainee 
was injured whilst doing practical work assignments at a third party, the hotel.546 The 
legal entity viewed as the employer was subsidised by the Commonwealth 
Government to train or educate trainees,547 but that did not change the fact that the 
trainee was working under a contract of service for Quality Training.548
4.11. Atypical employment arrangements
According to available data, a slightly lower number of employees are included 
within the definition of an employee which is partly attributed to the decline in the 
traditional employer-employee system of full-time work in the service of one
542 Ibid 9.
543 Ibid 9 -13.
544 Ibid 2.
545 Ibid 14.
546 Ibid 17.
547 Ibid 16-17.
548 Ibid 18.
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employer, in recent times.549 The category of non-traditional work in Australia 
includes temporary labour, part-time labour, self-employed persons, fixed-term 
contract labour, labour hire workers, outworkers, seasonal labour and unrecorded 
labour.550
According to the findings of the Commission of Inquiry, this group is more likely to 
be unaware of their rights with regard to a claim and to be afraid of negative 
consequences to their positions if a claim is reported on their behalf.551 Specifically 
young and atypically-employed people hesitate to institute claims.552
Data confirming a decrease in the number of employees covered by compensatory 
legislation is scarce. However, according to findings of the Australian Bureau of 
Statistics, the proportion of incorporated enterprises managed by their owners 
increased from 1.8% to 5.6% between 1978 and 1996; while the Productivity 
Commission’s own analysis shows an increase of 15% of people defining themselves 
as self-employed contractors over the two decades prior to the Final Report.553
Although certain categories (horse racing jockeys, boxers, wrestlers and referees) of 
professional sportsmen and women may be deemed as workers for the purpose of 
compensatory laws, in general professional sportspersons are excluded from the 
definition.554 Uniquely to Australia, some Ministers of religion are excluded 
determined upon the denomination but others who are working under a contract of 
service are included.555
549 Productivity Commission Report (2004): 158-160.
550 Australian Capital Territory ss 9 & 10; Northern Territory s 3(1); Queensland Schedule 2 Part 2; 
South Australia Regulations Part 2 Item 5; Tasmania s 4(5); Victoria ss 9, 11 & 12 & Western 
Australia s 14.
551 Productivity Commission Report (2004): 158-161. See also Quinlan: 494-501.
552 Ibid.
553 Productivity Commission Report (2004): 158-160.
554 Australian Capital Territory s 84 (excluding the activity); Northern Territory s 6A(10); 
Queensland Schedule 2 Part 2; South Australia s 58(1); Tasmania s 7; Victoria s 16 & Western 
Australia ss 11 & 11 A.
555 Queensland s 18; Tasmania s 3(4); Western Australia ss 8 -1 0  & South Australia Regulation 6(1) 
of the Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Regulations 2010 (in terms of the Workers 
Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 124 of 1986). Retrieved on 07/09/2012 from 
http://www.legislati0n.sa.gov.aU/LZ/C/R/W0RKERS%20REHABILITATI0N%20AND%20C0M 
PENSATION%20REGULATIONS%202010/CURRENT/2010.154.UN.PDF.
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4.12. Summary
The Australian compensatory laws generally exclude directors, trustees and 
partners of companies from the definition of a worker; but in certain jurisdictions 
they may apply for inclusion to the applicable Compensation Authority with 
jurisdiction.556
Similarly to the South African definition in COIDA, the following workers do not 
satify the definition of an employee:
• workers in informal employment;557
• wokers in atypical employment;558
• independent contractors;559
• child labourers under the legal age as it will be against public policy (similar 
to illegal immigrants);560
Contrary to the South African exclusions, the following catogories are included 
within the definition of an employee:
• members of the Federal Police and Defence Force;561
• voluntary workers;562
• students when registered with a recognised learning institution;563
• financially-dependent child(ren) at the death of that employed parent;564
• domestic workers in private households;565
• migrant workers.566
556 Chapter 5 para 4.1 supra.
557 Chapter 5 paras 4.1; 4.2 4.3 & 4.8 supra.
558 Chapter 5 paras 4.8 & 4.11 supra.
559 Chapter 5 paras 4.1; 4.2; 4.3; 4.3.1; 4.3.2; 4.3.3; 4.3.4; 4.3.5; 4.5 & 4.11.
560 Chapter 5 para 4.11 supra.
561 Chapter 5 para 4.1 supra.
562 Chapter 5 para 4.1 supra.
563 Chapter 5 para 4.1 & 4.10.1 supra.
564 Chapter 5 para 4.1 supra.
565 Chapter 5 paras 4.1; 4.2 & 4.9 supra.
566 Chapter 5 paras 4.1; 4.2 & 4.7 supra.
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The historical principle of balancing-of-interests is central to the definitions of 
employer and employee but similar to South Africa and Canada:
• the employee's right of compensation is not dependent upon the registration 
and payment of levies by the employer;567
• third party employers will not be protected against common law claims for 
damages when utilising the services of directors who did not follow the 
presribed procedure to apply for inclusion within the ambit of the Act.568
The basis of the definition remains the common law contract of service which may 
be tested according to the applicable indicia as included in the Abraham Abdalla re 
Abraham Abdalla v Viewdaze Pty Ltd t/as Malta Travel ruling; and with the point of 
departure, the control test laid as developed which requires a weighing of all 
relevant factors similarly to South Africa.569
5. CONCLUSION
In all three countries the definitions of employee and employer correspond to each 
other in ruling the historic trade-off. They define the scope of compensatory 
legislation as only workers satisfying the definition will have a right to 
compensation and only employers satisfying the applicable definition will be 
immune against civil liability.570
In all three countries, the basis of the employment relationship is founded in the 
common law contract of employment and it is embedded in the statutory definitions 
of all three countries' workers' compensatory legislation.571 In all three countries, 
the courts preferred a liberal interpretation of the definitions so as to include as 
many persons as possible within the protective provisions of the legislation.572 The 
courts in all three countries have laid down indicia which are to be applied in a
567 Chapter 5 para 4.6 supra.
568 Chapter 5 paras 4.1; 4.2 & 4.10 supra.
569 Chapter 5 paras 4.1; 4.3; 4.3.2; 4.3.3; 4.3.4 & 4.3.5 supra.
570 Chapter 5 paras 2.1; 2.2; 3.1; 3.2; 4.1 & 4.2 supra.
571 Chapter 5 paras 2.1; 2.2; 2.3; 3.1; 3.2; 3.3; 4.1; 4.2 & 4.3 supra.
572 Chapter 5 paras 2.3; 2.6.1; 2.6.2; 2.7.1; 3.3; 3.3.1; 3.3.2; 3.4.1; 3.6.1; 3.8.1; 4.3; 4.3.2; 4.3.3; 4.3.4; 
4.3.5; 4.4.2 & 4.10.1 supra.
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process of weighing of the different factors and of which only one factor will not be 
conclusive on its own. It is submitted that preference is given in all three countries 
to what is known in South African labour law as the "dominant impression" test to 
determine the true relationship between the parties.573
In South Africa574 and Canada,575 provision has been made for discretionary 
condonation pertaining to the validity of the contract of service but not in 
Australia576 where the courts made contradictory rulings. It appears that matters of 
public policy will be important decisive aspects as was shown in South Africa577 and 
Canada578 regarding child labour; and in Australia579 regarding illegal immigrants.
Remuneration in all three countries forms the basis of the monetary assessment for 
which the employer is liable and the compensation to which an injured employee 
may be rightfully entitled.580 Failure by an employer to register with a 
compensation authority and to pay levies or premiums will not bar a right to 
compensation in any of the three countries as provision has been made for 
compensation in these circumstances.581 The financial contribution of all employers 
is an important aspect of the continued financial viability of compensation schemes 
in all three countries. Although this Chapter only noted the concern on the Nominal 
Insurer in Australia; reference was made in Chapter 4 about the concerns raised 
about fraud and maladministration.
In all three countries, the legal nature of the employment relationship changed over 
time with vagueness and gray areas as a result.582 This is mainly due to a growing 
number of atypical forms of employment and a reduction in the number of workers 
in traditional employment relationships.583 The plight of workers in informal
573 Chapter 5 paras 4.1; 4.3; 4.3.2; 4.3.3; 4.3.4 & 4.3.5 supra.
574 Chapter 5 para 2.5 supra.
575 Chapter 5 para 3.4 supra.
576 Chapter 5 para 4.4 supra.
577 Chapter 5 para 2.5.1 supra.
578 Chapter 5 para 3.4.1 supra.
579 Chapter 5 paras 4.4.1; 4.4.2 & 4.4.3 supra.
580 Chapter 5 paras 2.6; 3.5 & 4.5 supra.
581 Chapter 5 paras 2.7; 3.6 & 4.6 supra.
582 Chapter 5 paras 2,3; 3.3 & 4.3 supra.
583 Chapter 5 paras 2.9; 3.11 & 4.11 supra.
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employment is of growing concern due to the lack of legislative protection available 
to this group.584 Migrating workers in South Africa and South Africans working 
abroad are not statutorily protected similar to employees in Canada and 
Australia.585 It is submitted that South Africa should follow the example of optional 
coverage for categories of workers currently not covered like trainees in training 
institutions, voluntary emergency workers and self-employed persons and South 
Africans working abroad.
Domestic workers in private households as a particularly vulnerable group is 
excluded from the ambit of the Act in South Africa but is to a great extent covered 
under Canadian and Australian compensatory legislation as an optional coverage.586 
It is submitted that inclusion of domestic workers in private households in South 
Africa ought to be prioritised to conform to the constitutional imperative.
Situations where third-party employers are involved create complications in all 
three countries, but the right to institute common law claims for damages against 
third parties who negligently exposed persons to hazards in the workplace is open 
to employees in all three countries.
It is a trait of the workers' compensatory acts in Canada and Australia that provision 
is being made for students, domestic workers, fire fighters and persons doing 
community service to be included in the definition of an employee for the purposes 
of compensatory law. It is submitted that recognition of these categories of persons 
encourages responsible citizenship because people voluntarily providing services in 
emergencies will not incur medical costs in cases of injuries. None of these 
categories are covered under COIDA and since acceptance of the RSA Constitution in 
1996, no amendments were made to COIDA to give life to the "progressive 
realisation" of these rights and extend it to those excluded from the working 
thereof.
584 Chapter 5 paras 2.9; 3.11 & 4.11 supra.
585 Chapter 5 paras 2.10; 3.7 & 4.7 supra.
586 Chapter 5 paras 2.11; 3.9 & 4.9 supra.
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CHAPTER 6
THE RIGHT TO DELICTUAL REMEDIES 
1 . INTRODUCTION
In compensatory legislation, the common law has been amended by a quid pro quid 
system according to which employers are indemnified against delictual claims in 
exchange for participation in an insurance scheme administered by an independent 
institution. In exchange for a common law claim, workers received an 
administrative recourse to obtain speedy compensation while relieved from the 
burden of proof required by court actions. The crux of this principle is underpinned 
by what is known as the "historic trade-off' principle.1
It is trite law that an employer owes his employees a common law duty of care to 
take reasonable care for their health and safety. The duty of care is not absolute and 
is limited by the standard of reasonableness2 flowing from the legal relationship 
between a master and his servant.3 Reasonableness depends upon a factual 
examination of the circumstances of each case.4
Meredith Report at 17.
Mischke e ta l  359.
Kelly, G. 2000. Post Traumatic Stress Disorder and the Law. 45. Dublin: Round Hall Sweet & 
Maxwell. Van Deventer v Workmen's Compensation Commissioner 1962 (4) SA 28. 31 B-D.
The Mine Health and Safety Act places the "owner" of a mine under an obligation to: 2(b) 
“ensure, as far as reasonably practicable, that the mine is commissioned, operated, maintained 
and decommissioned in such a way that employees can perform their work without 
endangering the health and safety, of themselves or of any other person" and defines 
“reasonable practicable" in s 102 as meaning "practicable having regard to —
(a) the severity and scope of the hazard or risk concerned;
(b) the state of knowledge reasonably available concerning that hazard or risk and of any 
means of removing or mitigating that hazard or risk;
(c) the availability and suitability of means to remove or mitigate that hazard or risk; and
(d) the costs and the benefits of removing or mitigating that hazard or risk".
The Occupational Health and Safety Act has a nearly identical definition of same in s 1[1) and 
requires in s 8(1) from an employer to “provide and maintain, as far as is reasonably 
practicable, a working environment that is safe and without risk to the health of his employees."
2
3
4
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2. SOUTH AFRICA
Spoor argued that administrative sanctions are the only mechanisms available to 
South African employees, whereby an employer who breaches the duty of care 
owed to his employees can be held accountable.5 Spoor contends that the bar on 
common law litigation has a number of consequences including the lack of 
development of case law to determine the content and meaning of the employer's 
duty of care, infrequent prosecutions for contravention of the employer's general 
duty of care with no precedents and no developed law on what such duties entail. 
COIDA excludes the civil justice system, by virtue of the provisions of section 35 of 
the Act, from playing its rightful rule in ensuring accountability.6
Although compensation for diseases in mines had been part of the compensatory 
legislation for roughly one century, delictual claims for lung diseases were not 
pursued prior to the significant judgment by the Constitutional Court in Mankayi 
(CC) concerning occupational diseases compensated under the Occupational 
Diseases in Mines and Works Act 78 of 1973 (ODIMWA).
2.1. Statutory provisions absolving an employer from liability
No right to institute a common law claim for damages against an employee's 
employer for negligently causing harm in cases of injuries and/or diseases in 
respect of which eligibility for statutory compensation prevails will arise by virtue 
of COIDA because of the working of section 35 which reads as follows:
35. Substitution of compensation for other legal remedies
(1) No action shall lie by an employee or any dependant of an employee for 
the recovery of damages in respect of any occupational injury or 
disease resulting in the disablement or death of such employee against 
such employee's employer, and no liability for compensation on the 
part of such employer shall arise save under the provisions of this Act 
in respect of such disablement or death.
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1) a person referred to in section 
56(1) (b), (c), (d) and (e) shall be deemed to be an employer.
5 Spoor, R. 2 0 0 9 .22nd Annual Labour Law Conference. The Employers Duty of Care: Responsibility 
without accountability is not responsibility at all. Retrieved on 20/02/2013 from 
http://www.lexisnexis.co.za/pdf/3.0_THE%20EMPLC)YERS%20DUTY%200F%20CARE.pdf.
6 Ibid 5.
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The deeming provision of section 35(2) extends the protection afforded to 
employers to the following categories of employees in terms of section 56(1):
(1). If an employee meets with an accident or contracts an occupational
disease which is due to the negligence-
(a) of his employer;
(b) of an employee charged by the employer with the management or 
control of the business or of any branch or department thereof;
(c) of an employee who has the right to engage or discharge 
employees on behalf of the employer;
(d) of an engineer appointed to be in general charge of machinery, or 
of a person appointed to assist such engineer in terms of any 
regulation made under the Minerals Act, 1991 (Act No. 50 of 
1991); or
(e) of a person appointed to be in charge of machinery in terms of any 
regulation made under the Occupational Health and Safety Act,
1993 (Act No. 85 of 1993),
the employee may, notwithstanding any provision to the contrary contained 
in this Act, apply to the commissioner for increased compensation in 
addition to the compensation normally payable in terms of this Act.
These two sections effectively abrogated the right to institute a civil claim in a court 
of law and replaced it with an administrative process except for third parties and 
persons not included in the definitions of an employee or employer.7 COIDA 
determines that compensation does not form part of the estate of an employee;8 and 
the Act does not specifically bar a claim by an employees' estate against his 
employer which leaves open the question as to the right in respect of a delictual 
claim for damages by a deceased employees' estate against the employer.
The definition of dependants of a deceased employee, discussed in the previous 
Chapter, has not been interpreted by the courts. However, it is clear the child of a 
deceased employee, who is older than 18 years at the time of the fatal accident 
killing his parent, does not have a claim for statutory compensation; and it is 
submitted that it is unclear whether a delictual claim for damages is open to him.9 If 
the correct interpretation of the definition in section l(xv)(e) of COIDA holds that
7 Chapter 5 supra.
8 "34. Compensation in terms of this Act owing to the death of an employee shall not form part of 
his estate.”
9 Chapter 5 para 2.1 supra.
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such a child is included as a dependent of the deceased at all times, it may result in 
an inequality that is unfair and discriminatory because the basis of workers' 
compensation is a quid pro quid scheme according to which the employee and his 
dependents give up the right to common law redress in exchange for an 
administrative no-fault remedy, which remedy is not open to persons not included 
within the definition.
Claims against third parties are expressly preserved by virtue of section 36:
36. Recovery of damages and compensation paid from third parties
(1) If an occupational injury or disease in respect of which compensation is 
payable, was caused in circumstances resulting in some person other 
than the employer of the employee concerned (in this section referred to 
as the "third party") being liable for damages in respect of such injury or 
disease-
(a) the employee may claim compensation in terms of this Act and may 
also institute action for damages in a court of law against the third 
party; and
(b) the Director-General or the employer by whom compensation is 
payable may institute action in a court of law against the third party 
for the recovery of compensation that he is obliged to pay in terms of 
this Act...
In cases of negligent and wrongful conduct by an employer or if the employer 
knowingly fails to correct patent defects present in premises, works, plants or 
machinery, the harmed employee has an option to institute a claim for increased 
compensation by virtue of section 56 but the standard of proof is the historical 
requirements applicable to common law claims that so very often resulted in failed 
claims before the enactment of workers’ compensatory legislation. Negligence by an 
employer should be distinguished from deliberate conduct by the employer 
harming an employee which will not save the employer from liability as was shown 
in the case of Kau v Fourie discussed supra.10
10 Kau v Fourie discussed supra at Chapter 4 para 2.2.5.
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2.2. Interpretation through case law: Constitutional challenges
2.2.1. Joo ste  v Score Superm arket Trading (Pty) Ltd (Minister o f  Labour  
Intervening)
The Constitutional Court ruled on the constitutional validity of section 35 in an 
equality challenge in Jooste  v Score Supermarket Trading (Pty) Ltd (Minister o f  
Labour Intervening)11 pursuant to the Interim Constitution.12 The Applicant argued 
that section 35(1) of COIDA needs to be viewed independently from the rest of the 
Act as it does not form an essential part of the Act; and no reason exists as to why a 
negligent employer need not pay assessments in terms of the Act and compensate 
delictual damages.13
The equality challenge (which was not based on a listed ground)14 was answered by 
deciding whether section 35 of COIDA is rationally connected to a legitimate 
government purpose; and if not, whether it constitutes unfair discrimination against 
employees as section 35(1) undoubtedly differentiates between employees and 
non-employees.15 The Court considered the context in which the right to a delictual 
recourse is barred in the light of the historical development of compensatory law 
taking into account the purpose of COIDA;16 and compared the position of a person 
exercising his right to a civil justice claim to that of an employee who exercises an 
administrative remedy available under COIDA.17 Counsel for the Applicant admitted 
that an employee will have "the best of both worlds" if the right to COIDA 
compensation is extended by a further right to common law damages.18 The Full 
Bench of the Constitutional Court refused to be drawn into what it considered to be 
a policy decision which rests with Parliament and not courts.19 The Court
11 This case was also discussed with reference to the purpose of workers' compensatory 
legislation in Chapter 3 para 3.2.1 of this study.
12 Jooste  [5] &. [9].
is ibid  [IS].
14 S 8(2) of the Interim Constitution.
15 Jooste  [11].
w Ibid [12].
i? Ibid [13].
is Ibid [15].
«  Ibid [16].
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considered American, Canadian20 and German case law and held the differentiation 
not to be arbitrary, irrational or discriminatory in nature as:21
The legislature clearly considered that it was appropriate to grant to 
employees certain benefits not available at common law. The scheme is 
financed through contributions from employers. No doubt for these reasons 
the employee's common law right against an employer is excluded. Section 
35(1) of the Compensation Act is therefore logically and rationally 
connected to the legitimate purpose of the Compensation Act, namely, a 
comprehensive regulation of compensation for disablement caused by 
occupational injuries or diseases sustained or contracted by employees in 
the course of their employment.22
The question whether section 35 infringes the Applicant's right of access to the 
courts was left unanswered due to the approach taken by the Applicant in casu.23
The Report o f  the Committee o f  Inquiry into a Comprehensive System o f  Social 
Security fo r  South Africa: Transforming the Present -  Protecting the Future24 took 
note of the Jooste ruling; and raised the possibility of a combined model of a no-fault 
workmen's compensation scheme coupled with a fault-based common law system 
of employer's liability in which double compensation is prevented but provision be 
made for full coverage like pain and suffering currently excluded from statutory 
compensation.25
2.2.2. Mlomzale v Mizpah Boerdery (Pty) Ltd
The constitutional validity of section 35 was also attacked in Mlomzale v Mizpah 
Boerdery (Pty) Ltd,26 a case in which the earlier decision of Pettersen v Irvin and 
Johnson Ltd 1963 (3) SA 255 (C) was both approved and applied.27 The Plaintiff 
contended that the statutory compensation comprises only of pecuniary loss and
20 Reference re.
21 Jooste [16]-[18].
22 Ibid [16].
23‘ Ibid [21].
24 Taylor Report 115.
25 Ibid 115-116.
26 Mlomzale v Mizpah Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 1997 (1) SA 790 (C). Hereinafter: Mlomzale.
27 Ibid 794 E-I.
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therefore general damages ought to be still available.28 Mitchell AJ interpreted 
section 7 of the 1941 Act which essentially mirrored section 35 of COIDA, and held 
that "compensation" refers to statutory compensation while "damages" designates a 
wider notion inclusive of general damages rendering the Pettersen ruling 
convincing.29
The Court was unconvinced that section 7 of the 1941 Act constituted an 
"unjustifiable infringement of the plaintiffs rights."30 Compensation is protected 
against attachment and proportional reduction due to contributory negligence by 
the employee.31 Furthermore, compensation is protected against the inability of an 
employer to recompense because compensation is paid from a fund in the form of 
insurance benefits funded by the employer's monetary contributions.32 The Court 
refrained from a finding of unconstitutionality inter alia because the Constitution 
does not have retrospective effect and the claim pre-dated the Constitution.33 The 
employer was not held liable for damages irrespective he omitted to register with 
the Commissioner and failed to duly report the claim to the Commissioner; but a 
different ruling was possible had the employee showed that the employer's 
omissions frustrated the employee's claim for COIDA compensation.34
2.2.3. Mankayi vAnglogold Ashanti Ltd
The Full Bench of the Constitutional Court overturned the SCA's judgment in a legal 
paradigm-shifting judgment in Mankayi (CC), challenging the applicability of 
COIDA's section 35 to ODIMWA claimants although they are not entitled to claim 
pursuant to COIDA.35
28 Ibid 794 C-D.
29 Ibid 794 I.
so Ibid 794 C-D.
31 Ibid 794 D.
32 Ibid 794 E.
33 Ibid 794 G-H.
34 Ibid 795 D-E.
35 Ibid [1]. The SCA noted in Mankayi (SCA), the history as: The Transvaal Workmen's
Compensation Act 36 of 1907 explicitly preserved an employee’s common law right to claim
damages from his employer arising from personal injury and dependent upon an irreversible 
selection by the worker whether to proceed at common law or claim statutory compensation. 
The Workmen's Compensation Act 25 of 1914 provided for a similar irrevocable elective 
process. The 1934 Act removed the right of an employee to institute a common law claim for
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The Constitutional Court isolated two main aspects for decision in respect of 
Mankayi's contentions, being36 whether:
[6.1] the word "employee” in section 35(1) of COIDA includes employees 
covered by 0D1MWA, notwithstanding that they are barred from 
claiming benefits under COIDA; and
[6.2] the abrogation of the common law right of action envisaged by section 
35(1) of COIDA applies to Mr Mankayi.
The Court proceeded by considering the history of compensatory legislation in 
South Africa regarding the two sets of legislation which respectively provide for 
compensation pertaining to certain occupational diseases under ODIMWA,37as well 
as compensation pertaining to occupational injuries and diseases under COIDA38 
similarly to the SCA.39
The Appellant argued that although he indeed fulfils the definition of an employee 
pursuant to COIDA,40 section 35(1) only affects him regarding claims under COIDA. 
The Respondent argued that a plain reading of section 35(1) extinguishes an 
employee's common law right to sue his employer in respect of "any" disabling 
occupational disease.41 The Court dismissed this argument and interpretation that 
was accepted by the courts a quo as untenable 42
The Court accepted that a plain reading of the definition of an "employee" in COIDA 
applies to persons like the Appellant working on controlled mines and works43 and 
that under certain circumstances the definitions "employee" and "employer" in
damages against his employer in exchange for a no-fault administrative remedy. Section 5 
introduced a claim for increased compensation, open to an employee if the accident was "due 
to" the employer’s negligence. The compensation system was reformed with the founding of a 
central fund to which employers contributed and from which employees were compensated by 
virtue of the 1941 Act with section 7 extinguishing the employee's right to a common law 
remedy. Mankayi (SCA) at [14]-[17],
36 Mankayi (CC) [3]-[5].
37 Chapter 2 paras 3.3; 3.4; 3.5 & 6 supra.
38 Chapter 2 paras 3.3 & 3.4 supra.
39 Mankayi (CC) [25]-[59].
40 Solely because if he sustained an injury or contracted a disease for which ODIMWA does not 
provide, he will have a claim in terms of COIDA. Mankayi (CC) at [69],
41 Mankayi (CC) [69],
42 Ibid.
43 ODIMWA is only applicable to "controlled mines and works".
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COIDA may include their counterparts in ODIMWA.44 The diseases contracted by 
Mankayi are compensable diseases under both ODIMWA and COIDA but by virtue of 
section 100(2)45 of ODIMWA, Mankayi is constrained to a claim under ODIMWA.46 
Although the Constitutional Court accepted this interpretation of the definition of 
"employee", the Court held it “cannot refer to employees who cannot benefit under 
that legislation"47 or to an "employee" in section 3 5 (1 )48
The Court held that sections 100(1) and (2) separate rightful claimants under 
ODIMWA from rightful claimants under COIDA; and while section 100(2) removes 
the right to compensation pursuant to COIDA, it is unable to simultaneously render 
section 35(1) applicable to an ODIMWA claimant. The purpose of section 100(2) is 
to prevent double compensation to one claimant for the same disease under both 
ODIMWA and COIDA.49 The honourable Court criticised the reasoning of the SCA by 
finding:50
COIDA is the principal Act, which sets out the generally applicable 
provisions, while ODIMWA deals with special circumstances without 
diminishing those principles, and that the limitation contained in section 
35(1) is of general application.
Three reasons are given in casu by the Court:51
• a general principle cannot be applicable to a person who has been removed 
from its ambit;
• COIDA and ODIMWA deal differently with compensation; and
• the clear wording of section 35(1) of COIDA.
44 Mankayi (CC) [72],
45 "100(2) Notwithstanding anything in any other law contained, no person who has a claim to 
benefits under this Act in respect of a compensatable disease as defined in this Act, on the 
ground that such person is or was employed at a controlled mine or a controlled works, shall be 
entitled, in respect of such disease, to benefits under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1941 
(Act 30 of 1941) or any other law."
46 Mankayi (CC) [73].
47 Ibid [76],
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid [77],
so Ibid [77]-[78].
si Ibid [78].
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The Court then compared benefits and compensatory regimes in the two Acts and 
found an employee compensated under COIDA to be in a much better position than 
his counterpart who is compensated in terms of ODIMWA.52 An ODIMWA claimant 
benefits less than a claimant under COIDA and consequently lower levies are raised 
from employers by the ODIMWA fund.53 It did not surprise then, that ODIMWA is 
silent on the right to a delictual claim because the "drastic reduction in his 
compensation is obligatory."54
Khampepe J noted that on a plain reading of section 35(1) of COIDA the significant 
absence of any reference to ODIMWA, although ODIMWA was enacted more than 
twenty years prior to COIDA.55 Section 35(1) creates two interconnected outcomes; 
firstly it extinguishes the right of an employee to claim damages against his 
employer, and secondly it confines the employer’s liability to payment of 
compensation pursuant to COIDA.56 The two parts of the sentence cannot be 
disengaged by holding that the first part only applies to extinguish the employee's 
right to claim damages (in terms of both COIDA and ODIMWA) while the second 
part only applies to an employer’s liability pursuant to COIDA.57
Although the Constitutional Court agreed with the interpretation of the SCA 
regarding section 4 of the 1934 Act and section 7 of the 1941 Act,58 it considered the 
Petterson ruling59 as of limited value, as it did not deal with the claim of an 
employee who had no right to claim compensation under the 1941 Act as in 
Mankayi's case.60 The Court refused to accept that section 35(1) of COIDA could by 
implication quench the right to a delictual claim under ODIMWA as it would be 
“extraneous and cumbersome, but constitutes an unjustified imposition on the 
wording."61 Furthermore, contextually section 35(1) is placed within Chapter IV 
which explicitly regulates the way in which COIDA compensation should be
52 Ibid [79]—[87].
ss ibid  [88].
54 Ibid.
55 Ibid [91].
56 Ibid [92].
57 Ibid [93].
58 Ibid [95],
59 Applied by the SCA.
60 Mankayi (CC) [96]-[98].
«  Ibid [102],
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handled62 while no reference is made to ODIMWA, the diseases it compensates or is 
open to the inclusion of ODIMWA employees.63 While ODIMWA similarly directs 
how compensation is to be dealt with, it does not have any provision mirroring 
section 35(I) .64 The dissimilarity is even more noticeable considering that COIDA 
provides for increased compensation due to an employer’s negligence but ODIMWA 
does not, which leaves the ODIMWA claimant in a lesser position and the two Acts 
distinctive.65
The judgment acknowledged the enormous contribution made by mining to the 
economy of the Republic on account of mine workers' health and the consequential 
impact upon families and communities in general.66
It is respectfully submitted that the Constitutional Court correctly ruled in this 
matter taking into consideration the requirement of monetary contributions 
expected from mine workers at the inception of compensation for lung diseases in 
mining referred to in Chapter 2 of this study.67 It is furthermore respectfully 
proposed that the judgment renders the argument of the Defendant correct68 in that 
it places mine workers in a different and possibly better position in respect of the
right to institute delictual claim(s) against their employer in comparison to
employees in other industries who are exclusively dependant on COIDA; with 
section 35(1) of COIDA previously held by the Constitutional Court to validly 
preclude the right to claim delictually.69
It is suggested that the financial and legal impact flowing from this case will be felt 
in years to come as class action litigation has already commenced in a format that 
has not been seen in South Africa before. The proverbial floodgates have been 
opened if initial indications prove to be true, with at least three law firms 
representing an estimated 25 000 employees and dependents of deceased workers
62 Ibid [103],
63 Ibid [103]—[105] & [113].
64 Ibid [106].
65 Ibid [107]—[108].
66 Ibid [23] & [109]—[110].
67 Chapter 2 para 3.3 & Chapter 2 fn 127-129  supra.
68 Mankayi (CC) [74],
69 Jooste supra.
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who died as a result of silicosis.70 The financial impact of the claims becomes 
evident considering potentially 200 000 claimants from the SADC region with an 
estimated monetary value of R1 000 000 each in actions against 78 gold mines for 
the period of 1965 until present.71 Judgment against the mining companies might 
render the companies financially vulnerable; but as discussed supra in this study, 
due to the difficulties in proving negligence and claiming damages from employers, 
claimants may not be able to recover damages.
2.3. Interpretation through case law: Applicability of statutory provisions
2.3.1. Van De Venter v MEC of Education: Free State Province
The question arises as to whether unique factual circumstances surrounding an 
accident and/or injury may squash the applicability of section 35 and/or may create 
a right to a civil justice claim.
The Free State High Court (as it was known then) answered the question in the 
negative in the still unreported case of Van De Venter v MEC o f  Education: Free State 
Province.72 The Court considered the definitions of an "occupational injury" and "an 
accident arising out of and in the course of an employee's employment.." and held:73
...There is no magic in any of the two definitions. The crux of both 
definitions is to be found in the words personal injury. The injury 
which the applicant sustained during the course of the robbery was and 
remains an occupational injury. ... The provisions of the particular 
legislation have to be generously construed in favour of employees. 
W hether doing so is good or bad remains a debate for another day.
[41] It follows, therefore, that any personal injury sustained by an employee 
caused by any criminal act arising out of and during the course of an 
employee’s employment amounts to an accident as defined in section 1.
70 Bloomberg. 2013. Lawyers in talks to merge mine silicosis lawsuits. Retrieved on 07/03/2013 from 
http://www.moneyweb.co.za/mone5web-mining/lawyers-in-talks-to-merge-south-african-mine- 
silic. See also Kolver, L. 2012. Anglo case should strongly influence Juture silicosis claims -  lawyer. 
Retrieved on 07/03/2013 from http://www.miningweekly.com/article/anglo-case-should-strongly- 
influence-future-silicosis-claims-lawyer-2012-12-07-1.
71 Ibid.
72 Van De Venter v MEC o f  Education: Free State Province (3545/2010] [2012] ZAFSHC 185 at
[40]-[44], Hereinafter: Van De Venter.
’ 3 Ibid [40]—[41].
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Section 35(1) precludes a delictual claim irrespective whether the employer 
"wrongfully neglected to ensure that the applicant was employed in a reasonably safe 
environment";74 and the constutional validity of section 35 has been confirmed by the 
Constitutional Court in Jooste.75 Safe working conditions do not create an absolute 
duty of care and is measured against community policy76 and the conduct of the 
employee77 who breached some of the protective measures instituted by the 
employer.78
2.3.2. Free State Consolidated Gold Mines Bpk h/a Western Holdings 
Goudmyn v Labuschagne
The Labour Appeal Court ruled in Free State Consolidated Gold Mines Bpk h /a  
Western Holdings Goudmyn v Labuschagne,79 an appeal from a decision by the 
Industrial Court, in which Labuschagne80 contended that the employer committed 
an unfair labour practice when the employer redeployed him irrespective of his 
back condition of which the employer was aware, on a crane which was difficult for 
him to handle. The employee expressed his disapproval to the redeployment.81 
Remedies in the form of damages tailored as an application for unfair dismissal and 
unfair labour practice were pleaded in the Court below verbatim:
7.1.2 Dat die agbare h o f  sal vind dat die respondent direk verantw oordelik was 
vir die m ediese toestand en agteruitgang van die applikant en 
skadevergoeding sal toestaan om  die applikant se finansiele posisie te 
herstel in term e van skade w at g ele i [sic] is onderm eer finansiele skade, 
verm oenskade en toekom stige skade, soos w at in die hofvoorgele  sal word.
7.1.3 D at d ie h o fe n ig e  m ed iese hulp w at aan  die app likan t verleen kan w ord  
sa l toestaan  en o o k  en ige hulp [w at] a lreeds verleen is sa l hersien  en oo k  
v erdere hulp sa l toestaan  en b e p a a l
7.1.4 Dat die respondent die applikant se finansiele posisie in oenskou neem  en 
herstel tot op die vlak van w at dit was voor die beeindiging van diens.
74 Ibid [45].
7s Ibid [45].
76 Ibid [48] & [50].
77 The Applicant in casu.
78 Van De Venter [51].
79 Free State Consolidated Gold Mines Bpk h/a Western Holdings Goudmyn v Labuschagne (1999) 20 
ILJ 2823 (LAC). Hereinafter: Labuschagne. Retrieved on 26/05/2012 from http://heinonline.org.
80 The employee.
81 Labuschagne [1], [11]—[12].
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7.1.5 Dat d ie app likan t v ergoed  w ord vir verliese g ely  tydens d ie beeindiging  
van sy diens en o o k  daarna, a so o k  w at in d ie toekom s m ag volg.
7.1.6 Enige an d er  kom pen sasie w at d ie h o fin  ag  sou neem.
7.1.7 Enige altern atiew e verligting w at d ie h o fa s g e s k ik  sou aanvaar.82 
(See footnote 82 for English translation).
The Court held that the employer is indemnified from all liabilities83 by virtue of 
section 35 of COIDA even if the employer acted blameworthy, the provisions of 
COIDA’s section 35 cannot be avoided by masking it as an unfair labour practice.84
2.4. Fault-based claims: Delictual claims
It does not fall within the scope of this study to fully examine the law relating to 
claims for delictual damages but it will be prudent to give attention to some aspects 
that are of importance in the consideration of these types of claims; and more 
importantly to note that it is fault-based while workers’ compensatory schemes are 
distinguishable by the no-fault principle.
According to Neethling,85 a delict may be defined as "the act of a person that in a 
wrongful and culpable way causes harm to another". All of five elements86 have to 
be satisfied before a claimant will have a valid claim which comprises of:
82 Ibid [2]. Translated into English it means: 7.1.2 That the honourable court will find that the 
respondent was directly responsible for the medical condition and deterioration of the 
applicant and will grant damages to restore the applicant's financial position in order to 
recover damages suffered, including financial damages, pecuniary loss and future loss, as will 
be presented to the court
7.1.3 That the court will grant any medical assistance to the applicant that may be granted as 
well as review of any assistance already given and will determine and grant further assistance.
7.1.4 That the respondent will consider the applicant's financial position and restore to the 
level prior to the termination of employment.
7.1.5 That the applicant be compensated for losses suffered at the termination of employment 
and thereafter, as well as future losses.
7.1.6 Any other compensation that the court would take into consideration.
7.1.7 Any alternative relief that the court would accept as appropriate.
83 The Court held in Labuschagne at [14] that s 35 specifically relieves the employer of all delictual 
liabilities and not only damage items specified in the Act.
84 Labuschagne [13]—[14].
85 Neethling, J, Potgieter, JM, Visser, PJ. 2006. Law o f  Delict 5th edition. Durban: Lexisnexis 
Butterworths. At 4.
86 The five elements: conduct, wrongfulness, fault, causation and damage. See Neethling et al 4.
260
• Conduct: a voluntary commissio or an omissio but liability for an omission 
will arise only where a positive duty to act exists.87
• Wrongfulness: the conduct complained of must be legally reprehensible and 
is tested according to the legal convictions (boni mores) of society.88
• Fault: once the wrongfulness of the conduct is proven,89 it is essential to 
establish whether the defendant acted intentionally (with dolus)90 or 
negligently (culpa),91 either of which is adequate for liability to attach.92
• Causation: a nexus needs to be established between the conduct and the 
harm caused; in this regard both factual causation93 and legal causation are 
considered.94 The purpose of legal causation is to limit the scope of factual 
causation.95 If the consequence of the action is "too remote" to have been 
foreseen by an objective, reasonable person, the defendant will be saved 
from liability.96
• Damage: the action must have resulted in loss or harm to the claimant in a 
form considered to be worthy of legal protection97 Damages may take the 
form of patrimonial loss98 or non-patrimonial damages.99
87 Neethling eta l  25-26.
88 Ibid 33-36 .
89 Except for in limited cases of strict liability which requires neither intention nor negligence as a 
prerequisite for liability.
90 Wilfulness is satisfied when a person acts with the desire to bring about harmful consequences 
and is substantially certain that such consequences will follow. Accountability is a prerequisite 
for fault: to be at fault, the defendant must be culpae capax, having the ability to know the 
difference between right and wrong and to act accordingly. Neethling et al 118-120.
91 The "reasonable person" sets an objective standard for negligence according to Neethling et al 
127-130.
92 Neethling eta l  117.
93 Factual causation is determined by considering the available facts and relevant probabilities by
applying a variety of theories according to Neethling et al 165-177.
94 Neethling et al 165.
95 Neethling et al 178. Applying legal causality it is determined which of different harmful 
consequences following a harmful event, ought to be attached to the "tortfeasor."
96 Neethling et al 178-180. The SCA expressly applied in S v Mokgethi 1990 1 SA (A) [40]-[41]
preference for a flexible text based on reasonableness, fairness and justice, or policy and 
normative considerations in determining legal causality. The High Court at [55] and the SCA at 
[17] found the conduct of the co-workers (by shooting at the vehicle in which Rieck was held
hostage) in the two Rieck rulings (discussed supra) as contradicting the reasonable person’s
conduct in similar circumstances.
97 Neethling et al 204.
98 Actual and prospective monetary loss, i.e. where the claimant incurred medical expenses and 
loss of earning capacity.
99 Damages that do not form part of a person's financial estate, but inclusive inter alia of 
compensation (solace or satisfaction for pain and suffering). See Neethling et al 204-207 .
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Furthermore, it will be necessary to consider the influence of the Apportionment of 
Damages Act No. 34 of 1956100 and the Prescription Act No. 68 of 1969. Pursuant to 
section 12(1) of the Prescription Act, prescription will start running101 as soon as 
the debt is due except when the creditor is being held in the dark as to the existence 
of the debt in which case prescription will only commence when the claimant 
becomes aware or reasonably ought to have known of the existence of the debt.102 A 
debt only becomes due when a complete cause of action is established and all 
evidentiary facts have been established.103
It is submitted that irrespective of the outcome of the silicosis delictual claims, the 
mining industry will have to improve current preventative measures to protect the 
health and safety of mine employees. It has been known for more than a century 
that dusty atmospheric conditions may lead to fibrotic changes in the lungs which 
with time lead to silicosis; and a person suffering from silicosis to be more 
susceptible of contracting tuberculosis known already then as the dual condition of 
"silico-tuberculosis" or "tuberculo-silicosis".104
i°o s i ( l ) ( a )  provides as that "Where any person suffers damage which is caused partly by his own 
fault and partly by the fault of any other person, a claim in respect of that damage shall not be 
defeated by reason of the fault of the claimant, but the damages recoverable in respect thereof 
shall be reduced by the court to such extent as the court may deem just and equitable having 
regard to the degree in which the claimant was at fault in relation to the damage" and s 2 : 
"Where it is alleged that two or more persons are jointly or severally liable in delict to a third 
person (hereinafter referred to as the plaintiff) for the same damage, such persons (hereinafter 
referred to as joint wrongdoers) may be sued in the same action."
101 "12. When prescription begins to run
(1) Subject to the provisions of subsections (2) and (3), prescription shall commence to run as 
soon as the debt is due.
(2) If the debtor wilfully prevents the creditor from coming to know of the existence of the
debt, prescription shall not commence to run until the creditor becomes aware of the
existence of the debt.
(3) A debt shall not be deemed to be due until the creditor has knowledge of the identity of the 
debtor and of the facts from which the debt arises: Provided that a creditor shall be deemed 
to have such knowledge if he could have acquired it by exercising reasonable care."
102 S 12(2). Also Visser, PJ, Potgieter, JM, Steynberg, L, Floyd, TB. 2008. Skadevergoedingsreg. 2nd
edition. Cape Town: Juta and Company Ltd. At 141. Hereinafter: Visser et al.
103 Visser et al at 1.3.1 in the case of Coetzee v £-4 Railways & Harbours 1933 CPD 565 where the 
Court cited from Abrahamse & Sons (Pty.) Limited v S.A. Railways and Harbours (1933 C.P.D. 
626): “The proper legal meaning of the expression “cause of action” is the entire set of facts 
which gives rise to an enforceable claim, and includes every fact which is material to be proved 
to entitle a plaintiff to succeed in his claim. It includes all that a plaintiff must set out in his 
declaration in order to disclose a cause of action."
104 See Chapter 2 para 3.3. and ILO Silicosis Conference Report 216.
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The South African Minister of Mines in the Union Government appointed a 
committee in 1912 to explore:105
the elaboration, introduction, and operation of a uniform and systematic 
standard of the practical methods which should be applied to every form of 
mining work in detail, both in regard to general and local ventilation and to 
dust prevention, in order to combat at every point the conditions which 
produce miners' phthisis.
The Committee reported back in 1916 on the conditions and specifically mining 
activities that were found to be the most hazardous in creating conditions leading to 
silico-tuberculosis. In particular rock-drill operators were frequently exposed to 
conditions described as "nothing less than appalling."106 Some of the preventative 
measures identified by the Committee e.g. ventilation, the use of water to wet down 
and containment of dust and infection control are still applied presently albeit 
methods have been refined and modernised.107
The standard of care owed by an employer to his employees is reasonableness; and 
it is submitted that mining companies have clearly been aware of the duty of care 
owed to their employees for a very long time and had the knowledge and means to 
prevent dreaded diseases in relatively easy and inexpensive ways rendering 
prevention reasonable in the circumstances.
2.5. Interpretation through case law: Claims for increased compensation
Section 56 of COIDA108 provides for increased compensation due to the negligence 
of the harmed employee's employer or certain categories of employees in the same 
enterprise who are included in the definition.109 It has been a concern for a long
105 United States of America. Bureau of Labor Statistics. 1917. Miner's Phthisis on the
Witwatersrand, Transvaal. Monthly Review o f  the Bureau o f  Labor Statistics 4: 102-105.
Retrieved on 02/03/2013 from http://heinonline.org.
Ibid.
107 Ibid.
108 See also s 43 of the 1941 Act.
109 COIDA s 56(1) cited supra in this Chapter at 1.1. and 1941 Act s 43(1).
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time that this provision is not utilised by employees. Benjamin110 described the 
number of claims instituted for increased compensation as "few and far between" 
and of a "miniscule proportion of cases handled by the commissioner", referring to 
the ten years preceding February 1985 seeing only 156 claims instituted of which 
only 30 succeeded.111 1985 saw 24 891 injuries reported (2 334 mortalities and
1 081 categorised as seriously disabling) but only 27 claims lodged for increased 
compensation and only 4 were successful.112 Benjamin attributed it to relative 
ignorance and a lack of access to investigation records held by the two 
inspectorates, which consequently do not lead to improved safety and health at 
workplaces.113
Similar sentiments were aired in a recent article asking whether this provision is 
"serving its intended purpose?" if only a few claims succeed.114 The authors see the 
answer in the negligence-based rules that pre-dated compensatory legislation and 
necessitated enactment of compensatory laws, as it has historically "been proven 
that many injured workers tend to go uncompensated under negligence-based 
compensation rules."115
The last Annual Report of the Compensation Fund reporting on the outcome of 
section 56 claims was the 2004/2005 Annual Report and the first available Report 
is the 2001/2002. The period 2001 to 2005 is therefore used for the purposes of 
analysing the trends in dealing with these claims.116
110 Benjamin, P. 1987. Additional Compensation for Accidents at Work: An Underutilized Remedy. 
Indus. L.J. 8 :1 5 -2 0 . Retrieved on 15/04/2012 from http://heinonline.org.
111 Ibid.
112 Ibid.
i'13 Ibid.
114 Mushai 10-12. (Chapter 2 fn 25).
115 Ibid 12.
116 South Africa (Republic). Department of Labour. 2002. Compensation Fund Annual Report 
2001/2002. Pretoria: Government Printing Works. At 11 & 16.
South Africa (Republic). Department of Labour. 2003. Compensation Fund Annual Report 
2002/2003. Pretoria: Government Printing Works. At 14 & 22.
South Africa (Republic). Department of Labour. 2004. Compensation Fund Annual Report 
2003/2004. Pretoria: Government Printing Works. At 15 & 30.
South Africa (Republic). Department of Labour. 2005. Compensation Fund Annual Report 
2004/2005. Pretoria: Government Printing Works. At 18 & 36.
All retrieved on 12/08/2011 from http://www.labour.gov.za/documents/annual-reports/annual- 
reports.
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SECTION 5 6  CLAIMS
Period : 2 0 0 1 /2 0 0 2 2 0 0 2 /2 0 0 3 2 0 0 3 /2 0 0 4 2 0 0 4 /2 0 0 5 TOTAL AVERAGE
Total: 126 128 130 133 5 1 7 129.3
Withdrawn/
Abandoned: 18 7 5 28 5 8 14.5
Not lodged in pre­
scribed manner: 7 11 6 30 5 4 13.5
Heard: Successful: 0 3 2 15 2 0 5
Heard: Dismissed: 5 7 2 0 1 4 3.5
Heard: Judgment 
Reserved: 2 0 0 1 3 0.75
Carried over from 
the previous year: 99 94 100 115 4 0 8 102
New applications 
received: 27 34 30 18 1 0 9 27.25
All Claims: 
Number of 
compensation 
awards: 45 236 42  693 53 781 42 668 184  378 46 095
It is submitted that an analysis of the numbers contained in the Annual Reports 
shows that on average 46 095 awards are made annually by the Fund in respect of 
permanent disablement which could indicate a serious injury or disease and an 
entitlement to institute a claim for increased compensation in cases of negligent 
exposure to harm but only a small fraction of claims for increased compensation are 
lodged annually (27.25). An even smaller number of the section 56 claims lodged 
are heard and a trifling number succeeds i.e. 5. The vast majority are either 
dismissed or repudiated for procedural reasons and even more are abandoned, 
possibly due to the extremely slow process prescribed by the Rules of the 
Commissioner that mimics the rules of civil procedure;117 and tardy management of 
these matters resulting in lost evidence and loss of contact with claimants as is clear 
from the huge number carried over from year to year without being finalised.118
The Compensation Fund acknowledged the need for speedy finalisation of claims 
for increased compensation in the protection of vulnerable groups in its Strategic 
Plan 2013/4-2018/9 by aiming to finalise claims where the facts are undisputed 
within 60 days from receipt.119
117 COIDA: GN 983 (Government Gazette 15785 of 27 May 1994): Rules, Forms and Particulars. Rule 
1 of the Rules prescribes the procedure to be followed in exchanging pleadings by the parties.
118 In this regard see also the administrative problems at the Compensation Fund discussed in 
Chapter 3 para 1.1.
119 South Africa (Republic). Department of Labour. 2013. Compensation Fund Strategic Plan 2013/4­
2018/9. Pretoria: Government Printing Works. At 18. Retrieved on 26/06/2013 from 
http: //www.labour.gov.za/documents/annual- reports/compensation- fund- strategic- plan- 2 0 12 - 
2017/2013-2019/compensation-fund-strategic-plan-2013-2019.
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The low success rate is indicative of the high burden of proof on employees to prove 
the complete blameworthiness of the employer as any contributory negligence 
(pure contributory negligence)120 by the employee renders a complete defence to 
the employer whereas comparative negligence only renders a partial defence.121
In the event of a successful claim, compensation is limited, with the maximum no­
fault compensation limited to 75% of an injured worker’s earnings at the time of the 
accident;122 and section 56(4) limits the amount of increased compensation to:123
4 (a) If the Director-General is satisfied that the accident or occupational 
disease was due to negligence as referred to in subsection (1), he shall 
award the applicant such additional compensation as he m ay deem  
equitable.
(b) The amount of such additional compensation together with any other 
compensation awarded in term s of this Act shall n ot exceed  th e 
am ount o f th e pecuniary  lo ss which the applicant has in the opinion 
of the Director-General suffered or can reasonably be expected to 
suffer as a direct result of the said accident or occupational disease.
It is submitted that the remedial nature and purpose of compensatory legislation 
(as the Court said: "The policy of the Act is to assist workmen as far as possible")124 
is not consistent with the limiting effects of sections 35 and 56 of COIDA.
120 McKinnon, RC. 2013. Changing the Workplace Safety Culture. 17. Bosa Roca (USA): Taylor & Francis 
Inc. Retrieved on 24/07/2013 from http://books.google.co.za/books?id=wlwDgLJ5hwC&pg=PA 
16&lpg=PA16&dq=history+of+south+african+workmen's+compensation+act+1941&source=bl&o 
ts=gFAmrx9iXD&sig=UIkaveljMLA-s01AVrkS2Egmuw&hl=en&sa=X&ei=ldzwUen0F9CDhQfd2IC4 
Ag&ved=0CDsQ6AEwAzgU#v=onepage&q=history%20of%20south%20african%20workmen's% 
20compensation%20act%201941&f=false.
121 jn pre(j Saber (Pty) Ltd v Franks 1949 (1) SA 388 (A) the words "due to" in s 43(1) was construed 
to mean "caused by" and consequently the accident was "caused by the respondent’s own 
negligence or if it was caused by the combined negligence of the appellant and the respondent, the 
respondent is not entitled to recover increased compensation..." as at 403.
122 COIDA Schedule 4.
123 COIDA s 56(4). Own emphasis. As COIDA is lacking policy documents, no published guidance is 
available in respect of the calculation of the monetary value in successful cases and it is 
distinguishable from delictual claims for damages which are accompanied by actuarial statements of 
claims.
124 Davis supra at Chapter 3 para 3.2.2 supra.
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2.5.1. Looyen v Simmer and Jack Mines Ltd. and Another
Interpretation of the right to claim increased compensation due to the negligence of 
the employer125 led to a number of court cases after the promulgation of the 1941 
Act seeking clarity on the categories of employees that would satisfy the provision 
e.g. in Looyen v Simmer and Jack Mines Ltd. and Another126 in which a shift boss was 
held to be "in charge o f ... any branch or department" of the employer’s business.127 
The relationship between the section removing the right to civil action and the right 
to increased compensation is stated as follows:128
There is no doubt that sec. 7 deprives the workmen ... of the right they 
otherwise would have to sue their employer for personal injury caused by 
his negligence or that of his servants acting in the course of their 
employment. There is equally, no doubt that sec. 43  applies to relieve the 
w orkm en... of some of the disabling effect of sec. 7 ...
The Court noted that Parliament did not intend to restore common law liability 
entirely by covering accidents caused by co-workers who are not in authoritative 
positions but rather the intention is to hold the employer liable for increased 
compensation in cases where a person appointed to be in charge of a part of the 
business was negligent.129
2.5.2. Grace v Workmen's Compensation Commissioner and Another
The Court below found that a patent defect existed in the machine which the 
employer failed to rectify and caused Grace's130 hand to be severed, but it also held 
that contributory negligent conduct of the part of Grace was a direct or proximate 
cause of the accident.131 The appeal turned around the question whether the Court 
below ought to have applied section 1(1) of the Apportionment of Damages Act in
125 S 43 of the 1941 Act and COIDA s 56.
126 Looyen v Simmer and Jack Mines Ltd. and Another 1952 (4) SA 547 (A.D.). Hereinafter: Looyen.
127 ibid 557 B.
128 Ibid 554 H-555 A.
129 Ibid 557 A.
130 The appealing employee.
131 Grace v Workmen's Compensation Commissioner and Another 1967 (4) SA 137 (T) at 138 A-C. 
Hereinafter: Grace.
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Grace v Workmen's Compensation Commissioner and Another132 which provides as 
follows:133
(a) Where any person suffers damage which is caused partly by his own 
fault and partly by the fault of any other person, a claim in respect of 
that damage shall not be defeated by reason of the fault of the claimant 
but the damages recoverable in respect thereof shall be reduced by the 
court to such extent as the court may deem just and equitable having 
regard to the degree in which the claimant was at fault in relation to the 
damage.
(b) Damage shall for the purpose of paragraph (a) be regarded as having 
been caused by a person’s fault notwithstanding that another person 
had an opportunity of avoiding the consequences thereof and 
negligently failed to do so.
The Transvaal High Court134 contrasted the word "damages" as in the 
Apportionment of Damages Act to the word "compensation" in the 1941 Workmen's 
Compensation Act.135 The Court followed the interpretation of section 43 by the 
Appeal Court in Fred Saber (Pty) Ltd v Franks 1949 (1) SA 388 (A)136 as the decision 
is binding save it be shown that section 1(1) of the Apportionment of Damages Act 
(which had been promulgated since the Fred Saber ruling) effectively amended 
section 43 of the 1941 Act which would render the Fred Saber decision no longer 
applicable.137 As a matter of general rule in interpretation of law, an earlier 
provision is amended by the later one if two provisions are inconsistent and 
irreconcilable.138 Nicholas J held that the two provisions are not inconsistent 
because section 1(1) of the Apportionment of Damages Act only relates to claims for 
damages while section 43 of the 1941 Act only relates to claims for increased 
compensation which is "compensation" and not "damages", a distinction drawn by 
the Act itself as section 7 saves employers from claims for "damages".139 The High
132 Ibid 138 C-E.
133 The Apportionment of Damages Act s l ( l ) (a )  abolished the common law doctrine of 
contributory negligence whereby any portion of negligence by the claimant constitutes a 
complete defence and s l ( l ) (b )  abolished the so-called "last opportunity" rule whereby the 
person who has the last opportunity to avoid the damage was held solely blameworthy.
134 As it was called then.
135 Grace 139 B-C.
136 Hereinafter: Fred Saber.
137 Grace 139 G-H.
138 Ibid 139 H.
139 Ibid 140 A-C.
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Court also relied on Hoexter JA in Table Bay Stevedores (Pty) Ltd v South African 
Railways and Harbours 1959 (1) SA 386 holding that:140
It is dear that sec. 7 of the Act deprives a workman of his common law right 
of suing his employer for damages in respect of patrimonial loss caused by 
the employer’s negligence. The workman is entitled to compensation only 
from his employer; it is true that, in terms of sec. 43 of the Act, the 
compensation may be increased if the accident of the workman is due to the 
employer’s negligence, but what the workman recovers from his employer 
under the Act remains compensation and nothing but compensation.
Nicholas J consequently held that the Apportionment of Damages Act did not apply 
to claims for increased compensation.141
COIDA retained the words "damages” in section 35 of the Act and "increased 
compensation" in section 56 which renders Grace still authoritative.
2.5.3. Young v Workmen's Compensation Commissioner and Another
The Transvaal Division of the High Court142 applied Fred Saber and Grace in Young v 
Workmen's Compensation Commissioner and Another143 by mouth of Le Roux J144 
who encapsulated the principles applied in previous rulings as follows:145
As a prerequisite for a claim for additional or increased compensation, the 
Act requires proof by a workman that the accident in which he/she was 
injured was 'due to' the negligence of his employer or a person entrusted 
with the management of the business or any branch thereof of the employer, 
or due to a patent defect in the condition of the premises, works, plant, 
material or machinery used in such business of which the employer was 
aware but negligently failed to remedy. Once the workman surmounts this 
hurdle, it is open to the employer to show that the workman was also 
negligent and that his negligence contributed to the accident and therefore 
to his damage. It is now trite law that the words 'due to' mean 'caused solely 
by', as was decided in Fred Saber (Pty) Ltd v Franks...
140 Grace 140 E & Table Bay Stevedores (Ply) Ltd v South African Railways and Harbours 1959 (1) 
SA 386 at 390.
Grace 140 F-G.
142 As it was known then although the province of Transvaal was dissolved in 1994.
143 Young v Workmen's Compensation Commissioner and Another 1998 (3) SA 1085 (T). 
Hereinafter: Young.
144 Maritz AJ concurring.
145 Young 1 0 9 1 A-E.
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It has also been held authoritatively that 'compensation' in terms of the Act 
is not 'damage' as contemplated in the Apportionment of Damages Act 34 of 
1956, and that upon proof of contributory negligence on the part of the 
workman he cannot succeed with an application for increased 
compensation in terms of s 43.
Although the case was judged in 1998, it was determined by virtue of the 1941 Act, 
as the claimant was very seriously injured on 9 December 1989 during the recital of 
the musical play "Camelot" and was subsequently awarded 100% permanent 
disablement by the Compensation Commissioner.146 The accident happened in a 
situation of urgency to move from one scene to another and Young was made aware 
of the dangers and the urgency involved during rehearsals.147 During the 
performance in darkness, she got confused, turned to the wrong side and fell into 
the void. No warning signs or appropriate precautionary measures were put in 
place to prevent harm to the actors and thus the employer was found negligent.148 
Consequently the next question to be answered was whether Young was 
contributory negligent because she had the last opportunity to avoid the accident 
and harm to herself.149 The Court a quo found contributory negligence on the part 
of Young as it "can only be attributed to her own negligence in losing concentration 
at that stage."150 The High Court took a different approach to the Tribunal by 
holding that "once it is conceded that the employer was negligent in creating a 
dangerous situation without proper safeguards, the onus is on it to prove negligence 
on the part of the workman."151 In casu the Court held that due to the urgency, 
inexperience and lack of preparation in dark conditions, Young panicked and under 
stress took the wrong option which was not unreasonable in the circumstances.152
According to the doctrine of non-culpable error of judgment a person finding 
himself in "an emergency created by someone else is not negligent if he makes an 
error of judgment and takes the wrong option under stress, provided the option
146 Ibid 1092 D-F.
Ibid 1093 B-F & 1094 H-J.
mb ibid 1093 F -1094 G.
i«  Ibid 1094 H.
iso Ibid 1094 I.
isi Ibid 1095 A-C.
152 ibid 1095 C-G.
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which he takes is not an unreasonable one under the circumstances."153 The onus 
rests on the employer to prove contributory negligence which they were 
unsuccessful to do.154
2.6. Summary
The South African situation may be summarised as follows:
• The general rule is that civil actions by employees against their employers is 
prohibited in respect of occupationally-acquired injuries and diseases;155
• An exception to the rule has been identified, being action that is open to 
claimants pursuant to ODIMWA;156
• Claims by virtue of section 56 of COIDA remain statutory-based but have the 
characteristic of quasi-civil actions;157
• Immunity against civil action by virtue of COIDA is extended to employers 
and certain categories of employees in authoritative positions;158
• The definitions of an "occupational injury" and an "occupational disease";159 
an "employee" and an "employer"160 determine whether an action will be 
barred and an employer be saved from same.
• The right of action against third parties is retained.161
3. CANADA
Chief Justice Meredith introduced subrogation of the right to a common law action 
for damages for compensation to be obtained via an administrative process based
153 Ibid 1 0 9 5  F - G .
154 Ibid 1 0 9 6  E - F .
155 Chapter 6 paras 2.1; 2.2 & 2.3 supra.
156 Chapter 6 para 2.2.3 supra.
157 Chapter 6 para 2.5 supra.
158 Chapter 6 paras 2.1 & 2.5 supra.
159 Chapter 4 supra.
160 Chapter 5 supra.
161 Chapter 5 para 2.8 supra.
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on a no-fault principle.162 Ison163 points out that the general rule determines that:164
No claim in respect of a compensable disability lies by court action against 
the employer of the injured worker, any worker of that employer, any other 
employer covered by the Act, or any worker of such other employer.
Differences exist between the provisions in the different jurisdictions but in all 
jurisdictions the statutory bar relates to the status of the parties i.e. employer165 and
162 Meredith Report at 9 & 17 that reads: "The bill would, in my opinion, fail to do justice to a large 
body of employees who will not be entitled to compensation under Part I, if it did not provide 
for a substantial modification of the common law as to the liability of the employer to answer in 
damages to an employee who is injured owing to the negligence of the employer or his 
servants.
According to the common law it is a term of the contract of service that the servant takes upon 
himself the risks incidental to his employment (popularly called the assumption of risk rule), 
and that this risk includes that of injury at the hands of fellow-servants, (popularly called the 
doctrine of common employment). The doctrine of common employment is an exception to the 
general rule that the master is responsible for the acts of his servants when engaged in his 
work, and has rightly, I think, often been declared unfair and inequitable...
The unfairness of this doctrine has been recognized by the Imperial Parliament and by the 
Legislature of this Province in the enactment of employers' liability acts which have modified it 
but to a very limited extent...
In my opinion there is no reason why this objectionable doctrine should not, as one of the 
provisions of Part II of the draft bill provides, be entirely abrogated.
The draft bill also provides for the abrogation of the assumption of risk rule.
The rule is based upon the assumption that the wages which a workman receives include 
compensation for the risks incidental to his employment which he has to run. That is, in my 
judgment, a fallacy resting upon the erroneous assumption that the workman is free to work or 
not to work as he pleases and therefore to fix the wages for which he will work, and that in 
fixing them he will take into account the risk of being killed or injured which is incidental to the 
employment in which he engages.
Another rule of the common law is unfair to the workman. Although the employer has been 
guilty of negligence, if the workman has been guilty of what is called contributory negligence 
and his injury was occasioned by their joint negligence the employer is not liable. The injustice 
of this rule consists in this, that though the employer may have been guilty of the grossest 
negligence, if the workman has been guilty of contributory negligence, however slight it may 
have been, and his injury was occasioned by the joint negligence, the employer is not liable.
It is proposed by the draft bill to substitute for this rule that of comparative negligence as it is 
called, and provide that contributory negligence shall not be a bar to recovery by the workman 
or his dependants but shall be taken into account in the assessment of damages."
And "It must also be borne in mind that the workman is required, as the price of the 
compensation he is to receive, to surrender his right to damages under the common law, if his 
injury happens under circumstances entitling him by the common law to recover or, if he would 
be entitled to recover only under the Workmen's Compensation for Injuries Act, his right to the 
like damages as he would be entitled to at common law limited, however, to an amount not 
exceeding three years' wages or $1,500, whichever is the larger sum."
Ison 1989 :163 .
164 Ibid.
165 Chapter 5 para 3.2 supra.
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em p lo y ee166 pursu ant to  th e re lev an t A ct.167 In som e ju risd iction s, th e  em ployee 
m ay opt for a civil ju stice  claim  or to claim  w orkm en 's com p en sation .168 If the 
em ployee claim s com pensation , th e right to a civil claim  for dam ages is subrogated  
to  th e  Board  and if  th e  Board ex ercises  its right, a civil claim  by th e em ployee will be 
d isallow ed.169 In addition to  th e  sta tu to ry  subrogation  w h ere applicable, w h eth er 
an em ployee has a valid s ta tu to ry  w o rk ers ' com p en sation  claim  will d eterm in e if  
th e  right to com m on law  to rt  action  is open to him .170
3.1. Statutory provisions absolving an employer from liability
An exam ple o f th e p articu lar p rovisions can  be found in the A ct o f Newfoundland 
(th e  an teced en t provisions form ed th e  su b ject m atter o f a con stitu tion al 
ch a llen g e)171 th a t prov id es:172
C om pensation  in stead  o f actio n
44.(1) The right to compensation provided by this Act is instead of rights 
and rights of action, statutory or otherwise, to which a worker or his or 
her dependents are entitled against an employer or a worker because 
of an injury in respect of which compensation is payable or which 
arises in the course of the worker's employment.
(2) A worker, his or her personal representative, his or her dependents or 
the employer of the worker has no right of action in respect of an injury 
against an employer or against a worker of that employer unless the 
injury occurred otherwise than in the conduct of the operations usual 
in or incidental to the industry carried on by the employer.
(3) An action does not lie for the recovery of compensation under this Act 
and claims for compensation shall be determined by the commission.173
166 Chapter 5 para 3.1 supra.
167 Ison 198 9 :1 6 3 -1 6 5 .
168 Alberta s 22; British Columbia s 10; Manitoba s 195; New Brunswick ss 10 ,11  & 12; Yukon s 51; 
Newfoundland ss 4 4 ,4 4 .1 ,4 5  & 46; Nova Scotia ss 30, 31 & 105(2); Nunavut s 64; Ontario s 30; 
Prince Edward Island s 11; Quebec ss 446 & Saskatchewan s 40.
169 Ison 1989:171 .
170 See Chapter 3 para 4.2.4 (the City o f  Medicine Hat ruling).
171 The current provisions in force have not been changed materially from the previous enactment.
172 Similar provisions can be found in the Acts of Alberta ss 21, 22, 22.1 & 23; British Columbia s 
10; Manitoba ss 9, 9.1, 10, 12, 13, 60 .8 (l)(b ), 68(4) & 112; New Brunswick ss 9, 10, 11 & 12; 
Newfoundland and Labrador ss 4 4 ,4 4 .1 ,4 5  & 46; Nunavut ss 64, 65 & 66; Nova Scotia ss 28, 29, 
30, 31, 32 & 33; Ontario ss 26, 27, 28, 29, 30 & 31; Prince Edward Island ss 11, 12, 13 & 88; 
Quebec ss 438 -453 ; Saskatchewan ss 3 9 -4 4  & 166-168 ; Yukon ss 50 & 51 & Government 
Employee's Compensation Act ss 9 ,1 0 ,1 1  & 12.
17 3  s  44( 1 ) replaced the repealed s 32 with minimal changes. It formed part of Reference re.
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44.1 (1) Section 44  shall not apply where the worker is injured or killed
(a) while being transported in the course of the worker's 
employment by a mode of transportation in respect of which 
public liability insurance is required to be carried; or
(b) as a result of an accident involving the use of a motor vehicle by 
the worker or another person, in the course of the worker's 
employment.
No compensation
W h e re  actio n  allow ed
45 .(1 ) Where a worker sustains an injury in the course of his or her 
employment in circumstances which entitle him or her or his or her 
dependents to an action
(a) against some person other than an employer or worker;
(b) against an employer or against a worker of that employer where 
the injury occurred otherwise than in the conduct of the 
operations usual in or incidental to the industry carried on by 
the employer; or
(c) where section 44.1 applies, the worker or his or her 
dependents, where they are entitled to compensation, may 
claim compensation or may bring an action.
(2) The worker or his or her dependents shall make an election under 
subsection (1) within 3 months of the injury and an application for 
compensation is a valid election for the purpose of this section.
(3) Where the worker or his or her dependents elect to bring an action, he 
or she or they shall immediately serve notice in writing of the election 
on the commission.
C om m ission d ecid es If a ctio n  p ro h ib ited
46. Where an action in respect of an injury is brought against an employer 
or a worker by a worker or his or her dependent, the commission has 
jurisdiction upon the application of a party to the action to adjudicate 
and determine whether the action is prohibited by this Act.174
The Canadian compensatory schemes categorise employers into divisions; and 
indemnity is generally provided to all employers within the scope of the Act and not 
only the injured employee's own employer and/or colleagues while the right to 
recover from third parties is preserved175 as was shown in the case of Budge.176
174 S 46 replaced the repealed s 32 with minimal changes and was under consideration in Reference re.
175 Alberta ss 21 & 23; British Columbia ss 10, 96, 113; Manitoba ss 9, 9.1, 10, 12, 13, 60 .8(l)(b ), 
68(4) & 112; New Brunswick ss 10 ,11  & 12; Newfoundland ss 44,44.1 , 45 & 46; Nova Scotia ss 
28 & 29; Nunavut s 62; Ontario ss 26 -31 ; Prince Edward Island ss 11-13 ; Quebec ss 438-445 ; 
Saskatchewan ss 3 9 -4 4 ,1 6 6 -1 6 8  & Yukon ss 50-51.
176 Chapter 3 para 4.2.3 supra.
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3.2. Interpretation through case law: Constitutional rulings
Ison177 opined that the bar on tort actions could be legislated inconsistently by the 
different Legislators before the Canadian Charter of Rights came into operation 
which rendered decisions vulnerable to constitutional challenges. Tort actions could 
previously have been barred irrespective whether the condition the worker 
suffered from was covered by workers’ compensation or not. Ison gives the example 
of a worker suffering from occupationally-induced stress, who would have been 
barred from pursuing a court action for damages, irrespective of the fact that it was 
considered as a non-compensable condition.178
3.2.1. Reference re; Workers' Compensation Act
The Constitutional validity of the subrogation of the worker's common law right to 
sue for damages against his employer was considered in Reference re: Workers' 
Compensation Act, 1983 (Nfld.), ss. 32, 34 ,1987  CanLII 118 (NL CA) by the Supreme 
Court of Newfoundland sitting as an appeal court.179 This ruling was also considered 
by the South African Constitutional Court when the constitutional validity of section 
35 of COIDA was judged in the Jooste ruling.180
The Supreme Court of Newfoundland had to answer four questions181 pursuant to 
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.182 The Canadian Constitution183 is the 
supreme law of Canada and any law inconsistent with it will be unenforceable to the
177 Ison 1996: 807-833.
178 Ibid.
179 Ibid. Ison considers this case as the leading authority on this point.
180 Jooste discussed supra at Chapter 6 para 2.2.1.
181 "1. Does section 15(1) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms (the "Charter") apply to causes of
action arising prior to April 17 ,1985?
2. Are sections 32 and 34 of The Workers’ Compensation Act, 1983, S.N. 1983, Chapter 48 (the 
"Act") inconsistent with section 15(1) of the Charter?
3. If sections 32 and 34 of the Act are inconsistent with section 15(1) of the Charter, are 
sections 32 and 34 of the Act saved by section 15(2) of the Charter?
4. If sections 32 and 34 of the Act are inconsistent with section 15(1) of the Charter and are 
not saved by section 15(2) of the Charter, to what extent, if any, can such limits on the rights 
protected by section 15(1) of the Charter be justified under section 1 of the Charter and 
thereby rendered not inconsistent with The Constitution Act, 1982?"
182 Reference re 1-2.
183 Similar to the South African Constitution.
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extent of the inconsistency.184 The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms185 
guarantees particular rights and freedoms which (similar to South Africa) may be 
limited only to the extent that is justified in a "free and democratic society."186 
Equality before the law, equal protection and equal benefit of the law coupled with 
protection against discrimination are some of the guaranteed rights and 
freedoms.187
The majority judgment by word of Goodridge CJN188 ruled the exclusionary 
provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act, 1983 (Newfoundland.), c. 48, 
consistent with the Canadian Constitution.189 Two legal questions were argued i.e. a 
widow (Mrs. Piercey) contended that sections 32 and 34 of the Workers' 
Compensation Act in place at the time, were "of no force and effect under s. 52(1) of 
the Constitution Act, 1982" because it conflicted with section 15 of the Charter. The 
second argument was offered by the employer that any inconsistencies were 
irrelevant, as section 15 of the Charter came into effect after the death of Mr. 
Piercey.190 It was conceded by the Counsel for Mrs. Piercey that section 15 did not 
apply retrospectively;191 but it was argued that sections 32 and 34 were 
nevertheless inconsistent with section 15(1) of the Charter and could not be saved 
by section 15(2) or section 1 of the Charter. Compensatory legislation as such was 
not attacked but it was argued that workers' compensation and the common law 
right of action could be entertained in a parallel situation.192
The Court considered the historical development of workers’ compensation in 
Canada with particular attention to the Meredith principles and identified workers’ 
compensation as a new, separate system of law distinguishable from tort law and of 
which Chief Justice Meredith:193
184 Reference re 3.
185 Similar to the South African Bill of Rights.
186 Reference re 3.
187 Ibid.
188 Gushue, Mahoney and O'Neill JJA concurred with Goodridge with Morgan JA consenting in a 
minority judgment but with different reasons.
189 Reference re 39.
190 Ibid 4 .
191 Which answered question 1 in the negative.
192 Reference re 6.
ibid  7 .
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recommended the abolition of the common law defences of volens, common 
employment and contributory negligence. For this new system to succeed 
he recommended, among other things, that workers give up their common 
law rights of action against their own employers in exchange for specific 
guaranteed benefits as a trade-off194 for employers shouldering the expense 
of this new system.
Very importantly, Meredith intended a system by which all workers would benefit 
by guaranteed compensation irrespective of fault and without costly litigation.195 
The Court considered the benefits of statutory compensation to an injured 
worker;196 but in acknowledging the difficulties in comparing the monetary value of 
statutory benefits to that which may be otherwise acquired, limited itself to some 
general remarks.197 Statutory benefits include medical costs inclusive of future costs 
(that might not be available by virtue of common law actions), compensation in 
respect of loss of earnings and earning capacity (which is considered higher under 
the Act) and general damages relating to raised living costs and non-economic loss 
that are only partly covered by a rating schedule determined by the Act.198 Raised 
living costs demonstrated the biggest gap between statutory benefits and damages 
recoverable under common law because through common law, the raise in living 
costs may be recovered in full while non-economic loss will also be higher under 
common law than by virtue of statutory compensatory law.199 Fatalities may attract 
higher statutory compensation than at common law.200 Rehabilitation and 
reintegration into the workplace of an injured worker benefit employees and 
compensation is paid immediately which excludes the extremely tardy processes 
that are characteristic of common law claims for damages.201 Contrary to civil 
litigation, compensation can be claimed without legal costs and the solvency of the 
employer does not influence the viability of compensation; and liability to 
compensate does not endanger the continued existence of a company.202 Very
194 The so-called "historical trade-off."
195 Reference re  8 .
w e  Ibid 9 - 1 1 .
i”  Ibid 1 1 .
198 ibid.
199 Ibid.
200 Ibid. This is contrary to COIDA where a spouse is limited to compensation that equals 40%  of 
75% of the earnings of the deceased at the time of death and subject to an annual maximum 
amount that is currently R 7  8 1 2  per month as per Government Gazette No. 3 6 2 7 3 .
2 0 1 Ibid 1 2 .
202 Ibid.
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importantly, other workers are also saved from liability while contributory 
negligence by the injured worker causes no reduction in compensation.203 Other 
advantages of statutory compensation include periodic payments versus lump sum 
payments which are vulnerable to spending and compensation is periodically 
reviewed and tax-free.204
The only disadvantage to employees identified by the Court is that a higher amount 
of damages can be recovered through common law actions than through statutory 
compensation and the Court could not find any disadvantage to employers caused 
by the system.205
The fundamental issue before the Court related to whether the removal of the right 
to common law actions constituted "an inequality that is discriminatory."206 The 
limitation on bringing a tortfeasor before the Court is viewed as acceptable in the 
light of the workability of the compensation scheme and the relatively immaterial 
consequences thereof.207 The Court held that in founding a compensation scheme 
more favourably to employees than would be possible at common law, the 
consequence of section 32 is: "some individuals in certain circumstances have been 
adversely affected."208 Such inequality could not be said to be "discriminatory in the 
invidious sense" but the question to be answered remained, could the extent of the 
adverse consequences of section 32 be such as to render it discriminatory?209
Two questions are central to any Charter challenge:210
The first question is what is the test to be applied to the impugned 
legislation under, in this reference, s. 15. The second question is what is the 
test to be applied under s. 1 if the legislation fails the first test.
203 Ibid.
204 Ibid.
2°s ibid 13.
zee Ibid.
207 Ibid.
208 Ibid 14.
209 Ibid.
2i° Ibid 16.
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In answering the first question, the provision’s historical and philosophical context 
should be contemplated.211 In considering a discrimination challenge, the applicable 
test will be "reasonableness and fairness".212 A challenger by virtue of section 15(1) 
of the Charter has to establish that his rights have been infringed; and only after the 
breach has been proven on a preponderance of probabilities will sections (1), 15(2) 
or 24 be considered.213 The challenger first has to prove differential treatment 
pursuant to the applicable breach and thereafter, needs to prove whether:214
having regard  to the purposes and aim s o f the legislation , th e re  is an 
ad v erse e ffect upon the person which, on an objective basis, can properly 
be said to be unfair or unreasonable w hen com pared to the treatm en t given 
to persons sim ilarly situated, and w hen considered in the light o f the 
circum stances in which the d istinction is made, if  the d istinction  is a 
reason able and rational one, a finding o f discrim ination is less likely.
The applicable group being treated differently pursuant to the Workers' 
Compensation Act is identified as "victims of tort" whom were owed a duty, which 
duty was breached and damages consequently suffered.215 The differential 
treatment is shown by comparing victims of tort to victims of tort who suffered 
occupational injuries or diseases. The first named group will have a cause of action 
at common law but not the second group who will have a right to compensation 
which might be materially less.216 Identifying an inequality does not render the 
specific law unenforceable; and once a prima facie  case has been made out 
favouring the challenger of the law, the onus shifts to the defender of the law to 
show that the "articulated purpose justifies the law."217
In answering question two i.e. whether sections 32 and 34 of the Workers' 
Compensation Act is inconsistent with section 15(10 of the Charter, the Court 
reasoned that the Workers' Compensation Act must be seen in the light of its social
211 Ibid.
212 Ibid 20.
213 Ibid 23.
214 Ibid.
215 Ibid 23-24.
216 Ibid 24.
217 Ibid.
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shown that the differential treatment creates an inequality that is unjustifiable or 
unreasonable.241
In considering whether section 15(1) of the Charter infringes the "right of action"242 
against an employer or co-worker243 as substituted by the right to compensation 
determined by an administrative tribunal determined according to the Act,244 the 
honourable Justice weighed the benefits and disadvantages of both a claim under 
common law against a claim under compensatory law taking into consideration the 
extent of the burden of proof in both instances.245 His Honour accepted categorising 
of workers for purposes of the Act to be valid, which then raises the question 
whether section 32 constitutes an inequality by removing the "right of action".246 
He answered the last question in the negative because all "workers are entitled to 
the benefits provided by the Act and regulations."247 He ruled that no inequality and 
therefore no discrimination is established. The honourable Justice held:248
To find an inequality by comparing those covered by the Act with those not so 
covered and therefore free to take an action in tort one must ignore the 
underlying purpose of the Act and the myriad of benefits enjoyed by those 
covered by the Act and not available to those others. In my view any economic 
loss that may be sustained by the taking away of the "right of action" for 
work-related injuries is more than off-set by the overall benefit of the Act and 
is a necessary incident to the implementation of a valid legislative scheme.
It follows then that the equality rights as protected under section 15 of the Charter 
are not violated and the other questions need not be answered.249
241 Reference re 3 3 - 3 4 .
242 An action at common law and which the courts have to consider taking into account the various 
defences an employer may raise.
243 By either the injured worker or his dependents based on the negligence of the employer or a 
co-worker.
244 Reference re 3 7 .
245 Ibid 3 8 .
246 Ibid.
247 Ibid.
248 Ibid.
249 Ibid 3 8 - 3 9 .
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The similarities in the reasoning of the Supreme Court of Newfoundland and the 
South African Constitutional Court is evident from the inferences drawn from the 
history, purpose and development of compensatory laws.250
3.2.2. Pasiechnyk vSaskatchewan (Workers' Compensation Board)
The Federal Supreme Court of Canada emphasised the purpose of compensatory 
legislation in Pasiechnyk v Saskatchewan (Workers' Compensation Board), a case that 
centred on the right to institute a civil claim against an employer, the government of 
Saskatchewan. The Claimants argued that the government did not act in its capacity 
as an employer but in its capacity as a regulator; which duties under the 
Occupational Health and Safety Act, R.S.S. 1978, c. 0-1, were neglected as the 
government failed to adequately inspect the crane that fell on the workers killing 
two and seriously injuring six others.251 The injured employees and the dependents 
of the deceased were compensated by the applicable Compensation Board.252
The Saskatchewan government requested the Compensation Board to determine 
whether the action was barred by the Saskatchewan Compensation Act, which 
application was opposed by the Claimants by applying for an order to prevent the 
Board from making the determination. The Claimants’ arguments that the Board 
lacked jurisdiction to make the determination was rejected by both the 
Saskatchewan Court of Queen’s Bench and the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal.253 
The Board's interpretation indicated that the government was an "employer" within 
the meaning of the Act and therefore the actions were barred.254
In casu, the Court considered the definitions of "employer"; "employment"; 
"industry"; "injury" and "worker" pursuant to the Act.255 The Court also cited
250 See also Jooste discussed at Chapter 6 para 2.2.1.
251 Ibid [1]—[3].
252 Ibid.
253 ibid [3],
254 The actions were instituted against the government of Saskatchewan, ProCrane and SaskPower. 
The Court of Queen’s Bench dismissed the application for a judicial review but the 
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal allowed the application for a review against the government but 
disallowed the application for a review against ProCrane and SaskPower. Pasiechnyk [4],
255 Pasiechnyk [5].
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sections 3(1)256; 22(1)257; 44258; 167259; 168260 and 18 0261 of The Workers' 
Compensation Act, 1979, S.S. 1979, c. W-17.1262
The Workers' Compensation Board as the court of first instance held the actions to 
be barred although protection by the Act was not designed to protect employers 
purely because of their position as an "employer" but because of its engagement in 
an "industry" which in the case of the government is "regulating".263 The Court of 
Queen’s Bench in its judgment held that the government was an employer engaged 
in an industry and categorised the government’s activities as an undertaking in the 
exercise of its regulatory duties pertaining to health and safety.264 The 
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal overturned the previous ruling. The Court held that 
the decision whether the government is an employer within the meaning of the Act, 
was ultra vires the jurisdiction of the Board because the relevant law to determine 
the question of "whether the government can be sued in tort in its capacity as 
regulator, despite the statutory bar, was the Occupational Health and Safety Act and 
the common law" and not compensatory law.265 This judgment recognised the "dual 
capacity" doctrine, which means that an action against the government in its 
capacity as regulator is not barred but an action against the government in its 
capacity as an employer is precluded.266
256 "3.(1) This Act applies to all employers and workers engaged in, about or in connection with 
any industry in Saskatchewan except those industries excluded by a regulation or order of the 
Lieutenant Governor in Council or by section 10."
257 "22.(1) The board shall have exclusive jurisdiction to examine, hear and determine all matters 
and questions arising under this Act and any other matter in respect of which a power, 
authority or discretion is conferred upon the board and, without limiting the generality of the 
foregoing, the board shall have exclusive jurisdiction to determine:..."
258 "44. No employer and no worker or any dependent of a worker has a right of action against an 
employer or a worker with respect to an injury sustained by a worker in the course of his 
employment."
259 "167  xhe right to compensation provided by this Act is in lieu of all rights of action, statutory or 
otherwise, to which a worker or his dependants are or may be entitled against the employer of the 
worker for or by reason of any injury sustained by him while in the employment of the employer."
260 "168. Any party to any action may apply to the board for adjudication and determination of the 
question of the plaintiffs right to compensation under this Act or as to whether the action is 
one barred by this Act, and that adjudication and determination is final and conclusive.”
261 "iso . Except as otherwise provided in this Act, all rights of action against the employers for injuries 
to workers, either at common law or under The Workmen’s Compensation Act, are abolished."
262 Pasiechnyk [5].
263 Ibid [6].
264 Ibid [8].
2<* ibid [10].
266 Ibid [11).
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The Federal Supreme Court of Canada examined in casu the history and purpose of 
compensatory legislation, which advanced the premise that the Board has exclusive 
jurisdiction to decide whether the statutory bar applies because “this question is 
intimately related to one side of the historic trade-off."267 The history of 
compensatory laws in Canada starting with the Meredith Report was considered by 
the Court,268 with specific attention to the "historic trade-off' that led to workers 
losing their cause of action against an employer but obtained compensation 
irrespective of fault or the employer’s financial ability to pay from a fund to which 
compulsory contributions had to be made by employers. One year after its 
promulgation, the Act was amended to extinguish the right to a cause of action by a 
Schedule 1 worker against a Schedule 1 employer.269
The Federal Court took note of case law that acknowledged the significance of the 
historic trade-off in relation to the purpose of compensatory laws e.g. Reference 
re270 and Medwid v Ontario.271 The statutory bar protects the integrity of the 
compensation system by providing the benefit of protection against suit to 
employers who might have sought to be exempted from paying premiums if no 
benefit could be derived from it.272
The Court reasoned that the Board is at the centre of the workers compensation 
system characterised by three aspects i.e. i) compensation and rehabilitation of 
injured employees; ii) prohibition of civil actions and iii) the compensation fund. As 
the Board has exclusive jurisdiction over the compensation fund, it follows that the 
Board has exclusive jurisdiction to decide inter alia if an industry falls within the 
reach of the Act.273
Three of the Act’s provisions preclude tort actions: section 44 removes the right of 
an employer and employee against and employer or employee for an injury
z«7 Ibid [23].
zee ibid  [24],
269 Ibid [25].
270 Pasiechnyk [26]. See discussion of Reference re  supra at Chapter 6 para 3.2.1.
271 Discussed at Chapter 3 para 4.2.1 supra.
272 Pasiechnyk [27],
273 Ibid [32]—[33],
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sustained on duty; section 167 clearly indicates that the right of action is replaced 
by the right to compensation and section 180 extinguishes all rights of actions 
against employers pertaining to injuries on duty by employees. These sections use 
words with specific meaning as defined in the Act like employer, worker and 
injury.274
Entitlement to compensation is closely related to the removal of the right to a civil 
action, but entitlement to compensation will not necessarily mean that every 
potential defendant is saved from liability because some rights of action will be 
retained but the Board will be subrogated275 to the claim.276 In terms of section 168, 
the vital questions to be answered by the Board are whether the plaintiff is entitled 
to compensation and whether the defendant is protected against suit as a 
contributor to the workers’ compensation system. Both aspects are intimately 
related "to the purposes and structure of the workers’ compensation system" and 
within the Board's exclusive jurisdiction.277
The Federal Court approved the reasoning of the Board that immunity against suit 
does not extend to all actions against employers but the "object, purpose and scope 
of the Act" requires the scope of immunity to be limited to the industry the 
employer was engaged in at the time of the accident; and therefore the Board 
followed four questions:278
1. Was the plaintiff a worker within the meaning of the Act?279
2. If so, was the injury sustained in the course of his or her employment?280
3. Is the defendant an employer within the meaning of the Act?281
4. If the defendant is an employer within the meaning of the Act, does the 
claim arise out of acts or defaults of the employer or the employer’s 
employees while engaged in, about or in connection with the industry or 
employment in which the employer or worker of such employer causing 
the injury is engaged?
274 Ibid [39].
275 Ss 39 and 40 of the Saskatchewan Act.
276 Pasiechnyk [40].
277 Ibid [41]-[42],
278 Ibid [44]-[45].
279 The definition of an "employee” was discussed in Chapter 5 supra.
280 For a discussion of causality see Chapter 4 supra.
281 See Chapter 5 supra for a discussion of the definition of an "employer".
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types of claims, inclusive of claims for harassment and psychological trauma.298 The 
true nature of the claim is identified by the Court as a typical common law claim 
purporting to cover its true identity to avoid recognition of immunity afforded to 
the Crown against civil liability actions.299 The Court held that "the respondent’s 
action is in reality an action by an employee against his employer seeking damages 
for harm allegedly suffered in the course of his employment".300 The Court ruled 
that the action is a masked common law action that arose out of the course of 
employment and thus barred by section 12 of the Government Employees 
Compensation Act.301 The Court furthermore held that before bringing a civil 
liability action against the Crown for damages, a claimant first needs to utilise all 
administrative law remedies available to him before the remedies afforded by the 
Charter may be exercised.302
3 .3 . In te r p r e ta t io n  th ro u g h  c a s e  la w : A p p lica b ility  o f  s ta tu to r y  p ro v is io n s
3 .3 .1 .  Kovach v Singh
The majority ruling in Kovach v Singh303 by the Court of Appeal for British Columbia, 
extended immunity afforded to employers to include medical practitioners by 
giving a broadened interpretation to the phrase "personal injury arising out of the 
course of employment".304 In casu the effect of the immunity is to protect the 
Defendant, a medical doctor, against professional liability arising from medical 
malpractice founded in the doctor-patient relationship and not the employer- 
employee relationship.305 Kovach's injury, sustained in the course of her 
employment, was aggravated by the negligent medical treatment she received at the 
hands of Dr. Singh.306
298 Ibid [48],
299 Ibid [69]—[76].
300 Ibid [69].
301 Ibid [71].
302 Ibid [76].
303 Kovach v Singh, 1998 CanLII 6423 (BC CA). Hereinafter: Kovach. Retrieved on 12/05/2013 from 
http: //canlii.ca/t/1 dxzp.
304 ibid [2],
305 ibid  [9],
306 Ibid [12] & [14],
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The honourable Madam Justice Newbury criticised the reasoning of the Court below 
as there is no evidence that the historic trade-off was intended to be applied to 
cases of medical malpractice.307 The possible insolvency of an employer referred to 
in Pasiechnyk is not applicable in this case as medical practitioners normally are 
covered by professional insurance schemes and barring an action under these 
circumstances "seems, with respect, a distortion of the purposes of the workers' 
compensation scheme."308 The Court was however bound by the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Pasiechnyk pertaining to the jurisdiction of workers' compensation 
boards and the final decision whether Kovach was injured "out of and in the course 
of her employment" through the treatment of Singh, rested with the Board and was 
not open to review unless it was patently unreasonable.309 The Court then held that 
the decision was indeed patently unreasonable because the reasoning of the Appeal 
Board was flawed as the Board considered that any injury sustained during 
negligent treatment "must be a direct result of and must have arisen out of her 
employment." This is contrary to a common sense view on causation and 
authorities.310
The Court found that an injury can only be sustained by a statutory-defined 
“worker" acting in the course of employment.311 The Appeal Board considered an 
irrelevant aspect i.e. whether Singh was a worker pursuant to the Act and whether 
he acted in the course of his employment and consequently the Board "made the 
leap to the conclusion that an action for negligence against him must be barred."312 
The statutory bar is, however, applicable when both the injured worker and the 
"tortfeasor" acted in the course of their respective employment.313 The compensable 
injury needs to be the same injury that gives rise to the statutory bar and the breach 
of duty refers to the action that gave rise to that same injury;314 and by extending 
protection to Singh, the historic trade-off was frustrated.315 The Court accordingly
307 Ibid [12].
308 Ibid.
309 Ibid [13].
310 Ibid [14].
311 Ibid [15].
312 Ibid [17].
313 Ibid [18].
314 Ibid [19].
315 Ibid [20],
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set aside the determination by the Board and resubmitted it back to the Board for 
reconsideration.316
It is submitted that the very broad collective liability principle underpinned the 
misjudgement of the Board in casu because if immunity was not available to all 
employers within a category, the doctor would not have been considered for 
protection. South Africa indemnifies only the employer as defined.317
3.3.2. OPSEU v Ontario et al
The Ontario Superior Court of Justice (Divisional Court)318 was approached by the 
Ontario Public Service Employees Union in an application to review the decision of 
the Vice-Chair of the Grievance Settlement Board in the case of OPSEU v Ontario et 
a/.319 The ruling concluded that the said Board could not award damages "for or by 
reason of an accident happening to the worker or an occupational disease 
contracted by the worker while in the employment of the employer” if the alleged 
accident or disease is/was compensable under workmen's compensatory laws.320
The Appellant claimed damages based on a collective agreement which 
incorporated provisions from the Occupational Health and Safety Act R .S.0.1990, c.
0. I 321 and required from the Crown as employer to provide reasonably for the 
health and safety of employees on duty;322 and which clauses were breached by 
exposure in correctional institutions to second-hand smoke that adversely affected 
the health of the union’s members.323
316 ibid [2 1 ]—[22].
317 Chapter 5 para 2.2 supra.
sis On 11/09/2012.
319 OPSEU v Ontario et al, 2012 ONSC 2348 (CanLII). Hereinafter: OPSEU. Retrieved on 23/03/2013 
from http://canlii.ca/t/fsqz9.
320 ibid [1],
321 ibid [4] & [28].
322 Ibid [2],
323 Ibid [3].
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The Respondent questioned the Board's jurisdiction ruled by Articles 9.1 and 18.1 
of the collective agreements324 as the Board had no jurisdiction to consider fault- 
based claims pursuant to the Workplace Safety and Insurance Act, 1997, S.O. 1997, 
c.16 irrespective of the right to provide for enhanced no-fault benefits in collective 
agreements.325 The Applicant in turn, argued inter alia that the historic trade-off 
limited no-fault insurance regarding claims based in tort and had no effect on a 
claim based in contract which means the worker has a right to "enforce a provision 
of an employment contract"326 which in the current instance was embodied in the 
collective agreement.327
The Board in its ruling rejected OPSEU’s argument that the Workplace Safety and 
Insurance Act only applies to tort and not to contractual damages. The historical 
trade-off entails that the employer's funding of the compensation fund shields it 
from liability for compensable occupational injuries, as "pleaded in tort or in 
contract, the substance was the same."328 The Board refused to award damages 
pursuant to the collective agreement,329 although it remains open to the parties to 
negotiate for supplementary benefits in clear and unambiguous language.330
On appeal the Union insisted that the remedy of damages was open to it and such a 
remedy does not constitute a “right of action" under the Ontario compensatory law 
and could thus not be seen as part of the historic trade-off. OPSEU based its 
arguments in case law and the right to pursue grievances through labour relations 
principles, particularly a previous decision by the Workers Compensation Appeals 
Tribunal determining that although the right to a civil claim is extinguished, it does 
not affect the right to pursue a grievance under a collective agreement.331 The 
Respondent argued that the Board correctly ruled that the right to civil actions was 
precluded and supported its argument with case law supporting that "grievance
324 As the Occupational Health and Safety Act R.S.O. 1990, c. 0 . 1 incorporated into the collective 
agreement does not provide for the award of damages.
32s OPSEU [4],
326 Ibid [5],
327 Ibid.
328 Ibid [12],
329 Ibid [13].
330 Ibid [14].
331 Ibid [28],
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arbitration constituted a form of action or right of action" and damages could then 
not be awarded for compensable injuries.332 The Respondent also raised the 
important argument that if the honourable Court accepted OPSEU's contentions, it 
would lead to different regimes for unionised and non-unionised workers 
pertaining to identical injuries.333
The Superior Court of Justice held that the Board’s interpretation was prudent, 
reasonable and correct.334 In casu, the Court found that a labour arbitrator would 
not have the jurisdiction to award monetary damages to compensate occupational 
injuries.335 It was held that awarding monetary damages based on breach of a 
collective agreement where a valid compensatory claim exists will lead to an 
artificial distinction between claims instituted by the employee himself and claims 
instituted on behalf of the worker.336 The Court furthermore could not find any 
justification to allow for different regimes for unionised and non-unionised workers 
in respect of identical injuries and declined the submission made by OPSEU.337
3.3.3. Decision No. 622/891
The Ontario Workplace Safety and Insurance Appeals Tribunal ruled on the 
influence of serious and wilful misconduct by the party accused of negligent conduct 
in Decision No. 622/891.338 In casu, the Defendant was criminally charged and 
convicted of dangerous driving with regard to a motor vehicle accident that injured 
the Applicant.339 It was common cause that the Applicant was injured in the course 
of his duties and the Panel had to decide:
332 Ibid [29],
333 Ibid.
334 Ibid [30] & [40]—[41].
33s Ibid [36].
336 Ibid [39].
337 Ibid.
338 Decision No. 622/891, 1990 CanLII 5168 (ON WSIAT). Retrieved on 30/04/2012 from 
http://www.canlii.org/en/on/onwsiat/doc/1990/1990canlii5168/1990canlii5168.pdf. 
Hereinafter: Decision No. 622/891.
339 Ibid 5.
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• Whether the Defendant was in the course of his duties at the time of the 
accident;
• If so, did the Defendant act with serious and wilful misconduct that would 
nullify the statutory protection?
• Will the action be barred if the answer to the first question is yes and to the 
second is no?340
The first question was answered in the affirmative341 and then the enquiry turned 
to whether his reckless driving constituted serious and wilful misconduct. Serious 
and wilful misconduct [section 3(7)] on the part of an employee will refute all 
statutory benefits unless the consequences are serious.342 The Panel held that the 
section will only be applicable if the injured worker (beneficiary) and the person 
guilty of the serious and wilful misconduct is the same person.343 Section 3(7) does 
not contemplate the presence of negligence but the no-fault system requires the 
conduct to be "wilful, not negligent, in order to trigger the denial of benefits."344 It 
was held that both the Applicant and the Defendant were in the course of their 
employment following which the Applicant's right of action has been barred.345
3 .3 .4 . Decision No. 324000
In casu, a hospital applied for a declaration that the Plaintiff in a court action's right 
of action in respect of tort was extinguished.346 The hospital was categorised as a 
Schedule 1 employer and the worker was employed by another schedule 1 
employer, which was contracted by the hospital to remove non-medical waste from 
the hospital's property. The worker sustained a needle-stick injury while removing 
waste.347
340 Ibid 3.
341 Ibid 8.
342 Ibid 9.
343 Ibid.
344 Ibid 9-10 .
345 Ibid 10.
346 Decision No. 324000, 2001 ONWSIAT 3137 (CanLll). At [1]. Retrieved on 29/04/2012 from 
http://www.canlii.org/en/on/onwsiat/doc/2001/2001onwsiat3137/2001onwsiat3137.html. 
Hereinafter: Decision No. 324000.
3« Ibid [11]—[13], [17]—[18] & [34],
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The worker relied on an exception [section 28(4)] whereby an exception to the rule 
is created and an employer will not be protected if another employer who is not the 
worker’s employer, supplies a motor vehicle without an operator to operate 
same.348 In casu, the truck was leased from another company.349 Section 28350 reads 
as follows:
2 8(1 ) A worker employed by a Schedule 1 employer, the worker's survivors 
and a Schedule 1 employer are not entitled to commence an action 
against the following persons in respect of the worker’s injury or 
disease:
1. Any Schedule 1 employer.
2. A director, executive officer or worker employed by any Schedule 1 
employer.
(4) Subsections (1) and (2) do not apply if any employer other than the 
worker's employer supplied a motor vehicle, machinery or equipment 
on a purchase or rental basis without also supplying workers to 
operate the motor vehicle, machinery or equipment.
The Defendant secondly put the Plaintiff to the proof that it was indeed an employee 
of the hospital who put the needle in the bin.351
The action was founded in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and based 
upon four specific rights: "Equality under the law; Equality before the law; Equal 
benefit of the law; and Equal protection of the law."352 In casu, the Defendant relied 
specifically upon "Equal benefit of the law" as he sought damages for pain and 
suffering which was not available pursuant to compensatory law.353
The Tribunal held that the leased truck did not form part of the sequence of events 
that resulted in the injury; although section 28(4) preserves the right of action only 
in respect of the supplier of a vehicle who fails to also supply an operator, it is not 
applicable to the hospital.354 The Tribunal accepted that the needle was put in the
ibid [8],
349 ibid [8], [11]—[13], [29] & [36],
350 Ontario Act.
351 Decision No. 324000 [29].
352 ibid [30],
353 Ibid [31].
354 Ibid [37]—[38].
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bin by a hospital employee or was in the bin due to negligence in the control of the 
garbage system but in both instances, the hospital worker will be indemnified 
because of the status of the hospital as a Schedule 1 employer.355
3.4. Summary
The Canadian system of compensatory laws pertaining to the right of access to the 
civil justice system to obtain redress for occupationally acquired injuries and 
diseases can be summarised as follows:
• The general rule is similar to South Africa, civil action by employees against 
employers within the same category is statutory barred;356
• An exception to the rule is civil action which is subrogated to the 
Compensation Authority;357
• Immunity against civil action by virtue of compensatory legislation is 
extended to all employers and all employees operating within the same 
statutory-determined category;358
• The definitions of an "occupational injury"; "occupational disease";359 an 
"employee"; an "employer"360 and the statutory-determined category of 
work is determinative of whether an action will be barred and an employer 
be saved from same;361
• The historic trade-off principle is viewed as an essential part of the success 
of the workers' compensation scheme;362
• The right of action against third parties is retained.363
355 Ibid [41]—[42].
356 See Chapter 6 paras 2.1 & 3.1 supra.
357 Chapter 6 paras 3 & 3.2.2 supra.
358 Chapter 6 paras 3.3.1 & 3.3.4 supra.
359 Chapter 4 paras 3.1; 3.3 & 3.4 supra.
360 Chapter 5  paras 3.1 & 3.2 supra.
361 Chapter 6 para 3.2.2 supra.
362 Chapter 6 paras 3.2.1 & 3.2.2 supra.
363 Chapter 6 para 3.1 supra & Chapter 3 para 4.2.3 supra.
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4. AUSTRALIA
The Australian federal system of government empowers the Federal Government 
and States to determine their own laws and thus the right to common law claims for 
damages differs between jurisdictions. Contrary to the situation in South Africa and 
Canada, Australia did not include a Bill of Rights in the Federal Constitution and 
only Victoria and the Australian Capitol Territory included human rights provisions 
into their individual Constitutions.364
The Productivity Commission365 reported on the implications to preserve, limit or 
bar access to common law damages for occupational injuries, diseases and fatal 
accidents366 in Australia in the process to harmonise the right to common law 
claims for damages between jurisdictions.367 The Commission found that 
compensation schemes barring common law claims or with limited access to such 
claims tend to provide long-term statutory compensation benefits but in contrast, 
schemes with unlimited access to common law remedies tend to provide short term 
statutory benefits supplemented by common law damages for the seriously 
injured.368 The object of recovery under common law is to "restore the worker, as 
far as money can, to the position they were in, before the accident. In an 
unrestricted system, it meets the full loss of earning capacity and explicitly 
compensates non-economic loss."369
It is trite law in Australia that employers owe their employees a general duty of 
care,370 which duty inter alia includes a duty to employ reasonably competent staff,
364 Bassam 4.
365 The Commission considered common law actions as "an inappropriate mechanism for providing 
workers’ compensation in most circumstances" as per Productivity Commission Report (2004): 246.
366 Productivity Commission Report (2004): 215.
367 ibid  215-249.
368 Ibid 215.
3«> Ibid 230.
370 The FindLaw Team. [Sa]. What duty o f  care do Australia employers owe employees? Find Law
Australia website, retrieved on 07/06/2013 from http://www.fmdlaw.com.au/articles/5090/ 
what-duty-of-care-do-australia-employers-owe-emplo.aspx, indicates that the High Court in 
O'Connor v Commissioner fo r  Government Transport (1959) 100 CLR 225, at 229, placed all 
employers under obligation to take reasonable care for the safety for every employee by the 
provision of: "proper and adequate means of carrying out his work without unnecessary risk, 
by warning him of unusual or unexpected risks, and by instructing him in the performance of 
his work where instructions might reasonably be thought to secure him from danger of 
injury...The standard of care for an employee’s safety is not a low one.”
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to prudently ensure a safe work place and to "provide, inspect and maintain safe 
plant and equipment".371 Failure of the duty of care resulting in loss to the worker, 
may entitle the worker to recover damages through common law.372
The different jurisdictions switched between periods of permitting the right to civil 
action,373 with limitations applicable in some of the jurisdictions374 and barring such 
right.375 Reasons for limitations on the right to common law actions include that it is 
"fundamentally contrary to the concept of ‘no-fault’; undermines scheme 
affordability and, is inimical to early intervention, rehabilitation and return to 
work"376 as well as the tardiness, costs, uncertainty and adversarial nature of civil 
litigation.377 Opposing views argue that the right to common law actions is a 
fundamental right, it incentivises safer work conditions, prevents cost shifting by 
employers, augments statutory benefits and barring the right constitutes 
discrimination against the injured.378 Purse contends that unlike Canada,379 the right 
to sue employers for negligence remained part of the Australian compensatory 
legislation380
A common characteristic between all the jurisdictions is that damages do not 
supplement no-fault compensation but rather provide an alternative to 
compensation i.e. both statutory compensation and recovery under common law is 
not permitted although in general the right to no-fault statutory compensation is 
preserved until the defendant's negligence is proved.381 The Commission 
recommended that if the right to common law actions is preserved, it ought to be 
confined to the most severely injured, compensating for non-economic loss, pain,
371 Productivity Commission Report (2004): 216. See also Bassam 109.
372 Productivity Commission Report (2004): 216.
373 The right was abolished in the Northern Territory in 1987 and in South Australia in 1992 as per 
the Productivity Commission Report (2004): 218.
374 Comcare prohibited claims for economic loss while New South Wales, Victoria and Western
Australia confined the right to common law claims to employees who were severely injured;
and Queensland and Tasmania have a minimum injury threshold as per Productivity
Commission Report (2004): 218.
375 Productivity Commission Report (2004): 218 & 221.
™ Ibid 221.
377 Ibid 221-222  & 236-239  & 242-245.
378 Ibid 222 -223  & 245-246.
379 For the South African history in this regard see Chapter 2 para 3.3 supra.
380 Purse 2005: 11.
381 Productivity Commission Report (2004): 218.
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suffering and disfigurement with statutory compensation for economic loss. The 
Commission rejected a fault-based only system.382
Successful claims for damages are paid from the compensation scheme although 
cases are heard and determined in the formal court system.383
4.1. S ta tu to r y  p ro v is io n s  a b s o lv in g  a n  e m p lo y e r  fro m  lia b ili ty
Employees of the Commonwealth,384 New South Wales,385 Queensland,386 
Tasmania,387 Victoria388 and Western Australia389 may opt390 to exercise a limited 
right of action for damages. Prerequisites include a successful statutory 
compensation claim391 and a minimum degree of permanent impairment.392
Contributory negligence by the worker may lead to the apportionment of 
damages393 and steps taken or failed to be taken by the employee in mitigation of
382 Ibid 247.
383 New South Wales [State Government). WorkCover Authority NSW. 2012. New South Wales Workers 
Compensation Scheme issues paper. Gosford: WorkCover NSW. At 12. Retrieved on 12/05/2012 from 
http://www.workcover.nsw.gov.au/injuriesclaims/changes-to-workers-compensation/Pages/ 
workers-compensation-scheme-issues-paper.aspx. See also, Shine Lawyers’: Who pays compensation 
if  I take legal action? Retrieved on 07/06/2013 from http://www.shine.com.au/service/personal- 
injury-victoria/workers-compensation-victoria/. WorkCover Queensland: Common law entitlements 
and payments. Retrieved on 07/06/2013 from http://www.workcoverqld.com.au/rehab-and- 
claims/support-and-benefits/common-law-payments. Tate, P. 2007. What is State Insurance? 
Commentaiy on David Bennett QC's Paper. Adelaide Law Review 28: 95-102. Retrieved on 
07/03/2012 from http://0-www,heinonline.org.oasis.unisa.ac.za/H0L/LuceneSearch?terms=what 
+AND+is+AND+state+AND+insurance%3F+Commentary+on+David+Bennett+&base=js&all=true& 
searchtype=advanced&collection=journals&submit=Go&sections=any&x=0&y=0.
384 The Commonwealth Act limits claims to damages for non-economic loss but dependants of 
deceased workers may claim both economic and non-economic loss.
385 New South Wales ss 149-151AD.
386 Queensland s 189(2) & 250 if the permanent impairment is assessed at 20% or less whole body 
impairment.
387 Tasmania s 138AB.
388 Victoria s 134AB.
389 Western Australia s 92 & 93E.
390 Commonwealth ss 45(2)(3) & 52; Queensland s 189(2) creates an irrevocable choice. See also
Productivity Commission Report (2004): 218.
391 Commonwealth s 45 & Queensland s 250.
392 New South Wales s 151H [15% permanent impairment]; Queensland ss 237(1) & 239 [20% whole
person impairment]; Tasmania s 138AB(2) [30% whole person impairment]; Victoria s 
134AB(15)(16) [30% impairment or a "serious injury’’] & Western Australia s 93E(3)(4) [degree of 
disability not less than 30% or a significant injuiy resulting a permanent disability of at least 16%].
393 New South Wales s 151N & 151S; Queensland s 307 & Western Australia s 93(2).
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his damages have to be taken into consideration.394 Research showed contributory 
negligence on the part of workers in only a small number of cases.395
If the employee received compensation before the recovery of damages for 
permanent impairment and pain and suffering,396 the compensation or the damages, 
whichever is the lesser, should be repaid to the applicable compensation 
authority.397
The right of claims against third parties are retained398 and if so decided by the 
compensation authority, it may be taken over and proceeds with action against such 
third party399 but the rule against double compensation is applicable 400
Both economic401 and non-economic loss402 and redress for death403 can be claimed 
under Australian common law which is usually paid as a lump sum.404 Some of the 
defences previously raised by employers e.g. volenti non fit  injuria405 and common 
employment406 are removed and may not be raised by employers.
Contrary to an absolute bar (similar in nature to the bar in COIDA)407 that is 
applicable in the Northern Territories408 and South Australia,409 employees in the
394 New South Wales s 151L & Queensland s 267.
395 Out of 261 claims in New South Wales, contributory negligence was found in only 13 with 50%
contribution in 3 cases and less than 20% in the other 10 cases. Productivity Commission
Report (2004): 229.
396 N ew South W alessl51A (2).
397 Commonwealth ss 48(3) & 49; New South Wales s 151A; Queensland ss 119, 128C, 178A; 
Tasmania s 133 & Western Australia s 92.
398 Commonwealth s 46; New South Wales ss 151 & 151Z; South Australia s 54(5); Victoria s 138 & 
Western Australia s 93. See also Productivity Commission Report (2004): 216.
399 Commonwealth s 50; Tasmania s 347; Victoria s 134AB(12) requires the consent of the 
Compensation Authority before the employee may institute proceedings against the employer.
400 Commonwealth ss 48(3), 49 & 51; New South Wales s 151A; Queensland s 270; South Australia 
s 54(7) & Western Australia s 91.
401 New South Wales ss 151I-151J.
402 Commonwealth s 52A & Victoria s 134AB.
403 Commonwealth s 46; Tasmania s 138AH & Western Australia s 93AD.
404 Productivity Commission Report (2004): 217.
4°5 New South Wales s 1510. Volenti non f it  injuria (voluntary assumption of risk) was one of the
dreaded defences raised historically that led to the enactment of compensatory legislation as
discussed in chapter 2 which discussed the purpose of compensatory laws.
4°6 New South Wales s 151AA.
407 Chapter 6 paras 2.1 & 2.2 supra.
4°8 Northern Territories s 52.
409 South Australia s 54, the wording of which strongly reminds of COIDA s 35(1).
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Australian Capital Territory have an unlimited right to sue for damages except for 
measures to prevent double compensation.410
The Victorian Act provides as follows:411 
134A B A ctions for dam ages
(3) Subject to subsection (4A), a worker may not bring proceedings in 
accordance with this section unless—
(a) determinations of the degree of impairment of the worker have 
been made under section 104B and the worker has made an 
application under subsection (4); or
(b) subject to any directions issued under section 134AF, the worker 
elects to make an application under subsection (4) on the ground 
that the worker has a serious injury within the meaning of this 
section.
(16) If the assessment under section 104B of the degree of impairment of 
the worker as a result of the injury is less than 30 per centum, the 
person may not bring proceedings for the recovery of damages in 
respect of the injury unless—
(a) the Authority or self-insurer—
(i) is satisfied that the injury is a serious injury; and
(ii) issues to the worker a certificate in writing consenting to the 
bringing of the proceedings; or
(b) a court, other than the Magistrates' Court, on the application of the 
worker made within 30 days after the worker received advice 
under subsection (7) or, with the consent of the Authority under 
subsection (20), after that period, gives leave to bring the 
proceedings.
(19) For the purposes of subsection (16)(b)—
(a) a court, other than the Magistrates' Court, must not give leave 
unless it is satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the injury 
is a serious injury;
(38)For the purposes of the assessment of serious injury in accordance 
with subsections (16) and (19)—
(a) ...
(b) the terms serious and severe are to be satisfied by reference to 
the consequences to the worker of any impairment or loss of a 
body function, disfigurement, or mental or behavioural 
disturbance or disorder, as the case may be, with respect to—
(i) pain and suffering; or
410 Australian Capital Territory ss 36F, 182A-186.
411 The subsections that will be applicable to the discussion of case law hereafter, are cited here.
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(ii) loss of earning capacity—
when judged by comparison with other cases in the range of 
possible impairments or losses of a body function,...
(c) an impairment or loss of a body function or a disfigurement shall 
not be held to be serious for the purposes of subsection (16) 
unless the pain and suffering consequence or the loss of earning 
capacity consequence is, when judged by comparison with other 
cases in the range of possible impairments or losses of a body 
function, or disfigurements, as the case may be, fairly described as 
being more than significant or marked, and as being at least very 
considerable;
(d) ...
(e) where a worker relies upon paragraph (a), (b) or (c) of the 
definition of serious injury in subsection (37), the Authority or 
self-insurer shall not grant a certificate under subsection (16)(a) 
and a court shall not grant leave under subsection (16)(b) on the 
basis that the worker has established the loss of earning capacity 
required by paragraph (b) unless the worker establishes in 
addition to the requirements of paragraph (c) or (d), as the case 
may be, that—
(i) at the date of a decision under subsection (16)(a) or at the date of the 
hearing of an application under subsection (16)(b), the worker has a 
loss of earning capacity of 40 per centum or more,...
The definition of an "employer" is generally broadly defined in Australian 
compensatory laws and may include "any person deemed to be an employer by this 
Act",412 with none of the laws categorising employers similar to COIDA413 or 
Canada.414
4 .2 . In te r p r e ta t io n  th ro u g h  c a s e  law : C o n s titu tio n a l ru lin g s
The Federal Constitution of Australia lacks a Bill of Human Rights and consequently 
court cases challenging human rights breaches in compensatory legislation or 
practise are not to be found.
412 Victorian Act s 5(1) (c).
413 See Chapter 5 para 2.2 supra for the COIDA definition.
414 See Chapter 5 para 3.2 supra for the Canadian definition.
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4.3. Interpretation through case law: Applicability of statutory provisions
4 .3 .1 .  Ninkovic v Pajvancek
Marks J laid down principles in the Supreme Court of Victoria in the case of Ninkovic 
v Pajvancek415 on the interpretation of the definition of a "serious injury" as the test 
for a right of access to common law remedies. The case turned on a similarly- 
worded provision enacted416 in the Transport Accident Act No. I l l  of 1986 which 
Act created a no-fault compensation system for victims of motor vehicle accidents. 
The interpretation was subsequently confirmed by the Full Bench in Humpries and 
Another v Poljak [1992] VicRp 58; [1992] 2 VR 129417 and is still applied by the 
Victorian courts when faced by the need to interpret the provision in the Victorian 
Accident Compensation Act.418
Access to common law remedies is limited by the defined expression "serious 
injury" and consequently courts need to be satisfied that the victim has suffered a 
"serious injury” due to a specific accident, before a court may approve leave to 
proceed at common law 419 This provision creates an "exception to the general rule 
which prevents or, rather, prohibits common law proceedings..."420 and if a "serious 
injury" is sustained, the injured person may apply to the Commission for a 
certificate allowing to sue under common law; but if such is denied, the plaintiff has 
recourse to the court and may apply for leave to proceed at common law 421
415 Ninkovic v Pajvancek [1991] VicRp 81; [1991] 2 VR 427. Hereinafter: Ninkovic. Retrieved on 
14/06/2013 from http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/vic/VicRp/1991/81.html.
416 Ninkovic [8]:
" 'Serious injury' means:
(a) serious long-term impairment or loss of a body function; or
(b) permanent serious disfigurement; or
(c) severe long-term mental or severe long-term behavioural disturbance or disorder; or
(d) loss of a foetus."’
417 Humphries and Another v Poljak [1992] VicRp 58; [1992] 2 VR 129. Retrieved on 14/06/2013 
from http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/vic/VicRp/1992/58.html. Hereinafter Poljak.
418 In this regard, see Poljak as well as Kelso v Tatiara Meat Co Pty Ltd [2007] VSCA 267. Retrieved on 
13/06/2013 from http://www.ausdii.edu.au/au/cases/vic/VSCA/2007/267.html. Sabo v George 
Weston Foods [2009] VSCA 242. Retrieved on 13/06/2013 from http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/ 
cases/vic/VSCA/2009/242.html. Bachos v Storden Pty Ltd & Anor [2012] VCC 1745. Retrieved on 
14/06/2013 from http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/vic/VCC/2012/1745.html.
419 Ninkovic [5].
« °  Ibid [6]-[7],
Ninkovic [7] and Victorian Act s 134AB(3)(a) & 134AB(16).
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A court is bound not to give permission to pursuit at common law unless it is 
satisfied that "the injury is a serious injury", the onus of which rests upon the 
plaintiff to convince the court that the "injury suffered by the plaintiff was 
serious."422 The Court has to be satisfied that the Plaintiff could bring himself within 
the corners of the definition which is characterised by its all-inclusivity by the word 
"means" in "serious injury means".423 The honourable Justice interpreted "serious 
long-term impairment or loss of a body function" to mean there "must be an 
impairment which is serious, and it must be long-term, or there must be a serious 
loss of a body function."424 The word "serious" indicates serious consequences for 
the plaintiff which in the context of the statute means consequences in the form of 
disablement from work or impedes enjoyment of life.425
4 .3 .2 .  To Ha Lu v Mediterranean Shoes Pty Ltd & Ors
Supreme Court of Victoria sitting as an Appeal Court ruled on To Ha Lu v 
Mediterranean Shoes Pty Ltd & Ors426 to determine whether different injuries may 
be combined to satisfy the requirement of a "serious injury” as meant by section 
135A(19)(a)427 of the Victorian Accident Compensation Act.428
According to his minority reasons, Buchanan JA interpreted a "serious injury" to 
mean that the Act only requires the existence of impairment or loss of physical 
function without confining the bodily function to the body part directly affected by 
the injury.429 Combining two injuries will necessitate it to flow from one incident.430 
The definition of "serious injury" does not explicitly require a "relationship between
422 Ninkovic [8] and Victorian Act s 134AB(38)(e)(i). .
423 Ninkovic [10].
424 /6/d [11].
425 Ibid.
426 To Ha Lu v Mediterranean Shoes Pty Ltd & Ors [2000] VSCA 65. Hereinafter: To Ha Lu. Retrieved 
on 14/06/2013 from http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/vic/VSCA/2000/65.html.
427 "(19) In this section—
determination date, in relation to an injury, means the date on which—
(a) the injury is determined, or deemed, in accordance with this section, or 
declared by a court, to be a serious injury; o r ...”
«8 To Ha Lu [6],
429 Ibid [3],
430 Ibid [4].
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an injury and impairment or loss of a body function"431 but the definition should be 
interpreted within the context of the Act and the limited right of access to common 
law redress. Impairments or loss of bodily functions flowing from separate 
incidents, each giving rise to a cause of action for damages, should be considered 
separately when deciding whether the test has been met with the "only relevant 
impairment or loss of a body function is that resulting from the defendant's 
wrongful act or omission the subject matter of the plaintiffs cause of action."432
Leave was sought from the Supreme Court to sue under common law for injuries 
sustained in the employ of the first Respondent after the Compensation Authority 
assessed the Plaintiffs degree of impairment at less than 30 percent and the County 
Court dismissed the Plaintiffs application 433
The Plaintiff sustained an injury by repeatedly straining his right elbow and to a 
lesser extent his left elbow when pulling shoes from a mould in a shoe factory. A 
second injury followed later when a mould fell on his right shoulder, close to his 
neck but neither the shoulder nor the neck injury were mentioned to his doctor or 
reported to the Authority although impairment to the neck and "right upper limb" 
was accepted and compensated 434 Medical evidence supported the elbow condition 
(which was accepted as minor)435 and a rotator cuff tear in the shoulder but the 
relationship between the shoulder injury and the incident when the mould hit the 
Plaintiff was unclear.436 It was also held in the Court below that the injuries to the 
elbow and the neck could not be relevantly aggregated to be considered as "serious" 
in combination.437 It was contended on behalf of the Plaintiff that the two injuries 
ought to be aggregated and the combined degree of impairment caused a serious 
and long-term impairment of one bodily function, the right arm; and it gave rise to 
one cause of action or in the alternative the shoulder injury ought to be considered 
as a "serious injur/'438
431 ibid [5].
432 Ibid.
433 Ibid [6],
434 Ibid [7],
Ibid [11].
436 Ibid [9].
437 Ibid [11]—[12],
438 Ibid [13].
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The Supreme Court of Victoria's majority ruling, held that for an injury to be 
considered as "serious”, it necessitates serious consequences for the Plaintiff as 
judged on an objective basis; and if compared to similar cases, it must fit a fair 
description of at least "'very considerable' and certainly more than 'significant' or 
'marked'".439 On a balance of probabilities, it needs to be established that the injury 
caused serious long-term impairment of a bodily function decided on "elements of 
fact, degree and value judgement”.440
In relying on Humphries v Poljak, [1992] VicRp 58; [1992] 2 V.R. 129 it was argued 
on behalf of the Plaintiff that the two injuries need to be "relevantly aggregated" for 
the purposes of fulfilling the test on seriousness because it resulted in the 
impairment of one body function, the right arm 441 According to Humphries, multiple 
impairments may not be aggregated for the purpose of establishing whether it 
constitutes a "serious injury"; but injuries442 may relevantly be combined for that 
purpose.443 It was also contended that both injuries formed part of one cause of 
action, the negligent failure of the first Respondent to provide a safe work system.444 
The Court declined the arguments and held that it cannot be relevantly aggregated 
as it "impaired two separate body functions"445 viz the shoulder and arm; and 
Humphries was distinguishable as that ruling was made in the context of one 
incident that resulted in more than one injury.446 Chernov JA explained that an 
injury to the big toe of one foot and subsequently an injury to the knee of the same 
leg may negatively affect the use of that leg, but it would be inaccurate to describe it 
as one impaired bodily function, the leg, but if this is wrong, his Honour continued 
to analyse the relevant provisions of Act447
The Act defines "injury" to mean "any physical or mental injur/' which includes the 
"aggravation... of any pre-existing injury" and "serious injury" is defined to mean "a
439 Ibid.
440 ibid  [15].
4«  ibid [22],
442 It is important to note the difference in meaning of impairments and injuries.
443 To Ha Lu [22].
444 Ibid.
445 Ibid [22]—[23].
446 Ibid [29].
447 Ibid [23].
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long-term impairment or loss of body function".448 It is not the injury p erse  which is 
indicative of it's seriousness but rather the degree of impairment or loss of bodily 
function consequential to the injury 449 The Act aims to forbid common law actions 
by occupationally-injured employees who are entitled to statutory compensation 
and the limited access creates an exception to the prohibition 450 To come within the 
exception, the Plaintiff needs to show that the relevant injury indeed constitutes a 
"serious injury"451 It is not open for the Court to grant leave unless it is satisfied 
that the injury is a "serious injury"452
Multiple injuries require each individual injury to be shown as a “serious injury".453 
Aggregation of multiple injuries depends on whether the same body function is 
affected and whether they arose from the same relevant accident failing which they 
remain distinct.454 The Statute prohibits relevant aggregation of separately 
sustained occupational injuries which do not individually constitute a "serious 
injury" despite impairing one bodily function.455 In cases of a pre-existing injury, it 
is permissible to combine injuries to determine if the second injury aggravated the 
first and if so, whether the additional impairment satisfies the "serious injur/' 
test.456 The process includes a comparison between the impairment immediately 
before and after the second injury; and if shown that the impairment flowing from 
the second injury can be fairly described as "serious", the second injury will satisfy 
the te s t457
The Court held that the injuries could not be relevantly aggregated because each 
injury gave rise to one cause of action which means that proceedings would involve 
two claims founded in two distinct incidents that resulted from two separate 
allegedly-negligent acts or omissions and will necessitate separate rulings.458
448 Ibid [24],
449 Ibid.
450 Ibid.
451 Ibid.
452 Ibid.
Ibid [26],
454 Ibid.
«s Ibid [28],
456 Ibid.
4”  Ibid.
«8 Ibid [31].
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4.3 .3 . Haden Engineering Pty Ltd v McKinnon
The impact of pain and suffering on the seriousness of the injury was considered by 
the Supreme Court of Victoria in an application for leave to pursue at common law 
based on section 134AB(38)(c)459 in the case of Haden Engineering Pty Ltd v 
McKinnon.460 The Court acknowledged the numerous disputes relating to the 
statutory test for a "serious injury" in its function as gatekeeper regarding "common 
law proceedings for damages attributable to the injury."461 For purposes of clarity, 
the specific subsection states that none of impairment, loss of bodily function or 
disfigurement shall be held as "serious":
... unless the pain and suffering consequence or the loss of earning capacity 
consequence is, when judged by comparison with other cases in the range of 
possible impairments or losses of a body function, or disfigurements, as the 
case may be, fairly described as being more than significant or marked, and 
as being at least very considerable...
The test criteria is criticised by the Court to be unfortunately vague, "imprecise, 
impressionistic, adjectival";462 and putting the courts to task to apply the test 
consistently and follow the rule of law by treating similar cases alike irrespective of 
the difficulties posed by imprecise criteria such as "unquantifiable as pain."463
Interpretation of the "pain and suffering consequence" includes a two-folded test 
with the first element the applicant’s experience of pain and the second element the 
disabling effect thereof on the applicant's physical capabilities (e.g. incapacity for 
work) and amenities of life.464
459 “134AB(38)(c) an impairment or loss of a body function or a disfigurement shall not be held to be
serious for the purposes of subsection (16) unless the pain and suffering consequence or the loss
of earning capacity consequence is, when judged by comparison with other cases in the range of 
possible impairments or losses of a body function, or disfigurements, as the case may be, fairly 
described as being more than significant or marked, and as being at least veiy considerable;"
460 Haden Engineering Pty Ltd v McKinnon [2010] VSCA 69. Hereinafter: Haden Engineering Pty Ltd. 
Retrieved on 25/08/2010 from http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/vic/VSCA/2010/69.html.
461 Ibid [1]—[2],
ibid [3].
463 Ibid [4].
464 Ibid [9].
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To assess the experience of pain, the Court has to consider the intensity, frequency 
and duration of the pain and episodes of pain465 with the evidentiary basis 
comprising of:466
(a) what the plaintiff says about the pain (both in court and to doctors);
(b) what the plaintiff does about the pain (e.g. medication, rest, seeking 
medical treatm ent);
(c) what the doctors say about the extent and intensity of the p laintiffs 
pain; and
(d) what the objective evidence shows about the disabling effect of the pain.
The Plaintiffs credibility will determine the weight attached to his version of the 
pain experienced,467 with cognisance taken of an individual's preparedness to 
endure pain to facilitate a desired level of function in which case objective evidence 
of the disabling effect may be of less importance.468
In assessing the second element, the disabling effect of pain, the extent of the 
limiting effect on the Plaintiffs physical functioning and interferences with the 
Plaintiffs amenities of life, ought to be considered.469 The disabling effect of the pain 
on work capacity entails a consideration of whether the Plaintiff is able to and the 
extent to which the Plaintiff can perform his pre-injury employment470 The ability 
to return to full-time employment does not exclude a finding of "serious injury" as it 
is but one of the factors to be considered.471
Assessment of the impact upon everyday activities of life will depend upon the 
circumstances of each case but may include considering the impact of pain on the 
Plaintiffs sleep, mobility, cognitive function,472 ability to self-care, execution of 
household duties, recreational and social activities, sexual life and enjoyment of 
life 473 The statutory test requires the consequences for the Plaintiff be compared
«s Ibid [10].
466 Ibid [11].
« 7 ibid [12].
468 Ibid [13].
469 Ibid [14].
«o Ibid [15].
471 Ibid.
472 Which may be impaired due to the use of medication.
473 Haden Engineering Pty Ltd [16].
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with similar cases and the Court held it to be relevant to take into consideration the 
Plaintiffs life expectancy to determine the likely duration for which those 
consequences will be experienced.474
In assessing the pain, the Court takes cognisance of both "objective matter of fact" 
and the Plaintiffs version of his pain experience,475 with the last aspect of 
importance in assessing the credibility of the Plaintiff.476 A finding of pain that is 
"more than significant and at least very considerable” requires the Court to take into 
account every individual's level of pain tolerance and preparedness to endure pain 
while going on with work and life.477
4 .3 .4 .  Guppy v Victorian WorkCover Authority & Anor
The requirement of loss of earning capacity as an indication of the seriousness of an 
injury was considered in Guppy v Victorian WorkCover Authority & Anor.478 Guppy 
entered the labour market as a labourer at the age of 16479 and injured his back in
2 0 0 1 480 and again in 2005481 at different employers; and in 2008 he applied for 
leave to commence with common law actions against his employers 482 Guppy 
contended that each injury was a "serious injury" and impaired function of his 
back/spine, within the meaning of section 134AB(37) of the Victorian Act.483
The application in the Court below was successful in respect of the first injury but 
not in respect of the second and Guppy appealed that finding on the grounds that he 
suffered a “serious injur/' in the form of an aggravation of a pre-existing condition 
as meant in section 134AB(37) of the Act which injury caused him consequently
474 Ibid [17].
475 Ibid [38]—[45].
47« Ibid.
477 Ibid [40]—[42].
478 Guppy v Victorian WorkCover Authority & Anor [2010] VSCA164. [1], [10]—[12]. Hereinafter: Guppy. 
Retrieved on 13/06/2013 from http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/vic/VSCA/2010/164.html.
479 Ibid [3].
480 Ibid [4],
481 Ibid [ 5 ] .
482 Ibid [6],
483 Ibid [7],
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"very considerable" pain, suffering and loss of earning capacity.484 To establish a 
"serious injury", Guppy relied on the consequences of impairment in respect of loss 
of earning capacity and not the subsequent pain and suffering.485 Section 
134AB(37) defines "serious injury" as a "permanent impairment or loss of a body 
function"486 with the process to establish the seriousness of an injury to be 
determined according to subsection (38) and specifically the second injury shall not 
be held as "serious" by the Court unless:487
• Consideration is given to the consequences to Guppy of the impairment 
regarding the loss of earning capacity compared to similarly impaired cases;
• the loss of earning capacity when compared to similar cases can be “fairly
described as being more than significant or marked, and as being at least 
very considerable";
• even if paragraphs (b) and (c) have been satisfied, Guppy further needs to
show that he has a permanent loss of earning capacity of at least 40%  in 
financial means measured in accordance with paragraph (f)
• loss of earning capacity is to be measured by comparing Guppy's gross
annual income which he earns, or is capable of earning in suitable 
employment at the date of the hearing by the County Court, with the gross 
annual income which he earns, or is capable of earning during the 3 years 
preceding and the 3 years following the injury that "most fairly reflects his 
earning capacity had the injury not occurred".
The influence of the test is that Guppy has to show a loss of 40% earning capacity 
due to the second injury which can fairly be described "as more than significant or 
marked, and as being at least very considerable" if compared to similar cases.488 In 
following earlier authorities, the Court held that the second injury must in itself 
satisfy the requirements of a "serious injury" as "the additional impairment caused 
by the aggravation must bear consequences of sufficient magnitude (more than
484 Ibid [8]—[9].
« s Ibid [11]-[12].
486 Ibid [13].
487 Guppy [14] and the Victorian Act s 134AB(37)(b)(c) & (f).
488 Ibid [17].
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significant or marked, and at least very considerable) for the second injury to 
qualify as a 'serious' injury."489
Before the first injury, Guppy was fit and healthy; he sought medical treatment and 
tried to return to work on light duties after the injury but was found to be 
incapacitated after about 6 months in September 2001.490 About four years later he 
commenced work with an employer who specialises in the placement of people with 
disabilities 491 where his hours of work fluctuated492 but by the mid of 2005 he 
could only manage 11 hours of work per week.493 The second injury was sustained 
in August of 2 0 0 5494 and upon returning to work thereafter, he worked 10 hours 
per week.495 The Court accepted Guppy’s pre-injury earning capacity as an average 
of 20-22 hours per week496 and after the injury he could only work 10-12 hours per 
week497 which meant a reduction of close to 50% which satisfies the requirement of 
at least 40% reduction in income.498 Once the 40% threshold has been met, the next 
test to apply is whether the second injury resulted in consequences that can be 
described as "more than significant or marked and must be at least very 
considerable" in comparison to similar cases.499 The Court held that in most cases, 
satisfying the 40% threshold will also mean "at least very considerable" 
consequences pertaining to earning capacity. It was argued by the Defendant that 
because Guppy's earnings was low, satisfying the 40% test will not take much to 
satisfy for example, a person working 4 hours per week, reduced to two hours, 
losing 50% could “hardly be described as 'very considerable"’500 The Court firmly 
declined this argument and held that for “an already impoverished person to lose 40 
per cent of his already reduced work capacity is a consequence that must on any 
measure be viewed as 'very considerable'.”501 Accordingly, leave was granted to
489 Ibid [18]—[19].
490 Ibid [20],
Ibid [22],
492 Ibid [23],
493 Ibid [26]—[27].
494 Ibid [28],
49s Ibid [29].
Ibid [40].
497 Ibid [41].
498 Ibid [47]—[48],
499 Ibid [49].
soo ibid [50].
soi ibid [51].
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bring common law actions in respect of the aggravation due to the second injury 
based on a reduced earning capacity.502
4 .3 .5 .  Parry v Masterpet Australia Pty Ltd
The District Court of New South Wales determined a case that turned on the 
limitation period allowed to commence proceedings in Parry v Masterpet Australia 
Pty Ltd,503 a case that was decided on section 151D of the New South Wales 
Compensation Act.504 The Plaintiff sought an order nunc pro tunc for leave to bring 
an action for damages outside the three year limitation period505 after sustaining an 
occupational injury on 29 March 2004.506
The Plaintiff notified her employer at the time of the accident and consulted a 
lawyer who advised that it is "premature" to pursue compensation and failed to 
inform her on a right to civil action.507 After three operations she was informed in 
March 2006 by the Compensation Authority that she may be entitled to 
compensation for whole person impairment and needed to see a lawyer.508 She saw 
another lawyer and upon an enquiry as to an action for damages, she was informed 
that it wasn’t applicable to her.509 She received compensation on 24 November 
2006 based on an assessment of 17% whole person impairment and a further 
amount pertaining to pain and suffering. She was informed that she was not entitled 
to any further compensation by the end of 2007;510 but after a new claims manager 
was appointed to her case, she was informed that her "compensation rights 
remained open for all time."511 She consulted another lawyer on 24- May 2009 and 
was informed that she might be entitled to further compensation due to 
deterioration in her condition and about the possibility to pursue at common law
502 Ibid [52],
503 Parry v Masterpet Australia Pty Ltd [2013] NSWDC 71. Hereinafter: Parry. Retrieved on 
16/06/2013 from http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/nsw/NSWDC/2013/71.html.
504 Ibid [1].
sos ibid [1], [27]—[28] & [40]—[41].
506 ibid  [2],
507 Ibid [4]-[5],
sos ibid  [6],
509 Ibid [7].
sio Ibid [11].
sii Ibid [12].
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for damages.512 She was advised to apply for reinstatement of compensation for loss 
of earnings which may influence the employer’s insurer to resolve to payment of a 
lump sum on a once-and-for-all basis rather than compensation for loss of earnings 
which she may be entitled to until the age of 67,513 Notice of the intended claim for 
damages was given by her lawyers to the employer on 24 October 2011514 which is 
outside the limitation period as provided in section 151D(2):515
A person to whom compensation is payable under this Act is not entitled to 
commence court proceedings for damages in respect of the injury concerned 
against the employer liable to pay that compensation more than 3 years 
after the date on which the injury was received, except with the leave of the 
court in which the proceedings are to be taken.
Prejudice to a defendant might compel a Court to refuse extension of the limitation 
period but the absence of prejudice does not necessarily mean a favourable 
outcome to the Plaintiff.516
The first question to be considered is specifically the date on which the limitation 
period begins to run;517 which was agreed by the parties to be the "date of the 
finding, in a valid medical certificate" that the Plaintiffs injuries surpassed the 
threshold of 15%.518 The Court found authority for this reasoning in the decision of 
Opoku v P & M Quality Smallgoods P / L [2012] NSWSC 478 where it was accepted 
that Opoku could not institute proceedings until he met the required threshold.519 
This is contrary to previous decisions in which the New South Wales Court of 
Appeal held that the three year limitation period starts from the date of the injury 
and not from the date of the finding that the threshold has been reached.520
In considering prejudice to the defendant, the Honourable Justice applied the test 
framed in Itex Graphix Pty Limited v Elliott [2002] NSWCA 104 at [87] on the
512 Ibid [13].
513 Ibid [14],
si4 Ibid [15].
sis ibid [21].
sis Ibid [22].
5i7 Ibid [23]—[24].
sis Ibid [25] & [40].
sw Ibid [26].
52o Ibid [27]-[40],
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discretion by the Court in deciding applications for leave to sue after the limitation 
period stating that "the general question that has to be asked is what is fair and just 
(per Gleeson Cj in Salido). Or what does the justice of the case require".521 The Court 
held that the Defendant was aware from the date of the injury of the Plaintiffs 
injury and causal relationship between her injuries, disabilities and employment 
duties.522 The Plaintiff tried to ascertain her legal rights and accepted the advice of 
lawyers in a case where negligence is not obvious, while the limitation period 
expired during a time which she was under the impression that a claim for damages 
was not open to her.523 The Court held it to be "fair and just" in the light of all the 
circumstances to grant the relief sought.524
4.4. Summary
The Australian situation regarding the right to action at common law by an 
employee against his employer may be summarised as follows:
• The general rule is that civil actions by employees against their employers is 
prohibited in respect of occupational injuries and diseases;525
• An exception to the rule has been created by a number of Australian 
jurisdictions;526
• Civil claims by virtue of the applicable compensatory law are barred until a 
minimum threshold of permanent impairment is established;527
• Immunity against civil action by virtue of Australian compensatory laws is 
extended to the company as employer and certain categories of employees in 
an enterprise that are not specifically specified;528
• The right of action against third parties is retained;529
521 ibid [49].
522 Ibid [50],
523 Ibid [50],
524 Ibid [51]—[53].
525 Chapter 6 paras 4.1 & 4.3.1 supra.
526 Chapter 6 paras 4.1 & 4.3.1 supra.
527 Chapter 6 paras 4.1 & 4.3.4 supra.
528 Chapter 6 para 4.1 supra.
529 Chapter 6 para 4.1 supra.
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• The definitions of an "occupational injury"; "occupational disease";530 an 
"employee" and an "employer"531 determine whether an action will be 
barred and an employer be saved from same.
5. CONCLUSION
The general rule in all three countries is that the employee's right to common law 
redress is removed.532 Limited access has been allowed in all three countries. In 
South Africa, the right is limited to mine employees who are entitled to 
compensation for lung diseases under ODIMWA.533 In Canada, a limited right has 
been subrogated to the Compensation Authority (who has the final decision 
whether to proceed with civil action) and differs between jurisdictions, some of 
which have abrogated the right.534 In Australia, a limited right exists in some 
jurisdictions based on statutory determined thresholds.535 The right in Australia is 
the broadest of the three countries in following a hybrid system whereby the right 
arises once a minimum threshold of impairment has been reached.536
Reasons for the removal or limitation of the rights are closely related to the purpose 
and development of compensatory laws in all three countries; founded on an 
argument that is essential to the existence of compensatory legislation and without 
it, the social contract between employers and employees may be breached.537
Common law actions for damages are fault-based in contrast to workers 
compensation schemes which are by their very nature no-fault systems of social 
security.538 COIDA is unique amongst the three countries in providing for a fault- 
based claim for increased compensation within the statutory compensation
530 See Chapter 4 paras 4.1; 4.3 & 4.4 supra.
531 See Chapter 5  paras 4.1 & 4.2 supra.
532 Chapter 6 paras 2.1; 2.2; 3.1; 3.2; 4.1 & 4.2 supra.
533 Chapter 6 para 2.2.3 supra.
534 Chapter 6 para 3.1 supra.
535 Chapter 6 para 4.1 supra.
536 Chapter 6 paras 4.1 & 4.3 supra.
538 Chapter 6 para 2.4 supra.
537 Chapter 6 paras 2.2; 2.2.1; 2.2.2; 2.2.3; 3.1; 3.2; 3.2.1; 3.2.2; 3.2.3; 4.1; 4.2 & 4.3 supra.
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scheme,539 The rules that govern recovery are however archaic in nature and pre­
dates current common law rules pertaining to non-statutory claims for damages.540 
Successful claims are limited to compensation for pecuniary loss only 
disadvantaging employees who have a higher burden of proof than at common law 
for lower redress.541 It is submitted that such disadvantages to employees are not 
consistent with the remedial nature of compensatory legislation. A further 
disadvantage is that the employer is not held responsible according to his statutory 
and common law duties of care as a claim for increased compensation is a claim 
against the Compensation Fund and not against the employer.542
Categories of employees included in the ambit of protection against civil action, and 
for the purposes of increased compensation and wrongful conduct include senior 
employees in charge of the employer’s business which leaves colleagues of equal 
hierarchical status and lower ranking employees open to common law claims for 
damages if they do not fulfil the definition of "in charge of a branch or department" 
under COIDA.543 Immunity to employers in the Canadian compensatory schemes is 
very broad because contrary to COIDA, a system of collective liability is followed 
according to which all employers in the same category are indemnified against civil 
claims by all employees in the same category.544 Immunity in Canada has been 
extended to include even professional medical negligence, which is contrary to the 
philosophy of the compensation system which is based on the employment 
relationship.545 In Australian compensatory law immunity is generally broad and 
may include a deemed employer, with none of the laws categorising employers 
similar to COIDA or Canada.546
The right of action against third parties is retained in all three countries.547
539 Chapter 6 paras 2.5; 2.5.1; 2.5.2; 2.5.3 supra.
540 Chapter 6 paras 2.5.1; 2.5.2; 2.5.3 supra.
541 Chapter 6 para 2.5 supra.
542 Chapter 6 para 2.5 supra.
543 Chapter 6 para 2.5 supra.
544 Chapter 6 paras 3.1; 3.3 & 3.3.1 supra.
545 Chapter 6 para 3.3.1 supra.
546 Chapter 6 para 4.1 supra.
547 Chapter 6 paras 2.1; 3.1 & 4.1 supra.
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The fragmentation in the South African compensation scheme has markedly been 
enlarged and deepened as an unintended consequence of the Mankayi ruling 
widening the disparity between the rights and redress of employees pursuant to 
COIDA and ODIMWA respectively.548 Fragmentation in the Canadian compensatory 
scheme is real in the form of provincial jurisdictional determinations, but has been 
overcome by the Interjurisdictional Agreement.549 It is thus not considered as 
problematic in contrast to Australia with a similar federal system of government but 
which has expressed the need for harmonising the schemes across the country and 
has commenced the process with a system of benchmarking health and safety laws 
across jurisdictions.550
Irrespective of how a common law claim for damages is framed, be it a breach of 
human rights or human rights remedies, labour relations disputes or remedies or in 
breach of contract, the courts in all three countries will not allow a masked claim if 
the applicable compensatory law prohibits actions for damages against the 
employer. In deciding the true nature of the action, the courts have regard to the 
employment relationship and the applicable definitions.551
In South Africa and Canada, court actions by employees generally challenge the 
immunity afforded to employers,552 but in Australia court actions by employees are 
characterised by appeals turning on technical requirements to obtain a declaration 
of the right to pursue at common law.553 Interpretation of unclear provisions in 
Australia poses difficulties to the Courts in determining the seriousness of an injury 
through evidence and testimony inter alia on pain and suffering, loss of earning 
capacity in addition to procedural aspects like the date when prescription starts to 
run. The very technical nature of the Australian compensation system has seen the 
need for greater involvement from lawyers; and workers are advised to seek legal 
advice once the required threshold has been met and the right to pursue at common
548 Chapter 6 para 2.2.3 supra.
549 Chapter 6 para 3 supra.
550 Chapter 6 para 4 supra.
551 Chapter 6 paras 2.3.1; 2.3.2; 3.2.3; 3.3.2; 3.3.3; 3.3.4 & 4.1 supra.
552 Chapter 6 paras 2.2; 2.3; 3.2 & 3.3 supra.
553 Chapter 6 paras 4.3; 4.3.1; 4.3.2; 4.3.3; 4.3.4 & 4.3.5 supra.
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law is established.554 It is proposed that an overly-complicated compensatory 
system is contrary to the principle of equal access and equal benefit of the law and 
contrary to the Meredith principles.
It is submitted that employers will be indemnified irrespective of the circumstances 
surrounding the accident unless the employer removes himself from the ambit of 
the protection by deliberately wrongful actions.555
Human rights challenges in South Africa and Canada have shown that courts are of 
the view that the compensation scheme is advantageous to workers, with the only 
disadvantage to employees that a higher amount of damages can be recovered 
through common law actions than through statutory compensation. However, it is 
important to note that no disadvantages to employers due to the system could be 
identified.556 Australia does not have a Bill of Rights in its Constitution and 
accordingly no such challenges were reported.
No statutory compensation is provided for pertaining to non-pecuniary loss like 
pain and suffering, loss of enjoyment of life etc. under COIDA or in Canada but it is 
compensated under Australian compensatory laws.557 It is also the reason why 
recovery under common law is normally higher than at statutory compensation; 
and it is submitted that employees have a need for their harm to be redressed in a 
manner that vindicates harm done, which is not the case in very limited 
compensation regimes. It is submitted that employees will challenge the provisions 
that exclude employers from liability for negligently exposing employees until 
either adequate no-fault compensation is being paid or the right to pursue at 
common law is re-instated.
None of the three compensatory systems allow of double compensation. If a worker 
recovers at common law, statutory compensation will be deducted from it and vice 
versa which ever is the lesser.558
554 Chapter 6 para 4.3.5 supra.
555 Chapter 6 fn 10 supra.
556 Chapter 6 paras 2.2.1 & 3.2.1 supra.
557 Chapter 6 fn 25; 353 & 396 & Chapter 6 paras 4.3.1; 4.3.2 & 4.3.3 supra.
558 Chapter 6 paras 2.2.1; 2.2.3; 3.1 & 4.1 supra.
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The common law has been developed and amended in Australia to assist employees 
specifically through the removal of certain defences often utilised by employers in 
the past. Neither South Africa nor Canada has similar provisions.559
559 Chapter 6 para 4.1 & Chapter 6 fn 405 & 406 supra.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION
1. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this study was stated as an exploration whether South African 
employees find themselves in a less favourable position regarding the right to 
compensation for occupational injuries and diseases and if so, the extent thereof in 
comparison to Canadian and Australian employees.
In answering the question, four areas have been identified that revealed 
problematic aspects:
1. the scope of workers' compensation in South Africa;
2. the administrative remedy and access to courts;
3. common law liability; and
4. fragmentation.
Protection against financial distress with fair and just compensation through an 
effective administrative system for occupational injuries and diseases is of the 
utmost importance.1 This study tried to establish if some of the provisions in the 
South African workers' compensatory scheme are outdated; and to establish 
whether the South African workers' compensation scheme is adequate for current 
employment needs. The aim of the study was not to concentrate on the contents of 
the right to compensation in the form of the benefits although reference was made 
to it but rather to examine the right itself and its scope of application.2
South Africa has a supreme Constitution which includes a Bill of Rights and the right 
to workers’ compensation is implicated in the right of access to social security in 
section 27 of the Constitution. The Government of South Africa is obliged by virtue 
of the Bill of Rights to gradually broaden social security rights but the only
1 Chapter 1 para 1.
2 Chapter 2 para 3.4.
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amendments to COIDA related to the list of scheduled occupational diseases in 
2004. It did not extend the right to no-fault compensation to excluded persons and 
has not been broadened since the promulgation of the Constitution.3 Similar social 
security sentiments to the South African Bill of Rights are expressed in the SADC 
Instruments which is of particular importance for South Africa as an important role 
player and leader in the region with an increase in the movement of people and 
goods across the borders of the SADC region and ultimately globally.4 Canada has a 
similar constitutional framework with a Charter of Rights representing a human 
rights culture.5 Australia does not have a Bill of Rights as part of its Constitution and 
social security rights are thus a silent part of the Australian law.6
It is submitted that the purpose section in COIDA be amended to include human 
rights values in the form of human dignity (inclusive of bodily integrity), respect 
and fairness similar to those included in the Northwest Territories Act7 and to 
acknowledge people suffering from occupational injuries and diseases' disabilities.
The lack of inclusivity in COIDA is a major stumbling block in accessing benefits and 
in achieving social justice.8 As the role of the tripartite relationship of social 
partners is to balance the interests of state, employer and employee,9 it is important 
that all members of the stakeholder groups are included in all forms of decision­
making to effectively balance the interests of the parties;10 as with the example of 
Meredith who consulted widely to find a solution acceptable to all groupings.11 It 
remains true and in South Africa inclusivity may act as a method to creatively 
relieve specific social security problems. As there is a bulk of research available e.g. 
the Taylor Report, the Benjamin Report, Reports by the Department of Labour etc. 
what is lacking is clear policy documentation.12
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10 
11 
12
Chapter 1 para 2 & Chapter 2 para 3.1.
Chapter 1 para 3.
Chapter 2 para 4.1.
Chapter 6 para 4.
Chapter 3 para 4.1.
Chapter 2 para 3.4.
Chapter 2 para 6.
Chapter 3 para 5.3.
Chapter 2 paras 4.3 & 4.5.
Chapter 2 para 3.5.
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2. THE SCOPE OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION IN SOUTH AFRICA
In South Africa,13 Canada14 and Australia,15 the scope of cover by virtue of the 
statutory provisions is limited to compensation for occupational injuries and 
diseases for persons fulfilling the statutory definitions of an employee, a dependant 
of a deceased employee and an occupational injury or disease.
The scope of workers' compensatory law should be viewed in the light of the 
purpose of this type of social security provisions which has been identified as 
limited to compensation for occupational injuries and diseases. If the object and 
intent are read together with the applicable definitions, it is clear that this type of 
statutory compensation is intended to be exclusively compensating work-related 
injuries and diseases and not any injuries or diseases irrespective of where and 
when they are sustained or contracted.16 It has been held in all three countries that 
compensatory laws as part of beneficial legislation should be interpreted in a 
manner that favours employees. Particularly in cases where two possible competing 
interpretations are possible, the more beneficial interpretation ought to be 
construed in favour of the employee and consistent with human rights values.17
South Africa and Canada share the Meredith principles laid down in Ontario, of 
which the principle of collective liability forms part. The collective liability, known 
as the historic trade-off or compromise, holds that all employers participate in the 
scheme which then covers all the participating employers’ workers.18 The history of 
compensatory legislation in Australia is characterised by periods of few legislative 
changes followed by periods of rapid and often broad legislative changes under 
influence of the political philosophy of the day.19 This creates a situation where
13 Chapter 2 para 3.
14 Chapter 2 para 4.3.
15 Chapter 2 para 5.3.
16 Chapter 3 paras 4.2; 4.2.1 [Medwid); 4.2.2. [Henry); 4.2.3. [Budge) & 4.2.4. [City o f  Medicine Hat) 
&. Chapter 3 para 5.1.
17 Chapter 3 paras 3.1; 4.2; 5.1 & Chapter 5 para 4.1.
18 Chapter 2 para 4.3.
19 Chapter 2 para 5.5.
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social legislation is misused by the political fraternity for its own purposes and 
ought to be avoided in South Africa.20
The scope of workers' compensation is determined by the fulfilment of the 
definitions of what constitutes an occupational injury or disease; and also who will 
be entitled to institute a claim for compensation as well as who will be protected 
against civil action for damages.21
Secondary legislation in the form of regulations and policy documents is lacking in 
the South African compensatory scheme, which are extensively used in Canada22 
and Australia23 to guide the three social partners on the interpretation of definitions 
and help to create clarity in law. As the Court in Odayar v Compensation 
Commissioner held that the Commissioner is not empowered to issue regulations, it 
will be necessary for COIDA to be amended to empower the Commissioner to issue 
regulations or alternatively and in the interim the publication of guideline 
documentation that clearly states the requirements, rights and duties in plain 
language for the benefit of particularly less sophisticated employees.24 Care should, 
however, be taken not to reduce guidelines into set rules so as to avoid limiting the 
general nature of the test phrases.25 Queensland in Australia also made use of a 
schedule annexed to the act to assist with clarity on the interpretation of the 
definitions.26
Although the courts have advanced different tests over time to determine whether 
an injury arose out of and in the course of employment, it can be concluded that all 
the tests can be categorised and included into the control test in the form of control 
by the employer over the employee27 The test is a pre-requisite for compensation 
in all three of the countries but has the narrowest application in South Africa with
20 Chapter 2 para 5.3.
21 Chapter 2 para 3.3 & Chapter 4 para 3.2.
22 Chapter 4 para 3.2.
23 Chapter 4 para 4.2.
24 Chapter 4 para 3.2.
25 Chapter 4 para 3.2 (Puddicombe).
26 Chapter 5 para 4.1.
27 Chapter 4 para 2.
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the requirement that an injury arise "out of and in the course of employment."28 
Australia exchanged the conjunctive "and" in the test phrase "out of and in the 
course of" to the disjunctive form "or". However, without other limitations requiring 
a nexus with employment, it resulted in a situation where injuries flowing from non­
work related activities, satisfied the test.29 The requirement of employment in some 
jurisdictions, to be a "substantial" or "significant" contributing factor requires a 
stronger nexus with employment but is not settled in law yet.30 Australia has the 
broadest and least restrictive definition of the three countries but it has 
unintentional consequences that resulted in compensation for non-work related 
injuries. Canada31 and Australia32 specifically provide for an aggravation of a pre­
existing condition which is lacking in COIDA. Canada has a similar definition to 
South Africa but has broadened the definition with the inclusion of conditions in the 
form of a "recurrence, relapse or aggravation" and a presumption favouring an 
employee that softened the conjunctive "and" in the test phrase by presuming that if 
one element has been satisfied, the other is true and putting the compensation 
authority to the task to rebut the presumption.33
It is submitted that the Canadian approach is preferable as the current COIDA 
definitions do not accommodate an employee with a pre-existing condition although 
the Constitution precludes discrimination against persons with disabilities. It is also 
contrary to the well-known doctrine of "take your victim as you find him" or the so- 
called talem qualem rule in the law of delict.34
The COIDA test is a combination of two definitions, an occupational injury defined 
as "a personal injury sustained as a result of an accident"35 and an accident as "an 
accident arising out o f  and in the course o f  an employee's employment and resulting
28 Chapter 4 para 3.1.
29 Chapter 2 para 5.3; Chapter 4 para 4.1 & the case PVYW v Comcare (Chapter 4 para 4.2.4) & 
commuting injuries to and from work (Chapter 4 para 4.3.4).
30 Chapter 4  para 4.1.
31 Chapter 4 para 3.1.
32 Chapter 4 paras 4.1; 4.2.1 (Kavanagh) & 4.3. & Chapter 3 para 5.2.1 {Johnston).
33 Chapter 4 para 3.1.
34 Neetling eta l  (2005) 199.
35 S l(xxx).
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in a personal injury, illness or the death of the employee".36 The latter phrase 
comprises of two tests due to the working of the conjunctive noun "and" which 
means that both parts of the test phrase need to be satisfied.37 Arising out of 
employment indicates the location of the accident and whether it is the employee's 
employment that necessitated his presence at the location of the accident by virtue 
of his contract of employment;38 while in the course of employment relates to 
circumstances of discharging the duties under his contract of employment and that 
which is related to it, be it expressly or impliedly with factors to be taken into 
consideration the time when employment commences, ends and the duration there- 
off.39 The element of "in the course of’ limits the scope of accidents that will attract 
compensation to be work-related. It is clear that the test phrase consists of two 
interrelated but distinct elements.40
The early English case law extensively interpreted the test phrase; and the approach 
by Rumpff JA in Khoza by declining to be guided by English case law is regrettable as 
South Africa has limited authorities on the subject in comparison to countries like 
England. The approach of Williamson JA in Khoza, by which he concurred with 
Rumpff JA but also relied on English authorities, is preferred as it opens up a South 
African approach but with the added benefit of settled English law and the nuances 
previously determined on by the courts 41
In Khoza, which is considered still to be the leading case on the subject, Rumpff JA 
held that the legislator did not define the relationship between duties and accident 
and a broad relationship would suffice 42 This holds that only a broad relationship 
with employment is required which may include an open-ended spectrum of factors 
that maybe taken into consideration during the enquiry of the test phrase, even 
broad enough to include assaults on the employee if the reason is causally 
connected to the employment.43
36 Chapter 4 para 2.1.
37 Chapter 4 para 2.1.
38 Chapter 4 para 2.1.
39 Chapter 4 paras 2.1 & 3.2.
40 Chapter 4 paras 2.1 & 3.2.
41 Chapter 4 para 2.2.
42 Chapter 4 para 2.2.
43 Chapter 4 paras 2.2 & 3.1.
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On the opposite side of the spectrum it is possible for the deliberate conduct on the 
part of the employer to take him outside the immunity afforded by the legislation to 
employers against delictual claims for damages.44
All three countries extended the right to compensation by a deeming provision to 
provide for circumstances related to employment but which do not comprise of the 
discharging of contractual duties. Under the deeming provisions, COIDA includes 
transport provided by the employer free of charge and under the control of the 
employer;45 circumstances of "serious and wilful misconduct" if it results in a 
serious disablement; actions taken by an employee in the interest of the employer 
irrespective it be contrary to the employer's instructions or otherwise unlawful; and 
emergency work by a mine worker with the consent of his employer.46 In the spirit 
of an interpretation most favourable to the employee, the courts have held that the 
onus rests on the Commissioner to prove the presence of serious and wilful 
misconduct.47 In the Canadian legislation, the right has also been broadened with a 
presumptive provision regarding the death of a person in that the death will be 
deemed to fulfil the test if a person is found dead at his place of work.48 It is 
submitted that this should seriously be considered to be included into South African 
law, seen in the light of South Africa's dangerous mining industry.
The definition of an employee was broadened with the promulgation of COIDA but it 
remains exclusive in nature 49 The definition of an employee is determined by the 
statutory definition which is based on the common law contract of service50 in all 
three of the countries;51 with the test applied by the courts to be the dominant 
impression test52 and the power afforded to the applicable administrative body to 
condone invalid employment contracts.53 In this regard, the courts ought to 
carefully weigh up the long-term interests of the parties so as not to defeat social
44 Chapter 4 para 2.2.
45 Chapter 4 paras 2.3; 3.3.6 & 4.3.
46 Chapter 4 paras 2.3; 3.2; 3.3; 3.3.5 & 4.3.
47 Chapter 4 para 2.3.
48 Chapter 4 para 3.3.
49 Chapter 2 para 3.3.
50 Chapter 5 paras 2.3; 3.3; 4 & 4.3;
51 Chapter 5 paras 2.1; 3.1 & 4.
52 Chapter 5 paras 2.3.2; 3.3; 4.3.2 (Stevens) & 4.3.4 (Abraham Abdalla).
53 Chapter 5 paras 2.5; 3.4 & 4.4.
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justice as was done in Daytona.54 It is of utmost importance that young workers are 
protected equally to their adult counterparts when embarking on some forms of 
employment like waiting, delivering newspapers and magazines, acting, singing 
etc.55
Dependants as defined in COIDA exclude children that are older than 18 years at the 
time of the death of the parent from benefits irrespective whether they have 
concluded their education and training.56 As it is unclear what the exact status is of 
this category of children, it is uncertain whether these children’s right to pursue at 
common law is removed by virtue of section 35 of COIDA. Canada57 and Australia58 
define a dependent to be a family member who was wholly or partially financially 
dependent upon the employee and no reference is made with regard to age. It is 
submitted that the age restriction on dependents be substituted by a provision that 
allows all family members that are financially dependent upon the employee to be 
rightful claimants.
COIDA59 excludes a self-employed person (independent contractor) by the 
determination as represented in the definition by the words "a person who 
contracts for the carrying out of work and himself engages other persons to perform 
such work” which does not favour entrepreneurial enterprises which often consist 
of one person businesses or other forms of self-employment.60 Furthermore, this 
phrase does not take cognisance of the changing world of work, with a worldwide 
increase in atypical forms of employment and does not conform to the provisions of 
the SADC Code on Social Security.61 It is submitted that for legislation to remain 
relevant and purposive, it needs to provide for current labour trends; and it is 
proposed that a process should be followed according to which gradual inclusion 
into the definition is executed starting with optional cover for self-employed
54 Chapter 5 paras 2.5.1; 3.4.1 (Decision No. 20053860) & 4.4.2 (Riley) in connection with the 
influence of a suspended driver’s licence.
55 Chapter 5 para 2.4.1.
56 Chapter 5 para 2.1.
57 Chapter 5 para 3.1.
58 Chapter 5 para 4.1.
59 S l(xix)(d)(iv).
60 Chapter 5 paras 2.3 & 2.9.
61 Chapter 5 paras 2.9; 3.11 & 4.11.
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persons as this will give effect to the constitutional imperative. The exclusion of 
domestic workers in private households should be addressed similarly as this group 
is considered to be extremely vulnerable and in need of protection as could be seen 
in the Van Vuuren case62 where the assistant matron in a hostel was excluded from 
the ambit of the Act but was seriously injured in a work-related accident.63 The 
Canadian64 and Australian65 compensatory laws in general include domestic 
workers in private households. In all these categories optional coverage ought to be 
changed to compulsory coverage over time.
Attention should be given to persons in training as the previous dispensation of 
apprentices is not currently followed in South African industries; and young 
persons in training at training institutions are not considered to be "employees" for 
the purposes of the Act although they are exposed to employment hazards in 
practical training sessions.66 The example of Canada67 and Australia68 ought to be 
followed and in the public interest trainees ought to be included.
Inclusion of the categories of self-employed persons, students and trainees could be 
done similar to Canada and Australia by way of deeming them to be employees of 
the government for the purposes of the act. It will be necessary to remove the 
current subsection excluding persons working under a "contract for service" and 
insert a deeming provision.
The plight of migrant workers deserves to be addressed. Migrant workers from 
SADC countries working at South African mines are in particular need of protection. 
South Africa should not be perceived as a country spreading poverty and ill-health 
but rather the opposite. It is important that migrant workers should be treated 
equally to South Africans even when returning to their countries of origin and if 
they are entitled to compensation, it must not be terminated upon leaving South
62 Chapter 5 para 2.11.1.
63 See Chapter 5 para 3.9 for the Canadian situation.
64 Chapter 5 para 3.9.
65 Chapter 5 para 4.9.
66 Chapter 5 para 2.9.
67 Chapter 5 paras 3.1 & 3.3.2 (University o f  Lethbridge).
68 Chapter 5 paras 4.1 & 4.10.1 (Fogliano).
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Africa permanently. The inter-jurisdictional agreements in Canada and Australia 
need to be studied more thoroughly to determine precisely how it can be used as 
examples of agreements on an international level in the SADC region. South African 
workers working in the SADC countries are also in need of protection, and 
agreements, albeit international, need to address this aspect too. These issues are 
contained in the SADC Code on Social Security which requires from the SADC 
countries to provide adequate social security benefits to the people of the region in 
a harmonised manner. International agreements are soft law instruments and will 
only be binding when negotiated and agreed upon and cannot be enforced by law. It 
is submitted that the ideal situation will be the extension of such agreements to 
include all the members of the African Union.69 Serious consideration ought to be 
given to include provisions for optional coverage to South Africans working abroad 
in countries that do not adequately provide for compensation for work-related 
injuries and diseases.
The definition of an employer corresponds to that of an employee70 and is essential 
in balancing the interests of the parties as only the employer able to satisfy the 
definition will be immune against delictual claims for damages.71 Although 
participation by all employers are an important part of the continued existence of a 
compensatory scheme, an anomaly is set in law by which omitting to register by an 
employer will neither defeat the right to benefits nor an employer's counter right to 
protection.72 Australia uniquely provides for specific insurance for uninsured 
employers in the form of the "Nominal Insurer" but concerns were raised by the 
Productivity Commission (2004) regarding the financial impact it might have on the 
financial health of the compensation scheme.73 It is submitted that the South African 
administrative body administering the Compensation Fund, the Compensation 
Commissioner, ought to put processes and procedures in place to expose employers 
who are not registered and who are not in good standing with the Fund. Awareness 
should be raised by way of compulsory posters in workplaces informing employees 
and employers of their rights and obligations. Furthermore, employers who are not
69 Chapter 4 paras 2.4; 3.4; 4.4 & 5.3 and Chapter 5 paras 2.9; 2.10; 3.7 & 4.7.
70 Chapter 5 paras 2.2; 3.2 & 4.2.
71 Chapter 5 para 2.2.
72 Chapter 5 paras 2.7; 2.7.1 (Boer v Momo] & 3.6.1 (Isaac).
73 Chapter 5 para 4.6.
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compliant ought to be penalised openly to enhance compliance through example. It 
however requires a reliable financial system with clean audits confirming that 
employers are treated fairly and that correct assessments and penalties are charged 
which is clearly not currently the situation according to the Compensation Fund's 
Annual Reports.74
3. THE ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDY AND ACCESS TO COURTS
The purpose of workers' compensatory laws, the administrative remedy and the 
protection afforded to employers against civil actions are very closely related.75
The administrative nature of workers' compensatory legislation stems from the 
principle of speedy compensation born from the need to provide continued financial 
support in times that the employee cannot provide for himself without any fault of 
his own.76 Because the court system is a slow and adversarial process, the remedy is 
to be executed by an administrative system intended to avoid breaks in financial 
income and reach speedy outcomes. The effectiveness of these bodies has the 
potential to greatly impact on the parties that have to exercise their rights through 
the administrative body. The tardiness of the common law system was one of the 
reasons for removing workers' compensation from the court system to enable rapid 
processes with quick decision-making and compensation at a time when it is most 
needed.77 However, if the administrative system is not an effective system, this 
object is defeated. It was shown that dissatisfaction with the administrative bodies 
providing this service is growing in all three countries amongst employers and 
employees who are reliant on the effectiveness of these administrative bodies as the 
route of first instance.78 In South Africa, Canada and Australia it was acknowledged 
by the courts that the monetary value of statutory compensation provided for 
pursuant to workers' compensation is less than what is recoverable under common
74 Chapter 3 para 2.1.
75 Chapter 3 para 2.
76 As shown from the historical development of workers’ compensatory law in Chapter 2.
77 Chapter 6 para 3.2.1 (Reference re).
78 Chapter 3 paras 2.1; 2.2 & 2.3.
331
law.79 In all three of the countries the exclusive jurisdiction of the administrative 
bodies tasked with execution of the scheme was recognised by the courts.80 It also 
follows that the administrative nature rules dispute resolution processes and 
procedures.81
Removal of workers’ compensation from the ambit of the court system was one of 
the very first steps to address the plight of workers who could not afford to pursue 
actions in courts of law.82 Rights to appeal and to review administrative decisions 
are limited in all three countries so as to restrict a worker and an employer from the 
repeated use of courts instead of the administrative system that in itself forms part 
of the remedy created as part of the solution to have justice for both parties.83
COIDA provides for an appeal process, with the court of first instance a tribunal and 
a limited right of appeal to the High Court but only regarding interpretation without 
any right of appeal against findings of fact.84
COIDA is outdated in terms of section 92, which instructs the presiding officer of the 
tribunal (who previously was a permanently-appointed officer of the Compensation 
Fund) to refer a case to the High Court if his view is not supported by at least one of 
the assessors. In practice, the presiding officer has a limited tenure without 
resources to refer a case to the High Court. This led to the case of Nazeem Mallie in 
which the Court indicated the Director-General to be the applicable person that 
should refer a case in the applicable circumstances to the High Court.85 It is 
submitted that the Act be amended to provide for either the referral by the 
Director-General or alternatively for a permanently-appointed administrative 
appeals tribunal. It does not fall within the scope of this study to further explore the 
administrative tribunal system but it suffices to submit that the South African
79 Chapter 6 paras 2.2.1 {Jooste); 3.2.1 (Reference re) & para 4 (Productivity Commission Report).
80 Chapter 6 para 3.2.2 (Pasiechnyk).
81 Chapter 3 para 2.
82 Chapter 2 para 5.2.
83 Chapter 2 para 3.2.
84 Chapter 2 para 3.2.
85 Chapter 2 para 3.2.
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judicial system in general and workers' compensation specifically would greatly 
benefit by a similar comprehensive administrative tribunal system as Australia.86
The Constitutional Court refused access to a common law claim for damages in 
favour of the statutory administrative remedy in Jooste.87 The administrative 
remedy as provided by the Compensation Commissioner through the Compensation 
Fund is unfortunately failing its objective of speedy compensation that is just and 
fair as is clear from the need for the implementation of a turnaround strategy and 
medical practitioners' refusal to treat injured employees88 Similar dissatisfaction 
was expressed in Canada89 and Australia;90 and it does not seem that any of the 
three countries have an answer except for the approach embarked on by the South 
African Compensation Commissioner by identifying the problems and interacting 
with the relevant affected parties and real actions aimed at addressing the 
problems.91 If the administrative problems are not addressed effectively to the 
satisfaction of the stakeholders, the compensation scheme is in itself endangered by 
one of the parties of the tripartite stakeholder group, the State. Pressure by the 
dissatisfied groups might cause the end of the scheme if the scheme cannot fulfil the 
purpose of its existence.92
The right to appeal in Canada is similar to South Africa, limited to questions of law 
and factual questions for as far as it concerns the law. An administrative tribunal 
system is in place of which the expertise in workers' compensatory law is 
recognised and appreciated by the higher courts.93 Unfortunately, although the 
intention was to provide easy access to informal and inexpensive hearings, it 
became more judicialised, influenced by procedural requirements and involvement 
in hearings.94 Approaching the higher courts with an application for review appears 
to be complicated with the standard of review to receive attention first of all in all
86 Chapter 3 paras 2.1 & 2.3.
87 Chapter 3 para 2.1.
88 Chapter 3 para 2.1.
89 Chapter 3 para 2.2.
90 Chapter 3 para 2.3
91 Chapter 3 para 2.1
92 Chapter 3 para 3.1.
93 Chapter 2 para 4.2.
94 Chapter 2 para 4.2.
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cases. The rules governing review were codified in British Columbia to create 
certainty in law.95
The Australian judicial system comprises of a comprehensive Administrative 
Appeals Tribunal system which includes jurisdiction over workers’ compensation 
matters.96 The aim of the system is to provide just, fair, economical and speedy 
resolutions to disputes. Appeals to higher courts are, similar to South Africa and 
Canada, limited to questions of law.97
4. COMMON LAW CLAIMS
The roots of compensation lie in ancient times where the right to be compensated 
for bodily harm was from very early on influenced by statutory involvement98 Any 
right will only be as effective as the results flowing from it as is clear from the 
historical need for the development of workers' compensatory legislation; which 
was shown to lie in the failure of the common law system of redress to provide a fair 
and just retribution system for employees suffering from occupational injuries and 
diseases.99 In addressing the said failure of the adversarial system and the 
deficiencies in informal social assistance schemes which was not viable to all 
workers, a new branch of law was developed in the form of compensation without 
regard to fault in the form of an administrative remedy intended to provide speedy 
relief by replacing litigation.100 This was necessary to address, inter alia, the so- 
called unholy trinity of defences raised by employers in the court system which 
successfully relieved them from liability.101 From its inception, the workers' 
compensation scheme was under the control of the three social partners namely 
State, business and labour; aiming to benefit society at large by removing the 
economical burden society historically had to endure due to occupational injuries
95 Chapter 2 para 4.2.
96 Chapter 2 para 5.2.
97 Chapter 2 para 5.2.
98 Chapter 2 para 1.
99 Chapter 2 para 1.
100 Chapter 2 para 1.
101 Chapter 2 para 1.
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and diseases.102 Any current scheme needs to address the needs historically 
identified as well as newly-identified needs associated with current circumstances.
In South Africa, the 1941 Act to a great extent incorporated the Meredith principles 
into South African workers' compensatory law which is a no-fault based workers' 
compensation system.103 Compensation for occupational lung diseases in declared 
mines and works is compensated through a no-fault compensation system but the 
right to common law action was retained and acknowledged by the Constitutional 
Court in the Mankayi case.104 The consequences of the decision is the 
acknowledgement of the right to common law action against employers but it is 
limited to the specific occupational diseases covered in terms of ODIMWA and 
applicable only to declared mines and works; although COIDA compensates for the 
same occupational diseases but to employees working in all other workplaces.105 It 
ought to be noted that Mankayi was unsuccessful in his application in both the High 
Court and the Supreme Court of Appeal before the Constitutional Court changed the 
ruling in his favour but both the SCA and the Constitutional Court alluded to the 
"meagre" compensation paid pursuant to ODIMWA.106
Both in South Africa107 and Canada,108 the exclusion from common law access was 
constitutionally challenged in different cases and the exclusion in section 35 of 
COIDA was declared valid seen in the light of the purpose of the Act.109 Although the 
protection afforded to the class of employers in Canada was acknowledged by the 
Court in Budge as discriminatory in nature, the Court considered the protection of 
the statutory compensatory scheme as of more importance than the employees' 
right to common law redress.110 The Court reasoned that allowing access to 
common law for the widow would undermine the compensatory system.111 The
purpose includes the historic compromise but in Australia, although the general
102 Chapter 2 para 2.
103 Chapter 2 para 3.3.
104 Chapter 2 para 3.3; Chapter 6 para 2.2.3 [Mankayi).
105 Chapter 6 para 2.2.3.
106 Chapter 6 para 2.2.3.
107 Chapter 6 para 2.2.1 [Jooste); Chapter 6 para 2.2.2 [Mlomzale).
108 Chapter 6 paras 3.2 & 3.2.1 [Reference re).
109 Chapter 3 paras 3.1; 3.2 & 4.2; Chapter 6 paras 3.1 & 3.2.
110 Chapter 3 para 4.2.3 [Budge).
111 Chapter 6 para 3.2.1 [Reference re).
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rule is also the exclusion of the right to common law claims for damages, limited 
access to common law actions is allowed.112
Flowing from the historic need to remove compensation for occupational injuries 
and diseases from the adversarial court system, the common law has been amended 
by a quid pro quid system according to which employers are indemnified against 
delictual claims in exchange for participation in an insurance scheme administered 
by an independent body; and in exchange for a common law claim, workers 
received an administrative remedy intended at speedy compensation while relieved 
from the burden of proof required by court actions, often referred to as the historic 
trade-off principle.113
The law is settled that an employer owes his employees a common law and a 
statutory duty of care to take reasonable care for their health and safety flowing 
from the legal relationship between a master and his servant, which duty is limited 
by the standard of reasonableness.114 In recognising the need for redress in cases of 
negligent conduct on the part of the employer, COIDA uniquely provides for an 
additional claim in terms of section 56 in respect of increased compensation.115 The 
definition of an employer is broadened for the purposes of sections 35 and 56 to 
include inter alia persons in charge of a branch or department of the employer's 
business.116 Section 35 read together with section 56 abrogates the right to common 
law claims for damages by employees against their employers.117 The position of a 
child over the age of 18 years is not clear as he does not have a right to 
compensation and the text of the definition is vague and might need court 
interpretation or rephrasing in an amendment. However, it is submitted that if a 
person does not have a statutory right to compensation, he ought to have the 
avenue of civil law because he is not caught in the quid pro quid principle.
112 Chapter 2 para 5.3; Chapter 3 para 5.1 & Chapter 6 para 4.
113 Chapter 6.
114 Chapter 6.
115 Chapter 6 para 1.1.
116 Chapter 6 paras 2.1 & 2.5.1 (Looyen).
117 Chapter 6 para 2.1.
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Although COIDA has the unique option whereby employees may claim based on the 
negligence of the employer, it is hardly ever used by employees for various reasons, 
some of which include ignorance, inadequate proof of the employer's negligence 
and the complicated procedural process that mimics civil procedure in delictual 
claims for damages.118 Of the few claims duly lodged, more is abandoned than what 
is heard and of those heard a miniscule number succeeds due to the high burden of 
proof required from the employee.119 A similar burden of proof faces an employee 
in pursuit of a section 56 claim than a worker more than a century ago in common 
law as he needs to prove pure negligence on the employer’s part as any percentage 
of negligence on his own side will defeat his claim because no proportional 
apportionment of damages120 is possible due to the text of the Act that refers to the 
monetary payment as compensation and not as damages.121
Older doctrines of defences like the last opportunity rule are still applied to the 
detriment of employees' claims for increased compensation.122 It is submitted that 
COIDA be amended in this regard to allow for limited access to common law actions 
which will then render the Apportionment of Damages Act applicable. This will 
mean that the pure negligence rule will not defeat a claim in its totality or 
alternatively that section 56 be amended to have the Apportionment of Damages 
Act applicable to it. A further possible solution may include the inclusion of 
presumptive or deeming provisions to assist employees coupled with the removal 
of the words "due to" which has been held to mean "solely to"; and it is proposed 
that the example of Australia be followed irrespective whether the section is 
retained in COIDA or the right to common law reintroduced, the common law 
defences of employers ought to be removed.123
The bar against delictual claims remains in force irrespective of the fact that 
statutory compensation only compensates for pecuniary loss and not for general
118 Chapter 6 para 2.1 & 2.5.
119 Chapter 6 para 2.5.
120 Chapter 6 para 2.5.2 [Grace).
121 Chapter 6 para 2.5.
122 Chapter 6 para 2.5.3 [Young).
123 Chapter 6 para 4.1.
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damages like contumelia, loss of amenities, etc.124 and irrespective of specific 
circumstances surrounding the incident.125 The bar remains effective irrespective of 
how it is masked by a plaintiff,126 as the bar is rationally connected to the purpose of 
the workers' compensatory scheme.127 It is submitted that access to common law be 
allowed to enable employees to recover damages in excess of pecuniary loss.
An employer will, however, be exposed to civil action if he takes himself out of the 
protection by deliberate conduct like an assault on the employee for a non-work 
related reason as was held in Kau v Fourie.128 The protective immunity of the 
employer should not be extended to classes or categories of employers as it will 
lead to the unsatisfactory situation as in Canada whereby it was even extended to 
protect medical practitioners against professional liability.129 The case of Kovach130 
shows the importance of a purposive interpretation in the light of the historical 
development of a statute, because it was never the intention to protect an employer 
against mistakes he might make in professional conduct unrelated to the 
employment relationship. This case also demonstrates the consequence of 
extending collective contributions (assessments) to include collective liability in a 
spirit of "an injury to one is an injury to all."131 The notion of collective contributions 
should not force collective liability to such an extreme and it is submitted that the 
South African approach is preferable as it conforms to the purpose of the scheme 
and has not been and ought not to be broadened.
Claims against third parties are retained in all three of the countries,132 which will 
be ruled by the civil procedure rules applicable to delictual claims in South Africa 
inclusive of prescription and proportional reduction of damages due to contributory 
negligence on the part of the claimant.133
124 Chapter 3 para 3.1; Chapter 6 paras 2.2.1 (Jooste] & 2.2.2 (Mlomzale).
125 Chapter 6 para 2.3.1 (Van De Venter).
126 Chapter 6 paras 2.3.2 (Labuschagne); 3.2.2 (Pasiechnyk); 3.2.3 (Prentice) 8i 3.3.2 (OPSEU).
127 Chapter 6 paras 2.2.1 (Jooste) & 3.2.2 (Pasiechnyk).
128 Chapter 4 para 2.2.5 (Kau v Fourie) & Chapter 6 para 2.1.
129 Chapter 6 para 3.3.1 (Kovach).
130 Chapter 6 para 3.3.1 (Kovach).
131 Regarding the notion of collective liability see also; Chapter 6 para 3.3.4 (Decision No. 324000).
132 Chapter 6 paras 2.1; 3.1 & 4.1.
133 Chapter 6 para 2.4.
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In Australia a limited right to common law redress is allowed134 and the limitation is 
contained by threshold per centum impairment under the exclusive jurisdiction by 
the Compensation Authority which needs to issue a certificate135 to allow common 
law access. However, provision has also been made for courts to allow an action if 
the certificate is refused based on set limitations that are highly technical in nature. 
The limitations require an employee to prove that his injury qualifies the test as a 
"serious injury" taking into consideration factors such as consequences of 
seriousness nature inclusive of disfigurement, loss of bodily functions, mental or 
behavioural disturbances or disorders, pain and suffering and loss of earning 
capacity136 which have been described by the courts as vague.137 It is submitted that 
should South Africa follow the Australian example and allow limited access to 
common law actions, the limitations be stipulated in clear and unambiguous 
language and the example of Australia be followed of a staggered process which 
requires the issue of a certificate by the administrative body and if declined a right 
of appeal to the High Court with jurisdiction.
5. FRAGMENTATION
The South African compensatory system is characterised by fragmentation with the 
compensation system developed along two very distinctive lines with disparate and 
meagre compensation for lung diseases in mine workers and limited compensation 
for all other occupational diseases and occupational injuries ruled by a separate Act 
under different State departments with different enforcement structures.138
ODIMWA is the applicable statute regulating occupational lung diseases in mine 
workers and it developed from a scheme which does not reflect a true workers' 
compensatory scheme funded by only employer contributions in exchange for
134 Chapter 6 para 4; Chapter 6 para 4.3.1 (Ninkovic);
135 Chapter 6 para 4.1 & Chapter 6 para 4.3.1 (Ninkovic).
136 Chapter 6 paras 4.3.1 (Ninkovic); 4.3.2 (To Ha Lu); 4.3.3 (Haden Engineering Pty Ltd); 4.3.4 
(Guppy) & 4.3.5 (Parry).
137 Chapter 6 para 4.3.3 (Haden Engineering Pty Ltd).
138 Chapter 2 paras 3.3 & 3.5.
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immunity against common law liability which proves the landmark decision of the 
Constitutional Court in Mankayi as correct.139
The Mankayi ruling did not address the question of the constitutionality of the 
disparity in compensation between COIDA and OIDMWA. The question remains 
open as to unfair discrimination and if so, if it can be saved by the "reasonableness" 
thereof or section 36 of the Constitution. Dignity and equality are of particular 
importance for purposes of occupational injuries and diseases.140 It is submitted 
that the two acts need to be merged into one act, starting by placing both under the 
auspices of one State department and one administrative body with a process of 
equalisation of benefits. The deepened fragmentation between the two 
compensatory schemes by the Mankayi ruling, which allowed one group the right to 
common law actions which the other group is disallowed, will place a higher burden 
upon the Legislator to merge the two acts. As removal of the right to common law 
redress has only recently been acknowledged, removal of the right will create 
enormous dissatisfaction, confusion and probably litigation and it is submitted that 
the right rather be extended to all claimants inclusive of COIDA claimants albeit a 
limited right so as to preserve the purpose of the historic compromise.
The lack of inclusivity in COIDA is a major stumbling block in accessing benefits and 
in achieving social justice as it creates confusion amongst employees who are 
unaware of the two compensation systems and cannot always differentiate between 
the different bodies similarly named and with similar purposes (to compensate) but 
compensation is for different reasons (e.g. lung diseases in mine workers in terms of 
ODIMWA and all occupational diseases and injuries in terms of COIDA).141
Prevention of accidents is not addressed in the South African compensatory 
schemes, with the only factor dealing with it the assessments that may be adjusted 
to penalise an employer who does not provide a safe and healthy workplace 
irrespective of his common law and statutory duty to do so. Unless the
139 Chapter 2 para 3.3 & Chapter 6 para 2.2.3 (Mankayi rulings).
140 Chapter 2 para 3.5.
141 Chapter 2 para 3.4.
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fragmentation is addressed in this regard, it is doubtful that South African 
employees will be on par with their counterparts in Canada and Australia. 
Benjamin's argument that South Africa is lacking a coherent policy framework 
inclusive of strategically-incorporated prevention measures is supported.142
Multiplicity of compensatory and health and safety laws in Australia lead to a 
strategic framework according to which a gradual system of harmonisation is 
developed. A model bill has been provided and the different jurisdictions are 
adopting it on an individual basis in a process whereby it is adjusted in each 
jurisdiction to address the specific needs of that jurisdiction. COIDA lacks the 
provision for cross-border mobility of compensation benefits and the cross-border 
entitlements to the right of compensation, although it is an ILO standard.143 This has 
been addressed by Interjurisdictional agreements by Canada144 and Australia.145 It 
is submitted that South Africa ought to develop a comprehensive policy framework 
after consultation and negotiations with relevant role players to extend coverage 
and the portability of compensation to the countries of the SADC region. This will 
facilitate the movement of people across borders but simultaneously ensure the 
continued provision of social security benefits.146
Ultimately the workers' compensatory scheme is aimed at reducing hardship. As the 
Court concluded in Henry:
The Workers' Compensation Act is obviously remedial legislation designed to 
protect workers and their dependents from the hardship of economic loss 
sustained through injuries suffered by the worker in the course of his 
employment.
142 Chapter 2 para 3.5.
143 Chapter 5 paras 2.10 & 4.7.
144 Chapter 4 para 3.4 & Chapter 5 para 3.7.
145 Chapter 4 paras 2.4; 3.4 & 4.4 & Chapter 5 para 3.7.
146 Chapter 1 para 3 & Chapter 2 paras 3.4 & 3.5.
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